PROSE
Edited By
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**SYLLABUS**

**Prose**

Objectives:
- To introduce essay as a specific genre of literature and discuss its various aspects
- To improve students’ understanding of essay writing and its critical and analytical aspects
- To discuss the stylistic features of the essayists included in the syllabus

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Understand the important period’s of English Literature.
• Discuss the development of prose writing through the literary ages.

Introduction

This unit covers the period of discovery in the history of English literary prose. It begins with the latter half of the fourteenth century, when the writing of prose first assumed importance in the life of the English people, and it ends with the first quarter of the seventeenth century, when practice and experiment had made of English prose, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, a highly developed and efficient means of expression.

The origins of English prose come relatively late in the development of English literary experience. This apparently is true of most prose literatures, and the explanation seems to lie in the nature of prose. Even in its beginnings the art of prose is never an unconscious, never a genuinely primitive art. The origins of prose literature can consequently be examined without venturing far into those misty regions of theory and speculation, where the student of poetry must wander in the attempt to explain beginnings which certainly precede the age of historical documents, and perhaps of human record of any kind. Poetry may be the more ancient, the more divine art, but prose lies nearer to us and is more practical and human.

Being human, prose bears upon it, and early prose especially, some of the marks of human imperfection. Poetry of primitive origins, for example the ballad, often attains a finality of form which art cannot better, but not so with prose. Perhaps the explanation of this may be that poetry is concerned primarily with the emotions, and the emotions are among the original and perfect gifts of mankind, ever the same; whereas prose is concerned with the reasonable powers of man’s nature, which have been and are being only slowly won by painful conquest. Whether this be a
right explanation or not, it is certainly true that in its first efforts English prose is uncertain and faltering, that it often engages our sympathies more by what it attempts to do than by what it actually accomplishes.

The study of the origins of English prose is consequently concerned not only with the growth of the English mind, but, in the broadest sense, with the development of the English language. Since literary prose is very largely the speech of every-day discourse applied to special purposes, it is in a way true that the origins of English prose are to be sought in the origins of English speech. No student of the speech would be content to pause short of the earliest English records in the four centuries which preceded the Norman Conquest. From the days of the first Teutonic conquerors of Celtic Britain, the English speech has continued in an un-broken oral tradition to the present time. But obviously English literary prose in its various stages has not been merely the written form, the echo, of this colloquial speech.

The bonds which unite the two are close, but their courses are not parallel. English literary prose has had no such continuous history as the language, and there are sufficient reasons for regarding the prose of Alfred and his few contemporaries and successors as a chapter in the life of the English people which begins and ends with itself. For its antiquity and for its importance in preserving so abundantly the early records of the language, Old English prose is to be respected; but it was never highly developed as an art, nor was its vitality great enough to withstand the shock of the several conquests which brought about a general confusion of English ideals and traditions in the tenth and eleventh centuries. It is consequently in no sense the source from which modern English prose has sprung. It has a separate story, and when writers of the early modern period again turned to prose, they did so in utter disregard and ignorance of the fact that Alfred and Elfric had preceded them by several centuries in the use of English for purposes of prose expression. Nor did the later writers unwittingly benefit by the inheritance of a previous discipline of the language in the writing of prose. In the general political and social cataclysm of the eleventh century, the literary speech of the Old English period went down forever, leaving for succeeding generations nothing but the popular speech upon which to build anew the foundations of a literary culture.

After the Conquest came the slow process of establishing social order. Laws must first be formulated, Normans, Scandinavians, and Saxons must learn to live in harmony with one another, above all must learn to communicate with one another in a commonly accepted speech, before literature could again lift its head. During all this period of the making of the new England, verse remained the standard form for literary expression. Such prose as was written was mainly of a documentary character, wills, deeds of transfer and gift, rules for the government of religious houses, and similar writings of limited appeal. In the lack of a standard vernacular idiom, more serious efforts, such as histories and theological treatises, were composed in Latin, and to a less extent, in French. It was not until towards the middle of the fourteenth century that the various elements of English life were fused into what came to be felt more and more as a national unity. A wave of popular patriotism swept over the country at this time, clearing away the encumbering foreign traditions by which the English had permitted themselves to become burdened. This new national feeling showed itself in various ways, in a renewed interest in English history, in the special respect now shown to English saints, and above all in the rejection of French and in the cultivation of the English language as the proper expression of the English people. At the same time men of riper and broader culture made their appearance in the intellectual life of the people. An age which produced three such personalities as those of Chaucer, Langland, and Wiclif cannot be regarded as anticipatory and uncertain of itself. Economic conditions also forced upon the humbler classes of people the necessity of thinking for themselves and of setting forth and defending their interests. In the larger world of international affairs the dissensions and corruptions of the church, culminating in the great schism of the last quarter of the century, compelled account to be taken of that whole
order of theocratic government which the medieval world had hitherto accepted almost without question.

In this combination of circumstances, one man stands out pre-eminently in England as realizing the drift of events and the kind of action needed to regulate them. This man was Wiclif, a scholar and theologian, but not merely a man of the study or the lecturer's chair. Wiclif's practical wisdom is particularly apparent in his deliberate choice of the English language as a means of exposition and persuasion. If English prose must have a father, no one is so worthy of this title of respect as Wiclif. Not a great master of prose style himself, Wiclif was the first Englishman clearly to realize the broad principles which underlie prose expression. He made a sharp distinction between prose and verse, and he foresaw, at least, the ends to be attained by a skillful use of the mechanism of daily colloquial speech for broader and less ephemeral purposes than those to which it had hitherto been applied. In a word, Wiclif was the first intelligent writer of English prose, a discoverer in the truest sense of the word. With him begins the long and unbroken line of English writers who have striven to use the English tongue as a means of conveying their message as directly and as forcibly as possible to their hearers and readers. The spirit of Wiclif is the spirit of Sir Thomas More, of Tindale, of Hooker, of Milton, of Burke, of Carlyle, of all the great masters of expositional and hortatory prose in the English language. Technical details have changed, exterior ornaments have varied, but the fundamental purpose and method have remained the same. With Wiclif and his period, therefore, we begin our study of the rise of English literary prose.

The later limits of the present undertaking have not so easily determined themselves. It would have been interesting to carry the discussion down to the masters of prose in the seventeenth century, to Milton, Clarendon, Jeremy Taylor, Burton, Dryden, for they are indeed the fruit of the sixteenth-century flower. But the close of the sixteenth century and the opening of the seventeenth century mark the end of the great originating period in the development of English prose. The tentative beginnings of Wiclifite prose are by that time fully realized in models of the plain style not surpassed by any later writers. The literary and more narrowly artistic interests have entered, and experiment in this direction has been carried almost to the extreme limits of the possibilities of the language. Scarcely any side of human activity remains unexpressed in English prose at the end of the reign of Elizabeth, and though it by no means follows that the prose of later times is less admirable, it is nevertheless different from the prose of this first fresh and tremendously energetic age of invention and experimentation.

Since that is the subject of the whole volume, it manifestly falls outside the province of these prefatory remarks to discuss the various processes and developments of this first formative period of English prose. It may be worth while to put down, however, as a kind of preliminary scaffolding, the opinions of one of the greatest of the early moderns, of one who from the vantage-ground of the end of a long life, cast his eye backward and formulated what seemed to him the prime moving causes and tendencies of writing in his day. Starting with the discussion of the origins of the fantastic or ornate literary style in Europe, Bacon continues with an analysis which, whether true for the whole European awakening or not, certainly applies in a peculiar degree to England, where the Renascence was from the first so largely a religious and theological movement:

"Martin Luther, conducted (no doubt) by an higher Providence, but in discourse of reason finding what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the church, and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his succors to make a part against the present time, so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This by con-sequence did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages original wherein those authors did write, for the better understanding of those authors and the better advantage of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew again a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration
of that kind of writing; which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those (primitive but seeming new) opinions had against the schoolmen; who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings were altogether in a differing style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express their own sense and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may call it) lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again, because the great labor then was with the people, (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say, Execrabilis ista turba, qua non novit legem,) [the wretched crowd that has not known the law.] for the winning and persuading of them, there grew of necessity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort. So that these four causes concurring, the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more after words than matter; and more after the choicenes of the phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the orator and Hermo-genes the rhetorician, besides his own books of periods and imitation and the like. Then did Car of Cambridge, and Ascham, with their lectures and writings, almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo: Decem annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone, [I have spent ten years in reading Cicero :] and the echo answered in Greek, one, Asine. Then grew the learning of the school-men to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole inclination and bent of those times was rather toward copie than weight.”

Bacon closes his survey with the generation which immediately preceded his own. The detachment with which he viewed the refinements of the artificial writers shows that he at least had accepted different standards and ideals of writing. To complete the sketch, it would be necessary to add certain developments of English prose in the direction of order and moderation of which Bacon’s own writings are signally illustrative. And it is with these developments that the survey undertaken in the following pages will come to an appropriate conclusion.

The limits of the present undertaking imply certain exclusions. This unit is neither a bibliographical nor a biographical history of English literary prose, nor is it a dictionary of reference to all prose monuments for the period it covers. No attempt has been made to give a critical survey of the paper wars that have centered about debated points, though it will be found, it is hoped, that the references given supply the clew to all the rest. Thus the earlier bibliography of Euphuism may be derived from the studies mentioned in the text or notes. Biographical details are included only when they seemed useful for the better understanding of such writings as are discussed, and titles are mentioned only for the purpose of indicating with certainty the sources of the various passages cited or quoted in the text. Passages within double quotation marks are quoted exactly—except that, for the sake of consistency, the modern custom in the use of u and v has been followed. Passages within single marks are the author’s literal modernizations. The temptation to quote more frequently and at greater length has been strong, but a single volume of reasonable size cannot be both history and anthology. Quotation can never take the place of the reading of texts, and fortunately, for those who have not access to large libraries and for students in college classes, several collections of illustrative extracts are available.

The author has assumed the liberty of saying nothing about works and about writers that, to his mind, required no mention. It might be a satisfaction to put down all the results of one’s investigations, if one could only be sure in so doing that the reader’s share in this pleasure would
be as great as the author’s. But it would be unkind for the literary critic or historian to attempt to rescue insignificant names from the “poke of oblivion” where time in its mercy has permitted them to rest in peace. In such names the sixteenth century was as rich as any other, though mere antiquity does often seem to lend a specious importance to writings otherwise not important. But the author has endeavored to choose his materials always with an eye to the main point, which has been to trace the growth of a temper and attitude of mind towards the use of speech, to show the development of taste and feeling for prose expression by directing attention to those writings which reveal some skill and originating power in the practice of the art of prose composition.

1.1 Periods of English Literature—An Overview

Historians normally divide English literature into periods for convenience of discussion. Sometimes the numbers, dates or the names of the periods seem to vary.

The four and a half century between the Norman Conquest in 1600, which became the cause for radical changes in the language, life and culture of England, and about 1500, when the standard literary language has become “modern English” that is similar to the language of ours. The period from 1100 to 1350 is sometimes called the Anglo-Norman Period because the non-Latin literature of the era was written in Anglo-Norman. Among the important works of the period were Marie de France’s “Lais” and Jean de Meun’s “Roman de La Rose”. When the native vernacular - descended from Anglo-Saxon period.

The native vernacular descended from Anglo-Saxon with widespread syntactic and lexical elements assimilated from Anglo-Norman which was later called “Middle English” came into literary application. Therefore, it became primarily the medium of homiletic and religious writings.

The 15th century was known by what was called “Scottish Chaucerians”. It was important more for popular literature than the artful sorts of literature normally addressed to the upper class. It was the age of excellent songs, secular and folk ballads.

The second half of the 14th century produced secular kind of literature along with native English literature. This was the age of Chaucer and John Gower which gave great kind of religious and satirical poems like “Piers Plowman”. There was the most famous prose romance written by Thomas Malory called “Morte d’ Arthur”.

The Renaissance Period (1500-1600)

Many historians consider this age an “early modern” age. It refers to a rebirth commonly applied to the period of European history following the Middle Ages. During this period the European arts of sculpture, painting and literature reached a peak. The development came late to England in the 16th century which didn’t have its flowering until the emergence of Elizabethan or Jacobean period. In fact sometimes, John Milton (1608-74) is considered as the last greatest renaissance poet.

Elizabethan Age (1558-1603)

Elizabethan Age is often used to describe the late 16th and early 17th centuries even after the death of Elizabeth. This was the time of swift expansion in English commerce and the development of nationalist feeling - the time of the defeat of Spanish Armada in 1588. It is considered as a great age English literature - the greatest in the field of drama. You can call it the age of Sir Phillip Sidney, Christopher Marlow, Edmund Spencer, Francis Bacon, Ben Jonson, shakespeare and other excellent writers of prose and dramatic, lyrical and narrative poetry. Many scholars have considered this age as one of intellectual coherence and social order.
Elizabethan Lyrics - Greatest Lyrical Poetry of the Time

If we talk about lyrical poetry, the temper of the Elizabethan age was perfectly suited to the lyrical mood. For that reason, there was the emergence of the lyrics in abundance. The lyrical expressions came on the surface with the efforts of Wyatt and Surrey, the prominent poets of the time. This lyrical spirit sustained through the dramas of the age. Furthermore, this spirit got foothold in the several miscellanies of the time. Afterward, this lyrical impulse was seen into the melodies of Campion and the darker moods of metaphysical poetry and poets like Donne.

In the history of the English literature, the Elizabethan period occupies a grater place because in this period lyrical forms were properly shaped. Songs were sung in parlors and halls. They were composed around the themes such as love songs and religious songs. It was the age of singing birds in right sense of the term. They were composed in every mod for example mocking, grave, cynical and sentimental. The form of lyrical poetry is effortless to read and enjoy.

Jacobean Age (1603-1625)

Jacobean Age covers the reign of James I (often called “Jacobus” in Latin). This was the period when the prose writings of Bacon, John Donne’s sermons, Robert Burton’s “Anatomy of Melancholy”, king James translation of the Bible, major writings of poets and playwrights including Ben Johnson, Michael Drayton, Beaumont, Fletcher, John Webster, George Chapman developed. Elizabeth Cary was the first English woman whose biblical drama “The Tragedy of Marium, the Faire Queen of Jewry” was published at that time.

Caroline Age (1625-1649)

Caroline Age - the reign of Charles I (called “Carolus” in Latin). It was the time of English Civil War between the supporters of the King and supporters of the parliament. More interestingly John Milton began his writing during this period. It was the age of the religious poet George Herbert and of the prose writers like Robert Burton and Thomas Browne. The poets of this period were called Cavalier Poets. There were the writers of witty and of polished lyrics of courtship and gallantry. This was the group of Richard Lovelace, Sir John Suckling and Thomas Carew.

Commonwealth Period (1649-1660)

Commonwealth Period extended from the end of the Civil War and the excursion Charles I in 1649 to the restoration of the Stuart monarchy under Charles II in 1600. Dramas disappeared for almost eighteen years after the puritans closed the public theaters in September 1642, not only on moral and religious grounds, but also to prevent public gatherings and assemblies that might create civil disorder. It was the age of Milton’s political pamphlets, of Hobbes’s political treatise Leviathan (1651) of the prose writers like Sir Thomas Browne, Abraham Cowley and Andrew Marwell.

The Neo-classical Period (1600-1785)

The Neo-classical Period in England covers almost 140 years after the Restoration (1660). The authors such as John Dryden, Alexander Pope, Joseph Addition, Jonathan Swift, Oliver Gold Smith, Samuel Johnson, Edmund Burke contributed to neoclassic literature.

The literature of this period was considered to be an “art” that is a set of skills which ought be perfected by practice. Neoclassical writers considered human beings as limited agents who ought to set themselves only accessible goals. Many of the great writings of the period was satirical, didactic and was often direct attack on human “pride”

Restoration Period (1660-1700)

Restoration Period takes its name from the restoration of the Stuart line (Charles II) to the English throne in 1600, at the end of Commonwealth. The urbanity, wit and licentiousness of the life focusing on the court is reflected in the literature of this period. The theaters came back to life after
the revocation of the ban placed them by the Puritans in 1642. Sir George Etherege, William Wycherley, William Congreve and John Dryden developed the distinctive comedy of manners called “Restoration Comedy”. Dryden was the major poet and critic as well as one of the major dramatists of the time.

The Development of Prose Style

English writers of the sixteenth century were self-consciously puzzled about the state of their language. They knew that it had changed markedly in the past two centuries, but they were not sure whether too rapid a change was good. They were aware also that its vocabulary was being influenced by other modern languages, especially French and Italian. They wondered whether it should be more like Latin, the international language of learning, or whether it should be true to its own native genius.

The spread of printing meant that people who were not learned (who did not know Latin) could afford English books and would therefore read, as they had not done before. Notable defenses of the vernacular tongues of Italian and French had been published; some Englishmen felt that an equally valid defense of English could be made. As early as 1543 a translator, Peter Betham, proclaimed that he thought translators ought to use the usual terms of our English tongue, not borrowing terms from other languages, because, as he said, continual borrowing without repayment would make the language, as it would make a man, bankrupt. Furthermore, he deplored what he called “inkhorn” terms, learned words derived from Latin or invented by authors—words so obscure that he thought the ordinary Englishman would not be able to understand them. To be sure, he admitted, a few words of foreign origin must be allowed, since languages are clearly interlaced with each other, but the good writer of English is the one who follows Chaucer and other old writers, keeping English in its native tradition. The most notable theorist of language reform in the middle of the century was the famous classical scholar, Sir John Cheke, Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge. His theory of phonetic spelling is demonstrated in his letter to the translator Sir Thomas Hoby. The most important translations of the sixteenth century were the renderings of the Bible into the vernaculars. In England William Tyndale began his translation in 1523; he had to do it surreptitiously and outside the country; he finally suffered martyrdom for his efforts. In 1530 a royal proclamation condemned Tyndale’s translation and all other versions in the vulgar tongue. Then in 1535 Miles Coverdale published, in Zurich, the first complete Bible in English. By this time the official attitude was changing, and in 1540 the so-called Great Bible was published, the first English Bible issued with official sanction—evidence of the extent of the breach between the English church and the Church of Rome.

1.2 Prose in the Fourteenth Century

The second half of the fourteenth century in England was a period rich both in realization and in anticipation. At such happy times, not one but many kinds of thought and action occupy men’s attention. The pageant of chivalry was then still being displayed upon the stage of the great world, and was finding in Froissart a worthy chronicler. Crecy and Poitiers were living memories of young men when Edward III died. Though the changes abroad were many, at home English laws and government were rapidly assuming forms which were to be permanent. The place of the commons in the control of affairs was becoming more clearly defined, and the nation at large was entering upon a new era of patriotism and national self-consciousness. Architecture, especially domestic architecture, flourished, and the comforts and luxuries of life were increasing. Gower, Chaucer, Langland, and the unknown author of The Pearl and other remarkable poems, were lending luster to the newly-prized English language. In the humbler walks of life, the voice of the people was making itself heard, and the last remnants of medieval serfdom were disappearing as new conceptions of personal liberty came into being. Wiclif and his followers were spreading
doctrines of almost incalculable importance for the future growth of the English nation. And not least in importance among these shadowings of the future, English prose was coming to be applied to English thought in ways more effective and intimate than had ever before been necessary or possible.

By the middle of the fourteenth century, the various Scandinavian and Romance additions which had enriched at the same time that they had disintegrated the old England, built up by the successive kings of the West Saxons from the time of Egbert, had united with the English base to form a new nation. During the time of disturbance the English speech had passed through a period of popular degradation. It had lost literary caste, but now, under the influence of a new national feeling and a renascence of culture, it had recovered all that had been lost and was gaining more. By the assimilation of a host of Romance words, it had acquired possibilities of expression beyond the reach of the language of the Old English period. The English were no longer an isolated people. Their intellectual life was more vigorous and more varied, and their social life was more gracious, than either had been in the most flourishing days before the Conquest. The English writer of the later fourteenth century had a richer body of thought and sentiment to express than his Anglo-Saxon ancestor, and he had a more effective medium in the language of his day to serve the purposes of expression. The Anglo-Saxon poets had seldom passed beyond the simple themes of war and religion; and the prose of Alfred, of Wulfstan, of Ælfric, was limited almost entirely to the second of these themes. Religion and theology remain, indeed, the principal concern of prose even into the sixteenth century, but with a very great difference. Scarcely a trace of popular insurgence is to be found in English writing before the days of Wiclif. The newest, the most disturbing, and for the history of English prose, the most important element in the life of England in the fourteenth century was just this awakening of the underworld of the people. Men now first began to realize that their political and spiritual salvation lay not in the hands of overlords and ecclesiastics, but in their own. New impulses within demanded new modes of external expression. Literature could not continue to be merely artistic and courtly, learning could not expend itself entirely in theological exegesis or the formulation of dogma. The pallid legends and the summary repetitions of officially approved information and doctrine which constitute so large a part of medieval writing in the vernacular began now to disappear and their place to be taken by a fresher literature, addressed not merely to the memory, but directly to the reason and the hearts of mankind.

1.3 Chaucer’s Prose

It was only gradually, however, that English writers acquired the courage to use prose. Long custom had established verse as the only accredited form of literary expression. From the point of view of literary art, the two most significant writers of the latter half of the fourteenth century were Chaucer, courtly, polished, and reasonable, and Langland, something of a mystic and enthusiast, a fellow-sufferer with the people, whose hard life he so intimately describes, and certainly less an artist than his greater contemporary. Chaucer’s prevailing interest being in men and manners, one might suppose that prose would have been for him a more appropriate form of expression than verse. And in truth, we may suppose that the use of metrical form by Chaucer was largely an accident of time. He wrote in verse because the literary conventions of his time imposed the metrical form upon all writing of artistic pretension. Perhaps it was fortunate for Chaucer that he accepted these conventions. In his day and hour it was easier to realize the ideals of simplicity, clarity, and control which his verse exhibits by following the conventional custom of metrical composition than it would have been if he had chosen to experiment in prose. But Chaucer was not temperamentally an experimenter or innovator. He followed clearly defined paths of literary tradition, changing and improving greatly in detail, but seldom departing widely from the practice of his predecessors and masters. He seems to have felt no impulse, therefore, to invent prose for English literature, to become an English Boccaccio.
Chaucer did not neglect altogether the writing of prose, although by universal consent his prose writings are regarded as the least interesting of all his works. They are four in number, and all of considerable length. The only one which can be dated certainly is the latest, the *Treatise on the Astrolabe*, written in 1391. The others were written probably within the decade preceding this year, and it is interesting to note, therefore, that Chaucer’s prose works were produced at about the same time that Wiclif began to write in English. Of these four prose efforts of Chaucer, the most important is his translation of the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius, made probably in entire ignorance of the fact that it had already been translated into English by King Alfred almost five hundred years before. The *De Consolatione* is mentioned in the *Romance of the Rose* as “Boece,” and the original author of this section of the famous allegory, Jean de Meun, declares that he would confer a great benefit on the unlearned folk who should translate this work for them. It is not unlikely that Chaucer found in this statement of the much admired French poet the suggestion which led him to undertake his translation into English.

The original work of Boethius is divided into five books, and each book is sub-divided into alternating metrical and prose sections, commonly known as Metres and Proses, all of which, however, Chaucer translated into prose. In general Chaucer’s translation attempted to give the content of the original, but it is by no means a literal translation, such not being the custom of Chaucer’s day. Neither is it altogether a true translation, for Chaucer’s scholarship was not always sufficient to save him from blunders. An instructive comparison may be made between Chaucer’s prose version of Boethius and those passages of the same work which he versified in *Troilus* and *Cressida* and in *The Former Age*. Such a comparison will show that the metrical versions are decidedly more idiomatic and natural than the prose—another proof, if any were needed, that Chaucer had mastered more completely the discipline of verse than that of prose.

The main defects of the translation are crudity and awkwardness, even at times obscurity, of expression, due to imperfect adaptation of the thought to the English idiom. Chaucer’s difficulties arose from the embarrassment caused by the necessity of striking a balance between a Latin and an English phrasing. In general the translations of the Proses are more idiomatic and less complicated than the translations of the Metres, obviously due to the fact that the Metres are more compact and involved in expression in the original. Chaucer wisely made little effort to introduce specifically English ornaments of style. Rimming passages occur occasionally, but they are not frequent or long enough to disturb the prose intention. Alliteration is used, sometimes rather markedly, as in the phrase “fortroden under the feet of felonous folk,” but is never carried through long passages. The only notable mannerism of style is the omission of the definite article where the English idiom requires it. This is an obvious Latinism, found not only in Chaucer but in Wiclif and many other writers of this time who wrote English under the influence of Latin.

Two of Chaucer’s prose writings were distinguished by inclusion within the framework of the Canterbury Tales. One of these is Chaucer’s own contribution to the entertainment of the pilgrims, the *Tale of Melibeus*, narrated by Chaucer after he has been ‘stinted’ of his *Tale of Sir Thopas* by the disgusted Host. The other is the *Parson’s Tale*, a long and weary treatise on the vices and virtues which serves as the pious ending to the whole series of the Canterbury Tales. It is not certain that Chaucer wrote either of these tales, granting them this title by courtesy, for the express purpose of including them in the Canterbury group. Quite possibly they were early works written when he was more deeply interested in the composition of pious prayers and other works of devotion than he was later, which were thriftily turned to account in the elaboration of the plan of the Canterbury Tales. The two prose tales have very little dramatic appropriateness. One does not expect a conventional medieval sermon on the vices and virtues from the parson, the brother of the ploughman, who is described in the Prolog in terms that suggest Wiclif’s poor priests. Here was Chaucer’s opportunity to give that picture of actual popular movements in his day which we miss so much in his writings and which, without question, he consciously avoided giving.
other prose tale, the Tale of Melibeus, is equally inappropriate to Chaucer, who tells it. Chaucer apparently assigned this tale to himself in a moment of ironic humor. At the same time it must be kept in mind that the modern reader’s impatience with these two tales is likely to be much greater than was that of Chaucer’s contemporaries. In the fourteenth century both the materials and the method of them were familiar and approved, and many of Chaucer’s readers doubtless received them as highly respectable and meritorious performances.

Both of these prose tales are really translations. The Tale of Melibeus is a translation of a French treatise, Le Livre de Melibe et de dame Prudence, probably made by Jean de Meun, on the basis of a Latin work, Liber Consolationis et Consilii, by Albertano of Brescia. The Tale is not much more than a bundle of quotations of a generally moral and sententious character, bound together by a simple thread of allegorical narrative. Melibeus is a rich man of the world who finds himself ill-treated by his enemies and who is elaborately counseled by his wife, Dame Prudence, on such topics as the choice of friends and advisers, on avenging wrongs, on the use of riches. The characters are not realistically conceived, and the wife of Melibeus is the source of all wisdom in the story because Prudentia, Justitia, Philosophia, and the other virtues were traditionally allegorized as feminine. The Tale has some resemblance to the type of didactic romance made popular in the sixteenth century by Guevara’s Dial of Princes, the quotations being derived not merely from scriptural and patristic sources, but many of them from classical and post-classical literature. But the romantic and narrative interests of the Tale are held severely in hand and the main purpose of the story was to serve as a container for numerous aphoristic and sententious quotations. From the point of view of Chaucer as a writer of prose, the chief interest of the Tale lies in the fact that it is freely and idiomatically written, and that it thus shows how much easier Chaucer found it to translate from French than from Latin.

The other of Chaucer’s two pious tales is not unlike the Tale of Melibeus. It likewise is obviously a translation, but the immediate source is not known. Whatever this immediate source may have been, it was almost certainly written in French and was closely followed by Chaucer in his translation. Like the Tale of Melibeus, the Parson’s Tale is idiomatically expressed in a simple, straightforward, and unmannered style. Like the Melibeus in another respect, it is quite without personal or dramatic coloring in the body of text, although occasionally, as in the satirical passages on extravagance in dress, the conventional themes of medieval sermonizing are treated with some vivacity. But the main personal interest of the Tale lies in the fact that it is followed by the well-known retractions of Chaucer, in which he revokes his “Endytinges of worldly vanitees,” and calls attention to his “othere bokes of Legendes of seintes and omelies and moralitee and devocioun.”

Both the Melibeus and the Parson’s Tale come safely under the head of medieval works of devotion, and it is quite probable that a good many similar pious writings of Chaucer have been lost. If so, some of them were pretty certainly written in prose, for in this kind of writing, prose had established for itself an unquestioned position.

Chaucer’s remaining English prose work is a kind of medieval text-book, written for his little son Louis, who was at the time of the “tendre age of ten yeer” and who had shown evidences of ability to “lerne sciencez touchinge noumbres and proporciouns.” This Treatise on the Astrolabe, like Chaucer’s other prose writings, is merely a translation, or adaptation, the original in this case being a Latin version of a text in Arabic. Chaucer has omitted parts of his Latin source and has rearranged the materials to suit himself, but his translation of the Latin is often literal. Although the exigencies of the subject-matter compelled him to use a good many Latinized technical words, the style on the whole, thanks perhaps to Chaucer’s efforts to adapt it to a child of ten, is simple and much more idiomatic than the style of the translation from Boethius. The work was popular in Chaucer’s day, as is shown by the unusual number of twenty-two early manuscripts still extant in various libraries.
More interesting, however, to the student of Chaucer's prose than the body of this translation is an original preface by Chaucer, which is addressed to his little son Louis, and which, short as it is, constitutes the longest piece of original prose we have from Chaucer's hand. Chaucer declares it to be his purpose to set forth his treatise under "ful lighte rewles and naked wordes in English; for Latin ne canstow yit but smal, my lyte sone." He continues with a more general address to his readers in which he asks them to excuse his "rewde endyting" and his "superfluite of wordes," the first because "curious endyting and hard sentence is ful hevy atones for swich a child to lerne," and the second because it seems to him better "to wryten unto a child twyes a good sentence than he forgete it ones." In conclusion Chaucer points out that he makes no claim to the original authorship of his book, but confesses that he is merely "a lewd compilatour of the labour of olde Astrologiens," whose work he has translated: "And with this swerd shal I sleen envye." The whole passage is instructive as showing that the quaint simplicity and humor which constitute the main charm of his verse writings were not impossible to Chaucer in prose. Had he chosen to do so, Chaucer might have written prose tales for some of his Canterbury pilgrims, the Shipman or the Miller for example, which would have been more than deserving of a place in that series. But prose in Chaucer's mind must have seemed entirely inappropriate for writing of an entertaining or artistic character, and he therefore uses it only for practical and pious purposes. Chaucer's attitude towards prose was generally the attitude of his contemporaries. The first English prose was written under the hard necessity of instructing and edifying men, not of pleasing them, as Chaucer was mainly endeavoring to do. The art of prose begins with the effort to adapt language to useful ends, to find some means of communication whereby men may inform or persuade each other in the thousand and one complications of everyday life. Chaucer's perfunctory use of prose shows on the one hand how little interested he was in the complexities of the life of his day from the point of view of direct exposition or of persuasion, and it shows on the other hand how little impressed he was with the possibilities of prose as an art of fine writing. Limited though this attitude towards prose may seem to the modern student, it was natural in Chaucer's day and represents undoubtedly the best literary feeling of his time. For the development of the technic of English writing in verse, Chaucer is important; for the development of the technic of English prose, he is almost negligible.

1.4 Langland and Maundevile

By the side of Chaucer stands his greatest literary contemporary, Langland. Thanks to his connections with the court and with the higher official life of his time, public records have preserved a considerable body of information with respect to Chaucer. All that is known of Langland, on the other hand, is derived from the various manuscripts of his writings, and the information thus obtained is meager and often uncertain. It is fairly sure that the author of Piers Plowman was of Midland origin, that he lived for some time in London, that he was married and therefore not eligible to any of the higher offices of the church, that he himself had known the miseries of poverty which he so feelingly describes, and that his Christian name was William. The exact form of his surname is doubtful, but tradition has firmly established Langland in general use. The poem which passes under Langland's name is not a single, systematically organized work, but rather a group of closely related poems centering more or less about the figure of the Plowman. It is recorded in three quite distinct versions, the earliest composed about 1362, the second a revision and enlargement of this version made some fifteen years later, and the third a second revision probably made in the last decade of the fourteenth century. Certain interesting questions of technical scholarship have been raised by the existence of these three versions, the most important being whether the three versions are to be regarded as the work of a single poet or of two or more poets who revised and expanded the original theme as it was first developed by Langland. It is quite certain that Piers Plowman came to be in time a type figure about whom there gathered a
considerable number of writings of generally similar style and purpose. He became thus in a way the eponymous hero of popular political and theological discussion of the times. But that the three versions of the poem known as *Piers Plowman* were the work of a school of popular alliterative poets, writing perhaps under the direct inspiration of Langland very much as Wiclif’s poor priests preached and taught under the leadership of their master, though not inherently impossible, seems on the ground of the evidence less probable than that Langland himself revised and enlarged his own work. Whether the poem be regarded as the work of one or of several authors, however, the significant point is that the three versions exemplify a homogeneous and fully thought out method of literary expression.

Both the similarities and the differences of *Piers Plowman* as compared with the writings of Chaucer are significant. Like Chaucer, Langland accepted verse unquestioningly as the proper medium of literary expression and for general, popular appeal. He viewed life at a different angle from the courtly Chaucer, but he also in his degree was a literary artist, and in his art, the child of his own generation. Both poets used the standard literary speech of their day, for Chaucer’s style was not pedantically learned, nor was Langland’s extravagantly archaic or popular. The most striking characteristic of Langland which distinguishes him from Chaucer, the characteristic also which connects him directly with the study of the origins of English prose, is his use of metrical form. Chaucer wrote in the strictly regulated meter of numbered syllables and of rime which English borrowed from French and which the traditions of English poetry have established as the prevailing English meter. But Langland followed a different and native style of metrical composition, moribund but temporarily revived in his day and effectively employed by a number of different poets. This was the alliterative long line which came by direct descent from the Old English line of *Caedmon* and *Cynewulf*. It differs from the Old English line, however, in that the latter, in standard Old English poetry, is maintained more rigorously and in accordance with the rules of a more narrowly defined metrical system than in Langland’s long line. With the later poet, we observe clearly the operation of that breaking down tendency which led ultimately to a complete loss of feeling for the alliterative long line as in any way a metrical form distinguished from prose. Even in the latter part of the Old English period, the pure tradition of Old English versification was not maintained, and *Ælfric*, in many respects possessed of a fine literary feeling, was guilty of a kind of prose poetry compounded of legitimate prose and degenerate Old English verse. With the obscuring and loss of native customs in general which attended the Danish and Norman conquests, the strict system of Old English meter disappeared, never again to be restored in the practice of English poetry. At no time, however, did the composition of alliterative English verse cease altogether. Side by side with the regular meter of Romance origin, which took upon itself the character of the standard literary meter, a corrupted form of the older alliterative long line continued to be used, especially as the meter appropriate to popular and patriotic writing. This popular alliterative meter was cultivated, at least in one or two regions of England, with special enthusiasm in Langland’s own day, as evidenced not only by Langland’s preference for it, but also by the writings of his contemporary, the unknown but highly accomplished author of *Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight* and other poems.

Structurally the old alliterative long line consisted of two approximately equal half-lines, each with its own independent scansion, which were held together as one line by the possession of a common alliterating sound. Each half-line contained two metrically stressed syllables, sometimes also a third secondarily stressed syllable, and a varying but on the whole rather narrowly limited number of unstressed syllables, the two kinds of syllables being arranged according to a small number of fixed patterns. The alliterating sounds were always the initial sounds of metrically stressed syllables, which at the same time must also bear a logical stress, and each half-line contained at least one, though either or both might contain two. Alliteration other than that between metrically stressed syllables did not count in the metrical scheme, and where it occurs is
to be regarded as accidental. It was a fixed rule in this strict system of scansion that the first
metrically stressed syllable of the second half-line must bear the alliteration and thus serve as a
kind of key-word to the alliterative scheme of the line as a whole.

Many lines will be found in Langland which satisfy the demands of the strict system of Old
English alliterative verse. The following, for example, are as regular as any written in the Old
English period:

“And also Job the gentel what Joye hadde he on erthe,
How bittere he hit bouhte as the book telleth!”

Such lines are not uncommon in the poem, but the poet usually preserves the general rhythm of
the style without paying much attention to the strict rules of Old English scansion. Sometimes the
alliteration is altogether lacking, sometimes it falls on words so lightly stressed that they fail to
take their place in the metrical structure of the line. Frequently the two half-lines contain separate
and independent alliterating sounds. Many half-lines are found which can be read only with three
and sometimes more heavy stresses, and the unstressed syllables are frequently so numerous and
so disposed as to destroy altogether the feeling for the few type patterns of scansion characteristic
of regular alliterative verse. The result of these various irregularities is to produce a line which
often is without strict metrical structure, and when several of these lines come together the effect
is not distinguishable from prose with a sprinkling of alliteration. It is true that the swing of the
lines in *Piers Plowman* usually carries the reader over these unmetrical passages without a violent
sense of interruption. But it is apparent that in the hands of a more careless versifier than Langland
the meter would suffer still more and the distinction between prose and verse become completely
effaced. As it is, often a slightly unusual order of words is all that distinguishes Langland’s verse
rhythm from prose rhythm.

The free alliterative line, as treated by Langland, is admirably suited to his somewhat rambling,
often turgid and colloquial subject-matter. The style is not that of the scholar or the refined artist.
Langland probably never submitted himself to the severe discipline in versification which Chaucer’s
early experiments in ballades and complaints illustrate. Discipline was not necessary to write the
kind of verse he was trying to write. The main requisites were a feeling for rhythm, a vocabulary
extensive enough to provide alliterating words, and, finally, volubility of expression.

Perhaps this last is the most persistent and striking characteristic of Langland’s style, a characteristic
which again connects him with the popular feeling for prose expression. Although many lines of
admirable compression occur, they are usually proverbial in tone, or are short summaries of moral
wisdom. The poem is not infrequently powerful, but it attains its effects by a tumultuous heaping
of details rather than by the carefully weighed style of a classic artist, like Chaucer, who uses
every word with a sense of its fullest effect and meaning. His own moral earnestness and the
unfailing gift of a concrete and highly poetic imagination are all that save Langland from falling
into rant and bombast. This quality of improvisation in the poem appears throughout in the
selection of detail. Everything that came into the author’s mind is included, the coarsest pictures
of popular life standing side by side with poetical and profoundly spiritual allegorical imagery.
Personal allusions abound, to Wat and to Tom Stowe, to Bet and to Beton the brewster, to Hick the
hackneyman, and to dozens of others, who may or may not stand for real persons of Langland’s
acquaintance, but who are effectively real in the poem. Frequent references to places in London, to
Cornhill, Westminster, Shoreditch, Southwark, Tyburn, and others, also often lend an air of easy
familiarity to the narrative. The speech, even of very dignified characters, is often colored with the
colloquialism of conversation. Truth responds to Mercy when the latter expounds the plan of the
resurrection, that her story is “bote a tale of Walterot,” a piece of nonsense. And the version of the
sentiment, *Deniem pro dente, et oculum pro oculo*, which is put into the mouth of the Lord himself,
picturesquely declares that whoso hitteth out a man’s eye or else his front teeth or maimeth or
hurteth any other limb, he shall suffer the same sore.
Langland was fond of making up long fantastic compound names, such as Dame Work-when-time-is, the name of the wife of Piers, or Do-right-so-or-thy-dame-shall-thee-beat, the name of his daughter. Some of these names, as for example the name of Piers’ son, are several lines in length and so unwieldy as to become grotesque. Picturesque words of popular color occur, and the main difference between the vocabulary of Langland and that of Chaucer consists in the presence of a certain number of outlandish words, as they seem to the modern reader, in the writings of Langland, which have been lost altogether to the language or have fallen from the literary speech to the dialects. Undoubtedly the alliteration, demanding as it does a wide range of vocabulary, is partly responsible for Langland’s popular words, alliteration and the popular style naturally going together. Broad picturesque phrases abound, as in the description of Sir Harvey, the covetous man, “bitelbrowed and baberlipped,” his beard beslobbered, like a bondman’s, with his bacon; or when Langland calls Christ’s disciples God’s boys, merry-mouthed men, the minstrels of heaven. When occasion calls for them, Langland even uses freely words not to be repeated for modern readers. Plainness of speech is inherent in his mode of thought, and if plainness becomes vulgarity, Langland feels no necessity for apologizing, as Chaucer does when he defends his broad style on the artistic grounds that the manner must be appropriate to the matter. On the other hand, Langland is equally free in introducing learned Latin and French into the body of his narrative, not systematically in the manner of the later Macaronic writing, as in Skelton, but apparently as the fancy struck him.

The spirit of Langland’s verse was not that of the school. Although the style was not without its technic, it was a free and easy technic. It called for the readiness and copiousness of the improviser, rather than the care and forethought of the literary artist. If impassioned prose had been possible in his day, Langland might well have chosen to write in that form, but lacking such a medium, he developed in his free metrical rhythms a form that approaches prose. By means of this form he expressed himself with an astonishing ease and abundance. There is a power in the mere sweep of his thought which would have been impossible in the regular rimed meters of Chaucer. And yet Langland’s eloquence seldom reaches the lofty heights of great poetry. His art is crude, grotesque, and unformed, as compared with the art of later masters of the serious style, like Hooker in prose or Milton in verse. Lacking Langland’s earnestness of thought, his style in the hands of his successors often degenerated into the blustering, robustious, but formless writing of a host of popular rimesters, pamphleteers, and preachers of the Tudor and Elizabethan periods. Even with Langland, the form of Piers Plowman occupied a position of unstable equilibrium between verse and prose, and not infrequently the free alliterative verse of this tradition passed over into popular alliterative prose. In its looseness of form and its picturesqueness and homely vigor this prose resembles the degraded survival of the older alliterative long line known as ‘tumbling verse,’ and perhaps no better name can be found for it than ‘tumbling prose.’ With all its crudities, this prose played a not inconspicuous part in the development of literary style in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and more must be said of it later.

The latter half of the fourteenth century presents no writers of equal eminence to Chaucer and Langland. Verse, as has already been pointed out, occupied almost the whole field of literary activity, and such prose as was written had usually an immediate practical or documentary purpose. Simple narration, however, was not beyond the powers of fourteenth-century prose, and the famous Voyage and Travaile of Sir John Moundevile and Trevisa’s numerous translations, especially his version of Higden’s Poly-chronicon, are the best representatives of this naive and rudimentary prose which had as yet hardly lifted itself to the literary level. The Voyage and Travaile is also a translation, preserved in three versions by unknown translators, which are all more or less freely adapted from the French original. Under the guise of a manual of directions for pilgrims making the journey to the Holy Land, the original author or compiler of the work, who also is unknown, really wrote a traveler’s book, filled with all manner of picturesque misinformation about man and nature. How much faith the compiler of the book and its translators may have had in the
marvelous stories it contained it is difficult to say. Everything is told with a most profound seriousness, equal to that of Defoe or Swift, which gives even the most absurd descriptions an air of verisimilitude. That a fourteenth-century reader would realize to some extent the contrast between the matter and the manner can hardly be questioned, but it is not probable that his attitude in general would be very skeptical. In fact, mixed with the other matters, the book contains a number of Bible stories which can scarcely have been told in any other than a spirit of simple belief. To the modern reader the book seems much more of an artistic feat than it would have seemed to the reader of the time of its compilation. And the same applies to the style in which the narrative is written. The distinguishing characteristic of this style is its utter, its guileless simplicity. The sentences are short and direct, never complex. Few connectives are used and those of the most obvious kind. The words are all familiar and never merely ornamental. The whole tone of the expression is naive, the language of a grown-up child:

"Also beyonde that Flome, more upward to the Deseretes, is a gret Pleyn alle gravelly betwene the Mountaynes; and in that Playn every day at the Sonne risynge begynnen to growe smale Trees, and thei growen til mydday, berynge Frute; but no man dar taken of that Frute, for it is a thing of Fayrye. And aftre mydday thei discrecen and entren ayen in-to the Erthe; so that at the goynge down of the Sonne thei apperen no more; and so thei don every day : and that is a gret marvaylle."

And so it continues, the tone never rising, never falling. The simplicity of the book is the simplicity of nature, not of art. Much of its quaintness is imparted to it by the modern reader who feels keenly the contrast between its childlike and effortless style and the more mature manner of modern English expression. But no such contrast could have been intended in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, and the style is consistent because it reflects the naive simplicity of the medieval mind.

1.5 Trevisa

Though John de Trevisa was an industrious writer, he can scarcely be called a man of letters. A student and fellow of Oxford, he later became chaplain and vicar to Thomas, fourth baron Berkeley, at whose request his various translations were made. These consisted of a translation of Bartholomew de Glanville’s *De Proprietatibus Rerum*, of Vegetius’ *De Re Militari*, of Aegidius’ *De Regimine Principum*, and of various other works interesting to his master, besides the most important of all, a version of Higden’s *Polychronicon*. As a preface to the *Polychronicon*, Trevisa composed a *Dialogue between a Lord and a Clerk upon Translation*, in which he discusses interestingly the principles of the art of translation. Diversity of speech, says the lord, has brought it about that men of different nations understand each other “no more than gagling of geese.”

Interpreters are therefore necessary, especially out of Latin, in which so many important books are written. The clerk presents various reasons why translations should not be made, one of them being that “a great deal of these books standeth much by holy writ, by holy doctors, and by philosophy,” which should not be translated into English. The lord responds with arguments frequently used by the reformers of the sixteenth century, that St. Jerome translated from Hebrew into Latin, that the gospel and the faith must be preached to men who know no Latin, that “English preaching is very translation, and such English preaching is good and needful.” The clerk finally sees the necessity of translation, as was fore-ordained, and asks the lord if he would “liefer have a translation of these chronicles in rhyme or in prose?” “In prose,” answers the lord, “for commonly prose is more clear than rhyme, more easy and more plain to know and understand.”

The translation was accordingly made in prose, carried through and finished on the 18th of April, 1387. “In some place I shall set word for word,” says Trevisa, “and active for active, and passive for passive, a-row right as it standeth, without changing of the order of words. But in some place I must change the order of words, and set active for passive and again-ward. And in some place
I must set a reason for a word and tell what it meaneth. But for all such changing, the meaning shall stand and not be changed. To this program Trevisa faithfully adhered. His translation is usually close, though not literal, and his additions are few and unimportant. Occasional errors occur, due to misunderstanding of the original Latin. The most notable characteristic of Trevisa’s English as compared with the compact and well-constructed Latin of the original, is its looseness of form and its verbosity. A single English word is seldom allowed to count as the equivalent of a Latin word. The simple Latin phrase of Higden, in signum quod minoris virtutis est quaerere quam quaesita tueri, became in Trevisa, “ in tokeynge pat pis is lasse maistrie to wynne and to conquere pan it is to kepe and to save pat is conquered and i-wonne.” The more earnest and the more careful he is, the more cumbersome Trevisa becomes. An unfamiliar allusion always calls for elaboration, as in the following sentence of Higden: Cujus negotii, velut Daedalini labyrinthi, inextricabilem attendens intricationem, rogata sum veritus attemptare. This is rendered by Trevisa as follows: “poo toke I hede pat pis matir, as laborintus, Dedalus hous, hap many halkes and hurnes, wonderful weies, wyndynges and wrynkelynges, pat wil noust be unwarled, me schamed and dradde to fynde so grete and so gostliche a bone to graunte.” Awkward as this translation of Trevisa’s is, however, it is better than that of the later fifteenth-century translator of the Polychronicon, who speaks in his Latin English of “ the intricacion inextricable of this labor” and of “the obnubilous and clowdy processe of this matter.” Trevisa, with all his faults, retains his feeling for native and familiar English. It had not yet occurred to him that English words could be made out of Latin by the simple process of bodily transference. His struggle was to render his original into intelligible English, not to write a high style or to create a new literary vocabulary. His attitude towards English is not that of the Renascence but of the Medieval mind. He uses the language naturally, crudely, laboriously, with no higher quality than occasionally the unconscious and naive charm of a simple-minded man writing as he speaks.

The latter fourteenth century was not, however, without more ambitious writers who attempted to develop a higher literary type of prose than the simple medieval narrative of Maundevile and Trevisa. These experimenters, like the earliest Greek prose stylists, endeavored to raise prose to the literary level by giving it some of the characteristics of verse. Or perhaps it would be truer to say that a kind of prose was derived by abstracting some of the most marked features of verse, leaving something which stood half-way between colloquial discourse and regular verse. An instructive example of this type of English prose is a didactic treatise written about 1357 on the basis of a Latin original by John Thoresby, archbishop of York. The name of the translator, or paraphraser, was John de Taystek (Tavistock ?), a monk of St. Mary’s Abbey at York, a name which seems to have been corrupted in later transcripts of the text to Gaytrigge, Gaytrik, Gaytringe, and other forms. The treatise was intended to be preached, as a manual of instruction, by Parsons and vicars to their parishioners. It has been printed in three versions, one from the official records preserved at York, another from the manuscript of a Wiclifite version of Taystek’s translation, and one from a later copy of it. The work treats of the ten commandments, the seven sacraments, the seven deadly sins, the seven virtues, and the seven works of mercy, and similar material, and it serves, so far as content goes, as a good example of popular discourse in the fourteenth century. The most notable stylistic feature of the treatise is its semi-metrical character. The metrical characteristics easily become obscured, however, and in the Wiclifite version many passages pass over into unqualified prose. In the version known as Dan Jon Gaytrige’s Sermon, the editors have felt so little the metrical elements in the text that they have simply printed it as prose. There can be no doubt, however, that Taystek in his paraphrase of Thoresby’s original intended to produce a style which would be a safe compromise between plain prose and out-and-out verse. The metrical feature which survives most distinctly is the feeling for the cadence of the four-stress long line of alliterative verse. Occasional lines occur which are quite regular in scansion, both with respect to rhythm and alliteration. In general, however, alliteration is not well maintained, and apparently what Taystek endeavored to do was to discard alliteration and retain the general rhythmical
structure of the alliterative long line. Rime occurs scarcely at all. Sometimes the rhythm of the line has been satisfied at the expense of an unusual word-order, but otherwise there is little in the text to warn the reader that he is not reading prose but verse. We can scarcely suppose that Taystek refrained from writing his treatise in a more regular verse style either from ignorance or inability. Quite probably he felt that ordinary alliterative verse, familiar to all in secular romance and story, was not appropriate for official instruction in the serious concerns of the religious life. And to have spoken to his audience merely as man to man, in the language of daily communication, was of course not to be thought of. It would be vain to seek for evidences of a genuinely creative attitude towards prose style in so crude a stylist as Taystek. To the worn-down verse which he employed, he added nothing in the way of stylistic ornament, except perhaps the frequent use of synonymous word-pairs, such as of witt and of wisdome (p. 2), withouten travaile or trey (p. 4), to knowe and to kun (p. 4), comandes and biddes (p. 20), ordained and bidden (p. 22), hiding or helyng (p. 50).

This was a trick of style not unknown to prose writers of the Old English period, and one which became almost a constant feature of oratorical and artistic prose of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Needless to say these word-pairs were used because of their appropriateness to the rotund oratorical style which the various writers affected, not at all for the sake of logical clearness or with any theories of the etymological origins of the words thus paired.

1.6 Richard Rolle

A much more skillful writer of prose and of prose poetry than Taystek was Richard Rolle, called of Hampole from the place of his death and burial. Although Richard Rolle died in the year 1349 at about the age of fifty, his influence was especially strong in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. At that time a revival of his fame took place, and with the popular growth of interest in religion and theology, Rolle was annexed by the reformers to their party. In one of the transcriptions of Rolle’s English Psalter, dating from this time, the writer complains that the Psalter has been Lollardized and thus “ymped in with eresy.” Various disciples who followed Rolle’s methods in writing became active in the last quarter of the century. Of these the most important were William Nassyngeton, Walter Hylton, and Juliana of Norwich. Doubtless there were other members of this group whose names have been lost, and whose works, if they have survived, are not distinguishable from the writings of the better known representatives of the school.

Rolle began his career in a dramatic manner. He had left Oxford at the age of nineteen, having spent his time there mainly in the study of the Bible and having become dissatisfied with the scholasticism which at that time held sway in the university. He returned home, and shortly after, dressing himself up in a costume made from a white and a gray gown of his sister’s and a hood of his father’s, and frightening off his sister, who thought that he had gone mad, he ran away and became a hermit. For the rest of his life Rolle led the life of a recluse, occupying himself with preaching, writing, and meditation, and according to his own testimony, passing through the various formal stages of mystical experience. He was not in holy orders, was not a priest or a monk, and though his whole life was passed in pious and religious activities, in the eyes of the church he was a layman. At first he appears to have attempted to spread his views by oral preaching, but perhaps he was limited in these endeavors because he was not a priest and so could not preach from church pulpits. Quite probably, however, he preached anyway, very much as Wiclif’s poor priests did later, speaking to the people wherever he found them. Later he turned to writing, and in the composition both of verse and of prose treatises, he seems to have found a congenial and effective mode of expression.

As a thinker, Rolle makes no pretensions to a philosophic system. “His system is religious life, not theory.” His prose pieces, consisting of prayers, meditations, sentences, epistles, tracts, translations from Bonaventura, Richard of St. Victor, and other mystics, are generally structureless and unrelated.
to each other, except as they all breathe the same feeling of pious and fervid devotion. The longer
pieces are made up merely of a succession of spiritual reflections and ejaculations, especially on
divine love. Few allusions to contemporary life occur, and the satirical note is altogether absent.
Rolle has little of the righteous indignation of the reformer, and though the punishments of hell
are eloquently described, his most frequent subject is the love of God.

It was a fervid and lyrical temperament which Rolle brought with him to the composition of his
prose. His feeling for prose was by no means artless, although on the other hand, the use of his
various devices of style is not persistent and regular enough to give him a carefully thought out
and consistent style. At times he wrote quite simply. One of his most popular tracts was his *Form
of Perfect Living*, addressed to Margaret, an anchoress, who was Rolle’s disciple and with whom he
seems to have enjoyed much spiritual communion. The tract recounts the various temptations to
which one leading the lonely life of the hermit is subjected and also the ways by which the perfect
love of God may be attained. Now thou hast heard, he says, a part of the subtle crafts of the devil,
and if thou wilt thou shalt destroy his traps, and ‘burn in the fire of love all the bands that he
would bind thee with.’ ‘For that thou hast forsaken the solace and the joy of this world, and taken
thee to solitary life, for God’s love to suffer tribulation and anguish here, and sitthen [afterwards]
come to that bliss that nevermore blins [ceases]: I trow truly that the comfort of Jesus Christ and
the sweetness of his love, with the fire of the Holy Ghost that purges all sin, shall be in thee and
with thee, how thou shalt think, how thou shalt pray, what thou shalt work, so that in a few years
thou shalt have more delight to be alone and speak to thy love and to thy spouse Jesus Christ, that
high is in heaven, than if thou were lady here of a thousand worlds.’ Many suppose, he continues,
that we hermits are in pain and great pence. ‘They see our body, but they see not our heart,
where our solace is. If they saw that, many of them would forsake all that they have, for to follow
us.’ The love of God is the perfection of the religious life. ‘Amore langueo. These two words are
written in the book of love, that is called the song of love, or the song of songs.’ The special gift of
the solitary is to love God. ‘In heaven the angels that are most burning in love are nearest God.’ ‘If
thou love him mickle, mickle joy and sweetness and burning thou feelest, that is thy comfort and
strength, night and day.’

The *Form of Perfect Living* is an example of Rolle’s simpler prose style, the purpose of it being
mainly expositional. Even here, however, there is considerable alliteration, some use of the metrical
cadences of the long line, of oratorical, ejaculatory devices, in short a general tendency to fall into
a dithyrambic kind of expression suited to the mood of the prose-poet. The sentences often have
a fullness and roundness of phrasing which remind one of the cadences of later liturgical literature.
Always one feels that Rolle’s written style is merely a transference of the impassioned expression
of the orator to the more permanent record of the manuscript page.

More characteristic of Rolle’s popular style in its admixture of prose and verse is the tract *Ego
dormio et cor meum vigilat*. In general this tract is similar in method to Taystek’s sermon, and is
representative of a kind of preaching and writing which Wiclif expressly condemned. At times,
passages can be scanned as alliterative verse, though the piece is intended in the main to be prose.
It is a disquisition, a kind of rhapsody, on divine love, and naturally the subject lends itself to a
more lyric treatment than the *Form of Perfect Living*:

“All perisches & passes pat we with eghe see. It wanes in to wretchednes, pe welth of pis worlde.
Robes & ritches rotes in dike. Prowde payntyng slakes in to sorow. Delites & drewynse stynek sal
ful sone. paire golde & paire tresoure drawes pam til dede. Al pe wikked of pis worlde drawes til
a dale, pat pai may se pare sorowyng whare waa es ever stabel. Bot he may syng of solace pat
lufed Jhesu Criste: be wretchesse fra wele falles in to hell.”

The tract continues with a passage of plain exposition in a more normal prose style, until it reaches
a *Meditatio de passione Cristi*, where it again breaks out into a kind of rimed prose.

From the point of view of ingenuity of technic Rolle is without question the most effective writer
of prose in the fourteenth century, though it cannot be said that he accomplished much in the
development of a practicable art of prose style. The distinction between prose and verse is not
clearly maintained by him, and of prose dignified by thought and wisdom, he had no conception.
Good English prose has generally appealed primarily to the reason, but Rolle’s appeal is almost
altogether to emotion. When his prose is normal it is least distinguished. It is only when his heart
is kindled by the fire of love that a kind of vatic enthusiasm colors and exalts his expression, and
at the same time lifts it into regions where only those equally inspired can follow him.

One further experiment in the writing of artistic prose in this period must be noted. This is
Thomas Usk’s Testament of Love, made about 1387, and formerly often attributed to Chaucer. The
treatise is in fact based upon Chaucer’s translation of Boethius, and is an attempt to give a testament,
or witness, of the divine love in relation to a symbolic Margaret, the pearl beyond all price, who
stands for various ideas, the Church, the grace of God, and others. The author of the treatise
endeavored to write mystically, but being without genuine mystical fervor, he succeeded merely
in furnishing an instructive illustration of what must happen when an uninspired writer tries to
write an inspired style. Usk comments in some detail on his own theories of style. Many men, he
says, so much swallow the deliciousness of gists and of rime by quaint knitting colors, that they
take little heed of the goodness or bad-ness of the thought. But such craft of enditing, he continues,
will not be of my acquaintance. He puts his trust in “ rude wordes and boystous.” Many delight
in French and Latin, but Englishmen will do better to write in English, for “the understanding of
Englishmen wol not strecche to the privy termes in Frenche, what-so-ever we bosten of straunge
langage.” He frequently speaks of his ‘lewdness,’ and his desire to write plainly in order to be
easily understood. The reader of his Testament soon realizes, however, that this is all false modesty
and affectation of simplicity, for the style of the work is highly artificial and ambitious. Although
there is some use of alliteration, of rime, of puns, of violent antitheses, and of ingenious figures,
Usk depends mainly for his stylistic effects upon an obscure and tortuous form of expression,
derived apparently by taking the crudities of word-order and of unidiomatic phrasing found in
Chaucer’s Boece (and due there merely to Chaucer’s difficulty in rendering the text of his original)
and making these inadequacies of the Boece the marks of his own distinction of style. That Usk was
striving after a literary prose style is apparent. He deserves some credit for rejecting the dithyrambic
style of Rolle, but his own style, though different, is little better. His theme he felt to be lofty, but
without a genuine or deep desire to express himself truly and lacking a model to follow, he
invented a literary prose which saved itself from being merely colloquial and natural by being un-
idiomatic and unintelligible.

Self-Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) The period of discovery in the history of English Literary Prose begins with the latter half
of the .......... .
       (a) 13th century  (b) 14th century
       (c) 15th century  (d) None of these

   (ii) The Tale of Melibeus was narrated by .......... .
        (a) Chaucer  (b) Spencer
        (c) Dryden  (d) None of these

   (iii) Caroline Age belongs to the reign of .......... .
         (a) James I  (b) Charles II
         (c) Charles I  (d) None of these
The New-classical period in English covers almost ............... .

(a) 100 years (b) 140 years (c) 200 years (d) None of these.

1.7 Summary

- This unit covers the period of discovery in the history of English literary prose. It begins with the latter half of the fourteenth century, when the writing of prose first assumed importance in the life of the English people, and it ends with the first quarter of the seventeenth century, when practice and experiment had made of English prose, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, a highly developed and efficient means of expression.

- The origins of English prose come relatively late in the development of English literary experience. This apparently is true of most prose literatures, and the explanation seems to lie in the nature of prose. Even in its beginnings the art of prose is never an unconscious, never a genuinely primitive art. The origins of prose literature can consequently be examined without venturing far into those misty regions of theory and speculation, where the student of poetry must wander in the attempt to explain beginnings which certainly precede the age of historical documents, and perhaps of human record of any kind. Poetry may be the more ancient, the more divine art, but prose lies nearer to us and is more practical and human.

- Being human, prose bears upon it, and early prose especially, some of the marks of human imperfection. Poetry of primitive origins, for example the ballad, often attains a finality of form which art cannot better, but not so with prose. Perhaps the explanation of this may be that poetry is concerned primarily with the emotions, and the emotions are among the original and perfect gifts of mankind, ever the same; whereas prose is concerned with the reasonable powers of man’s nature, which have been and are being only slowly won by painful conquest. Whether this be a right explanation or not, it is certainly true that in its first efforts English prose is uncertain and faltering, that it often engages our sympathies more by what it attempts to do than by what it actually accomplishes.

- Historians normally divide English literature into periods for convenience of discussion. Sometimes the numbers, dates or the names of the periods seem to vary.

- The four and a half century between the Norman Conquest in 1600, which became the cause for radical changes in the language, life and culture of England, and about 1500, when the standard literary language has become “modern English” that is similar to the language of ours. The period from 1100 to 1350 is sometimes called the Anglo-Norman Period because the non-Latin literature of the era was written in Anglo-Norman. Among the important works of the period were Marie de France’s “Lais” and Jean de Meun’s “Roman de La Rose”. When the native vernacular - descended from Anglo-Saxon period.

- Many historians consider this age an “early modern” age. It refers to a rebirth commonly applied to the period of European history following the Middle Ages. During this period the European arts of sculpture, painting and literature reached a peak. The development came late to England in the 16th century which didn’t have its flowering until the emergence of Elizabethan or Jacobean period. In fact sometimes, John Milton (1608-74) is considered as the last greatest renaissance poet.

- English writers of the sixteenth century were self-consciously puzzled about the state of their language. They knew that it had changed markedly in the past two centuries, but they were not sure whether too rapid a change was good. They were aware also that its vocabulary was being influenced by other modern languages, especially French and Italian. They wondered
whether it should be more like Latin, the international language of learning, or whether it should be true to its own native genius.

- The spread of printing meant that people who were not learned (who did not know Latin) could afford English books and would therefore read, as they had not done before. Notable defenses of the vernacular tongues of Italian and French had been published; some Englishmen felt that an equally valid defense of English could be made. As early as 1543 a translator, Peter Betham, proclaimed that he thought translators ought to use the usual terms of our English tongue, not borrowing terms from other languages, because, as he said, continual borrowing without repayment would make the language, as it would make a man, bankrupt. Furthermore, he deplored what he called “inkhorn” terms, learned words derived from Latin or invented by authors—words so obscure that he thought the ordinary Englishman would not be able to understand them. To be sure, he admitted, a few words of foreign origin must be allowed, since languages are clearly interlaced with each other, but the good writer of English is the one who follows Chaucer and other old writers, keeping English in its native tradition. The most notable theorist of language reform in the middle of the century was the famous classical scholar, Sir John Cheke, Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge. His theory of phonetic spelling is demonstrated in his letter to the translator Sir Thomas Hoby. The most important translations of the sixteenth century were the renderings of the Bible into the vernaculars. In England William Tyndale began his translation in 1523; he had to do it surreptitiously and outside the country; he finally suffered martyrdom for his efforts. In 1530 a royal proclamation condemned Tyndale’s translation and all other versions in the vulgar tongue. Then in 1535 Miles Coverdale published, in Zürich, the first complete Bible in English. By this time the official attitude was changing, and in 1540 the so-called Great Bible was published, the first English Bible issued with official sanction—evidence of the extent of the breach between the English church and the Church of Rome.

1.8 Key-Words

1. Elizabethan Age: Elizabethan Age is often used to describe the late 16th and early 17th centuries even after the death of Elizabeth. This was the time of swift expansion in English commerce and the development of nationalist feeling - the time of the defeat of Spanish Armada in 1588. It is considered as a great age English literature - the greatest in the field of drama.

2. Caroline Age: Caroline Age - the reign of Charles I (called “Carolus” in Latin). It was the time of English Civil War between the supporters of the King and supporters of the parliament.

3. The Neo-classical Period: The Neo-classical Period in England covers almost 140 years after the Restoration (1660). The authors such as John Dryden, Alexander Pope, Joseph Addition, Jonathan Swift, Oliver Gold Smith, Samuel Johnson, Edmund Burke contributed to neoclassic literature.

1.9 Review Questions

1. Write a short note on the history of English Literary Prose.
2. Discuss Chaucer’s prose writing.
3. What is the development of English prose through Literary ages.
Notes

Answers: Self-Assessment

1.  (i) (b)  
    (ii) (a)  
    (iii) (c)  
    (iv) (b)

1.10 Further Readings

1.  Evans, History of English Literature.

Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

- Know about Francis Bacon.
- Discuss Bacon’s Life and Works.

Introduction

Francis Bacon was an English philosopher, statesman, scientist, jurist, and author. He served both as Attorney General and Lord Chancellor of England. Although his political career ended in disgrace, he remained extremely influential through his works, especially as philosophical advocate and practitioner of the scientific method during the scientific revolution.

Bacon has been called the creator of empiricism. His works established and popularised inductive methodologies for scientific inquiry, often called the *Baconian method*, or simply the scientific method. His demand for a planned procedure of investigating all things natural marked a new turn in the rhetorical and theoretical framework for science, much of which still surrounds conceptions of proper methodology today.

Bacon was knighted in 1603, and created both the Baron Verulam in 1618 and the Viscount St. Alban in 1621; as he died without heirs, both peerages became extinct upon his death. He famously died by contracting pneumonia while studying the effects of freezing on the preservation of meat.

2.1 Biography

Early life

Bacon was born on 22 January 1561 at York House near the Strand in London, the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon by his second wife Anne (Cooke) Bacon, the daughter of noted humanist Anthony Cooke. His mother’s sister was married to William Cecil, 1st Baron Burghley, making Burghley Francis Bacon’s uncle. Biographers believe that Bacon was educated at home in his early years owing to poor health (which plagued him throughout his life), receiving tuition from John Walsall, a graduate of Oxford with a strong leaning towards Puritanism. He entered Trinity College, Cambridge, on 5 April 1573 at the age of twelve, living for three years there together with his older
brother Anthony Bacon under the personal tutelage of Dr John Whitgift, future Archbishop of Canterbury. Bacon’s education was conducted largely in Latin and followed the medieval curriculum. He was also educated at the University of Poitiers.

His studies brought him to the belief that the methods and results of science as then practised were erroneous. His reverence for Aristotle conflicted with his loathing of Aristotelian philosophy, which seemed to him barren, disputatious, and wrong in its objectives.

On 27 June 1576, he and Anthony entered de societate magistrorum at Gray’s Inn. A few months later, Francis went abroad with Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador at Paris, while Anthony continued his studies at home. The state of government and society in France under Henry III afforded him valuable political instruction. For the next three years he visited Blois, Poitiers, Tours, Italy, and Spain. During his travels, Bacon studied language, statecraft, and civil law while performing routine diplomatic tasks. On at least one occasion he delivered diplomatic letters to England for Walsingham, Burghley, and Leicester, as well as for the queen.

The sudden death of his father in February 1579 prompted Bacon to return to England. Sir Nicholas had laid up a considerable sum of money to purchase an estate for his youngest son, but he died before doing so, and Francis was left with only a fifth of that money. Having borrowed money, Bacon got into debt. To support himself, he took up his residence in law at Gray’s Inn in 1579.

It was at Cambridge that he first met Queen Elizabeth, who was impressed by his precocious intellect, and was accustomed to calling him “the young Lord Keeper”.

Parliamentarian

Bacon had three goals: to uncover truth, to serve his country, and to serve his church. He sought to further these ends by seeking a prestigious post. In 1580, through his uncle, Lord Burghley, he applied for a post at court which might enable him to pursue a life of learning. His application failed. For two years he worked quietly at Gray’s Inn, until he was admitted as an outer barrister in 1582. His parliamentary career began when he was elected MP for Bossiney, Devon in a 1581 by-election. In 1584, he took his seat in parliament for Melcombe in Dorset, and subsequently for Taunton (1586). At this time, he began to write on the condition of parties in the church, as well as on the topic of philosophical reform in the lost tract, Temporis Partus Maximus. Yet he failed to gain a position he thought would lead him to success. He showed signs of sympathy to Puritanism, attending the sermons of the Puritan chaplain of Gray’s Inn and accompanying his mother to the Temple Church to hear Walter Travers. This led to the publication of his earliest surviving tract, which criticised the English church’s suppression of the Puritan clergy. In the Parliament of 1586, he openly urged execution for Mary, Queen of Scots.

About this time, he again approached his powerful uncle for help; this move was followed by his rapid progress at the bar. He became Bencher in 1586, and he was elected a reader in 1587, delivering his first set of lectures in Lent the following year. In 1589, he received the valuable appointment of reversion to the Clerkship of the Star Chamber, although he did not formally take office until 1608 - a post which was worth £16,000 a year.

In 1588 he became MP for Liverpool and then for Middlesex in 1593. He later sat three times for Ipswich (1597, 1601, 1604) and once for Cambridge University (1614).

He became known as a liberal-minded reformer, eager to amend and simplify the law. He opposed feudal privileges and dictatorial powers, though a friend of the crown. He was against religious persecution. He struck at the House of Lords in their usurpation of the Money Bills. He advocated
for the union of England and Scotland, thus being one of the influences behind the consolidation of the United Kingdom; and also advocated, later on, for the integration of Ireland into the Union. Closer constitutional ties, he believed, would bring greater peace and strength to these countries.

**Attorney General**

Bacon soon became acquainted with Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, Queen Elizabeth’s favourite. By 1591, he acted as the earl’s confidential adviser. In 1592, he was commissioned to write a tract in response to the Jesuit Robert Parson’s anti-government polemic, which he titled *Certain observations made upon a libel*, identifying England with the ideals of democratic Athens against the belligerence of Spain.

Bacon took his third parliamentary seat for Middlesex when in February 1593 Elizabeth summoned Parliament to investigate a Roman Catholic plot against her. Bacon’s opposition to a bill that would levy triple subsidies in half the usual time offended many people. Opponents accused him of seeking popularity. For a time, the royal court excluded him. When the Attorney-Generalship fell vacant in 1594, Lord Essex’s influence was not enough to secure Bacon that office. Likewise, Bacon failed to secure the lesser office of Solicitor-General in 1595. To console him for these disappointments, Essex presented him with a property at Twickenham, which he sold subsequently for £ 1,800.

In 1596, Bacon became Queen’s Counsel, but missed the appointment of Master of the Rolls. During the next few years, his financial situation remained bad. His friends could find no public office for him, and a scheme for retrieving his position by a marriage with the wealthy and young widow Lady Elizabeth Hatton failed after she broke off their relationship upon accepting marriage to a wealthier man. In 1598 Bacon was arrested for debt. Afterwards however, his standing in the Queen’s eyes improved. Gradually, Bacon earned the standing of one of the learned counsels, though he had no commission or warrant and received no salary. His relationship with the Queen further improved when he severed ties with Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, a shrewd move because Essex was executed for treason in 1601.

With others, Bacon was appointed to investigate the charges against Essex, his former friend and benefactor. A number of Essex’s followers confessed that Essex had planned a rebellion against the Queen. Bacon was subsequently a part of the legal team headed by Attorney General Sir Edward Coke at Essex’s treason trial. After the execution, the Queen ordered Bacon to write the official government account of the trial, which was later published as *A Declaration of the Practices and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert late Earle of Essex and his Complices, against her Majestie and her Kingdoms ...* after Bacon’s first draft was heavily edited by the Queen and her ministers.

According to his personal secretary and chaplain, William Rawley, as a judge Bacon was always tender-hearted, “looking upon the examples with the eye of severity, but upon the person with the eye of pity and compassion”. And also that “he was free from malice”, “no revenger of injuries”, and “no defamer of any man”.

**James I Comes to the Throne**

The succession of James I brought Bacon into greater favour. He was knighted in 1603. In another shrewd move, Bacon wrote his *Apologie* in defence of his proceedings in the case of Essex, as Essex had favoured James to succeed to the throne.

The following year, during the course of the uneventful first parliament session, Bacon married Alice Barnham. In June 1607 he was at last rewarded with the office of Solicitor-General.[5] The following year, he began working as the Clerkship of the Star Chamber. In spite of a generous income, old debts still couldn’t be paid. He sought further promotion and wealth by supporting King James and his arbitrary policies.
In 1610 the fourth session of James' first parliament met. Despite Bacon’s advice to him, James and the Commons found themselves at odds over royal prerogatives and the king's embarrassing extravagance. The House was finally dissolved in February 1611. Throughout this period Bacon managed to stay in the favour of the king while retaining the confidence of the Commons.

In 1613, Bacon was finally appointed attorney general, after advising the king to shuffle judicial appointments. As attorney general, Bacon successfully prosecuted Robert Carr, 1st Earl of Somerset and his wife, Frances Howard, Countess of Somerset for murder in 1616. The so-called “Prince’s Parliament” of April 1614 objected to Bacon’s presence in the seat for Cambridge and to the various royal plans which Bacon had supported. Although he was allowed to stay, parliament passed a law that forbade the attorney-general to sit in parliament. His influence over the king had evidently inspired resentment or apprehension in many of his peers. Bacon, however, continued to receive the King’s favour, which led to his appointment in March 1617 as the temporary Regent of England (for a period of a month), and in 1618 as Lord Chancellor. On 12 July 1618 the king created Bacon Baron Verulam, of Verulam, in the Peerage of England. As a new peer he then styled himself as “Francis, Lord Verulam”.

Bacon continued to use his influence with the king to mediate between the throne and Parliament and in this capacity he was further elevated in the same peerage, as Viscount St Alban, on 27 January 1621.

Lord Chancellor and Public Disgrace

Bacon’s public career ended in disgrace in 1621. After he fell into debt, a Parliamentary Committee on the administration of the law charged him with twenty-three separate counts of corruption. To the lords, who sent a committee to enquire whether a confession was really his, he replied, “My lords, it is my act, my hand, and my heart; I beseech your lordships to be merciful to a broken reed.” He was sentenced to a fine of £40,000 and committed to the Tower of London during the king’s pleasure; the imprisonment lasted only a few days and the fine was remitted by the king.[12] More seriously, parliament declared Bacon incapable of holding future office or sitting in parliament. He narrowly escaped undergoing degradation, which would have stripped him of his titles of nobility. Subsequently the disgraced viscount devoted himself to study and writing.

There seems little doubt that Bacon had accepted gifts from litigants, but this was an accepted custom of the time and not necessarily evidence of deeply corrupt behaviour.[13] While acknowledging that his conduct had been lax, he countered that he had never allowed gifts to influence his judgement and, indeed, he had on occasion given a verdict against those who had paid him. The true reason for his acknowledgement of guilt is the subject of debate, but it may have been prompted by his sickness, or by a view that through his fame and the greatness of his office he would be spared harsh punishment. He may even have been blackmailed, with a threat to charge him with sodomy, into confession.

The British jurist Basil Montagu wrote in Bacon’s defense, concerning the episode of his public disgrace:

Bacon has been accused of servility, of dissimulation, of various base motives, and their filthy brood of base actions, all unworthy of his high birth, and incompatible with his great wisdom, and the estimation in which he was held by the noblest spirits of the age. It is true that there were men in his own time, and will be men in all times, who are better pleased to count spots in the sun than to rejoice in its glorious brightness. Such men have openly libelled him, like Dewes and Weldon, whose falsehoods were detected as soon as uttered, or have fastened upon certain ceremonious compliments and dedications, the fashion of his day, as a sample of his servility, passing over his noble letters to the Queen, his lofty contempt for the Lord Keeper Puckering, his open dealing with Sir Robert Cecil, and with others, who, powerful when he was nothing,
might have blighted his opening fortunes for ever, forgetting his advocacy of the rights of the people in the face of the court, and the true and honest counsels, always given by him, in times of great difficulty, both to Elizabeth and her successor. When was a “base sycophant” loved and honoured by piety such as that of Herbert, Tennison, and Rawley, by noble spirits like Hobbes, Ben Jonson, and Selden, or followed to the grave, and beyond it, with devoted affection such as that of Sir Thomas Meautys.

2.2 Bacon’s Personal Life

When he was 36, Bacon engaged in the courtship of Elizabeth Hatton, a young widow of 20. Reportedly, she broke off their relationship upon accepting marriage to a wealthier man—Edward Coke. Years later, Bacon still wrote of his regret that the marriage to Hatton had not taken place.

Bacon wrote two sonnets proclaiming his love for Alice. The first was written during his courtship and the second on his wedding day, 10 May 1606. When Bacon was appointed Lord Chancellor, “by special Warrant of the King”, Lady Bacon was given precedence over all other Court ladies.

Reports of increasing friction in his marriage to Alice appeared, with speculation that some of this may have been due to financial resources not being as readily available to her as she was accustomed to having in the past. Alice was reportedly interested in fame and fortune, and when reserves of money were no longer available, there were complaints about where all the money was going. Alice Chambers Bunten wrote in her Life of Alice Barnham that, upon their descent into debt, she actually went on trips to ask for financial favours and assistance from their circle of friends. Bacon disinherited her upon discovering her secret romantic relationship with Sir John Underhill. He rewrote his will, which had previously been very generous to her (leaving her lands, goods, and income), revoking it all.

The well-connected antiquary John Aubrey noted in his Brief Lives concerning Bacon, “He was a Pederast. His Ganimeds and Favourites took bribes”, biographers continue to debate about Bacon’s sexual inclinations and the precise nature of his personal relationships. Several authors believe that despite his marriage Bacon was primarily attracted to the same sex. Professor Forker for example has explored the “historically documentable sexual preferences” of both King James and Bacon – and concluded they were all oriented to “masculine love”, a contemporary term that “seems to have been used exclusively to refer to the sexual preference of men for members of their own gender.” The Jacobean antiquarian, Sir Simonds D’Ewes implied there had been a question of bringing him to trial for buggery.

This conclusion has been disputed by others, who point to lack of consistent evidence, and consider the sources to be more open to interpretation.

In his “New Atlantis”, Bacon describes his utopian island as being “the chastest nation under heaven”, in which there was no prostitution or adultery, and further saying that “as for masculine love, they have no touch of it”.

Men fear death as children fear to go in the dark; and as that natural fear in children is increased with tales, so is the other. —“Of Death”

Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man’s nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. —“Of Revenge”
The virtue of prosperity is temperance; the virtue of adversity is fortitude. —“Of Adversity”

He that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune. —“Of Marriage and Single Life”

There was never proud man thought so absurdly well of himself as the lover doth of the person loved: And therefore it was well said, That it is impossible to love and to be wise. —“Of Love”

They that deny a God destroy man’s nobility, for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body, and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. —“Of Atheism”

A principal fruit of friendship is the ease and discharge of the fullness and swellings of the heart. —“Of Friendship”

A man’s own observation, what he finds good of, and what he finds hurt of, is the best physic [medicine] to preserve health. —“Of Regiment of Health”

As the baggage is to an army, so is riches to virtue. —“Of Riches”

Death

On 9 April 1626 Bacon died of pneumonia while at Arundel mansion at Highgate outside London. An influential account of the circumstances of his death was given by John Aubrey’s Brief Lives. Aubrey has been criticised for his evident credulousness in this and other works; on the other hand, he knew Thomas Hobbes, Bacon’s fellow-philosopher and friend. Aubrey’s vivid account, which portrays Bacon as a martyr to experimental scientific method, had him journeying to Highgate through the snow with the King’s physician when he is suddenly inspired by the possibility of using the snow to preserve meat: “They were resolved they would try the experiment presently. They alighted out of the coach and went into a poor woman’s house at the bottom of Highgate hill, and bought a fowl, and made the woman exenterate it”.

After stuffing the fowl with snow, Bacon contracted a fatal case of pneumonia. Some people, including Aubrey, consider these two contiguous, possibly coincidental events as related and causative of his death: “The Snow so chilled him that he immediately fell so extremely ill, that he could not return to his Lodging ... but went to the Earle of Arundel’s house at Highgate, where they put him into ... a damp bed that had not been layn-in ... which gave him such a cold that in 2 or 3 days as I remember Mr Hobbes told me, he died of Suffocation.” Being unwittingly on his deathbed, the philosopher wrote his last letter to his absent host and friend Lord Arundel:

My very good Lord,—I was likely to have had the fortune of Caius Plinius the elder, who lost his life by trying an experiment about the burning of Mount Vesuvius; for I was also desirous to try an experiment or two touching the conservation and induration of bodies. As for the experiment itself, it succeeded excellently well; but in the journey between London and Highgate, I was taken with such a fit of casting as I know not whether it were the Stone, or some surfeit or cold, or indeed a touch of them all three. But when I came to your Lordship’s House, I was not able to go back, and therefore was forced to take up my lodging here, where your housekeeper is very careful and diligent about me, which I assure myself your Lordship will not only pardon towards him, but think the better of him for it. For indeed your Lordship’s House was happy to me, and I kiss your noble hands for the welcome which I am sure you give me to it. I know how unfit it is for me to write with any other hand than mine own, but by my troth my fingers are so disjointed with sickness that I cannot steadily hold a pen.”

Another account appears in a biography by William Rawley, Bacon’s personal secretary and chaplain: He died on the ninth day of April in the year 1626, in the early morning of the day then celebrated for our Saviour’s resurrection, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, at the Earl of Arundel’s house in Highgate, near London, to which place he casually repaired about a week before; God so ordaining that he should die there of a gentle fever, accidentally accompanied with a great cold, whereby the defluxion of rheum fell so plentifully upon his breast, that he died by suffocation.
At the news of his death, over thirty great minds collected together their eulogies of him, which was then later published in Latin. He left personal assets of about £7,000 and lands that realised £6,000 when sold. His debts amounted to more than £23,000, equivalent to more than £3m at current value.

Notes
Bacon’s personal secretary and chaplain, William Rawley, however, wrote in his biography of Bacon that his inter-marriage with Alice Barnham was one of "much conjugal love and respect", mentioning a robe of honour that he gave to her, and which "she wore unto her dying day, being twenty years and more after his death".

2.3 Philosophy and Works

Francis Bacon’s Philosophy is displayed in the vast and varied writings he left, which might be divided in three great branches:

- **Scientific works** - in which his ideas for an universal reform of knowledge, scientific method, and the improvement of mankind’s state are presented.
- **Religious/literary works** - in which he presents his moral philosophy and theological meditations.
- **Juridical works** - in which his reforms in Law are proposed.

Influence

**Science**

Bacon’s ideas were influential in the 1630s and 1650s among scholars, in particular Sir Thomas Browne, who in his encyclopaedia Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646–1672) frequently adheres to a Baconian approach to his scientific enquiries. During the Restoration, Bacon was commonly invoked as a guiding spirit of the Royal Society founded under Charles II in 1660.

Bacon is also considered to be the philosophical influence behind the dawning of the Industrial age. In his works, Bacon called for a “spring of a progeny of inventions, which shall overcome, to some extent, and subdue our needs and miseries”, always proposing that all scientific work should be done for charitable purposes, as matter of alleviating mankind’s misery, and that therefore science should be practical and have as purpose the inventing of useful things for the improvement of mankind’s estate. This changed the course of science in history, from a merely contemplative state, as it was found in ancient and medieval ages, to a practical, inventive state - that would have eventually led to the inventions that made possible the Industrial Revolutions of the following centuries.

The Industrial Revolution marks a major turning point in history. In the two centuries following 1800, the world’s average per capita income increased over tenfold, while the world’s population increased over sixfold. In the words of Nobel Prize winner Robert E. Lucas, Jr., “For the first time in history, the living standards of the masses of ordinary people have begun to undergo sustained growth ... Nothing remotely like this economic behavior has happened before”.

He also wrote a long treatise on Medicine, *History of Life and Death*, with natural and experimental observations for the prolongation of life.

For one of his biographers, Hepworth Dixon, Bacon’s influence in modern world is so great that every man who rides in a train, sends a telegram, follows a steam plough, sits in an easy chair, crosses the channel or the Atlantic, eats a good dinner, enjoys a beautiful garden, or undergoes a painless surgical operation, owes him something.
In the nineteenth century his emphasis on induction was revived and developed by William Whewell, among others. He has been reputed as the “Father of Experimental Science”.

North America

Some authors believe that Bacon’s vision for a Utopian New World in North America was laid out in his novel New Atlantis, which depicts a mythical island, Bensalem, located somewhere between Peru and Japan. In this work he depicted a land where there would be freedom of religion - showing a Jew treated fairly and equally in an island of Christians, but it has been debated whether this work had influenced others reforms, such as greater rights for women, the abolition of slavery, elimination of debtors’ prisons, separation of church and state, and freedom of political expression, although there is no hint of these reforms in The New Atlantis itself. His propositions of legal reform (which were not established in his life time), though, are considered to have been one of the influences behind the Napoleonic Code, and therefore could show some resemblance with or influence in the drafting of other liberal constitutions that came in the centuries after Bacon’s lifetime, such as the American.

Francis Bacon played a leading role in creating the British colonies, especially in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Newfoundland in northeastern Canada. His government report on “The Virginia Colony” was submitted in 1609. In 1610 Bacon and his associates received a charter from the king to form the Tresurer and the Compayre of Adventurers and planter of the Cityye of London and Bristoll for the Collonye or plantacon in Newfoundlend and sent John Guy to found a colony there. In 1910 Newfoundland issued a postage stamp to commemorate Bacon’s role in establishing the province. The stamp describes Bacon as, “the guiding spirit in Colonization Schemes in 1610.” Moreover, some scholars believe he was largely responsible for the drafting, in 1609 and 1612, of two charters of government for the Virginia Colony. Biography Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the United States and author of the Declaration of Independence, wrote: ”Bacon, Locke and Newton. I consider them as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral sciences”. Historian and biographer William Hepworth Dixon considered that Bacon’s name could be included in the list of Founders of the United States of America.

It is also believed by the Rosicrucian organization AMORC, that Bacon would have influenced a settlement of mystics in North America, stating that his work “The New Atlantis” inspired a colony of Rosicrucians led by Johannes Kelpius, to journey across the Atlantic Ocean in a chartered vessel called Sarah Mariah, and move on to Pennsylvania in late XVII Century. According to their claims, these rosicrucian communities “made valuable contributions to the newly emerging American culture in the fields of printing, philosophy, the sciences and arts”.

Johannes Kelpius and his fellows moved to Wissahickon Creek, in Pennsylvania, and became known as “Hermit of Mystics of the Wissahickon” or simply “Monks of the Wissahickon”.

Law

Although much of his legal reform proposals were not established in his life time, his legal legacy was considered by the magazine New Scientist, in a publication of 1961, as having influenced the drafting of the Code Napoleon, and the law reforms introduced by Sir Robert Peel.

The historian William Hepworth Dixon referred to the Code Napoleon as “the sole embodiment of Bacon’s thought”, saying that Bacon’s legal work “has had more success abroad than it has found at home”, and that in France “it has blossomed and come into fruit”.

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The scholar Harvey Wheeler attributed to Bacon, in his work “Francis Bacon’s Verulamium - the Common Law Template of The Modern in English Science and Culture”, the creation of these distinguishing features of the modern common law system:

- Using cases as repositories of evidence about the “unwritten law”;
- Determining the relevance of precedents by exclusionary principles of evidence and logic;
- Treating opposing legal briefs as adversarial hypotheses about the application of the “unwritten law” to a new set of facts.

As late as the eighteenth-century some juries still declared the law rather than the fact, but already before the end of the seventeenth century Sir Matthew Hale explained modern common law adjudication procedure and acknowledged Bacon as the inventor of the process of discovering unwritten laws from the evidences of their applications. The method combined empiricism and inductivism in a new way that was to imprint its signature on many of the distinctive features of modern English society.

In brief, Bacon is considered by some jurists to be the father of modern Jurisprudence. Political scientist James McClellan, from the University of Virginia, considered Bacon to have had “a great following” in the American colonies.

**Self-Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Bacon had the goals ...............
   
   (a) To uncover truth  
   (b) To serve his country  
   (c) To serve his church  
   (d) All of these

   (ii) The King created Bacon Baron Verulam, of Verulam, in the Peerage of England on ...............

   (a) 14th July, 1615  
   (b) 12th June, 1618  
   (c) 12th July, 1618  
   (d) None of these

   (iii) The Government’s report on ‘the Virginia Colony’ was submitted in ...............

   (a) 1609  
   (b) 1705  
   (c) 1805  
   (d) 1510

   (iv) The magazine ‘New Scientist’ was published in ...............

   (a) 1961  
   (b) 1960  
   (c) 1958  
   (d) 1962

2.4 **Summary**

- It was at Cambridge that he first met Queen Elizabeth, who was impressed by his precocious intellect, and was accustomed to calling him “the young Lord Keeper”.
- Bacon had three goals: to uncover truth, to serve his country, and to serve his church.
- On 12 July 1618 the king created Bacon **Baron Verulam**, of Verulam, in the Peerage of England.
- In the nineteenth century his emphasis on induction was revived and developed by William Whewell, among others. He has been reputed as the “Father of Experimental Science”.
- **History of Life and Death**, with natural and experimental observations for the prolongation of life.
- Johannes Kelpius and his fellows moved to Wissahickon Creek, in Pennslyvania, and became known as “Hermit of Mystics of the Wissahickon” or simply “Monks of the Wissahickon”.
2.5 Key-Words

1. Baconian method: This method developed by Sir Francis Bacon. It means the ability to gradually generalise a finding based on accumulating data—he advised proceeding by this method.

2. Exerterate: To remove the contents of a part of the body especially the orbit of the eye or the paranasal sinuses.

2.6 Review Questions

1. Explain Francis Bacon as a Philosopher.
2. Bacon’s essays reflect his deep understanding of human nature and ripe experiences of life. Discuss.
3. What are the three goals of Bacon?
4. Discuss Bacon’s life and works.

Answers: Self-Assessment
1. (i) (d) (ii) (c) (iii) (a) (iv) (a)

2.7 Further Readings

Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Understand the essay Of Studies.
• Make the critical analysis of the essay ‘Of Studies’.

Introduction

Of Studies is the first essay of the first collection of ten essays of Francis Bacon which was published in 1597. But it was revised for the edition of 1612. More than dozen new sentences were added and some words were also altered. Of Studies is typically Baconian essay with an astonishing terseness, freshness of illustrations, logical analysis, highly Latinized vocabulary, worldly wisdom and Renaissance enlightenment.

The purpose of this work is to analyze Sixteen Century Francis Bacon’s essay “Of Studies” by summarizing its main points and the relevance of its statements to this day. Francis Bacon was an English Philosopher and writer best known as a founder of the modern empirical tradition based on the rational analysis of data obtained by observation and experimentation of the physical world.

Of Studies contains almost all the techniques of Bacon’s essay writing and the world of his mind. It is full of wisdom, teachings and didacticism. In style, the essay is epigrammatic proverbial form, of balance and force. It is full of warmth and colour, profound wit and knowledge, experience and observation.

3.1 Text-Of Studies

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment, and disposition of business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars, one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study;
and studies themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments, and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know, that he doth not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend. Abeunt studia in mores. Nay, there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies; like as diseases of the body, may have appropriate exercises. Bowling is good for the stone and reins; shooting for the lungs and breast; gentle walking for the stomach; riding for the head; and the like. So if a man’s wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the Schoolmen; for they are cymi sectores. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyers’ cases. So every defect of the mind, may have a special receipt.

Many have an opinion not wise, that for a prince to govern his estate, or for a great person to govern his proceedings, according to the respect of factions, is a principal part of policy; whereas contrariwise, the chiefest wisdom, is either in ordering those things which are general, and wherein men of several factions do nevertheless agree; or in dealing with correspondence to particular persons, one by one. But I say not that the considerations of factions, is to be neglected. Mean men, in their rising, must adhere; but great men, that have strength in themselves, were better to maintain themselves indifferent, and neutral. Yet even in beginners, to adhere so moderately, as he be a man of the one faction, which is most passable with the other, commonly giveth best way. The lower and weaker faction, is the firmer in conjunction; and it is often seen, that a few that are stiff, do tire out a greater number, that are more moderate. When one of the factions is extinguished, the remaining subdivideth; as the faction between Lucullus, and the rest of the nobles of the senate (which they called Optimates) held out awhile, against the faction of Pompey and Caesar; but when the senate’s authority was pulled down, Caesar and Pompey soon after brake. The faction or party of Antonius and Octavianus Caesar, against Brutus and Cassius, held out likewise for a time; but when Brutus and Cassius were overthrown, then soon after, Antonius and Octavianus brake and subdivided. These examples are of wars, but the same holdeth in private factions. And therefore, those that are seconds in factions, do many times, when the faction subdivideth, prove principals; but many times also, they prove ciphers and cashiered; for many a man’s strength is in opposition; and when that faileth, he groweth out of use. It is commonly seen, that men, once placed, take in with the contrary faction, to that by which they enter: thinking belike, that they have the first sure, and now are ready for a new purchase. The traitor in faction, lightly goeth
away with it; for when matters have stuck long in balancing, the winning of some one man casteth them, and he getteth all the thanks. The even carriage between two factions, proceedeth not always of moderation, but of a trueness to a man’s self, with end to make use of both. Certainly in Italy, they hold it a little suspect in popes, when they have often in their mouth Padre commune: and take it to be a sign of one, that meaneth to refer all to the greatness of his own house. Kings had need beware, how they side themselves, and make themselves as of a faction or party; for leagues within the state, are ever pernicious to monarchies: for they raise an obligation, paramount to obligation of sovereignty, and make the king tanquam unus ex nobis; as was to be seen in the League of France. When factions are carried too high and too violently, it is a sign of weakness in princes; and much to the prejudice, both of their authority and business. The motions of factions under kings ought to be, like the motions (as the astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may have their proper motions, but yet still are quietly carried, by the higher motion of primum mobile.

Did you know? Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.

He that is only real, had need have exceeding great parts of virtue; as the stone had need to be rich, that is set without foil. But if a man mark it well, it is, in praise and commendation of men, as it is in gettings and gains: for the proverb is true, That light gains make heavy purses; for light gains come thick, whereas great, come but now and then. So it is true, that small matters win great commendation, because they are continually in use and in note: whereas the occasion of any great virtue, cometh but on festivals. Therefore it doth much add to a man’s reputation, and is (as Queen Isabella said) like perpetual letters commendatory, to have good forms. To attain them, it almost sufficeth not to despise them; for so shall a man observe them in others; and let him trust himself with the rest. For if he labor too much to express them, he shall lose their grace; which is to be natural and unaffected. Some men’s behavior is like a verse, wherein every syllable is measured; how can a man comprehend great matters, that breaketh his mind too much, to small observations? Not to use ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to use them again; and so diminisheth respect to himself; especially they be not to be omitted, to strangers and formal natures; but the dwelling upon them, and exalting them above the moon, is not only tedious, but doth diminish the faith and credit of him that speaks. And certainly, there is a kind of conveying, of effectual and imprinting passages amongst compliments, which is of singular use, if a man can hit upon it. Amongst a man’s peers, a man shall be sure of familiarity; and therefore it is good, a little to keep state. Amongst a man’s inferiors one shall be sure of reverence; and therefore it is good, a little to be familiar. He that is too much in anything, so that he giveth another occasion of satiety, maketh himself cheap. To apply one’s self to others, is good; so it be with demonstration, that a man doth it upon regard, and not upon facility. It is a good precept generally, in seconding another, yet to add somewhat of one’s own: as if you will grant his opinion, let it be with some distinction; if you will follow his motion, let it be with condition; if you allow his counsel, let it be with alleging further reason. Men had need beware, how they be too perfect in compliments; for be they never so sufficient otherwise, their enviers will be sure to give them that attribute, to the disadvantage of their greater virtues. It is loss also in business, to be too full of respects, or to be curious, in observing times and opportunities. Solomon saith, He that considereth the wind, shall not sow, and he that looketh to the clouds, shall not reap. A wise man will make more opportunities, than he finds. Men’s behavior should be, like their apparel, not too strait or point device, but free for exercise or motion.
3.2 Critical Analysis

The main focus of Bacon’s essay rests on explaining to the reader the importance of study knowledge in terms of its practical application towards the individual and its society. Bacon through a syllogistic tripartite statement begins his argument to validate the usefulness and advantage of study in our life. Bacon has the power of compressing into a few words a great body of thought. Thus he puts forward the three basic purposes of studies: “Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability”. He later expands his sentence to bring lucidity and clearness. Studies fill us delight and aesthetic pleasure when we remain private and solitary. While we discourse, our studies add decoration to our speech. Further, the men of study can decide best on the right lines in business and politics. Bacon deprecates too much studies and the scholar’s habit to make his judgment from his reading instead of using his independent views.

Bacon is a consummate artist of Renaissance spirit. Thus he knows the expanse of knowledge and utility of studies. He advocates a scientific enquiry of studies. Through an exquisite metaphor drawn from Botany he compares human mind to a growing plant. As the growing plants need to be pruned and watered and manured for optimum development, the new growing conscience of us are to be tutored, mounded, oriented and devised by studies. But it is experience which ultimately matures our perception and leads us to perfection:

“They perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants that need pruning by study”.

Next Bacon considers what persons despise studies and what people praise them and what people make practical use of them. The crafty men condemn studies; simple men admire them while the wise men make ultimate use of it. But it should be remembered that the inquisitive mind and keen observation cultivate the real wisdom. Bacon advises his readers to apply studies to ‘weigh and consider’ rather than useless contradictions and grandiloquence.

In The Advancement of Learning Bacon makes systematic classifications of studies and considers different modes to be employed with different kinds of books: “Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed and some few to be chewed and digested”.

![Did u know?] Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.

The books according to its value and utility are to be devised into various modes of articulations. The worthy classical pragmatic sort are to be adorned by expertise reading with diligence while the meaner sort of books or less important books are to be read in summary or by deputy. Again the global span of knowledge is revealed in his analysis of various subjects and their beneficent categories. The scholarly mind of Bacon here makes the subtle observation:

“Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural philosophy deep; moral grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend”.

Studies do not shape a perfect man without the needed conference and writing. “And therefore if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth’ not”. Bacon further tells us that our studies pass into our character (Abeunt studia in mores). Rightly so the constitution of our moral disposition is the outcome of our learning and experience.

Every defect of the mind, Bacon says, may be cured by a proper choice of reading. Bacon here draws a parallel between the physical exercise and intellectual exercise. As different games, sports,
exercises beget growth and development, the different branches of studies cures the in capability of logic, wondering of wit, lack of distinguish etc. Bacon emphatically concludes that every defect of the mind may have a special receipt and remedial assurance.

His first analysis is an exposition on the purposes or uses that different individuals can have by approaching Study – "...for delight, ornament, and for ability". And how certain professions are better served by individuals with study knowledge. As he mentions the virtues of Study he also points out its vices: "To spend too much time in study is sloth..." Also, how Study influences our understanding of Nature, and in opposition, how our experience of Nature bounds our acquired knowledge. After that, the Author presents the concept of how different individuals with different mental abilities and interests in life, approach the idea of studying.

"Crafty men contempt studies..." and offers advice on how study should be applied: "...but to weight and consider". Then Bacon goes into expressing his ideas in how the means to acquire study knowledge, books, can be categorized and read according to their content and value to the individual. The benefits of studying are Bacon’s final approach. Benefits in terms of defining a "Man" by its ability to read, write or confer, and in terms of being the medicine for any "impediment in the wit" and by giving "receipts" to "every defect of the mind".

Certainly, some of Francis Bacon’s insights in this subject are of value after 400 years of societal evolution. We can ascertain this when we read the phrase “They perfect Nature, and are perfected by experience...” Nevertheless some of the concepts expressed in his Essay have to be understood through the glass of time. By this I mean Society values and concepts were different altogether to what we know today. By that time Society was strongly influenced by the idea of literacy and illiteracy (relatively few were educated and could read and write). Only educated people had access to knowledge and by that, to social status and opportunity. Nowadays would be difficult to accept ideas which relate skills or professions towards an attitude to approach studying. Today, a skilled machinist or carpenter can certainly be a studied person. Nowadays most people in our Society have the possibility to read and by that, to obtain knowledge independently of what our personal choices are in terms of profession. Also we must consider how today we value the specialization of knowledge which in the past, characterized by a more generic and limited access to knowledge, wasn’t a major factor into the conceptualization and understanding of study knowledge as to the extent we see it today.

Finally, it is doubtful that the benefits of studying can be approached as a recipe for any “intellectual illness”. We now know that the real illnesses are related to mental conditions and not necessarily to our mental skills, abilities or lack of them and by that I mean that Bacon’s solutions to those conditions are substantially naïve under the actual understanding of Human Psychology. Concepts and ideas evolve at the same time as the Human condition changes in all social, scientific, political and economic aspects. By looking through the glass of time and comparing the past to the present we come to the realization of the universality and endurance of some concepts and the fragility and impermanence of some others.

Self-Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Of Studies was published in ............ .
      (a) 1597  (b) 1600
      (c) 1585  (d) 1590
   (ii) Of Studies is the ............. essay of the first collections of ten essays.
      (a) Second  (b) First
      (c) Third   (d) Fourth
3.3 Summary

- Francis Bacon was an English Philosopher and writer best known as a founder of the modern empirical tradition based on the rational analysis of data obtained by observation and experimentation of the physical world.

- The main focus of Bacon’s essay rests on explaining to the reader the importance of study knowledge in terms of its practical application towards the individual and its society.

- Bacon is a consummate artist of Renaissance spirit.

- The benefits of studying are Bacon’s final approach.

- In his essay entitled Of Studies, Francis Bacon examines the benefits and effects of studies, maintaining that when studies are balanced by experience, diverse studies may help counteract personal imperfections.

- Bacon proposes that study may be done for three purposes: for one’s own entertainment, such as reading book on a favorite author, to impress others and bring attention to oneself, such as by touting one’s academic accomplishments in hopes of gaining a pretty girl’s admiration, or to gain competence and proficiency, an example would be by studying for an upcoming exam.

- Too much study may be considered a downfall, as the individual studying may be considered by others to be self-indulgent or even lazy if they appear to be studying and not much else. Just to do what books tell you to do and nothing else is characteristic of an academic/bookish individual.

- Studying alone is insufficient; learning must also be accompanied by real life experience, as they are counter-balances of one another. Abilities are strengthened and capabilities balanced by studies.

- Cunning individuals regard studies with contempt because concepts learned from books might thwart their devious goals; unpretentious individuals admire studies because they themselves may have had little opportunity for study, and an astute individual makes good use of studies and knowledge gained by studying as a tool to glean more information.

- Study and take time to meditate on the information learned rather than taking what is learned as gospel, or arguing about the information, even discussing it.

- Three types of literature that are widely available include that which is be read in parts and not spent a lot of time on, that which is to be read through and enjoyed, and that which is to be read thoroughly with attention and sincerity.

- Studying makes people complete, discussion makes a prepared person, and writing makes an exact person by communicating well.
3.4 Key-Words

1. Abridgment : Miniature
2. Absurd : Stupid, unpolished
3. Abuse : Cheat, deceive
4. Aculeate : Stinging

3.5 Review Questions

1. Bacon says that only a few books are to be “chewed and digested.” What books would be on your list in this category? Why would you include them?

2. Bacon says that too much studying is laziness. Do you agree? Explain how this paradox, or seeming contradiction, can be true.

3. Bacon had the reputation of being a hard, ambitious man, and his essays are frequently said to be cynical and lacking in warmth. Find remarks in “Of Studies” that could support this view. How did you feel about the person behind this essay?

4. Bacon’s fondness for parallel structure and balanced sentences is apparent in “Of Studies.” For example: “Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” Find and read aloud other examples of Bacon’s parallelism and balance.

5. Why do you read? Compare your reasons with Bacon’s arguments for reading.

6. What passages in “Of Studies” do you think could apply especially well to today’s arguments about the value of education?

7. “Of Studies” was written almost four hundred years ago. Are any of its points dated? Do you disagree with anything Bacon says?

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (b) (iii) (c) (iv) (d)

3.6 Further Readings

Unit 4: Francis Bacon—Of Truth: Detailed Study

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Objectives
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4.4 Review Questions
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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Discuss Bacon as a thinker.
• Explain the essay ‘Of Truth’.

Introduction
As a pragmatic and as an empirical thinker Bacon subscribed two fundamental Renaissance ideals—Sepantia (search for knowledge) and Eloquentia (the art of rhetoric). Here in the essay Of Truth he supplements his search for truth by going back to the theories of the classical thinkers and also by taking out analogies from everyday life. It is to be noted here that his explication of the theme is impassioned and he succeeds in providing almost neutral judgements on the matter. Again, it is seen that Bacon’s last essays, though written in the same aphoristic manner, stylistically are different in that he supplied more analogies and examples to support or explain his arguments. As this essay belongs to the latter group, we find ample analogies and examples. Bacon, while explaining the reasons as to why people evade truth, talks of the Greek philosophical school of sceptics, set up by Pyrro. Those philosophers would question the validity of truth and constantly change their opinions. Bacon says that now people are like those philosophers with the important difference that they lack their force and tenacity of argument. He says that like him the Greek philosopher Lucian was equally puzzled at the fact that people are more attracted to lies and are averse to truth. Bacon is surprised by the fact that people are loathed to find out or even acknowledge truth in life. It seems to him that this is an innate human tendency to do so. He finds evidence in support of his arguments in the behaviour of the ancient Greek sceptics who used to question the validity of truth and would have no fixed beliefs. Bacon thinks that people behave like those philosophers. But he understands that they lack their strength of arguments. He then finds the Greek philosopher Lucian, while considering the matter, was equally baffled. Lucian investigated and found that poets like lies because those provides pleasure, and that businessmen have to tell lies for making profit. But he could not come to a definite conclusion as to why people should love lies. Bacon says that men love falsehood because truth is like the bright light of the day and would show up pomp and splendour of human life for what they are. They look attractive and colourful in the dim light of lies. Men prefer to cherish illusions, which make life more interesting. Bacon here gives an interesting analogy of truth and falsehood. He says that the value of truth is like that of a pearl, which shines best in the day-light, while a lie is like a diamond or carbuncle, which shines best producing varied rays in dim light of candles. He comes to the conclusion that people
love falsehood because it produces imaginary pleasure about life. Bacon also examines the statement of one of the early Church authorities, which severely condemned poetry as the wine of the devils. Bacon here shows that even the highest art of man—poetry, is composed of lies. He seems to have compounded the two statements made by two early Christian thinkers. The equation is that, since the devil or Satan works by falsehood, lies are its food. Poetry tends to be Satanic because it resorts to falsehood while producing artistic pleasure. Bacon, however, makes a distinction here between poetic untruth and fascination with falsehood in everyday life. He thinks that poetic untruth is not harmful, as it does not leave lasting impressions on the mind and character of a person. On the other hand, the lies, which are embedded in the mind and control and regulate every thought and action of a person, are harmful. Bacon refers to the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, beautifully expressed by the famous poet of that school, Lucretius, who considered the realization of truth to be the highest pleasure of life. Bacon says that the value of truth is understood by those who have experienced it. The inquiry, knowledge and the belief of truth are the highest achievements that human beings can pursue. He amplifies the matter by giving an analogy from the Bible. Bacon here interestingly comments that, since he finished the work of Creation, God has been diffusing the light of His spirit in mankind. He supports his argument by referring to the Epicurean theory of pleasure beautifully expressed by Lucretius who held that there is no greater pleasure than that given by the realization of truth. The summit of truth cannot be conquered and there is tranquility on this peak from which one can survey the errors and follies of men as they go through their trials; but this survey should not fill the watcher with pity and not with pride. The essence of heavenly life on this earth lies in the constant love of charity, an unshakable trust in God, and steady allegiance to truth. At the concluding section of the essay Bacon explains the value of truth in civil affairs of life. He is conscious of the fact that civil life goes on with both truth and falsehood. He feels that the mixture of falsehood with truth may sometimes turn out to be profitable. But it shows the inferiority of the man who entertains it. This is, he says, like the composition of an alloy, which is stronger but inferior in purity. He then compares this kind of way of life to that of a serpent, which is a symbol of Satan itself. Bacon finds a striking similarity between the crooked and mean devices adopted by people and the zigzag movements of a serpent. To clarify his point more clearly, Bacon quotes Montaigne who said that a man, who tells lies, is afraid of his fellow men but is unafraid of God who is all perceiving. Bacon concludes his arguments by saying that falsehood is the height of wickedness, and such that it will invite the wrath of God on Doomsday.

He agrees with St Augustine who criticized poetry as “the wine of error”, and with Hironymous, who condemned poetry as “the food of demons”.

4.1 Essay–Of Truth

What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be, that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits, which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them, as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor, which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians, examineth the matter, and is at a stand, to think what should be in it, that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell; this same truth, is a naked, and open day-light, that doth not
show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs, of the world, half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds, of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum doemonum, because it filleth the imagination; and yet, it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt; such as we spake of before. But, howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments, and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense; the last, was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since, is the illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light, upon the face of the matter or chaos; then he breathed light, into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light, into the face of his chosen. The poet, that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: It is a pleasure, to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure, to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling, or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth. To pass from theological, and philosophical truth, to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged, even by those that practise it not, that clear, and round dealing, is the honor of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehoods, is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding, and crooked courses, are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice, that doth so cover a man with shame, as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason, why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge? Saith he, If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much to say, as that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood, and breach of faith, cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal, to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men; it being foretold, that when Christ cometh, he shall not find faith upon the earth.

According to him, God created the light of the senses first so that men could see the world around them. The last thing he created, according to him, was the light of reason, that is, the rational faculty.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Sepantia means
      
      (a) Search for knowledge          (b) The art of rhetoric
     
     (c) Judgment on the matter        (d) None of these
(ii) ............ criticized poetry as “the wine of error
(a) St. Augustine (b) Hironymous
(c) Bacon (d) None of these

(iii) Who condemned poetry as “the food of demons”?
(a) Hazlit (b) Charles Lamb
(c) Jesting Pilate (d) Hironymous

(iv) According to Bacon, the first creature of God was the
(a) Truth (b) Coin of Gold
(c) Light of reason (d) None of these

4.2 Summary
• “Of Truth” raises the interesting problem of our difficulty in defining lies, especially when we consider theology as a view with a higher and more profound standard of truth than mere mortal philosophy. More dangerously, he speculates “A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure” (1259). When moving into ordinary language of “civil business” (see the preface regarding his career!), he turns openly censorious of lies, even though such a world is obviously full of them.
• He agrees with St Augustine who criticized poetry as “the wine of error”, and with Hironymous, who condemned poetry as “the food of demons”.
• According to him, God created the light of the senses first so that men could see the world around them.

4.3 Key-Words
1. Sepantia : Search for knowledge
2. Eloquentia : the art of rhetoric

4.4 Review Questions
1. Discuss the Essay ‘of Truth’
2. Bacon raises the interesting problems of our difficulty through ‘Of Truth’. Discuss
3. Discuss Bacon as a pragmatic thinker.

Answers: Self-Assessment
1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (d) (iv) (c)

4.5 Further Readings
Unit 5: Francis Bacon - Of Truth: Critical Analysis

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5.5 Further Readings

Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Analyse Bacon’s Essay ‘Of Truth’.

Introduction
Bacon’s essay Of Truth is, considered as an apology for poetical fiction, and for the masking and mumming of his theatre, on the score of man’s absolute love of lies, and hatred of truth. The modern love of novels is a very strong corroboration of this statement. Put a profound truth in the form of a problem novel and thousands will read it, attracted by its outward dress, whereas written as a treatise it would attract little attention! How many readers have Lord Bacon’s works compared to the plays attributed to Shakespeare!

5.1 Of Truth-Critical Analysis
It is very important to observe that Bacon’s essay Of Truth occupies the first or foremost place in the collection. Also that this essay opens and concludes with the allusion to our Savior, who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life. Bacon commences with the words “What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.” And the essay ends with the words, “Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgment of God upon the generations of men. It being foretold that when Christ cometh He shall not find faith upon the earth.” This is repeated in the essay “Of Counsel.”

It is worthy of note, too, what Bacon says of Pilate, that he “would not stay for an answer” implying that there was an answer, but that he did not want to hear it, and this is often the attitude of the world towards any problem that offends its prejudices, rouses its passions, or dares to challenge its universal consent upon some echoed tradition which has never hitherto been looked into or examined. In his essay “Of Atheism,” Bacon points out, how the judgment is prejudiced by the feelings or affections, and how the mind is deprived of free judgment by the inclinations of the heart.

“The Scripture saith, ‘The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God’; it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart,’ so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it or be persuaded of it.”

This equally applies to the nature of all human beliefs that are allied by custom with consent and sentiment – and perhaps most of all to the opposers of the Bacon authorship of the plays. They,
like Pilate, “will not stay for an answer,” or give a “learning patience” to the problem, and in their hearts declare the theory a heresy, a foolish fad, an impossibility.

Mark Twain has recently drawn a parallel, comparing Shakespeare to Satan, and there is something in it, for all denial is of the badge of Antichrist; and has not the great German poet, Goethe described Mephistopheles (and his followers?) with the words “der stets verneint,”—who everlasting denies? After all, rebutting evidence is always easier than proof, for the thing saves trouble if one only takes one’s ignorance seriously, or affirmatively, setting up for a judge instead of a learner, and imagining a faculty of not knowing can be a criterion for passing judgments upon new discoveries.

“Coming in a man’s own name,” Bacon declares, “is no infallible sign of truth. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth.” Veni in nomine patris, nec recipitis me; si quis venetit in nomine suo, eum recipietis (I came in the name of the Father, but ye did not receive Me; if any one shall come in his own name, him ye receive).

But in this divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely, to Antichrist, the highest deceiver) we may discern well that the coming in a man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an eum recipietis” (and book Advancement of Learning, p.99).

Therefore the coming of Shakespeare in his own name, although he has been received without question, is not an infallible sign of truth. In Aphorism 84 of the first book of the Novum Organum: “Again men have been kept back as by a kind of enchantment from progress in the sciences, by reverence for antiquity, by the authority of men accounted great in philosophy, and then by general consent. And with regard to authority it shows a feeble mind to grant so much to authors, and yet deny Time his rights, who is the author of authors, nay, rather of all authority. For rightly is truth called the daughter of time.”

By “consent” Bacon means, the world’s general or universal assent, or tradition; as, for example, that Shakespeare is the author of the 1623 Folio plays. The world often mistakes echoes for volume, and there is the popular fallacy that counting of heads is proof of truth. But in matters intellectual it is not as with physical power or wealth—there is no aggregate or arithmetical sum total, as, for example, when men pull on a rope or heap up money. But it is rather as in a race, where only a few can be first, and there is no addition of speeds.

Hear Bacon: “For the worst of all auguries is from consent in matters intellectual (Divinity excepted, and politics where there is right of vote). For nothing pleases the many unless it strikes the imagination, or binds the understanding with the bonds of common notions” (Aphorism 77, Novum Organum).

Therefore the saying, “That the world says, or the world believes,” though to be respected, is not final, and should not deter us from examining anew problems which the past generations had probably no time or curiosity to question. Besides, as Bacon says, in this essay Of Truth,

“ The first creature of God, in the work of the days, was the light of the senses, the last was the light of reason; and His Sabbath work ever since is the illumination of His Spirit.”

The Vedas say, “In the midst of the sun is the light, in the midst of light is truth, and in the midst of truth is the imperishable Being.” “ Truth,” says Chaucer, “is the highest thing that man can keep.” In this essay of Truth Bacon says,

“ One of the late school of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets; nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lies sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open day light, that doth not show the masques, and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily as candle lights.”
Compare Omar Khayam on the world as a theatre by candle-light: “For in and out, above, about, below, ‘Tis nothing but a Magic Shadow Show, Play’d in a box whose candle is the sun, Round which we phantom figures come and go!”

*Bacon continues,*

“Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.”

Observe the apology for poetical fiction in this passage, which presently we find repeated with something of an explanation:

“One of the Fathers, in great severity, called poesy *vinum daemonum* (the wine of the devils), because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with *the shadow of a lie.*”

That is to say, poetical fiction or invention, although it obscures truth, or veils it, is not all falsehood, and all parabolical poetry *shadows,* under tropes of similitude’s, a concealed meaning of truth. It would seem, then, that this essay *Of Truth* is a sort of apology for the poetical veil, or masque of Truth, upon the score of man’s dislike, or incapability, of receiving unadulterated truth itself? Bacon uses the expression “I cannot tell” to excuse himself explanation of the world’s love of lies. In the play of Richard III the same phrase in introduced, together with what would seem to answer the question in context with it:— “I cannot tell: the world is grown so bad that wrens may prey where eagles dare not perch.” (I. 3).

Christ exclaimed “That the world cannot receive truth,” and Bacon implies the same thing, and he then proceeds to explain that the disguises and actings of the world’s stage are better adapted, *than* the searchlight of open daylight, for the half-lights of the theatre. If the reader will turn to the essay entitled *Of Masques and Triumphs,* he will find complete proof that this is an allusion to the stage in the essay *Of Truth.* And it would seem as if there existed some sort of antithesis between these two essays, i.e., the world’s love of pleasure is so great, “Satis alter alteri magnum theatrum sumus” (We are sufficiently the great theatre of each other),—“All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players,” —and acting has little consonance with truth. Observe, too, in both essays there is the same allusion to candle-light.

In the plays candlelight is used as a metaphor for starlight:

“For by these blessed candles of the night.” (*Merchant of Venice,* V.i). “There’s husbandry in heaven; Their candles are all out.” (*Macbeth* II. i). Night’s candles are burnt out.” (*Romeo and Juliet* III.5). See Sonnet 21, “As those gold candles fixed in heaven’s air.”

This point seems to me very pertinent to the entire subject of the essay (and authorship of the plays), and is a hint of the very first importance as to whether Bacon wore a mask known as Shakespear. But the introduction of this subject, in connection with poetry, and with an apology for the poets’ “shadow of a lie,” on account of the pleasure afforded by the dainty shows of the theatre, seen by candlelight, is a hint that only the most obstinately blind or obtuse person can decline to perceive. The first Masque, in England, was held at Greenwich Palace (where King Henry the Eighth was born), “the first disguise (in the year 1513, on the day of the Epiphany), after the manner of Italy called a *Masque,* a thing not seen afore in England.” In *Love’s Labour Lost* we have a masque introduced, and also scene in *King Henry the Eighth* where the royal dancers are masked. Triumphs were processional pageants, or shows by Torchlight. Bacon is telling us that man does not care about abstract truth, and when he says men do not care for open daylight, he is speaking very truly. For he points out that “*the archflatterer* with whom all the petty flatterers have intelligence, is a man’s self” (essay *Of Love*). And in this essay *Of Truth*:

“A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the
like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?"

This is as much as to say, that most men “walk in a vain show,” and are actors, i.e., play up rather to the parts they imagine they possess, than are what they really are by nature. In the essay Of Love, Bacon says

“It is a poor saying of Epicurus, “We are a sufficiently great theatre to each other” . That Bacon should introduce this saying of Seneca (to be found in his Epistles, Moral I., 17) in the essay Of Love is not strange. For Bacon knew that love is one of the greatest of actors (and cause of acting) in life, as well as the motive for stage comedies in the theatre. He writes, “The stage is more beholding to love than the life of man. For as to the stage, love is ever a matter of Comedies, and now and then of tragedies. It is strange to note the excess of this passion; and how it braves the nature and value of things, that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but love.”

The ancients painted Cupid blind, because people in love are deprived of reason and sound judgment, and see everything by a candlelight of glamour an illusion, where all is appearance, as in a theatre. The lover conceals his real character, and pretends to all sorts of parts which he plays in order to attract the one beloved, just, as in natural selection, we find at the courting season, male birds spreading their peacock feathers to attract the female, that is to say, this passion consists of every sort of exaggeration both in action and in speech, which, to the onlooker, is ever a source of amusement and comedy because of its divagation from all semblance of truth. Observe how Bacon classes love with envy:

“ There be none of the affections which have been noted to fascinate, or bewitch, but love and envy.” He then makes this profound observation of envy, which is equally applicable to love :

“ A man that is busy and inquisitive is commonly envious..... therefore it must needs be, that he taketh a kind of play pleasure in looking upon the fortunes of others.” —essay Of Envy

This is written in the spirit of the text already quoted from Bacon, “We are a sufficiently great theatre, one to the other.”

That is to say, all life is a theatre, and it may be noted, that love, of all passions, is the one that attracts most attention from those within the circle, or theatre of its influence. People of all classes are everlastingly watching it, or contemplating it, or talking about it. For it brings with it other passions into play, such as envy, or jealousy, and often ends in the tragedies we read every day in the papers. In the 1st Book of the Advancement of Learning, Bacon once more quotes this saying with an apology which would seem to be pointed at himself:—

“Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more probably defended than truly denied, is that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact application ariseth from two causes— the one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person; for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man. We are sufficiently a great theatre to each other”.

It is very possible Bacon was thinking of Seneca, the dramatist, from whom he quotes this Latin saying (to whom he compares himself in the De Augmentis of 1623), particularly as he mentions him in the preceding paragraph but one. But this passage appears as an apology written for Bacon himself, who was a learned man after the pattern of Demosthenes and Cicero, whom he has just previously cited. He is covertly telling us he is a lover of the theatre—of the contemplation of life as a stage, but that he is not wise to tell us so. In the 2nd book of the Advancement of Learning he again introduces some part of the above passage, and this time directly pointed at himself:

“My hope is that, if my extreme love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that it is not granted to man to love and be wise” (p.75 2nd book Advancement).
I should like to point out that the poet is compared with lover in the *Midsummer’s Night Dream*, and in his essay *Of Truth* he says:

"But howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love making or wooing of it, the knowledge of of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it,— is the sovereign good of human nature." and from *Midsummer Night Dream*

“The lunatic, the lover, and the poet, Are of imagination all compact. One sees more devils than vast hell can hold; That is the madman. The Lover, all as frantic, Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt. The poet’s eye in a fine frenzy rolling doth glance From heaven to earth, from earth to heaven. And as imagination bodies forth the forms of things Unknown; the poet’s pen turns them to shapes, And gives to airy nothing a local habitation And a name.” Act V. i. Observe how Helen is compared to Cleopatra, and observe that we have in the lunatic’s and poet’s frenzy a hint for the divine madness connected with Bacchus, which was called mania, and which fury was sometimes the effect of wine. The lover, Bacon identifies with the madness (in his essay *Of Love*—"mad degree of love"). But it is poetic creation through love that Bacon is really thinking of, such as Plato describes the love of wisdom, the begetting the truth upon the body of beauty.

It is somewhat strange to consider how the true character of Bacon’s essay *Of Truth* has so long escaped discovery at the hands of critics— I mean the mingling, in this essay, of Truth and Poetry, and their interrelationship after the manner (to borrow a title from the German poet, Goethe) of *Warheit und Dichtung*. For the entire essay is an apology of the veils of poetry—that is to say, for its shadows and outlines, its bare suggestions, its parabolical character, its complete reserve. What I mean will be best understood by a study of Bacon’s introduction to the series of poetical and classical myths entitled *The Wisdom of the Ancients*, in which collection Bacon has endeavored to rationalize and explain away the shadows and veils in which the kernels of this ancient wisdom are enwrapped. His efforts to discover the true forms, hidden behind poetical fancy in these pieces, are just what he would have us apply to his theatre, with the help of his prose works. Just what Bacon, in his essay *Of Truth*, calls “a shadow of a lie,” constitutes the outward poetical garb of all myth containing inner meaning. “Aesop’s Fables” belong to this class of parable. *The Fox and the Grapes*, outwardly, is the shadow of a lie, which conveys (and veils at the same time) the inner moral truth—"We affect to despise everything unattainable."

Men being for the most part of the nature of children in their intellects, are only held and interested in sensible objects, and in pictures, or emblems, which poetry can present to their imagination. Two objects are served by creative poetry that embodies wisdom in poetic imagery and parable. It serves to preserve and to reveal. Like the fly embalmed in amber, great truths may be handed down to posterity and preserved intact through barbarous ages. The secrets of a society of learned men can thus be transmitted to after times. This indeed is living art, and probably it has been carried out to an almost incredible degree of perfection and completeness in the art we are now discussing.

“And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are. For it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitude’s.” (2nd book *Advancement of Learning, p. 153*)

Tennyson once made the remark “that the world was the shadow of God,” meaning that it not only argued, as all shadows do, a great light to produce shadow, but also concealed God. In Esdoras the dead are said to “flee the shadow of the world,” and “which are departed from the shadow of the world.” So, in like manner, I would suggest, Bacon’s theatre shadows a great rational interpretation, or revelation, with which latter Bacon has particularly identified his own unmasking in glory to man.
Bacon describes poesy (poetry) in respect of matter, (and not words), as, “one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as verse” — *Advancement*, p.90. So in the play of *As You Like It*, “The truest poetry is the most feigning.” That is to say, the *shadow of the lie* is only the envelope (Act III. ii) of the inward truth, or form, imprinted on it.

Schopenhauer called matter “a false truth,” and in parabolic poetry (which is the “shadow of a lie”), the vehicle of truth is the veil which shadows forth the truth. Spiritual truths are always immeasurably greater than their vehicles of utterance, and are those forms, or philosophical ideas, which are conveyed by means of poetic myth and fable.

“Truth in closet words shall fail, When truth embodied in a tale Shall enter in at lowly doors.” More than half the force of language, especially of poetical language, consists in its hints, suggestions, half-lights, which its words do not directly imply, yet habitually convey indirectly.

**Self-Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Of Truth is a sort of ............... for the poetical veil
   
   (a) Command     (b) Shadows
   (c) Apology      (d) None of these

   (ii) The remark ‘that the world was the shadow of God’ made by
   
   (a) Shakespeare (b) Tennyson
   (c) Bacon       (d) None of these

   (iii) The matter called as “a False truth” by
   
   (a) Tennyson    (b) Plato
   (c) Schopenhauer (d) None of these

   (iv) ‘The Fox and the Grapes is the
   
   (a) Wisdom     (b) Truth
   (c) Shadow of a life (d) None of these

**5.2 Summary**

- “Of Truth” raises the interesting problem of our difficulty in defining lies, especially when we consider theology as a view with a higher and more profound standard of truth than mere mortal philosophy. More dangerously, he speculates “A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure” (1259). When moving into ordinary language of “civil business” (see the preface regarding his career!), he turns openly censorious of lies, even though such a world is obviously full of them.

- In Francis Bacon’s “Of Truth”, why did Bacon say that truth may come to the price of a pearl instead of a diamond?

- Bacon’s essay *Of Truth* occupies the first or foremost place in the collection. Also that this essay opens and concludes with the allusion to our Savior, who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

- Bacon points out, how the judgment is prejudiced by the feelings or affections, and how the mind is deprived of free judgment by the inclinations of the heart.

- This equally applies to the nature of all human beliefs that are allied by custom with consent and sentiment — and perhaps most of all to the opposers of the Bacon authorship of the plays. They, like Pilate, “will not stay for an answer,” or give a “learning patience” to the problem, and in their hearts declare the theory a heresy, a foolish fad, an impossibility.
Notes

- Bacon describes poesy (poetry) in respect of matter, (and not words), as, “one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as verse” —Advancement, p.90. So in the play of As You Like It, “The truest poetry is the most feigning.”

5.3 Key-Words

1. Vinum daemonum : Wine of the devils

5.4 Review Questions

1. Do you see the apology for poetical fiction in the passage of Truth? Discuss.
2. Critically explain Bacon as essay Of Truth

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (c) (ii) (b) (iii) (c) (iv) (c)

5.5 Further Readings

Books

Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about the life and works of Charles Lamb
• Discuss Dream Children

Introduction
Charles Lamb was an English essayist, best known for his Essays of Elia and for the children’s book Tales from Shakespeare, which he produced with his sister, Mary Lamb. Lamb has been referred to by E.V. Lucas, his principal biographer, as the most lovable figure in English literature. Lamb was honoured by The Latymer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London where he lived for a time; it has six houses, one of which, “Lamb”, is named after Charles.

6.1 Biography
Charles Lamb was the youngest child of John Lamb, a lawyer’s clerk. He was born in the Inner Temple and spent his youth there, later going away to school at Christ’s Hospital. There he formed a friendship with Samuel Taylor Coleridge which would last for many years. After leaving school in 1789, he went to work for the South Sea House, whose subsequent downfall in a pyramid scheme after Lamb left would be contrasted to the company’s prosperity in the first Elia essay. In 1792 he went to work for British East India Company, the death of his father’s employer having ruined the family’s fortunes. Charles and his sister Mary both suffered periods of mental illness, and Charles spent six weeks in an psychiatric hospital during 1795. He was, however, already making his name as a poet.

In 1799, John Lamb died and Charles became guardian to Mary, whose mental instability prevented her from looking after herself. Lamb continued to work as a clerk for the East India Company and doubled as a writer in various genres, his tragedy, John Woodvil, being published in 1802. His farce, Mr H, was performed at Drury Lane in 1807. In the same year, Tales from Shakespeare (Charles handled the tragedies and Mary the comedies) was published, and became a best-seller for William Godwin’s “Children’s Library”.

Gowher Ahmad Naik, Lovely Professional University
Charles, who had never married because of his family commitments, fell in love with an actress, Fanny Kelly, of Covent Garden, but she refused him and he remained until his death a bachelor. His collected essays, under the title, Essays of Elia, were published in 1823 ("Elia" being the pen-name Lamb used as a contributor to The London Magazine). A further collection was published ten years later, shortly before Lamb's death. He died of an infection, erysipelas, contracted from a cut on his face. His sister, who was ten years his senior, survived him. Lamb was honoured by The Laytmer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London where he lived for a time; it has six houses, one of which, "Lamb", is named after Charles.

6.2 Youth and Schooling

Lamb was the son of Elizabeth Field and John Lamb. Lamb was the youngest child, with an 11 year older sister Mary, an even older brother John, and 4 other siblings who did not survive their infancy. John Lamb (father), who was a lawyer’s clerk, spent most of his professional life as the assistant and servant to a barrister by the name of Samuel Salt who lived in the Inner Temple in London. It was there in the Inner Temple in Crown Office Row, that Charles Lamb was born and spent his youth. Lamb created a portrait of his father in his “Elia on the Old Benchers” under the name Lovel. Lamb’s older brother was too much his senior to be a youthful companion to the boy but his sister Mary, being born eleven years before him, was probably his closest playmate. Lamb was also cared for by his paternal aunt Hetty, who seems to have had a particular fondness for him. A number of writings by both Charles and Mary suggest that the conflict between Aunt Hetty and her sister-in-law created a certain degree of tension in the Lamb household. However, Charles speaks fondly of her and her presence in the house seems to have brought a great deal of comfort to him.

Some of Lamb’s fondest childhood memories were of time spent with Mrs. Field, his maternal grandmother, who was for many years a servant to the Plummer family, who owned a large country house called Blakesware, near Widford, Hertfordshire. After the death of Mrs. Plummer, Lamb’s grandmother was in sole charge of the large home and, as Mr. Plummer was often absent, Charles had free rein of the place during his visits. A picture of these visits can be glimpsed in the Elia essay Blakesmoor in H—shire.

“Why, every plank and panel of that house for me had magic in it. The tapestried [sic] bed-rooms – tapestry so much better than painting – not adorning merely, but peopling the wainscots – at which childhood ever and anon would steal a look, shifting its coverlid (replaced as quickly) to exercise its tender courage in a momentary eye-encounter with those stern bright visages, staring reciprocally – all Ovid on the walls, in colours vivider than his descriptions.”

Little is known about Charles’s life before the age of seven. We know that Mary taught him to read at a very early age and he read voraciously. It is believed that he suffered from smallpox during his early years which forced him into a long period of convalescence. After this period of recovery Lamb began to take lessons from Mrs. Reynolds, a woman who lived in the Temple and is believed to have been the former wife of a lawyer. Mrs. Reynolds must have been a sympathetic schoolmistress because Lamb maintained a relationship with her throughout his life and she is known to have attended dinner parties held by Mary and Charles in the 1820s. E.V. Lucas suggests that sometime in 1781 Charles left Mrs. Reynolds and began to study at the Academy of William Bird.

His time with William Bird did not last long, however, because by October 1782 Lamb was enrolled in Christ’s Hospital, a charity boarding school chartered by King Edward VI in 1552. Christ’s Hospital was a traditional English boarding school; bleak and full of violence. The headmaster, Mr. Boyer, has become famous for his teaching in Latin and Greek, but also for his brutality. A thorough record of Christ’s Hospital in Several essays by Lamb as well as the Autobiography of Leigh Hunt and the Biographia Literaria of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, with whom Charles developed
a friendship that would last for their entire lives. Despite the brutality Lamb got along well at Christ’s Hospital, due in part, perhaps, to the fact that his home was not far distant thus enabling him, unlike many other boys, to return often to the safety of home. Years later, in his essay “Christ’s Hospital Five and Thirty Years Ago,” Lamb described these events, speaking of himself in the third person as “L.”

“I remember L. at school; and can well recollect that he had some peculiar advantages, which I and other of his schoolfellows had not. His friends lived in town, and were near at hand; and he had the privilege of going to see them, almost as often as he wished, through some invidious distinction, which was denied to us.”

Christ’s Hospital was a typical English boarding school and many students later wrote of the terrible violence they suffered there. The upper master of the school from 1778 to 1799 was Reverend James Boyer, a man renowned for his unpredictable and capricious temper. In one famous story Boyer was said to have knocked one of Lee Hunt’s teeth out by throwing a copy of Homer at him from across the room. Lamb seemed to have escaped much of this brutality, in part because of his amiable personality and in part because Samuel Salt, his father’s employer and Lamb’s sponsor at the school was one of the institute’s Governors.

Charles Lamb suffered from a stutter and this “an inconquerable impediment” in his speech deprived him of Grecian status at Christ’s Hospital and thus disqualifying him for a clerical career. While Coleridge and other scholarly boys were able to go on to Cambridge, Lamb left school at fourteen and was forced to find a more prosaic career. For a short time he worked in the office of Joseph Paice, a London merchant and then, for 23 weeks, until 8 February 1792, held a small post in the Examiner’s Office of the South Sea House. Its subsequent downfall in a pyramid scheme after Lamb left would be contrasted to the company’s prosperity in the first Elia essay. On 5 April 1792 he went to work in the Accountant’s Office for British East India Company, the death of his father’s employer having ruined the family’s fortunes. Charles would continue to work there for 25 years, until his retirement with pension.

LAMB is the heir of the eighteenth-century essayists, but with a richer imagination and a more delicate sensibility. He is an essayist rather than a story-teller,—an essayist of an intense individuality. But he could dream dreams as the other poets have done; and here is one of them, contained in the “Essays of Elia,” published in 1822.

In 1792 while tending to his grandmother, Mary Field, in Hertfordshire, Charles Lamb fell in love with a young woman named Ann Simmons. Although no epistolary record exists of the relationship between the two, Lamb seems to have spent years wooing Miss Simmons. The record of the love exists in several accounts of Lamb’s writing. Rosamund Gray is a story of a young man named Allen Clare who loves Rosamund Gray but their relationship comes to nothing because of the sudden death of Miss Gray. Miss Simmons also appears in several Elia essays under the name “Alice M.” The essays “Dream Children,” “New Year’s Eve,” and several others, speak of the many years that Lamb spent pursuing his love that ultimately failed. Miss Simmons eventually went on to marry a silversmith by the name of Bartram and Lamb called the failure of the affair his ‘great disappointment.’

Family tragedy Charles and his sister Mary both suffered periods of mental illness. Charles spent six weeks in a psychiatric hospital during 1795. He was, however, already making his name as a poet. On 22 September 1796, a terrible event occurred: Mary, “worn down to a state of extreme nervous misery by attention to needlework by day and to her mother at night,” was seized with acute mania and stabbed her mother to the heart with a table knife.
Although there was no legal status of ‘insanity’ at the time, a jury returned a verdict of ‘Lunacy’ and therefore freed her from guilt of willful murder. With the help of friends Lamb succeeded in obtaining his sister’s release from what would otherwise have been lifelong imprisonment, on the condition that he take personal responsibility for her safekeeping. Lamb used a large part of his relatively meagre income to keep his beloved sister in a private ‘madhouse’ in Islington called Fisher House.

The 1799 death of John Lamb was something of a relief to Charles because his father had been mentally incapacitated for a number of years since suffering a stroke. The death of his father also meant that Mary could come to live again with him in Pentonville, and in 1800 they set up a shared home at Mitre Court Buildings in the Temple, where they lived until 1809.

Despite Lamb’s bouts of melancholia and alcoholism, both he and his sister enjoyed an active and rich social life. Their London quarters became a kind of weekly salon for many of the most outstanding theatrical and literary figures of the day. Charles Lamb, having been to school with Samuel Coleridge, counted Coleridge as perhaps his closest, and certainly his oldest, friend. On his deathbed, Coleridge had a mourning ring sent to Lamb and his sister. Fortuitously, Lamb’s first publication was in 1796, when four sonnets by “Mr. Charles Lamb of the India House” appeared in Coleridge’s Poems on Various Subjects. In 1797 he contributed additional blank verse to the second edition, and met the Wordsworths, William and Dorothy, on his short summer holiday with Coleridge at Nether Stowey, thereby also striking up a lifelong friendship with William. In London, Lamb became familiar with a group of young writers who favoured political reform, including Percy Bysshe Shelley, William Hazlitt, and Leigh Hunt.

Lamb continued to clerk for the East India Company and doubled as a writer in various genres, his tragedy, John Woodvil, being published in 1802. His farce, Mr H, was performed at Drury Lane in 1807, where it was roundly booed. In the same year, Tales from Shakespeare (Charles handled the tragedies; his sister Mary, the comedies) was published, and became a best seller for William Godwin’s “Children’s Library.”

In 1819, at age 44, Lamb, who, because of family commitments, had never married, fell in love with an actress, Fanny Kelly, of Covent Garden, and proposed marriage. She refused him, and he died a bachelor. His collected essays, under the title Essays of Elia, were published in 1823 (“Elia” being the pen name Lamb used as a contributor to the London Magazine). A further collection was published ten years or so later, shortly before Lamb’s death. He died of a streptococcal infection, erysipelas, contracted from a minor graze on his face sustained after slipping in the street, on 27 December 1834, just a few months after Coleridge. He was 59. From 1833 till their deaths Charles and Mary lived at Bay Cottage, Church Street, Edmonton north of London (now part of the London Borough of Enfield. Lamb is buried in All Saints’ Churchyard, Edmonton. His sister, who was ten years his senior, survived him for more than a dozen years. She is buried beside him.

Work Lamb’s first publication was the inclusion of four sonnets in the Coleridge’s Poems on Various Subjects published in 1796 by Joseph Cottle. The sonnets were significantly influenced by the poems of Burns and the sonnets of William Bowles, a largely forgotten poet of the late 18th century. His poems garnered little attention and are seldom read today. Lamb’s contributions to the second edition of the Poems showed significant growth as a poet. These poems included The Tomb of Douglas and A Vision of Repentance. Because of a temporary fall-out with Coleridge, Lamb’s poems were to be excluded in the third edition of the Poems. As it turned out, a third edition never emerged and instead Coleridge’s next publication was the monumentally influential Lyrical Ballads co-published with Wordsworth. Lamb, on the other hand, published a book entitled Blank Verse with Charles Lloyd, the mentally unstable son of the founder of Lloyd’s Bank. Lamb’s most famous poem was written at this time entitled The Old Familiar Faces. Like most of Lamb’s poems it is particularly sentimental but it is still remembered and widely read, often included in Poetic Collections. Of particular interest to Lambarians is the opening verse of the original version.
of The Old Familiar Faces which is concerned with Lamb’s mother. It was a verse that Lamb chose to remove from the edition of his Collected Work published in 1818.

I had a mother, but she died, and left me, Died prematurely in a day of horrors - All, all are gone, the old familiar faces.

From a fairly young age Lamb desired to be a poet but never gained the success that he had hoped. Lamb lived under the poetic shadow of his friend Coleridge. In the final years of the 18th century Lamb began to work on prose with the novella entitled Rosamund Gray, a story of a young girl who was thought to be inspired by Ann Simmonds, with whom Charles Lamb was thought to be in love. Although the story is not particularly successful as a narrative because of Lamb’s poor sense of plot, it was well thought of by Lamb’s contemporaries and led Shelley to observe “what a lovely thing is Rosamund Gray! How much knowledge of the sweetest part of our nature in it!”

In the first years of the 19th century Lamb began his fruitful literary cooperation with his sister Mary. Together they wrote at least three books for William Godwin’s Juvenile Library. The most successful of these was of course Tales From Shakespeare which ran through two editions for Godwin and has now been published dozens of times in countless editions, many of them illustrated. Lamb also contributed a footnote to Shakespearean studies at this time with his essay “On the Tragedies of Shakespeare,” in which he argues that Shakespeare should be read rather than performed in order to gain the proper effect of his dramatic genius. Beside contributing to Shakespeare studies with his book Tales From Shakespeare, Lamb also contributed to the popularization of Shakespeare’s contemporaries with his book Specimens of the English Dramatic Poets Who Lived About the Time of Shakespeare.

Although he did not write his first Elia essay until 1820, Lamb’s gradual perfection of the essay form for which he eventually became famous began as early 1802 in a series of open letters to Leigh Hunt’s Reflector. The most famous of these is called “The Londoner” in which Lamb famously derides the contemporary fascination with nature and the countryside.

### 6.3 Dream Children

Children love to listen to stories about their elders, when they were children; to stretch their imagination to the conception of a traditionary great-uncle, or grandame, whom they never saw. It was in this spirit that my little ones crept about, me the other evening to hear about their great-grandmother Field, who lived in a great house in Norfolk (a hundred times bigger than that in which they and papa lived) which had been the scene — so at least it was generally believed in that part of the country — of the tragic incidents which they had lately become familiar with from the ballad of the Children in the Wood. Certain it is that the whole story of the children and their cruel uncle was to be seen fairly carved out in wood upon the chimney-piece of the great hall, the whole story down to the Robin Redbreasts, till a foolish rich Person pulled it down to set up a marble one of modern invention in its stead, with no story upon it. Here Alice put out one of her dear mother’s looks, too tender to be called upbraiding. Then I went on to say, how religious and how good their great-grandmother Field was, how beloved and respected by every body, though she was not indeed the mistress of this great house, but had only the charge of it (and yet in some respects she might be said to be the mistress of it too) committed to her by the owner, who preferred living in a newer and more fashionable mansion which he had purchased somewhere in the adjoining county; but still she lived in it in a manner as if it had been her own, and kept up the dignity of the great house in a sort while she lived, which afterwards came to decay, and was nearly pulled down, and all its old ornaments stripped and carried away to the owner’s other
house, where they were set up, and looked as awkward as if some one were to carry away the old
tombs they had seen lately at the Abbey, and stick them up in Lady C.’s tawdry gilt drawing-
room. Here John smiled, as much as to say, “that would be foolish indeed.” And then I told how,

This is hardly a story at all; it is so slight in substance and in texture; it is a revery
only. Yet it has its movement and its climax; it makes only a single impression;
and thus it is seen to have certain of the essential qualities of the true short-story.

when she came to die, her funeral was attended by a concourse of all the poor, and some of the
gentry too, of the neighbourhood for many miles round, to show their respect for her memory,
because she had been such a good and religious woman; so good indeed that she knew all the
Psaltery by heart, ay, and a great part of the Testament besides. Here little Alice spread her hands.
Then I told what a tall, upright, graceful person their great-grandmother Field once was; and how
in her youth she was esteemed the best dancer — here Alice’s little right foot played an involuntary
movement, till, upon my looking grave, it desisted — the best dancer, I was saying, in the county,
till a cruel disease, called a cancer, came, and bowed her down with pain; but it could never bend
her good spirits, or make them stoop, but they were still upright, because she was so good and
religious. Then I told how she was used to sleep by herself in a lone chamber of the great lone
house; and how she believed that an apparition of two infants was to be seen at midnight gliding
up and down the great staircase near where she slept, but she said “those innocents would do her
no harm;” and how frightened I used to be, though in those days I had my maid to sleep with me,
because I was never half so good or religious as she — and yet I never saw the infants. Here John
expanded all his eye-brows and tried to look courageous. Then I told how good she was to all her
grand-children, having us to the great-house in the holydays, where I in particular used to spend
many hours by myself, in gazing upon the old busts of the Twelve Caesars, that had been Emperors
of Rome, till the old marble heads would seem to live again, or I to be turned into marble with
them; how I never could be tired with roaming about that huge mansion, with its vast empty
rooms, with their worn-out hangings, fluttering tapestry, and carved oaken pannels, with the
gilding almost rubbed out — sometimes in the spacious old-fashioned gardens, which I had
almost to myself, unless when now and then a solitary gardening man would cross me — and
how the nectarines and peaches hung upon the walls, without my ever offering to pluck them,
because they were forbidden fruit, unless now and then, — and because I had more pleasure in
strolling about among the old melancholy-looking yew trees, or the firs, and picking up the red
berries, and the fir apples, which were good for nothing but to look at — or in lying a out upon the
fresh grass, with all the fine garden smells around me — or basking in the orangery, till I could
almost fancy myself ripening too along with the oranges and the limes in that grateful warmth —
or in watching the dace that darted to and fro in the fish-pond, at the bottom of the garden, with
here and there a great sulky pike hanging midway down the water in silent state, as if it mocked
at their impertinent friskings, — I had more pleasure in these busy-idle diversions than in all the
sweet flavours of peaches, nectarines, oranges, and such like common baits of children. Here John
slyly deposited back upon the plate a bunch of grapes, which, not unobserved by Alice, he had
meditated dividing with her, and both seemed willing to relinquish them for the present as
irrelevant. Then in somewhat a more heightened tone, I told how, though their great-grandmother
Field loved all her grand-children, yet in an especial manner she might be said to love their uncle,
John L—, because he was so handsome and spirited a youth, and a king to the rest of us; and,
instead of moping about in solitary corners, like some of us, he would mount the most mettlesome horse he could get, when but an imp no bigger than themselves, and make it carry him half over the county in a morning, and join the hunters when there were any out — and yet he loved the old great house and gardens too, but had too much spirit to be always pent up within their boundaries — and how their uncle grew up to man’s estate as brave as he was handsome, to the admiration of every body, but of their great-grandmother Field most especially; and how he used to carry me upon his back when I was a lame-footed boy — for he was a good bit older than me — many a mile when I could not walk pain; — and how in after life he became lame-footed too, and I did not always (I fear) make allowances enough for him when he was impatient, and in pain, nor remember sufficiently how considerate he had been to me when I was lame-footed; and how when he died, though he had not been dead an hour, it seemed as if he had died a great while ago, such a distance there is betwixt life and death; and how I bore his death as I thought pretty well at first, but afterwards it haunted and haunted me; and though I did not cry or take it to heart as some do, and as I think he would have done if I had died, yet I missed him all day long, and knew not till then how much I had loved him. I missed his kindness, and I missed his crossness, and wished him to be alive again, to be quarrelling with him (for we quarreled sometimes), rather than not have him again, and was as uneasy without him, as he their poor uncle must have been when the doctor took off his limb. Here the children fell a crying, and asked if their little mourning which they had on was not for uncle John, and they looked up, and prayed me not to go on about their uncle, but to tell them, some stories about their pretty dead mother. Then I told how for seven long years, in hope sometimes, sometimes in despair, yet persisting ever, I courted the fair Alice W—n; and, as much as children could understand, I explained to them what coyness, and difficulty, and denial meant in maidens — when suddenly, turning to Alice, the soul of the first Alice looked out at her eyes with such a reality of re-presentment, that I became in doubt which of them stood there before me, or whose that bright hair was; and while I stood gazing, both the children gradually grew fainter to my view, receding, and still receding till nothing at last but two mournful features were seen in the uttermost distance, which, without speech, strangely impressed upon me the effects of speech; “We are not of Alice, nor of thee, nor are we children at all. The children of Alice called Bartrum father. We are nothing; less than nothing, and dreams. We are only what might have been, and must wait upon the tedious shores of Lethe millions of ages before we have existence, and a name” — and immediately awaking, I found myself quietly seated in my bachelor arm-chair, where I had fallen asleep, with the faithful Bridget unchanged by my side — but John L. (or James Elia) was gone for ever.

Self-Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Charles spent six weeks in an psychiatric hospital during

   (a) 1795       (b) 1790       (c) 1798       (d) 1790

   (ii) Charles collected essays-under the title, Essays of Elia, were published in

   (a) 1825       (b) 1824       (c) 1822-1823  (d) 1829

   (iii) Lamb’s beloved sister kept in a private mad house in Islington called

   (a) Prison     (b) Mad House  (c) Fisher House  (d) Safe House

   (iv) Grandmother Field was tall and upright but later she bowed down by a disease called

   (a) Tuberculosis (b) Fever    (c) Cancer      (d) None of these

Notes
6.4 Summary

- The children of James Elia, John and Alice, asked him to tell them about his grandmother—their great grandmother—Mrs. Field who used to live in a great mansion in Norfolk. The house belonged to a rich nobleman who lived in another new house. Grandmother Field was the keeper of the house and she looked after the house with great care as though it was her own. The tragic incident of the two children and their cruel uncle had taken place in the house. The children had come to know the story from the ballad of 'The Children in the wood'. The story was carved in wood upon the chimney piece. But a foolish rich person later pulled down the wooden chimney and put a chimney of marble. The new chimney piece had no story on it. Alice was very unhappy that the rich man had pulled down the chimney piece with the story. She looked upbraiding and her anger was like her mother’s.

- When the house came to decay later, after the death of Mrs. Field the nobleman carried away the ornaments of the house and used them in his new house. The ornaments of the old house looked very awkward in the new house, just like the beautiful tombs of Westminster Abbey would look awkward if placed in someone’s drawing room. Things looked beautiful only if they are in harmony with the surroundings. John enjoyed the comparison and smiled as if he also felt it would be very awkward indeed. Grandmother Field was a very good lady. She was also very religious for she was well acquainted with 'The Book of Psalms' in 'The Old Testament' and a great portion of 'The New Testament' of 'The Bible'. Alice here spread her hands as if she was not interested in the praise of a quality of the grandmother that she herself did not have. Children find it difficult to learn lessons by heart.

- Grandmother Field did not fear the spirits of the two infants which haunted the house at night. So she slept alone. But Elia used to sleep with his maid as he was not so religious. John tried to look courageous but his eyes expanded in fear. When the grandmother died many people in the neighbourhood including the gentry or the aristocrats attended her funeral. She was also a good dancer when she was young. Here, Alice moved her feet unconsciously as she too was interested in dancing. Grandmother Field was tall and upright but later she was bowed down by a disease called cancer. She was good to her grand children. Elia in childhood used to spend his holiday there. He used to gaze upon the bust of the twelve Caesars or roam about in the mansion or in the garden. In the garden, there were fruits like nectarines, peaches, oranges and others. Elia never plucked them but rather enjoyed looking at them. Here John deposited a bunch of grapes upon the plate again. He was showing that he too was not tempted by fruits.

- His farce, Mr H, was performed at Drury Lane in 1807.

- Fortuitously, Lamb’s first publication was in 1796.

- His collected essays, under the title Essays of Elia, were published in 1823.

- The most famous of these is called “The Londoner” in which Lamb famously derides the contemporary fascination with nature and the countryside.

6.5 Key-Words

1. Friskings : It is a search of a person’s outer clothing wherein a person runs his or hands along the outer garments to detect any concealed weapons.

2. Melancholy looking : Sad or depressed
6.6 Review Questions

1. Discuss Charles Lamb as an essayist.
2. Why is the essay entitled as ‘Dream Children’?
3. Discuss the role of Grandmother Field. How does Lamb present her before his Dream Children?
4. What type of the essay is Dream Children? Discuss.

Answers: Self-Assessment
1. (i) (a) (ii) (c) (iii) (c) (iv) (a)

6.7 Further Readings

Unit 7: Charles Lamb-Dream Children: Critical Analysis

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know major works of Charles Lamb
• Analyse Lamb’s Dream Children

Introduction
A well-known literary figure in nineteenth-century England, Lamb is chiefly remembered for his “Elia” essays, works celebrated for their witty and ironic treatment of everyday subjects. Through the persona of “Elia,” Lamb developed a highly personal narrative technique to achieve what many critics regard as the epitome of the familiar essay style. Extremely popular in Lamb’s day, the “Elia” essays first appeared in the London Magazine between 1820 and 1825, but were later collected into two volumes. These nostalgic works have appealed to readers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly because of their gradual revelation of Lamb’s literary alter ego and his humorous idiosyncrasies. Lamb’s other writings include criticism of William Shakespeare’s dramas and the virtual rediscovery of a number of neglected Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights in the early nineteenth century. A dramatist and a skilled poet, Lamb was also a noted children’s author, frequently in collaboration with his sister, Mary. Lamb’s essays are thought to demonstrate a characteristically Romantic imagination akin to that of the poets Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth, Lamb’s contemporaries and friends. Overall, Lamb is highly regarded as an essayist, an original and perceptive critic, and a noteworthy correspondent with the renowned literati of early nineteenth-century England.

7.1 Charles Major Works
Although he began his literary career as a sonneteer, Lamb quickly discovered that his talent and inclination lay in prose, not verse. His first fictional work, a short novel entitled A Tale of Rosamund Gray and Old Blind Margaret, displays the influence of eighteenth-century sentimental writers Henry Mackenzie and Laurence Sterne. Lamb’s next literary composition, John Woodvil (1802), set
shortly after England’s monarchical Restoration in 1660, owes a debt to Elizabethan tragedy and features a commentary on the politics of Lamb’s day via historical analogy. Lamb’s collaborative works with his sister, Mary, all fall into the category of juvenile literature and include *Mrs. Leicester's School* (1807), a collection of children’s stories and poems, *Tales from Shakespear* (1807), simplified renderings in prose of William Shakespeare’s most famous plays, and *Poetry for Children* (1809). Lamb also adapted Homer’s epic poem *The Odyssey* for younger readers in *The Adventures of Ulysses* (1808). Among Lamb’s critical writings, his anthology *Specimens of English Dramatic Poets, Who Lived about the Time of Shakespeare* includes selections from the plays of such Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists as Christopher Marlowe, John Webster, George Chapman, and Thomas Middleton. Since many of these works were previously unobtainable to early nineteenth-century readers, Lamb’s compilation was an important reference source and is supplemented with explanatory notes now considered among Lamb’s most significant critical work. In a related essay, “On the Tragedies of Shakespeare Considered with Reference to Their Fitness for Stage Presentation,” Lamb argued that the best qualities of Shakespeare’s drama can be fully appreciated only through reading: according to Lamb, stage performances often diminish the play’s meanings, and individual performers often misinterpret Shakespeare’s intended characterizations. Lamb’s most prominent works were his last: the collections *Elia: Essays Which Have Appeared under That Signature in the “London Magazine”* and *The Last Essays of Elia* were published in 1823 and 1833, respectively. Featuring sketches in the familiar essay form—a style popularized by Michel de Montaigne, Robert Burton, and Sir Thomas Browne—the “Elia” essays are characterized by Lamb’s personal tone, narrative ease, and wealth of literary allusions. Never didactic, the essays treat ordinary subjects in a nostalgic, fanciful way by combining humor, pathos, and a sophisticated irony ranging from gentle to scathing. Among the essays, “Christ’s Hospital Five and Thirty Years Ago” features a schoolboy reminiscence of Coleridge, while “Confessions of a Drunkard” treats with ambivalence a theme that punctuated Lamb’s own life. Counted among his most significant writings, Lamb’s discerning and lively correspondence is collected in *The Letters of Charles Lamb* (1935).

### 7.2 Critical Analysis

This essay is about a dream. In this essay all characters are real except the children Alice and John. From the title we can guess that it’s a dream and reverie also means a day dream. Alice and John are children of James Elia (Charles Lamb). they ask their father, James Elia, to tell them about their grandmother. Grandmother’s name is field who has been acquainted to us by Lamb as perfect women with great qualities, incidents are real from life of Lamb. There is a story related to the house where grandmother field was a keeper. It was about the murder of children by their cruel uncle. Alice and John came to know this story through a carved writing on a tree which was later brought down by a rich man. After the death of grandmother, house owner took away his belongings and place them in his new house where they look awkward. When grandmother was alive she use to sleep alone but Elia was afraid of the souls of infants murdered by uncle as it was thought that house is haunted by the spirits of those children. Elia has a brother John full of enthusiasm and zeal, who was loved by everyone specially by her grandmother. on the other hand Elia’s childhood was full of isolation and he remained stagnant though out his life. His mind was working fast but bodily or pysically he was totally off and lazy. He was lame and helped by John in every possible way who used to carry him in his back. Unfortunately, John also become Lame but Elia never helped him and after his death he realized or missing him. at the end of the essay, alice and John are crying after hearing all this. Elia is looking his wife, whose name also Alia, in alice face. the children started to become faint and say to elia or lamb that we are not your real children and Alice is not your wife and our mother. Lamb wakes up finds himself in armed chair and James Elia was vanished. the whole story is based on life of Lamb, he was never able to married and childless
A Stylistic Analysis on Lamb’s Dream Children

Charles Lamb was a famous English prose-writer and the best representative of the new form of English literature early in the nineteenth century. He did not adhere to the old rules and classic models but made the informal essay a pliable vehicle for expressing the writer’s own personality, thus bringing into English literature the personal or familiar essay.

The style of Lamb is gentle, old-fashioned and irresistibly attractive, for which I can think of no better illustration than Dream Children: A Reverie. From the stylistic analysis of this essay can we find Lamb’s characteristic way of expression.

Dream Children records the pathetic joys in the author’s unfortunate domestic life. We can see in this essay, primarily, a supreme expression of the increasing loneliness of his life. He constructed all that preliminary tableau of paternal pleasure in order to bring home to us in the most poignant way his feeling of the solitude of his existence, his sense of all that he had missed and lost in the world. The key of the essay is one of profound sadness. But he makes his sadness beautiful; or, rather, he shows the beauty that resides in sadness. There are remarkable writing techniques to achieve such an effect.

7.3 Lexical Features

7.3.1 Old-fashioned but Elegant Diction

Lamb prefers to use archaic words in order to reach a certain distance between the author’s real life and his whimsies, such as:

1. And how in her youth she was esteemed the best dancer (esteemed here means admired, respected)
2. Here Alice’s little right foot played an involuntary movement, till, upon my looking grave, it desisted desisted here means stopped doing
3. And how the nectarines and peaches hung upon the walls, without my ever offering to pluck them (pluck, also a poetic word, here means pick)
4. He had meditated dividing with her, and both seemed willing to relinquish them for the present as irrelevant (meditated here means thought, and relinquish means give up)

7.3.2 Repetition of the Word here

When regarding for beautiful things and fine actions, Lamb does not forget to show to readers pictures of the children—real children until the moment when they fade away. He repeats the word here altogether eight times, to portray the children’s response. For example:

1. Here Alice put out one of her dear mother’s looks
2. Here John smiled, as much as to say, “that would be foolish indeed.”

With this repeating word, we can see these children almost as clearly and as tenderly as Lamb saw them. If we take the essay’s main purpose into account, we will find the more real they seem, the more touching is the revelation of the fact that they do not exist, and never have existed.

7.4 Sentence Features

7.4.1 Loose Structure and Post-Modification

Generally speaking, the tone of this essay is relaxed and comfortable, which can be attributed to Lamb’s use of loose structure and post-modification. Let’s study the sentence below:
1. Children love to listen to stories about their elders, when they were children; to stretch their imagination to the conception of a traditionary great-uncle, or grandame, whom they never saw.

If applied to daily communication, the former part of this sentence seems somewhat prolix. However, here it gives us a sense of comfort and enjoyment, for in the essay it causes our sympathy with the author of the fondness of innocent children. Therefore, we do not feel weary.

7.4.2 Cohesion
Sentences in Dream Children are long, sometimes containing more than eighty words in one. The author makes them cohesive with the help of coordination, conjunctions, as well as some adverbs. For instance:
1. Then I went on to say, how religious and how good their great-grandmother Field was, how beloved and respected by everybody (Adverb then and the coordination how...how...how... here function as cohesive devices.)
2. But still she lived in it in a manner as if it had been her own, and kept up the dignity of the great house in a sort while she lived, which afterwards came to decay, and was nearly pulled down, and all its old ornaments stripped and carried away to the owner’s other house, where they were set up, and looked as awkward as if some one were to carry away the old tombs they had seen lately at the Abbey, and stick them up in Lady C.’s tawdry gilt drawing-room. (Conjunction and here functions as a cohesive device.)

7.5 Article Features
7.5.1 Narration Enlivened by Depiction of the Children.
As is illustrated in sentence (5) and (6), the author’s narration of the great-grandmother and his brother is enlivened by a certain depiction concerning the children. Incidentally, while preparing his ultimate solemn effect, Lamb has inspired us with a new, intensified vision of the wistful beauty of children—their imitativeness, their facile and generous emotions, their anxiety to be correct, their ingenuous haste to escape from grief into joy. This vision gives us an impression that they seem real, thus makes the revelation in the end touching and pathetic.

7.5.2 Unexpected Ending
Dream Children begins quite simply, in a calm, narrative manner, representing Lamb as sitting by his fireside on a winter night telling stories to his own dear children, and delighting in their society, until he suddenly comes to his old, solitary, bachelor self, and finds that they were but dream-children. In the end of the essay, we read:
That I became in doubt which of them stood there before me, or whose that bright hair was; and while I stood gazing, both the children gradually grew fainter to my view, receding, and still receding till nothing at last but two mournful features were seen in the uttermost distance, which, without speech, strangely impressed upon me the effects of speech; “We are not of Alice, nor of thee, nor are we children at all. The children of Alice called Bartrum father. We are nothing, less than nothing, and dreams. We are only what might have been, and must wait upon the tedious shores of Lethe millions of ages before we have existence, and a name.”

Reflecting upon the essay, we will surely be obsessed by the beauty of old houses and gardens and aged virtuous characters, the beauty of children, the beauty of companionships, the softening beauty of dreams in an arm-chair—all these are brought together and mingled with the grief and regret which were the origin of the mood.
Rhetorical Devices
Lamb introduces some rhetorical devices to make his essay vivid and profound, such as:
And how the nectarines and peaches hung upon the walls, without my ever offering to pluck them, because they were **forbidden fruit**, unless now and then (metaphor)
Till I could almost fancy myself ripening too along with the oranges and the limes in that **grateful** warmth (empathy)
The nature of things mostly appeared to Charles Lamb in this way. Lamb does not frolic out of lightness of heart, but to escape from gloom that might otherwise crush. He laughed to save himself from weeping. In fact, Lamb’s personal life was of disappointments and frustrations. But instead of complaining, he looked at the tragedies of life, its miseries and worries as a humorist. Thus his essays become an admixture of humour and pathos. Examples of his keen sense of humour and pathetic touches are scattered in all of his essays. Let’s focus our discussion on Dream Children: A Reverie.

Characters
The young couple in the ancient Dutch farming village (in New England) who are the major living characters in “Dream Children” are the McNairs. The outward placidity that the pleasant and personable Mrs. McNair displays in her daily goings about among the villagers gives the impression that nothing bad or disturbing has taken place in her life. Yet the reckless manner in which she rides her stallion through the fields causes wonderment among some of the locals, such as Mrs. DePuy and her husband, who own the old Patroon farm near the McNairs’ land.

Dream Children: Themes
Expressed as a directive, a major theme of this story is “Measure a person by his or her sense of loss.” The young wife whose infant was stillborn is utterly transformed by the tragedy, going off on a new life course which is largely regulated by her ongoing need to penetrate by whatever means the unbreachable time-space wall of human existence and, in defiance of all logic, reason, and conventional wisdom, to be reunited with her lost baby son. Her husband, clearly not needing replacement therapy comparable with hers, reconstructs his life in the most convenient and thoughtful fashion...

Godwin’s “Dream Children” examines themes of marriage, self-definition, and loss.
1. Taking into account its subject matter and Godwin’s handling of the narrative structure, were you particularly affected emotionally by “Dream Children”? If so, explain.
2. Was the ending of the story, with its rhetorical question about Mrs. McNair’s happiness, effective in “wrapping up” the story of her life? Comment either way, or both ways.
3. What in your opinion is the purpose of all the italicized passages throughout the story? Who is saying or thinking those things? How do...

Self-Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) The Adventures of Ulysses was published in
       (a) 1808  (b) 1809  (c) 1810  (d) 1812
   (ii) The last essays of Elia were published in
        (a) 1823 and 1833  (b) 1820 and 1830  (c) 1815 and 1820  (d) 1813 and 1823
   (iii) ‘Elia’ essays first appeared in the
         (a) Dream Children  (b) London Magazine  (c) Children Stories  (d) None of these
(iv) The style of Lamb is
(a) Gentle
(b) Old-fashioned
(c) both (a) and (b)
(d) None of these

7.6 Summary

• In Lamb’s writing wit, humour and fun are interwoven and it is humour which is most notable for its extreme sensitiveness to the true proportion of things. Lamb often brings out the two sides of a fact and causes laughter at our own previous misconceptions. Therefore it borders on the painful realization. Thus his humour is very nearly allied to pathos. They are different facts of the same gem.

• In his essay Dream Children: A Reverie Lamb talks of personal sorrows and joys. He gives expressions to his unfulfilled longings and desires. He readily enters into the world of fantasy and pops up stories in front of his dream children. He relates his childhood days, of Mrs. Field, his grandmother and John Lamb, his brother. He describes how fun he had at the great house and orchard in Norfolk. Of his relations he gives us full and living pictures – his brother John is James Elia of My Relations, but here is John L-, so handsome and spirited youth, and a ‘king’. John was brave, handsome and won admiration from everybody Charles’ grandmother Mrs. Field is the other living picture. She was a good natured and religions – minded lady of respectable personality. Narrator’s sweet heart Alice Winterton is the other shadowed reality. The Dream Children, Alice and John are mere bubbles of fancy. Thus Lamb’s nostalgic memory transports us back to those good old days of great grandmother Field. But even in those romantic nostalgia the hard realities of life does not miss our eyes. Death, separation and suffering inject us deep-rooted pathos in our heart. Whereas Mrs. Field died of cancer, John Lamb died in early age. Ann Simmons has been a tale of unrequited love story of Charles Lamb. Notably the children are millions of ages distant of oblivion and Charles is not a married man but a bachelor having a reverie.

• In his actual life Lamb courted Ann Simmons but could not marry her, he wanted to have children but could not have any. Thus he strikes a very pathetic note towards the end of his essay when he puts the following word into the months of his imaginary children, “we are not of Alice, nor of thee, nor are we children at all … We are nothing, less than nothing, dreams. We are only what might have been”. Alice is here no other that Ann Simmons the girl Lamb wanted to marry, but failed to marry her. In fact, the subtitle of the essay – ’A Reverie’ which literally means a daydream or a fantasy – prepares us for the pathos of the return to reality although the essay begins on a deceptively realistic note.

• Although Dream Children begins on a merry note, the dark side of life soon forces itself upon Lamb’s attention and the comic attitude gives way to melancholy at the end of the essay. Throughout the essay Lamb presents his children in such a way that we never guess that they are merely figments of his imagination – their movements, their reactions, their expressions are all realistic. It is only at the end of the essay that we realize that the entire episode with his children is a daydream. We are awakening by a painful realization of the facts.

• Lamb’s humour was no surface play, but the flower plucked from the nettle of peril and awe. In fact, Lamb’s humour and pathos take different shapes in different essays. Sometimes it is due to his own unfulfilled desires, sometimes it is due to the ill-fortunes of his relatives and friends and on some other occasions it is due to his frustration in love etc. If his Poor Relations begin humorously of a male and female poor relation, he later gives us a few pathetic examples of poor relations that had to suffer on account of poverty. Again in his The Praise of Chimney Sweepers Lamb sways between humour and pathos while describing the
Prose

Notes

chimney sweepers. Similarly the essay Dream Children is a beautiful projection of Lamb’s feelings and desire to have a wife and children of his own. It is humorous that in his dream he is married and has two children of his own while he had a disheartening frustration in love. Thus Lamb has painted both the lights and shades of life in full circle. His is the criticism of life in pathos and humours.

1. Charles Lamb entitled the essay “Dream Children” because he never married and naturally never became the father of any children. The children he speaks of in the essay were actually the creations of his imagination or fancy.

2. Lamb had a sister, Mary Lamb, who did not marry since she had attacks of insanity. She has been referred to here as “faithful Bridget” because she never married and was Lamb’s only companion in his life. At the sudden breakdown of his reverie, he finds her seated by his side.

3. Dream Children is a personal essay. Lamb presents the characters and incidents from his own life—the sketches of his grandmother, Field, his brother—John Lamb, his sister—Mary Lamb, his tragic love-affairs with Ann Simmons. But Lamb is always playing with facts and fictions and transforms the real into the literary.

• Through the stylistic approach to Dream Children, we can see that Charles Lamb is a romanticist, seeking a free expression of his own personality and weaving romance into daily life. Without a trace of vanity of self-assertion, Lamb begins with himself, with some purely personal mood or experience, and from this he leads the reader to see life and literature as he saw it. It is this wonderful combination of personal and universal interests, together with Lamb’s rare old style, which make the essay remarkable.

• The Last Essays of Elia were published in 1823 and 1833, respectively.

• Lamb’s discerning and lively correspondence is collected in The Letters of Charles Lamb (1935).

• Dream Children records the pathetic joys in the author’s unfortunate domestic life.

7.7 Key-Words

1. Protean : readily taking on various shapes or forms variable, exhibiting considerable variety or diversity.

2. Prismatic effect : relating to, resembling, or constituting a prism

7.8 Review Questions

1. Who was Alice in Dream Children by Charles Lamb?
2. What is the summary of Dream Children a reverie by Charles lamb?
3. What is the theme of Dream Children by Charles lamb?
4. Who was James Elia in Lamb’s ‘Dream Children’?

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (b) (iv) (c)

7.9 Further Readings

Unit 8: Charles Lamb-A Bachelors Complaint on the Behaviour of Married: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Understand Lamb’s Humour, pathos and humanity
• Discuss A Bachelors Complaint on the Behaviour of Married

Introduction

It has well been said that the essay took a wrong turn in the hands of Bacon. For two centuries after Bacon the essay in England went on gravitating towards the original conception held by Montaigne, but it was only in the hands of the romantic essayists of the early nineteenth century that it became wholly personal, light, and lyrical in nature. From then onwards it has seen no essential change. The position of Lamb among these romantic essayists is the most eminent. In fact, he has often been called the prince of all the essayists England has so far produced. Hugh Walker calls him the essayist par excellence who should be taken as a model. It is from the essays of Lamb that we often derive our very definition of the essay, and it is with reference to his essays as a criterion of excellence that we evaluate the achievement and merit of a given essayist. Familiarity with Lamb as a man enhances for a reader the charm of his essays. And he is certainly the most charming of all English essay. We may not find in him the massive genius of Bacon, or the ethereal flights (O altitude) of Thomas Browne, or the brilliant lucidity of Addison, or the ponderous energy of Dr. Johnson, but none excels him in the ability to charm the reader or to catch him in the plexus of his own personality.

8.1 Lamb’s Self-Revelation

What strikes one particularly about Lamb as an essayist is his persistent readiness to reveal his everything to the reader. The evolution of the essay from Bacon to Lamb lies primarily in its shift from

1. objectivity to subjectivity, and
2. from formality to familiarity.
Of all the essayists it is perhaps Lamb who is the most autobiographic. His own life is for him “such stuff as essays are made on.” He could easily say what Montaigne had said before him—“I myself am the subject of my book.” The change from objectivity to subjectivity in the English essay was, by and large, initiated by Abraham Cowley who wrote such essays as the one entitled “Of Myself.” Lamb with other romantic essayists completed this change. Walter Pater observes in Appreciations; “With him, as with Montaigne, the desire of self-portraiture is below all mere superficial tendencies, the real motive in ‘writing at all, desire closely connected with intimacy, that modern subjectivity which may be called the Montaignesque element in literature. In his each and every essay we feel the vein of his subjectivity.” His essays are, as it were, so many bits of autobiography by piecing which together we can arrive at a pretty authentic picture of his life, both external and internal. It is really impossible to think of an essayist who is more personal than Lamb. His essays reveal him fully—in all his whims, prejudices, past associations, and experiences. “Night Fears” shows us Lamb as a timid, superstitious boy. “Christ’s Hospital” reveals his unpalatable experiences as a schoolboy. We are introduced to the various members of his family in numerous essays like “My Relations’ “The Old Benchers of the Inner Temple,” and “Poor Relations.” We read of the days of his adolescence in “Mackery End in Hertfordshire.” His tenderness towards his sister Mary is revealed by “Mrs. Battle’s Opinions on Whist.” His professional life is recalled in “The South-Sea House” and “The, Superannuated Man.” His sentimental memories full of pathos find expression in “Dream Children.” His prejudices come to the fore in “Imperfect Sympathies” and “The Confessions of a Drunkard.” His gourmandise finds a humours utterence in “A Dissertation upon Roast Pig,” “Grace before Meat,” and elsewhere. What else is left then? Very little, except an indulgence in self-pity at the stark tragedy of his life. Nowhere does he seem to be shedding tears at the fits of madness to which his sister Mary Bridget (of the essays) was often subject and in one of which she knifed his mother to death. The frustration of his erotic career (Lamb remained in a state of lifelong bachelorhood imposed by himself to enable him to nurse his demented sister), however, is touched upon here and there. In “Dream Children,” for instance, his unfruitful attachment with Ann Simmons is referred to. She got married and her children had to “call Bartrum father.” Lamb is engaged in a reverie about “his children” who would have possibly been born had he been married to Alice W-n (Ann Simmons). When the reverie is gone this is what he finds: “...and immediately awaking, I found myself quietly seated in my bachelor arm-chair where I had fallen asleep, with the faithful Bridget [his sister Mary] unchanged by my side...but John L (his brother John Lamb) was gone for ever.” How touching! Lamb’s excessive occupation with himself may lead one to assume that he is too selfish or egocentric, or that he is vulgar or inartistic. Far from that, Egotism with Lamb sheds its usual offensive accoutrements. The following specific points may be noted in this connexion:

1. His egotism is free from vulgarity. Well does Compton-Rickett observe: “There is no touch of vulgarity in these intimacies; for all their frank unreserve we feel the delicate refinement of the man’s spiritual nature. Lamb omits no essential, he does not sentimentalise, and does not brutalise his memories. He poetises them, preserving them for us in art that can differentiate between genuine reality and crude realism.”

2. His artistic sense of discrimination—selection and rejection—has also to be taken into account. David Daiches maintains: “The writer’s own character is always there, flaunted before the reader, but it is carefully prepared and controlled before it is exhibited.”

3. Though Lamb is an egotist yet he is not self-assertive. He talks about himself not because he thinks himself to be important but because he thinks himself to be the only object he knows intimately. Thus his egotism is born of a sense of humility rather than hauteur. Samuel C. Chew observes: “Like all the romantics he is self-revelatory, but there is nothing in him of the ‘egotistical-sublime.’ Experience had made him too clear-sighted to take any individual, least of all himself, too seriously. The admissions of his own weaknesses, follies, and prejudices are so many humorous warnings to his readers.”
The Note of Familiarity

Lamb’s contribution to the English essay also lies in his changing the general tone from formality to familiarity. This change was to be accepted by all the essayists to follow. “Never”, says Compton-Rickett, “was any man more intimate in print than he. He has made of chatter a fine art.” Lamb disarms the reader at once with his buttonholding familiarity. He plays with him in a puckish manner, no doubt, but he is always ready to take him into confidence and to exchange heart-beats with him. In the essays of the writers before him we are aware of a well-marked distance between the writer and ourselves. Bacon and Addison perch themselves, as it were, on a pedestal, and cast pearls before the readers standing below. In Cowley, the distance between the reader and writer narrows down—but it is there still. It was left for Lamb to abolish this distance altogether. He often addresses the reader (“dear reader”) as if he were addressing a bosom friend. He makes nonsense of the proverbial English insularity and “talks” to the readers as “a friend and man” (as Thackeray said he did in his novels). This note of intimacy is quite pleasing, for Lamb is the best of friends.

No Didacticism

He is a friend, and not a teacher. Lamb shed once and for all for all the didactic approach which characterises the work of most essayists before him. Bacon called his essays “counsels civil and moral.” His didacticism is too palpable to need a comment. Cowley was somewhat less didactic, but early in the eighteenth century Steele and Addison—the founders of the periodical essay-set in their papers the moralistic, mentor-like tone for all the periodical essayists to come. Even such “a rake among scholars and a scholar among rakes” as Steele arrogated to himself the air of a teacher and reformer. This didactic tendency reached almost its culmination in Dr. Johnson who in the Idler and Rambler papers gave ponderous sermons rather than what may be called essays. Lamb is too modest to pretend to proffer moral counsels. He never argues, dictates, or coerces. We do not find any “philosophy of life” in his essays, though there are some personal views and opinions flung about here and there not for examination and adoption, but just to serve as so many ventilators to let us have a peep into his mind. “Lamb’, says Cazamian, “is not a moralist nor a psychologist, his object is not research, analysis, or confession; he is, above all, an artist. He has no aim save the reader’s pleasure, and his own.” But though Lamb is not a downright pedagogue, he is yet full of sound wisdom which he hides under a cloak of frivolity and tolerant good nature. He sometimes looks like the Fool in King Lear whose weird and funny words are impregnated with a hard core of surprising sanity. As a critic avers, “though Lamb frequently donned the cap and bells, he was more than a jester; even his jokes had kernels of wisdom.” In his “Character of the Late Elia” in which he himself gives a character-sketch of the supposedly dead Elia, he truly observes: “He would interrupt the gravest discussion with some light jest; and yet, perhaps not quite irrelevant in ears that could understand it.”

The Rambling Nature of His Essays and His Lightness of Touch

The rambling nature of his essays and his lightness of touch are some other distinguishing features of Lamb as an essayist. He never bothers about keeping to the point. Too often do we find him flying off at a tangent and ending at a point which we could never have foreseen. Every road with him seems to lead to the world’s end. We often reproach Bacon for the “dispersed” nature of his “meditations”, but Lamb beats everybody in his monstrous discursiveness. To consider some examples, first take up his essay “The Old and the New School-master.” In this essay which apparently is written for comparing the old and new schoolmaster, the first two pages or thereabouts contain a very humorous and exaggerated description of the author’s own ignorance. Now, we may ask, what has Lamb’s ignorance to do with the subject in hand? Then, the greater part of the essay “Oxford in the Vacation” is devoted to the description of his friend Dyer. Lamb’s essays are seldom artistic, well-patterned wholes. They have no beginning, middle and end. Lamb himself described his essays as “a sort of unlicked incondite things.” However, what these essays lose in
artistic design they gain in the touch of spontaneity. This is what lends them what is called “the lyrical quality.”

8.2 Lamb’s Humour, Pathos, and Humanity

Lamb’s humour, humanity, and the sense of pathos are all his own; and it is mainly these qualities which differentiate his essays from those of his contemporaries. His essays are rich alike in wit, humour, and fun. Hallward and Hill observe in the Introduction to their edition of the Essays of Elia: “The terms Wit, Humour and Fun are often confused but they are really different in meaning. The first is based on intellect, the second on insight and sympathy, the third on vigour and freshness of mind and body. Lamb’s writings show all the three qualities, but what most distinguishes him is Humour, for his sympathy is ever strong and active.” Humour in Lamb’s essays constitutes very like an atmosphere “with linked sweetness long drawn out.” Its Protean shapes range from frivolous puns, impish attempts at mystification, grotesque buffoonery, and Rabelaisian verbosity (see, for example, the description of a “poor relation”) to the subtlest ironical stroke which pierces down to the very heart of life. J. B. Priestley observes in English Humour: “English humour at its deepest and tenderest seems in him [Lamb] incarnate. He did not merely create it, he lived in it. His humour is not an idle thing, but the white flower, plucked from a most dangerous nettle.” What particularly distinguishes Lamb’s humour is its close alliance with pathos. While laughing he is always aware of the tragedy of life—not only his life, but life in general. That is why he often laughs through his tears. Witness his treatment of the hard life of chimney sweepers and Christ’s Hospital boys. The descriptions are touching enough, but Lamb’s treatment provides us with a humorous medium of perception rich in prismatic effects, which bathes the tragedy of actual life in the iridescence of mellow comedy. The total effect is very complex, and strikes our sensibility in a bizarre way, puzzling us as to what is comic and what is tragic.

Style

A word, lastly, about Lamb’s peculiar style which is all his own and yet not his, as he is a tremendous borrower. He was extremely influenced by some “old-world” writers like Fuller and Sir Thomas Browne. It is natural, then, that his style is archaic. His sentences are long and rambling, after the seventeenth-century fashion. He uses words many of which are obsolescent, if not obsolete. But though he “struts in borrowed plumes”, these “borrowed plumes” seem to be all his own. Well does a critic say: “The blossoms are culled from other men’s gardens, but their blending is all Lamb’s own.” Passing through Lamb’s imagination they become something fresh and individual. His style is a mixture certainly of many styles, but a chemical not a mechanical mixture.” His inspiration from old writers gives his style a romantic colouring which is certainly intensified by his vigorous imagination. Very like Wordsworth he throws a fanciful veil on the common objects of life and converts them into interesting and “romantic” shapes. His peculiar style is thus an asset in the process of “romanticising” everyday affairs and objects which otherwise would strike one with a strong feeling of ennui. He is certainly a romantic essayist. What is more, he is a poet.

8.3 Text-A Bachelors Complaint on The Behaviour of Married

As a single man, I have spent a good deal of my time in noting down the infirmities of Married People, to console myself for those superior pleasures, which they tell me I have lost by remaining as I am.

I cannot say that the quarrels of men and their wives ever made any great impression upon me, or had much tendency to strengthen me in those anti-social resolutions, which I took up long ago upon more substantial considerations. What oftener offends me at the houses of married persons where I visit, is an error of quite a different description; — it is that they are too loving.
Not too loving neither: that does not explain my meaning. Besides, why should that offend me? The very act of separating themselves from the rest of the world, to have the fuller enjoyment of each other's society, implies that they prefer one another to all the world.

But what I complain of is, that they carry this preference so undisguisedly, they perk it up in the faces of us single people so shamelessly, you cannot be in their company a moment without being made to feel, by some indirect hint or open avowal, that you are not the object of this preference. Now there are some things which give no offence, while implied or taken for granted merely; but expressed, there is much offence in them. If a man were to accost the first homely-featured or plain-dressed young woman of his acquaintance, and tell her bluntly, that she was not handsome or rich enough for him, and he could not marry her, he would deserve to be kicked for his ill manners; yet no less is implied in the fact, that having access and opportunity of putting the question to her, he has never yet thought fit to do it. The young woman understands this as clearly as if it were put into words; but no reasonable young woman would think of making this the ground of a quarrel. Just as little right have a married couple to tell me by speeches, and looks that are scarce less plain than speeches, that I am not the happy man, the lady's choice. It is enough that I know I am not: I do not want this perpetual reminding.

The display of superior knowledge or riches may be made sufficiently mortifying; but these admit of a palliative. The knowledge which is brought out to insult me, may accidentally improve me; and in the rich man's houses and pictures, — his parks and gardens, I have a temporary usufruct at least. But the display of married happiness has none of these palliatives: it is throughout pure, unrecompensed, unqualified insult.

Marriage by its best title is a monopoly, and not of the least invidious sort. It is the cunning of most possessors of any exclusive privilege to keep their advantage as much out of sight as possible, that their less favoured neighbours, seeing little of the benefit, may the less be disposed to question the right. But these married monopolists thrust the most obnoxious part of their patent into our faces.

Nothing is to me more distasteful than that entire complacency and satisfaction which beam in the countenances of a new-married couple, — in that of the lady particularly: it tells you, that her lot is disposed of in this world: that you can have no hopes of her. It is true, I have none; nor wishes either, perhaps: but this is one of those truths which ought, as I said before, to be taken for granted, not expressed.

The excessive airs which those people give themselves, founded on the ignorance of us unmarried people, would be more offensive if they were less irrational. We will allow them to understand the mysteries belonging to their own craft better than we who have not had the happiness to be made free of the company: but their arrogance is not content within these limits. If a single person presume to offer his opinion in their presence, though upon the most indifferent subject, he is immediately silenced as an incompetent person. Nay, a young married lady of my acquaintance, who, the best of the jest was, had not changed her condition above a fortnight before, in a question on which I had the misfortune to differ from her, respecting the properest mode of breeding oysters for the London market, had the assurance to ask with a sneer, how such an old Bachelor as I could pretend to know any thing about such matters.

But what I have spoken of hitherto is nothing to the airs which these creatures give themselves when they come, as they generally do, to have children. When I consider how little of a rarity children are, — that every street and blind alley swarms with them, — that the poorest people commonly have them in most abundance, — that there are few marriages that are not blest with at least one of these bargains, — how often they turn out ill, and defeat the fond hopes of their parents, taking to vicious courses, which end in poverty, disgrace, the gallows, &c. — I cannot for my life tell what cause for pride there can possibly be in having them. If they were young phoénixes,
indeed, that were born but one in a year, there might be a pretext. But when they are so common I do not advert to the insolent merit which they assume with their husbands on these occasions. Let them look to that. But why we, who are not their natural-born subjects, should be expected to bring our spices, myrrh, and incense, — our tribute and homage of admiration, — I do not see.

“Like as the arrows in the hand of the giant, even so are the young children:” so says the excellent office in our Prayer-book appointed for the churching of women. “Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them:” So say I; but then don’t let him discharge his quiver upon us that are weaponless; — let them be arrows, but not to gall and stick us. I have generally observed that these arrows are double-headed: they have two forks, to be sure to hit with one or the other. As for instance, when you come into a house which is full of children, if you happen to take no notice of them (you are thinking of something else, perhaps, and turn a deaf ear to their innocent caresses), you are set down as untractable, morose, a hater of children. On the other hand, if you find them more than usually engaging, if you are taken with their pretty manners, and set about in earnest to romp and play with them, some pretext or other is sure to be found for sending them out of the room: they are too noisy or boisterous, or Mr. — does not like children. With one or other of these forks the arrow is sure to hit you.

I could forgive their jealousy, and dispense with toy ing with their brats, if it gives them any pain; but I think it unreasonable to be called upon to love them, where I see no occasion, — to love a whole family, perhaps, eight, nine, or ten, indiscriminately, to love all the pretty dears, because children are so engaging.

I know there is a proverb, “Love me, love my dog;” that is not always so very practicable, particularly if the dog be set upon you to tease you or snap at you in sport. But a dog or a lesser thing — any inanimate substance, as a keep-sake, a watch or a ring, a tree, or the place where we last parted when my friend went away upon a long absence, I can make shift to love, because I love him, and any thing that reminds me of him; provided it be in its nature indifferent, and apt to receive whatever hue fancy can give it. But children have a real character and an essential being of themselves: they are amiable or unamiable per se; I must love or hate them as I see cause for either in their qualities. A child’s nature is too serious a thing to admit of its being regarded as a mere appendage to another being, and to be loved or hated accordingly: they stand with me upon their own stock, as much as men and women do. Of but you will say, sure it is an attractive age, there is something in the tender years of infancy that of itself charms us. That is the very reason why I am more nice about them. I know that a sweet child is the sweetest thing in nature, not even excepting the delicate creatures which bear them; but the prettier the kind of a thing is, the more desirable it is that it should be pretty of its kind. One daisy differs not much from another in glory; but a violet should look and smell the daintiest. — I was always rather squeamish in my women and children.

But this is not the worst: one must be admitted into their familiarity at least, before they can complain of inattention. It implies visits, and some kind of intercourse. But if the husband be a man with whom you have lived on a friendly footing before marriage, if you did not come in on the wife’s side, — if you did not sneak into the house in her train, but were an old friend in fast habits of intimacy before their courtship was so much as thought on, — look about you — your tenure is precarious — before a twelve-month shall roll over your head, you shall find your old friend gradually grow cool and altered towards you, and at last seek opportunities of breaking with you. I have scarce a married friend of my acquaintance, upon whose firm faith I can rely, whose friendship did not commence after the period of his marriage. With some limitations they can endure that: but that the good man should have dared to enter into a solemn league of friendship in which they were not consulted, though it happened before they knew him, — before they that are now are man and wife ever met, — this is intolerable to them. Every long friendship, every old authentic intimacy, must he brought into their office to be new stamped with their currency, as a sovereign Prince calls in the good old money that was coined in some reign before he was born or thought of, to be new marked and minted with the stamp of his authority, before he will let it pass current in the world. You may guess what luck generally befalls such a rusty piece of metal as I am in these new mintings.
Innumerable are the ways which they take to insult and worm you out of their husband's confidence. Laughing at all you say with a kind of wonder, as if you were a queer kind of fellow that said good things, but an oddity, is one of the ways — they have a particular kind of stare for the purpose — till at last the husband, who used to defer to your judgment, and would pass over some excrescences of understanding and manner for the sake of a general vein of observation (not quite vulgar) which he perceived in you, begins to suspect whether you are not altogether a humorist, — a fellow well enough to have consorted with in his bachelor days, but not quite so proper to be introduced to ladies. This may be called the staring way; and is that which has oftenest been put in practice against me.

Then there is the exaggerating way, or the way of irony: that is, where they find you an object of especial regard with their husband, who is not so easily to be shaken from the lasting attachment founded on esteem which he has conceived towards you; by never-qualified exaggerations to cry up all that you say or do, till the good man, who understands well enough that it is all done in compliment to him, grows weary of the debt of gratitude which is due to so much candor, and by relaxing a little on his part, and taking down a peg or two in his enthusiasm, sinks at length to that kindly level of moderate esteem, — that “decent affection and complacent kindness” towards you, where she herself can join in sympathy with him without much stretch and violence to her sincerity.

Another way (for the ways they have to accomplish so desirable a purpose are infinite) is, with a kind of innocent simplicity, continually to mistake what it was which first made their husband fond of you. If an esteem for something excellent in your moral character was that which riveted the chain which she is to break, upon any imaginary discovery of a want of poignancy in your conversation, she will cry, “I thought, my dear, you described your friend, Mr. — as a great wit.” If, on the other hand, it was for some supposed charm in your conversation that he first grew to like you, and was content for this to overlook some trifling irregularities in your moral deportment, upon the first notice of any of these she as readily exclaims, “This, my dear, is your good Mr. — —.” One good lady whom I took the liberty of expostulating with for not showing me quite so much respect as I thought due to her husband’s old friend, had the candour to confess to me that she had often heard Mr. — speak of me before marriage, and that she had conceived a great desire to be acquainted with me, but that the sight of me had very much disappointed her expectations; for from her husband’s representations of me, she had formed a notion that she was to see a fine, tall, officer-like looking man (I use her very words); the very reverse of which proved to be the truth. This was candid; and I had the civility not to ask her in return, how she came to pitch upon a standard of personal accomplishments for her husband’s friends which differed so much from his own; for my friend’s dimensions as near as possible approximate to mine; he standing five feet five in his shoes, in which I have the advantage of him by about half an inch; and he no more than myself exhibiting any indications of a martial character in his air or countenance.

These are some of the mortifications which I have encountered in the absurd attempt to visit at their houses. To enumerate them all would be a vain endeavour: I shall therefore just glance at the very common impropriety of which married ladies are guilty, of treating us as if we were their husbands, and vice versa — I mean, when they use us with familiarity, and their husbands with ceremony. Testacea, for instance, kept me the other night two or three hours beyond my usual time of supping, while she was fretting because Mr. — did not come home, till the oysters were all spoiled, rather than she would be guilty of the impoliteness of touching one in his absence. This was reversing the point of good manners: for ceremony is an invention to take off the uneasy feeling which we derive from knowing ourselves to be less the object of love and esteem with a fellow-creature than some other person is. It endeavors to make up by superior attentions in little points, for that invidious preference which it is forced to deny in the greater. Had Testacea kept the oysters back for me, and withstood her husband’s importunities to go to supper, she would have acted according to the strict rules of propriety. I know no ceremony that ladies are bound to observe to their husbands, beyond the point of a modest behaviour and decorum: therefore I must
protest against the vicarious gluttony of Cerasia, who at her own table sent away a dish of
Morellas, which I was applying to with great good will, to her husband at the other end of the
table, and recommended a plate of less extraordinary goose berries to my unwedded palate in
their stead. Neither can I excuse the wanton affront of.

But I am weary of stringing up all my married acquaintance by Roman denominations. Let them
amend and change their manners, or I promise to record the full-length English of their names, to
the terror of all such desperate offenders in future.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Christ’s Hospital reveals his unpalatable experiences as a
       (a) College boy       (b) School boy
       (c) A student         (d) None of these

   (ii) Essays called “Counsels civil and moral by
       (a) Bacon            (b) Lamb
       (c) Hazlitt           (d) None of these

   (iii) Lamb is not a moralist nor a psychologist, according to
       (a) Bacon            (b) Hallward
       (c) Cazamian          (d) None of these

   (iv) In this essay ‘the vicarious gluttony of .........
       (a) Morellas         (b) Cerasia
       (c) Testacea          (d) None of these

8.4 Summary

• Charles Lamb’s essay “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is just
what the title suggests: it is indeed “a bachelor’s complaint of the behavior of Married
People."

• Lamb emphasizes his single status in the start of the essay”As a single man” and in doing so,
separates himself from the “Married People.” He talks about Married People as if they are
despicable and offensive and gives both hypothetical and personal examples to back up his
points. He believes that Married People “prefer one another to all the world” and openly
flaunt it, thus offending singles such as Lamb by implying that they “are not the object of this
preference.”

• Furthermore, Lamb believes that overall, singles are looked down on Married People are
undoubtedly more favored and knowledgeable. The main complaint that Lamb is making
throughout the whole essay is the Married People’s attitudes and how they demonstrate
their status.

• He goes as far as to “the airs which these creatures give themselves when they come to have
children and, by using the negative aspects of children, he furthers his disapproval of Married
People and their actions.

• “Christ’s Hospital” reveals his unpalatable experiences as a school boy.

• Lamb disarms the reader at once with his buttonholding familiarity.

• Bacon called his essays “counsels civil and moral.

• Lamb is too modest to pretend to proffer moral counsels.
8.5 Key-Words

1. Nettle : Irritate or annoy.
2. Protean : Tending or able to change frequently or easily, inconstant.

8.6 Review Questions

1. Explain Charles Lamb’s self revelation.
2. Discuss Lamb’s humour, pathos.
3. Briefly describe Lamb’s A Bachelor Complaint on the Behaviour of Married.
4. What is the theme of essay “a Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behaviour of the Married People” by Charles Lamb?

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (b) (ii) (a) (iii) (c) (iv) (b)

8.7 Further Readings

Unit 9: Charles Lamb-A Bachelors Complaint on the Behaviour of Married : Critical Appreciation

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Objectives
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9.4 Review Questions
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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about Charles Lamb
• Examine Lamb’s essay ‘A Bachelors Complaint on the Behaviour of Married’

Introduction
Lamb was the son of Elizabeth Field and John Lamb. Lamb was the youngest child, with an 11
year older sister Mary, an even older brother John, and four other siblings who did.
Charles Lamb was an English essayist, best known for his Essays of Elia and for the children’s
book Tales from Shakespeare, which he produced with his sister, Mary Lamb. Lamb has been
referred to by E.V. Lucas, his principal biographer, as the most lovable figure in English literature.
Lamb was honoured by The Latymer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London
where he lived for a time; it has six houses, one of which, “Lamb”, is named after Charles.

Lamb offers personal anecdotes as well as hypothetical situations that illustrate
and support his points.

9.1 Critical Appreciation
Charles Lamb’s essay “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is just what the
title suggests: it is indeed “a bachelor’s complaint of the behavior of Married People.” Lamb
emphasizes his single status in the start of the essay “As a single man” and in doing so, separates
himself from the “Married People.” He talks about Married People as if they are despicable and
offensive and gives both hypothetical and personal examples to back up his points. He believes
that Married People “prefer one another to all the world” and openly flaunt it, thus offending
singles such as Lamb by implying that they “are not the object of this preference.” Furthermore,
Lamb believes that overall, singles are looked down on Married People are undoubtedly more
favored and knowledgeable. The main complaint that Lamb is making throughout the whole
essay is the Married People’s attitudes and how they demonstrate their status. He goes as far as to “the airs which these creatures give themselves when they come to have children” and, by using the negative aspects of children, he furthers his disapproval of Married People and their actions. Lamb’s purpose in writing “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is to bring attention to the attitudes of Married People. He wishes for his audience to realize how Married People subconsciously flaunt themselves in their love, offending those who are single. Ultimately, he hopes that Married People will bring themselves to correct their mistakes and be more considerate towards others. He structures his argument by stating his main reason for decrying Married People is because he believes them to be overly involved with each other and their love that they disregard and “perk it up in the faces of [singles] so shamelessly.” From this claim, Lamb offers personal anecdotes as well as hypothetical situations that illustrate and support his points. He concludes his essay stating that although he despises their attitudes, he is still willing to “forgive their jealousy and dispense with toying with their brats” but thinks it “unreasonable to be called upon to love them.” Through Lamb’s willingness to forgive these people whom he disapproves of, he is seen to be credible with good values and his readers are more inclined to believe his words and work to correct the attitudes of Married People.

The structure of Lamb’s argument logically appeals to his readers, for it flows and clarifies his points through examples. However, Lamb fails to address any possible counter arguments. His argument addresses only the negative aspects of Married People, but surely there are positive sides as well. By failing to address and disprove these possibilities, Lamb leaves room for doubt. Despite this, his argument stands strong. The examples he gives are cogent and, through his personal anecdotes, he is able to establish a connection with the audience. He also appeals emotionally especially to the singles, for he is a bachelor himself. The injustice that he sometimes feels can appeal to others who have felt the same way. Overall, Lamb appeals effectively to his readers through his use of pathos, ethos, and logos. Although there are some flaws in his arguments, they are overlooked and undermined by his credibility and emotional appeal.

Lamb’s style of writing in this essay is fairly colloquial. He is very assertive in his argument, and states his points with conviction and support. These assertions are highlighted by his occasional use of italics throughout the essay. At the beginning of the essay, Lamb firmly establishes a line between him and Married People simply by capitalizing “Married People.” In doing so, he sets them apart in their own group of Married People, symbolizing that this is truly how it is in reality too: Married People set themselves apart in their own groups through their attitudes. They really do seem to be off in their own little world of love, and this is what Lamb dislikes. Towards the end of the essay, Lamb brings up the subject of children and how they also contribute to the Married People’s attitudes. He brings out all the negative aspects of children and emphasizes them by listing them continuously with dashes as separation. He also brings in a simile from “the excellent office in [the] Prayer-book” “Like as arrows in the hand of the giant, even so are the young children” and uses it in his favor. He takes this idea of arrows and extends it into a metaphor to support his argument. Like “double-headed” arrows with “two forks, to be sure to hit with one or the other”, how one acts with children will always be wrong: “with one or other of these forks the arrow is sure to hit you.” Whether you act stoic to a child’s attention or shower them with affection, “some pretext or other is sure to be found for sending them out of the room.” Through this comparison of double-headed arrows and children, Lamb effectively conveys his opinions of Married People and their attitudes that are shown in everything, including the way they handle their children.
Lamb firmly establishes a line between him and Married People simply by capitalizing “Married People.”

Personally, I do not agree with Lamb for the most part. Although I can see why he views married people in this way, I don’t think that they should be decried in this manner. Sure, it may seem like those who are married are flaunting their love to others, but I don’t think that they do it to offend others. Lamb makes it sound like married people intentionally target singles and taunt them for not having a significant other like themselves. But think of it in the married people’s perspective how can they possibly suppress the love that they are feeling? Love is a very strong feeling, and it is impossible to suppress. I’m sure that if Lamb got married and was finally allowed to show his love unconditionally, he would act like the “Married People” he discussed in his essay. He merely looks at the negative aspects of marriage from the perspective of an outsider but what about the positives aspects from the perspective of a married person? Furthermore, his discussion of the children, to me, was not very convincing. His views of children would most likely change after having some children of his own. To conclude, I don’t agree with Lamb’s views and arguments because he is a biased source. I think that he should get married and have children first, before making these kinds of assertions.

Overall, “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is effectively portrayed through Lamb’s arguments and claims. His complaints are easy to understand, thanks to the examples that he gives. He makes many good points about Married People, and most likely is able to persuade many readers of his views. Although I personally am more skeptical of his views, it is because I am also biased. I think of love as one of the most important and potent feelings, but not everybody thinks of love as strongly as I do. Despite my views, I still think that Lamb’s points are overall strong and assertive. I feel that the connection he makes with his readers is also very effective, and I believe his argument will continue to affect people of today, as marriage is a large part of society.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Lamb’s purpose in writing “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behaviour of Married People” is to bring the attention to the
   (a) Life of married people (b) Profession of married people (c) Attitude of married people (d) None of these

   (ii) Lamb uses in his essays
       (a) Pathos (b) Ethos (c) Dogos (d) All of these

9.2 Summary

• Charles Lamb was an English essayist, best known for his Essays of Elia and for the children’s book Tales from Shakespeare, which he produced with his sister, Mary Lamb. Lamb has been referred to by E.V. Lucas, his principal biographer, as the most lovable figure in English literature. Lamb was honoured by The Latymer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London where he lived for a time; it has six houses, one of which, “Lamb”, is named after Charles.

• Charles Lamb’s essay “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is just what the title suggests: it is indeed “a bachelor’s complaint of the behavior of Married People.” Lamb emphasizes his single status in the start of the essay “As a single man” and in
doing so, separates himself from the “Married People.” He talks about Married People as if they are despicable and offensive and gives both hypothetical and personal examples to back up his points. He believes that Married People “prefer one another to all the world” and openly flaunt it, thus offending singles such as Lamb by implying that they “are not the object of this preference.” Furthermore, Lamb believes that overall, singles are looked down on; Married People are undoubtedly more favored and knowledgeable.

- The structure of Lamb’s argument logically appeals to his readers, for it flows and clarifies his points through examples. However, Lamb fails to address any possible counter arguments. His argument addresses only the negative aspects of Married People, but surely there are positive sides as well. By failing to address and disprove these possibilities, Lamb leaves room for doubt. Despite this, his argument stands strong. The examples he gives are cogent and, through his personal anecdotes, he is able to establish a connection with the audience. He also appeals emotionally especially to the singles, for he is a bachelor himself. The injustice that he sometimes feels can appeal to others who have felt the same way. Overall, Lamb appeals effectively to his readers through his use of pathos, ethos, and logos. Although there are some flaws in his arguments, they are overlooked and undermined by his credibility and emotional appeal.

- Overall, “A Bachelor’s Complaint of the Behavior of Married People” is effectively portrayed through Lamb’s arguments and claims. His complaints are easy to understand, thanks to the examples that he gives. He makes many good points about Married People, and most likely is able to persuade many readers of his views. Although I personally am more skeptical of his views, it is because I am also biased. I think of love as one of the most important and potent feelings, but not everybody thinks of love as strongly as I do. Despite my views, I still think that Lamb’s points are overall strong and assertive. I feel that the connection he makes with his readers is also very effective, and I believe his argument will continue to affect people of today, as marriage is a large part of society.

### 9.3 Key-Words

1. **Flaunt**: display ostentatiously especially in order to provoke envy or admiration or to show defiance
2. **Despicable**: Worthy of being despised; contemptible; mean

### 9.4 Review Questions

1. Explore Lamb’s specific complaints about married couples here. How can you tell the extent to which he is serious or is exaggerating for comic effect?
2. Would unmarried friends today offer similar complaints about their married friends and their children? Are there any additional complaints that are pertinent to contemporary life?
3. Write an essay in which you describe some chronic complaints of your own relating to the behavior of a certain group of people that you number among your friends.

**Answers: Self-Assessment**

1. (i) (c)  (ii) (d)

### 9.5 Further Readings

Unit 10: Addison - Pleasures of Imagination: Introduction

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about Addison
• Discuss Pleasures of Imagination

Introduction
Joseph Addison was an English essayist, poet, playwright and politician. He was a man of letters, eldest son of Lancelot Addison. His name is usually remembered alongside that of his long-standing friend, Richard Steele, with whom he founded The Spectator magazine.

10.1 Addison’s Life and Works

Background
Addison was born in Milston, Wiltshire, but soon after his birth his father, Lancelot Addison, was appointed Dean of Lichfield and the Addison family moved into the cathedral close. He was educated at Charterhouse School, where he first met Richard Steele, and at The Queen’s College, Oxford. He excelled in classics, being specially noted for his Latin verse, and became a Fellow of Magdalen College. In 1693, he addressed a poem to John Dryden, and his first major work, a book of the lives of English poets, was published in 1694. His translation of Virgil’s Georgics was published the same year. Dryden, Lord Somers and Charles Montagu, 1st Earl of Halifax took an interest in Addison’s work and obtained for him a pension of £300 to enable him travel to Europe with a view to diplomatic employment, all the time writing and studying politics. While in Switzerland in 1702, he heard of the death of William III, an event which lost him his pension, as his influential contacts, Halifax and Somers, had lost their employment with the Crown.

Political career
He returned to England at the end of 1703. For more than a year he remained without employment, but the Battle of Blenheim in 1704 gave him a fresh opportunity of distinguishing himself. The government, more specifically Lord Treasurer Godolphin, commissioned Addison to write a commemorative poem, and he produced The Campaign, which gave such satisfaction that he was forthwith appointed a Commissioner of Appeals in Halifax’s government. His next literary venture was an account of his travels in Italy, which was followed by an opera libretto titled Rosamund. In
1705, with the Whigs in political power, Addison was made Under-Secretary of State and accompanied Halifax on a mission to Hanover. Addison’s biographer states that “In the field of his foreign responsibilities Addison’s views were those of a good Whig. He had always believed that England’s power depended upon her wealth, her wealth upon her commerce, and her commerce upon the freedom of the seas and the checking of the power of France and Spain”.

From 1708 to 1709 he was MP for the rotten borough of Lostwithiel. Addison was shortly afterwards appointed secretary to the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Wharton, and Keeper of the Records of that country. Under the influence of Wharton, he was Member of Parliament in the Irish House of Commons for Cavan Borough from 1709 until 1713. From 1710, he represented Malmesbury, in his home county of Wiltshire, holding the seat until his death.

Magazine founder

Joseph Addison: engraving after the Kneller portrait He encountered Jonathan Swift in Ireland and remained there for a year. Subsequently, he helped found the Kitcat Club and renewed his association with Richard Steele. In 1709 Steele began to bring out Tatler, to which Addison became almost immediately a contributor: thereafter he (with Steele) started The Spectator, the first number of which appeared on 1 March 1711. This paper, which at first appeared daily, was kept up (with a break of about a year and a half when the Guardian took its place) until 20 December 1714.

Plays

He wrote the libretto for Thomas Clayton’s opera Rosamond, which had a disastrous premiere in London in 1707. In 1713 Addison’s tragedy Cato was produced, and was received with acclamation by both Whigs and Tories. He followed this effort with a comedic play, The Drummer (his last undertaking was The Freeholder, a party paper, 1715-16.)

Marriage and death

The later events in the life of Addison did not contribute to his happiness. In 1716, he married the Dowager Countess of Warwick to whose son he had been tutor, and his political career continued to flourish, as he served Secretary of State for the Southern Department from 1717 to 1718. However, his crazy government newspaper, The Freeholder, was much criticised, and Alexander Pope was among those who made him an object of derision, christening him “Atticus”. His wife appears to have been arrogant and imperious; his stepson the seventh Earl was a rake and unfriendly to him; while in his public capacity his invincible shyness made him of little use in Parliament. He eventually fell out with Steele over the Peerage Bill of 1719. In 1718, Addison was forced to resign as secretary of state because of his poor health, but remained an MP until his death at Holland House, London on 17 June 1719, in his 48th year, and was buried in Westminster Abbey. Besides the works above mentioned, he wrote a Dialogue on Medals, and left incomplete a work on the Evidences of Christianity.

Cato

The actor John Kemble in the role of Cato in Addison’s play, which he revived at Covent Garden in 1816, drawn by George Cruikshank. In 1712, Addison wrote his most famous work of fiction, Cato, a Tragedy. Based on the last days of Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis, it deals with, inter alia, such themes as individual liberty versus government tyranny, Republicanism versus Monarchism, logic versus emotion and Cato’s personal struggle to cleave to his beliefs in the face of death. It has a prologue written by Alexander Pope and an epilogue by Dr. Garth. The play was a success throughout Britain and its possessions in the New World, as well as Ireland. It continued to grow in popularity, especially in the American colonies, for several generations. Indeed, it was almost certainly a literary inspiration for the American Revolution, being well known to many of the Founding Fathers. In fact, George Washington had it performed for the Continental Army while they were encamped at Valley Forge. Among the founders, according to John J. Miller, “no single work of literature may have been more important than Cato”. Some scholars have identified the
inspiration for several famous quotations from the American Revolution in *Cato*. These include:

- Patrick Henry’s famous ultimatum: “Give me Liberty or give me death!” (Supposed reference to Act II, Scene 4: “It is not now time to talk of aught/But chains or conquest, liberty or death.”).
- Nathan Hale’s valediction: “I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.” (Supposed reference to Act IV, Scene 4: “What a pity it is/That we can die but once to serve our country.”).
- Washington’s praise for Benedict Arnold in a letter to him: “It is not in the power of any man to command success; but you have done more — you have deserved it.”

(Clear reference to Act I, Scene 2: “'Tis not in mortals to command success; but we'll do more, Sempronius, we'll deserve it.”). Not long after the American Revolution, Edmund Burke quotes the play as well in his Letter to Charles-Jean-François Depont (1789) in *Further Reflections on the Revolution in France*: “The French may be yet to go through more transmigrations. They may pass, as one of our poets says, 'through many varieties of untried being,' before their state obtains its final form.” The poet in reference is of course Addison and the passage Burke quoted is from *Cato* (V.i. II): “Through what variety of untried being,/Through what new scenes and changes must we pass!” Though the play has fallen from popularity and is now rarely performed, it was widely popular and often cited in the eighteenth century, with Cato as an exemplar of republican virtue and liberty. For example, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon were inspired by the play to write a series of letters, *Cato’s Letters* on individual rights, using the name “Cato”. The action of the play involves the forces of Cato at Utica, awaiting the arrival of Caesar just after Caesar’s victory at Thapsus (46 BC). The noble sons of Cato, Portius and Marcus, are both in love with Lucia, the daughter of Lucius, a senatorial ally of Cato. Juba, prince of Numidia, another fighting on Cato’s side, loves Cato’s daughter Marcia. Meanwhile, Sempronius, another senator, and Syphax, general of the Numidians, are conspiring secretly against Cato, hoping to draw off the Numidian army from supporting him. In the final act, Cato commits suicide, leaving his supporters to make their peace with the approaching Caesar—an easier task after Cato’s death, since he has been Caesar’s most implacable foe. Joseph Addison by Kraemer

**Contribution**

It is mostly as an essayist that Addison is remembered today. Addison began writing essays quite casually. In April 1709, his childhood friend, Richard Steele, started *The Tatler*. Addison inspired him to write this essay. Addison contributed 42 essays while Steele wrote 188. Of Addison’s help, Steele remarked, “When I had once called him in I could not subsist without dependence on him”. On 2 January 1711, *The Tatler* was discontinued. On 1 March 1711, *The Spectator* was published, and it continued until 6 December 1712. *The Spectator* which was issued daily and achieved great popularity. It exercised a great deal of influence over the reading public of the time. In *The Spectator*, Addison soon became the leading partner. He contributed 274 essays out a total of 555; Steele wrote 236 for this periodical. Addison also assisted Steele with the *Guardian* which Steele began in 1713.

The breezy, conversational style of the essays later elicited Bishop Hurd’s reproving attribution of an “Addisonian Termination”, for preposition stranding, the casual grammatical construction that ends a sentence with a preposition.

**Albin Schram Letters**

In 2005 an Austrian banker and collector named Albin Schram died and, in his laundry room, a collection of around 1000 letters from great historical figures was found. One was written by Joseph Addison, reporting on the debate in the House of Commons over the grant to John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough and his heirs, following the Battle of Ramillies. The letter was written on the day of the debate, probably to George Stepney. Addison explains that the motion was opposed by Mr Annesley, Ward, Caesar and Sir William Vevian, ‘One said that this was showing no
honour to His Grace but to a posterity that he was not concerned in. Casar ... hoped ye Duke though he had been Victorious over the Enemy would not think of being so over a House of Commons: which was said in pursuance to a Motion made by some of the Craftier sort that would not oppose the proposition directly but turn it off by a Side-Wind pretending that it being a money affaire it should be refer’ed to a Committee of the whole House wch in all probability would have defeated the whole affaire...'. Following the Duke of Marlborough’s highly successful campaigns of 1706, he and George Stepney became the first English regents of the Anglo-Dutch condominium for governing the southern Netherlands. It was Stepney who formally took possession of the principality of Mindelheim in Marlborough’s name on 26 May, following the Battle of Ramillies. On Marlborough’s return to London in November, Parliament granted his request that his grant of £ 5,000 ‘out of ye Post-Office’ be made in perpetuity for his heirs.

A second letter to his friend Sir Richard Steele was also found, concerning the Tatler and other matters. ‘I very much liked your last paper upon the Courtship that is usually paid to the fair sex. I wish you had reserved the Letter in this days paper concerning Indecencies at Church for an entire piece. It would have made as good a one as any you have published. Your Reflections upon Almanza are very good.’ The letter concludes with references to impeachment proceedings against Addison’s friend, Henry Sacheverell (‘I am much obliged to you for yor Letters relating to Sackeverell!’), and the Light House petition: ‘I am something troubled that you have not sent away ye Letters received from Ireland to my Lord Lieutenant, particularly that from Mr Forster [the Attorney General] with the Enclosed petition about the Light House, which I hope will be delivered to the House before my Return’.

10.2 Analysis

Addison’s character has been described as kind and magnanimous, albeit somewhat cool and unimpassioned. His appealing manners and conversation made him one of the most popular men of his day; and while he laid his friends under obligations for substantial favours, he showed great forbearance towards his few enemies. His essays are noted for their clarity and elegant style, as well as their cheerful and respectful humour. One flaw in Addison character was a tendency to convivial excess, which nonetheless should be judged in view of the somewhat lax manners of his time.

“As a man, he may not have deserved the adoration which he received from those who, bewitched by his fascinating society, and indebted for all the comforts of life to his generous and delicate friendship, worshipped him nightly, in his favourite temple at Button’s. But, after full inquiry and impartial reflection, we have long been convinced that he deserved as much love and esteem as can be justly claimed by any of our infirm and erring race. Some blemishes may undoubtedly be detected in his character; but the more carefully it is examined, the more it will appear, to use the phrase of the old anatomists, sound in the noble parts, free from all taint of perfidy, of cowardice, of cruelty, of ingratitude, of envy. Men may easily be named, in whom some particular good disposition has been more conspicuous than in Addison. But the just harmony of qualities, the exact temper between the stern and the humane virtues, the habitual observance of every law, not only of moral rectitude, but of moral grace and dignity, distinguish him from all men who have been tried by equally strong temptations, and about whose conduct we possess equally full information.” – Lord Macaulay

Our Sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our senses. It fills the mind with the largest variety of ideas, converses with its objects at the greatest distance, and continues the longest in action without being tired or satiated with its proper enjoyments. The sense of feeling can indeed give us a notion of extension, shape, and all other ideas that enter at the eye, except colours; but at the same time it is very much straitened and confined in its operations, to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular objects. Our sight seems designed to supply all these defects, and may be
considered as a more delicate and diffusive kind of touch, that spreads itself over an infinite multitude of bodies, comprehends the largest figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote parts of the universe.

It is this sense which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by the pleasures of the imagination, or fancy, (which I shall use promiscuously,) I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up their ideas into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like occasion. We cannot, indeed, have a single image in the fancy that did not make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding those images, which we have once received, into all the varieties of picture and vision that are most agreeable to the imagination; for by this faculty a man in a dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with scenes and landscapes more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compass of nature.

There are few words in the English language which are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense than those of the fancy and the imagination. I therefore thought it necessary to fix and determine the notion of these two words, as I intend to make use of them in the thread of my following speculations, that the reader may conceive rightly what is the subject which I proceed upon. I must therefore desire him to remember, that by the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight, and that I divide these pleasures into two kinds my design being first of all to discourse of those primary pleasures of the imagination, which entirely proceed from such objects as are before our eyes; and in the next place to speak of those secondary pleasures of the imagination which flow from the ideas of visible objects, when the objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our memories, or formed into agreeable visions of things that are either absent or fictitious.

The pleasures of the imagination, taken in their full extent, are not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding. The last are, indeed, more preferable, because they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in the mind of man; yet it must be confess, that those of the imagination are as great and as transporting as the other. A beautiful prospect delights the soul, as much as a demonstration; and a description in Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in Aristotle. Besides, the pleasures of the imagination have this advantage above those of the understanding, that they are more obvious, and more easy to be acquired. It is but opening the eye, and the scene enters. The colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder. We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of anything we see, and immediately assent to the beauty of an object, without inquiring into the particular causes and occasions of it.

A man of polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures, that the vulgar are not capable of receiving. He can converse with a picture, and find an agreeable companion in a statue. He meets with a secret refreshment in a description, and often feels a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows, than another does in the possession. It gives him, indeed, a kind of property in everything he sees, and makes the most rude, uncultivated parts of nature administer to his pleasures: so that he looks upon the world, as it were in another light, and discovers in it a multitude of charms, that conceal themselves from the generality of mankind.

There are, indeed, but very few who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a relish of any pleasures that are not criminal: every diversion they take is at the expense of some one virtue or another, and their very first step out of business is into vice or folly. A man should endeavour, therefore, to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with safety, and find in them such a satisfaction as a wise man would not blush to take. Of this nature are those of the imagination, which do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our more serious employments, nor, at the same time, suffer the mind to sink into that negligence and remissness, which are apt to accompany our more sensual delights, but, like a gentle exercise
to the faculties, awaken them from sloth and idleness, without putting them upon any labour or difficulty.

We might here add, that the pleasures of the fancy are more conducive to health, than those of the understanding, which are worked out by dint of thinking, and attended with too violent a labour of the brain. Delightful scenes, whether in nature, painting, or poetry, have a kindly influence on the body, as well as the mind, and not only serve to clear and brighten the imagination, but are able to disperse grief and melancholy, and to set the animal spirits in pleasing and agreeable motions. For this reason Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to prescribe to his reader a poem or a prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtle disquisitions, and advises him to pursue studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables, and contemplations of nature.

We, by way of introduction, settled the notion of those pleasures of the imagination which are the subject of my present undertaking, and endeavoured, by several considerations, to recommend to my reader the pursuit of those pleasures.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Addison addressed a poem to John Dryden in
   (a) 1693    (b) 1692    (c) 1685    (d) 1691

   (ii) The first major work, ‘A book of the Lives of English Poets’ was published in
   (a) 1693    (b) 1694    (c) 1692    (d) 1991

   (iii) Addison’s tragedy ‘Cato’ was produced in
   (a) 1713    (b) 1715    (c) 1725    (d) 1718

   (iv) ‘The Spectator’ was published in
   (a) 1711    (b) 1712    (c) 1713    (d) 1714

10.3 Summary

- Joseph Addison was an English essayist, poet, playwright and politician. He was a man of letters, eldest son of Lancelot Addison.

- Magdalen College. In 1693, he addressed a poem to John Dryden, and his first major work, a book of the lives of English poets, was published in 1694. His translation of Virgil’s *Georgics* was published the same year. Dryden, Lord Somers and Charles Montagu, 1st Earl of Halifax took an interest in Addison’s work and obtained for him a pension of £300 to enable him travel to Europe with a view to diplomatic employment, all the time writing and studying politics. While in Switzerland in 1702, he heard of the death of William III, an event which lost him his pension, as his influential contacts, Halifax and Somers, had lost their employment with the Crown.

- Addison’s biographer states that “In the field of his foreign responsibilities Addison’s views were those of a good Whig. He had always believed that England’s power depended upon her wealth, her wealth upon her commerce, and her commerce upon the freedom of the seas and the checking of the power of France and Spain”.

- From 1708 to 1709 he was MP for the rotten borough of Lostwithiel.

- In 1712, Addison wrote his most famous work of fiction, *Cato, a Tragedy*.

- It is mostly as an essayist that Addison is remembered today. Addison began writing essays quite casually. In April 1709, his childhood friend, Richard Steele, started *The Tatler*. Addison inspired him to write this essay. Addison contributed 42 essays while Steele wrote 188. Of
Addison’s help, Steele remarked, “When I had once called him in I could not subsist without dependence on him”. On 2 January 1711, *The Tatler* was discontinued.

- On 1 March 1711, *The Spectator* was published, and it continued until 6 December 1712.
- Addison’s character has been described as kind and magnanimous, albeit somewhat cool and unimpassioned. His appealing manners and conversation made him one of the most popular men of his day; and while he laid his friends under obligations for substantial favours, he showed great forbearance towards his few enemies. His essays are noted for their clarity and elegant style, as well as their cheerful and respectful humour.
- Our Sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our senses.

### 10.4 Key-Words

1. **Commemorative**: Honoring or preserving the memory of mother.
2. **Republican virtue**: Republic is a form of government while republicanism is a political ideology that can appear in republics or monarchies.

### 10.5 Review Questions

1. Discuss Addison as an Essayist
2. Briefly describe ‘Pleasures of Imagination’ by Addison
3. How does Addison distinguish among the Pleasures of the Imagination the Pleasures of the Senses, and the Pleasures of the Understanding?

**Answers: Self-Assessment**

1. (i) (a) (ii) (b) (iii) (a) (iv) (a)

### 10.6 Further Readings

2. Addison-Pleasures of Imagination.
Unit 11: Addison-Pleasures of Imagination: Detailed Study and Critical Appreciation

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Understand Addison’s Pleasures of Imagination
• Discuss various aspects of Addison essays
• Critically examine Pleasures of Imagination

Introduction
Joseph Addison (1672-1719), studied classics at Queen’s College, Oxford and subsequently became a Fellow of Magdalen College. During his life, he held several governmental posts but is perhaps best known for his founding of the daily The Spectator with Richard Steele. Addison’s Cato, a play tracing the Roman statesman and stoic Cato’s opposition to Caesar, was immensely popular; in fact, George Washington had the play performed for his troops at Valley Forge. Addison’s optimistic writing style constructed with gracious mannerisms is a major reason for his abiding influence in English literature. Samuel Johnson praised his work, “Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the study of Addison.”

In his and Richard Steele’s The Spectator, Addison developed an essay style which greatly influenced the writings in eighteenth-century periodicals. In the short well-known passages in our readings on the pleasures of the imagination, Addison clearly notes some first suggestions towards a theory of aesthetics. His contribution represents a shift in emphasis from the creations of the artist to the pleasures of the connoisseur; for this reason, Addison’s essays had great appeal to the rising middle class seeking to improve their refinement and taste. Addison notes that of the pleasures of sense, the understanding and the imagination, only the latter pleasures originate from sight. Whether or not imaginative pleasures derive from the appearance or the ideas of visible objects, the pleasure, he thinks, is due to their expansiveness, novelty, or beauty. He argues that the purpose of such pleasure is attributable to the Supreme Being providing light and color to behold His works. Accordingly, Addison believes beauty in nature surpasses that of art, even though different aspects of beauty in each form enhance the beauty of the other.
Man in a Dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with Scenes and Landskips more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole Compass of Nature.

11.1 Text-Pleasures of The Imagination

The Pleasures of the Imagination is a long didactic poem by Mark Akenside, first published in 1744. The first book defines the powers of imagination and discusses the various kinds of pleasure to be derived from the perception of beauty; the second distinguishes works of imagination from philosophy; the third describes the pleasure to be found in the study of man, the sources of ridicule, the operations of the mind, in producing works of imagination, and the influence of imagination on morals. The ideas were largely borrowed from Joseph Addison’s essays on the imagination in the Spectator and from Lord Shaftesbury. Edward Dowden complains that “his tone is too high-pitched; his ideas are too much in the air; they do not nourish themselves in the common heart, the common life of man.” Samuel Johnson praised the blank verse of the poems, but found fault with the long and complicated periods. Akenside got the idea for the poem during a visit to Morpeth in 1738. The Pleasures of the Imagination may also refer to The Spectator papers numbered 411 through 418. These specific papers differed from the rest in that they were non-narrative and philosophical, and contained less obvious social commentary.

Our Sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our Senses. It fills the Mind with the largest Variety of Ideas, converses with its Objects at the greatest Distance, and continues the longest in Action without being tired or satiated with its proper Enjoyments. The Sense of Feeling can indeed give us a Notion of Extension, Shape, and all other Ideas that enter at the Eye, except Colours; but at the same time it is very much straightened and confined in its Operations, to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular Objects. Our Sight seems designed to supply all these Defects, and may be considered as a more delicate and diffusive kind of Touch, that spreads itself over an infinite Multitude of Bodies, comprehends the largest Figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote Parts of the Universe.

It is this Sense which furnishes the Imagination with its Ideas; so that by the Pleasures of the Imagination or Fancy (which I shall use promiscuously) I here mean such as arise from visible Objects, either when we have them actually in our View, or when we call up their Ideas in our Minds by Paintings, Statues, Descriptions, or any the like Occasion. We cannot indeed have a single Image in the Fancy that did not make its first Entrance through the Sight; but we have the Power of retaining, altering and compounding those Images, which we have once received, into all the varieties of Picture and Vision that are most agreeable to the Imagination; for by this Faculty a Man in a Dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with Scenes and Landskips more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole Compass of Nature.

“There are, indeed, but very few who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a Relish of any Pleasures that are not Criminal; every Diversion they take is at the Expence of some one Virtue or another, and their very first Step out of Business is into Vice or Folly”.

By the Pleasures of the Imagination, I mean only such Pleasures as arise originally from Sight, and that I divide these Pleasures into two Kinds: My Design being first of all to Discourse of those Primary Pleasures of the Imagination, which entirely proceed from such Objects as are before our Eye; and in the next place to speak of those Secondary Pleasures of the Imagination which flow from the Ideas of visible Objects, when the Objects are not actually before the Eye, but are called up into our Memories, or formed into agreeable Visions of Things that are either Absent or Fictitious.
The Pleasures of the Imagination, taken in the full Extent, are not so gross as those of Sense, nor so refined as those of the Understanding. The last are, indeed, more preferable, because they are founded on some new Knowledge or Improvement in the Mind of Man; yet it must be confest, that those of the “Pleasures of the Imagination” by Joseph Addison Imagination are as great and as transporting as the other. A beautiful Prospect delights the Soul, as much as a Demonstration; and a Description in Homer has charmed more Readers than a Chapter in Aristotle. Besides, the Pleasures of the Imagination have this Advantage, above those of the Understanding, that they are more obvious, and more easy to be acquired. It is but opening the Eye, and the Scene enters. The Colours paint themselves on the Fancy, with very little Attention of Thought or Application of Mind in the Beholder. We are struck, we know not how, with the Symmetry of any thing we see, and immediately assent to the Beauty of an Object, without enquiring into the particular Causes and Occasions of it.

Did u know? *The Pleasures of the Imagination* is a long didactic poem by Mark Akenside, first published in 1744.

There are, indeed, but very few who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a Relish of any Pleasures that are not Criminal; every Diversion they take is at the Expence of some one Virtue or another, and their very first Step out of Business is into Vice or Folly. A Man should endeavour, therefore, to make the Sphere of his innocent Pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with Safety, and find in them such a Satisfaction as a wise Man would not blush to take. Of this Nature are those of the Imagination, which do not require such a Bent of Thought as is necessary to our more serious Employments, nor, at the same time, suffer the Mind to sink into that Negligence and Remissness, which are apt to accompany our more sensual Delights, but, like a gentle Exercise to the Faculties, awaken them from Sloth and Idleness, without putting them upon any Labour or Difficulty.

We might here add, that the Pleasures of the Fancy are more conducive to Health, than those of the Understanding, which are worked out by Dint of Thinking, and attended with too violent a Labour of the Brain. Delightful Scenes, whether in Nature, Painting, or Poetry, have a kindly Influence on the Body, as well as the Mind, and not only serve to clear and brighten the Imagination, but are able to disperse Grief and Melancholy, and to set the Animal Spirits in pleasing and agreeable Motions. For this Reason Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to prescribe to his Reader a Poem or a Prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtle Disquisitions, and advises him to pursue Studies that fill the Mind with splendid and illustrious Objects, as Histories, Fables, and Contemplations of Nature.

### 11.2 Sources of Pleasures

I shall first consider those Pleasures of the Imagination, which arise from the actual View and Survey of outward Objects: And these, I think, all proceed from the Sight of what is Great, Uncommon, or Beautiful. There may, indeed, be something so terrible or offensive, that the Horror or Loathsomeness of an Object may over-bear the Pleasure which results from its Greatness, Novelty, or Beauty; but still there will be such a Mixture of Delight in the very Disgust it gives us, as any of these three Qualifications are most conspicuous and prevailing.

“Delightful Scenes, whether in Nature, Painting, or Poetry, have a kindly Influence . . . and not only serve to clear and brighten the Imagination, but are able to disperse Grief and Melancholy” By Greatness, I do not only mean the Bulk of any single Object, but the Largeness of a whole View,
Our Imagination loves to be filled with an Object, or to grasp at any thing that is too big for its Capacity. We are flung into a pleasing Astonishment at such unbounded Views, and feel a delightful Stillness and Amazement in the Soul at the Apprehension of them. The Mind of Man naturally hates everything that looks like a Restraint upon it, and is apt to fancy it self under a sort of Confinement, when the Sight is pent up in a narrow Compass, and shortned on every side by the Neighbourhood of Walls or Mountains... [W]ide and undetermined Prospects are as pleasing to the Fancy, as the Speculations of Eternity or Infinitude are to the Understanding. But if there be a Beauty or Uncommonness joined with this Grandeur, as in a troubled Ocean, a Heaven adorned with Stars and Meteors, or a spacious Landskip cut out into Rivers, Woods, Rocks, and Meadows, the Pleasure still grows upon us, as it rises from more than a single Principle.

[Novelty] bestows Charms on a Monster, and makes even the Imperfections of Nature please us.” Every thing that is new or uncommon raises a Pleasure in the Imagination, because it fills the Soul with an agreeable Surprize, gratifies its Curiosity, and gives it an Idea of which it was not before possesed. We are indeed so often conversant with one Set of Objects, and tired out with so many repeated Shows of the same Things, that whatever is new or uncommon contributes a little to vary human Life, and to divert our Minds, for a while, with the Strangeness of its Appearance: It serves us for a kind of Refreshment, and takes off from that Satiety we are apt to complain of in our usual and ordinary Entertainments. It is this that bestows Charms on a Monster, and makes even the Imperfections of Nature please us. It is this that recommends Variety, where the Mind is every Instant called off to something new, and the Attention not suffered to dwell too long, and waste it self on any particular Object. It is this, likewise, that improves what is great or beautiful, and make it afford the Mind a double Entertainment.

One of the dominant practices in contemporary eighteenth-century literary studies is reading art and aesthetics as ideology.

But there is nothing that makes its Way more directly to the Soul than Beauty, which immediately diffuses a secret Satisfaction and Complacency through the Imagination, and gives a Finishing to any thing that is Great or Uncommon. The very first Discovery of it strikes the Mind with an inward Joy, and spreads a Cheerfulness and Delight through all its Faculties. There is not perhaps any real Beauty or Deformity more in one Piece of Matter than another, because we might have been so made, that whatsoever now appears loathsome to us, might have shewn it self agreeable; but we find by Experience, that there are several Modifications of Matter which the Mind, without any previous Consideration, pronounces at first sight Beautiful or Deformed. Thus we see that every different Species of sensible Creatures has its different Notions of Beauty, and that each of them is most affected with the Beauties of its own Kind. This is no where more remarkable than in Birds of the same Shape and Proportion, where we often see the Male determined in his Courtship by the single Grain or Tincture of a Feather, and never discovering any Charms but in the Colour of its Species.

“Every different Species of sensible Creatures has its different Notions of Beauty, and that each of them is most affected with the Beauties of its own Kind.” There is a second Kind of Beauty that we find in the several Products of Art and Nature, which does not work in the Imagination with that Warmth and Violence as the Beauty that appears in our proper Species, but is apt however to raise in us a secret Delight, and a kind of Fondness for the Places or Objects in which we discover it. This consists either in the Gaity or Variety of Colours, in the Symmetry and Proportion of Parts, in the Arrangement and Disposition of Bodies, or in a just Mixture and Concurrance of all together.
Among these several Kinds of Beauty the Eye takes most Delight in Colours. We no where meet with a more glorious or pleasing Show in Nature than what appears in the Heavens at the rising and setting of the Sun, which is wholly made up of those different Stains of Light that shew themselves in Clouds Reading For Philosophical Inquiry of a different Situation. For this Reason we find the Poets, who are always addressing themselves to the Imagination, borrowing more of their Epithets from Colours than from any other Topic. As the Fancy delights in every thing that is Great, Strange, or Beautiful, and is still more pleased the more it finds of these Perfections in the same Object, so is it capable of receiving a new Satisfaction by the Assistance of another Sense. Thus any continued Sound, as the Musick of Birds, or a Fall of Water, awakens every moment the Mind of the Beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several Beauties of the Place that lye before him. Thus if there arises a Fragrancy of Smells or Perfumes, they heighten the Pleasures of the Imagination, and make even the Colours and Verdure of the Landskip appear more agreeable; for the Ideas of both Senses recommend each other, and are pleasant together than when they enter the Mind separately: As the different Colours of a Picture, when they are well disposed, set off one another, and receive an additional Beauty from the Advantage of their Situation.

11.3 Final Causes of Beauty

Though . . . we considered how every thing that is Great, New, or Beautiful, is apt to affect the Imagination with Pleasure, we must own that it is impossible for us to assign the necessary Cause of this Pleasure, because we know neither the Nature of an Idea, nor the Substance of a Human Soul, which might help us to discover the Conformity or Disagreeableness of the one to the other; and therefore, for want of such a Light, all that we can do in Speculations of this kind is to reflect on those Operations of the Soul that are most agreeable, and to range under their proper Heads, what is pleasing or displeasing to the Mind, without being able to trace out the several necessary and efficient Causes from whence the Pleasure or Displeasure arises. Final Causes lye more bare and open to our Observation, as there are often a great Variety that belong to the same Effect; and these, tho’ they are not altogether so satisfactory, are generally more useful than the other, as they give us greater Occasion of admiring the Goodness and Wisdom of the first Contriver.

One of the Final Causes of our Delight, in any thing that is great, may be this. The Supreme Author of our Being has so formed the Soul of Man, that nothing but himself can be its last, adequate, and proper Happiness. Because, therefore, a great Part of our Happiness must arise from the Contemplation of his Being, that he might give our Souls a just Relish of such a Contemplation, he has made them naturally delight in the Apprehension of what is Great or Unlimited. Our Admiration, which is a very pleasing Motion of the Mind, immediately rises at the Consideration of any Object that takes up a great deal of Room in the Fancy, and by Consequence, will improve into the highest Pitch of Astonishment and Devotion when we contemplate his Nature, that is neither circumscribed by Time nor Place, nor to be comprehended by the largest Capacity of a Created Being.

He has annexed a secret Pleasure to the Idea of any thing that is new or uncommon, that he might encourage us in the Pursuit after Knowledge, and engage us to search into the Wonders of his Creation; for every new Idea brings such a Pleasure along with it, as rewards any Pains we have taken in its Acquisition, and consequently serves as a Motive to put us upon fresh Discoveries. He has made every thing that is beautiful in our own Species pleasant, that all Creatures might be tempted to multiply their Kind, and fill the World with Inhabitants; for ’tis very remarkable that where-ever Nature is crost in the Production of a Monster (the Result of any unnatural Mixture) the Breed is incapable of propagating its Likeness, and of founding a new Order of Creatures; so that unless all Animals were allured by the Beauty of their own Species, Generation would be at an End, and the Earth unpeopled.
“The Supreme Author of our Being has so formed the Soul of Man, that nothing but himself can be its last, adequate, and proper Happiness.” In the last Place, he has made every thing that is beautiful in all other Objects pleasant, or rather has made so many Objects appear beautiful, that he might render the whole Creation more gay and delightful. He has given almost every thing about us the Power of raising an agreeable Idea in the Imagination: So that it is impossible for us to behold his Works with Coldness or Indifference, and to survey so many Beauties without a secret Satisfaction and Complacency. Things would make but a poor Appearance to the Eye, if we saw them only in their proper Figures and Motions: And what Reason can we assign for their exciting in us many of those Ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the Objects themselves, (for such are Light and Colours) were it not to add Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe, and make it more agreeable to the Imagination? We are every where entertained with pleasing Shows and Apparitions, we discover Imaginary Glories in the Heavens, and in the Earth, and see some of this Visionary Beauty poured out upon the whole Creation; but what a rough unsightly Sketch of Nature should we be entertained with, did all her Colouring disappear, and the several Distinctions of Light and Shade vanish? In short, our Souls are at present delightfully lost and bewildered in a pleasing Delusion, and we walk about like the enchanted Hero of a Romance, who sees beautiful Castles, Woods and Meadows; and at the same time hears the warbling of Birds, and the purling of Streams; but upon the finishing of some secret Spell, the fantastick Scene breaks up, and the disconsolate Knight finds himself on a barren Heath, or in a solitary Desart. It is not improbable that something like this may be the State of the Soul after its first Separation, in respect of the Images it will receive from Matter; tho indeed the Ideas of Colours are so pleasing and beautiful in the Imagination, that it is possible the Soul will not be deprived of them, but perhaps find them excited by some other Occasional Cause, as they are at present by the different Impressions of the subtle Matter on the Organ of Sight... 

11.4 The Art of Nature

If we consider the Works of Nature and Art, as they are qualified to entertain the Imagination, we shall find the last very defective, in Comparison of the former; for though they may sometimes appear as Beautiful or Strange, they can have nothing in them of that Vastness and Immensity, which afford so great an Entertainment to the Mind of the Beholder. The one may be as Polite and Delicate as the other, but can never shew her self so August and Magnificent in the Design. There is something more bold and masterly in the rough careless Strokes of Nature, than in the nice Touches and Embellishments of Art. The Beauties of the most stately Garden or Palace lie in a narrow Compass, the Imagination immediately runs them over, and requires something else to gratifie her; but, in the wide Fields of Nature, the Sight wanders up and down without Confinement, and is fed with an infinite variety of Images, without any certain Stint or Number. For this Reason we always find the Poet in Love with a Country-Life, where Nature appears in the greatest Perfection, and furnishes out all those Scenes that are most apt to delight the Imagination.

But tho’ there are several of these wild Scenes, that are more delightful than any artificial Shows; yet we find the Works of Nature still more pleasant, the more they resemble those of Art: For in this case our Pleasure rises from a double Principle; from the Agreeableness of the Objects to the Eye, and from their Similitude to other Objects: We are pleased as well with comparing their Beauties, as with surveying them, and can represent them to our Minds, either as Copies or Originals. Hence it is that we take Delight in a Prospect which is well laid out, and diversified with Fields and Meadows, Woods and Rivers; in those accidental Landskips of Trees, Clouds and Cities, that are sometimes found in the Veins of Marble; in the curious Fret-work of Rocks and Grottos; and, in a Word, in any thing that hath such a Variety or Regularity as may seem the Effect of Design, in what we call the Works of Chance.
“There is something more bold and masterly in the rough careless Strokes of Nature, than in the nice Touches and Embellishments of Art.”

If the Products of Nature rise in Value, according as they more or less resemble those of Art, we may be sure that artificial Works receive a greater Advantage from their Resemblance of such as are natural; because here the Similitude is not only pleasant, but the Pattern more perfect.

We have before observed, that there is generally in Nature something more Grand and August, than what we meet with in the Curiosities of Art. When therefore, we see this imitated in any measure, it gives us a nobler and more exalted kind of Pleasure than what we receive from the nicer and more accurate Productions of Art. On this Account our English Gardens are not so entertaining to the Fancy as those in France and Italy, where we see a large Extent of Ground covered over with an agreeable mixture of Garden and Forest, which represent every where an artificial Rudeness, much more charming than that Neatness and Elegancy which we meet with in those of our own Country.

"[W]ide and undetermined Prospects are as pleasing to the Fancy, as the Speculations of Eternity or Infinitude are to the Understanding."

If the Writers who have given us an Account of China, tell us the Inhabitants of that Country laugh at the Plantations of our Europeans, which are laid out by the Rule and Line; because, they say, any one may place Trees in equal Rows and uniform Figures. They chuse rather to shew a Genius in Works of this Nature, and therefore always conceal the Art by which they direct themselves. They have a Word, it seems, in their Language, by which they express the particular Beauty of a Plantation that thus strikes the Imagination at first Sight, without discovering what it is that has so agreeable an Effect. Our British Gardeners, on the contrary, instead of humouring Nature, love to deviate from it as much as possible. Our Trees rise in Cones, Globes, and Pyramids. We see the Marks of the Scissars upon every Plant and Bush. I do not know whether I am singular in my Opinion, but, for my own part, I would rather look upon a Tree in all its Luxuriancy and Diffusion of Boughs and Branches, than when it is thus cut and trimmed into a Mathematical Figure; and cannot but fancy that an Orchard in Flower looks infinitely more delightful, than all the little Labyrinths of the finished Parterre.

11.5 Important Points of Addison’s Essays

1. The essays in this reading are sometimes cited as having an influence on David Hume’s of the Standard of Taste. Specifically, which of Addison’s points do you think most influenced Hume?

2. Addison’s series of articles on the pleasures of the imagination is sometimes cited as the dawn of modern aesthetic theory. Prior to the publication of these essays in The Spectator in 1712, little sustained thought on aesthetics had been forthcoming in Western literature. Do you think the rise of the middle class and the resulting increase in leisure activities can be historically and economically associated with the development of modern aesthetics?

3. Explain what Addison means when he writes loathsome and offensive objects might still bring a kind of delight if the qualities of greatness, novelty, and beauty are present:

whatever is new or uncommon . . . serves us for a kind of Refreshment, and . . . bestows Charms on a Monster, and makes even the Imperfections of Nature please us.

How can this analysis of the beauty of a “Monster” be rendered consistent with Addison’s argument for the beauty resulting from the fixity of biological species.

The Supreme Being has made every thing that is beautiful in our own Species pleasant, that all Creatures might be tempted to multiply their Kind, and fill the World with Inhabitants; for ‘tis very remarkable that where-ever Nature is crost in the Production of a Monster (the Result of any unnatural Mixture) the Breed is incapable of propagating its Likeness, and of founding a new Order of Creatures.

4. Addison assumes the teleological source of the pleasures of imagination is the Supreme Creator. Do you think it would be possible to construct a basis for final causes of these pleasures in terms of biological or natural origin instead of basing them on God?
5. Even though Addison asserts that “unless all Animals were allured by the Beauty of their own Species, Generation would be at an End, and the Earth unpeopled,”

Darwin points out:

Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by artificial selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and complexity of the coadaptations between all organic beings . . . which may have been effected in the long course of time.

Certainly, as Darwin points out, “the gradual process of improvement” by crossing different varieties of flowers “may plainly be recognized in the increased size and beauty which we not see in the varieties” of “rose, pelargonium, dahlia, and other plants, when compared with the older varieties . . . ” Yet, recent experiments have shown, in the words of researcher Piotr Winkielman:

What you like is a function of what your mind has been trained on. A stimulus becomes attractive if it falls into the average of what you’ve seen and is therefore simple for your brain to process. In our experiments, we show that we can make an arbitrary pattern likeable just by preparing the mind to recognize it quickly.

This phenomenon is termed the “beauty-in-averageness effect” Does prototypicality then reflect health and fitness value of potential mates as Addison suggests? Or do these conflicting results suggest beauty is independent of biological explanation? Addison writes, “[W]e immediately assent to the Beauty of an Object, without enquiring into the particular Causes and Occasions of it.”

6. Explain clearly why Addison believes the necessary conditions for the experience of the pleasures of the imagination, including the experience of beauty, cannot be discovered? Why does he think we cannot know the nature of ideas or the mind? To what extent do you think he is following John Locke’s analysis that by “putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit.

7. Do you think that Addison makes a mistake in attributing the pleasures of the imagination as proceeding from sight alone? Why do you suppose he does not include pleasures of sense and pleasures of understanding as imaginative also? Indeed, Addison emphasizes that beauty is enhanced by the ideas of other senses such as music or fragrance. Could not he argue that different pleasures of the imagination derive from different “intelligence” types such as those proposed by Howard Gardner? That is, beauty in words and language stem from linguistic ability; beauty in numbers and logic is accounted for by logico-mathematical skill; beauty in music and rhythm originate from musical talent; beauty in structure and form of sculpture are attributable to tactile-kinesthetic experience and so forth, just as beauty in spatial perception derives from spatialvisual ability.

8. How do you think Addison’s account of the delight afforded by horrible or monstrous effects of pleasures of the imagination relate to Edmund Burke’s analysis of the sublime where Burke states, “Another source of the sublime is infinity; . . . [I]nfinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that sort of delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect and truest test of the sublime.”?

9. William Temple, in his essay “Upon the Gardens of Epicurus” contrasted the natural expression of Chinese gardens to disadvantage of the symmetry and order of English gardens, and for a time altered the practice of design landscape of English gardens. Pope also criticized the English formal landscape garden:

His Gardens next your admiration call;

On ev’ry side you look, behold the Wall!
No pleasing Intricacies intervene;
No artful wildness to perplex the scene;
Grove nods at grove, each Alley has a brother,
And half the platform just reflects the other.

Although the Chinese influence is reflected in Addison’s account of the influence of natural beauty in artistic construction, can it be effectively argued against Addison that the Chinese influence would not endure since historically those pleasures depended upon the factor of novelty more so than those of greatness or aesthetic beauty?

10. Addison writes, “We are pleased as well with comparing their Beauties [of works of nature], as with surveying them, and can represent them to our Minds, either as Copies or Originals. Examine closely whether or not Addison views beauty as resulting from nature or from the recognition of the originality of nature. Does the delight stem from the imposition of pattern and order from the mind upon nature or from the effects of the natural form and arrangement of natural objects upon the attentive mind?

11.6 Critical Appreciation

One of the dominant practices in contemporary eighteenth-century literary studies is reading art and aesthetics as ideology. This practice commonly issues in the specific claim that eighteenth-century literary writing and aesthetics serve the interests and values of the middle class or bourgeoisie, which is understood to be the rising or emerging group within a society whose economic structure can reasonably be referred to as “capitalism.” Indeed, as Lisa von Sneidern puts it in a recent article in *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, a journal that has encouraged and welcomed this approach, “it has become nearly commonplace to disclose how complicit the belles lettres were with the emergence of bourgeois capitalism and colonialism.”

Since Addison’s essays on the pleasures of the imagination are, if not the origin of eighteenth-century English aesthetics as some have argued, then at least of central importance to English speculation about art during the period, it is not surprising to find that both they and the periodical in which they appeared are exhibits in the case for eighteenth-century aesthetics as bourgeois ideology. In what, for those engaged in this project, was an extremely influential book published in 1962 but not translated into English until 1989, Jurgen Habermas identifies *The Spectator* as a major institution of “the bourgeois public sphere,” which he sees emerging in eighteenth-century western Europe. Following Habermas, Robert Holub discussed Addison’s aesthetics and “its place in this atmosphere of bourgeois justification and preparation,” while Terry Eagleton discussed his literary criticism as part of “a project of a bourgeois cultural politics.” Carole Fabricant, unhappy with the way in which literary critics were ignoring social and political history, then tried to give some textual support to the argument by citing and commenting on Addison’s essays on the pleasures in her essay, “The Aesthetics and Politics of Landscape in the Eighteenth Century.” Though Eagleton passes over Addison’s aesthetics in his later major treatment of the subject, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Erin Mackie has recently reaffirmed, with some adjustments, Habermas’ view of Addison’s periodical as “an exemplary organ of the bourgeois public sphere” and proceeded to discuss Addison’s aesthetics as a contribution to the “cultural aesthetic of bourgeois ideology.”

That this case is untenable becomes clear, I propose, as soon as we begin to take into account some of the work that has been done by historians of eighteenth-century society and historians of post-Renaissance political thought since Habermas presented his vision of eighteenth-century English society and ideology thirty-eight years ago. By doing so, we can see not just that the understanding of Addison’s aesthetics as bourgeois ideology is misguided, but also that the commitment to interdisciplinary studies that is supposedly a hallmark of the criticism supporting this understanding is weak. That the case is untenable is further evident once we consider those passages from
Addison’s essays that are cited as evidence, as well as some other passages from these essays. In response to the charge that denying the existence of bourgeois ideology in the essays is to empty them of all ideological content (on grounds that if Addison’s ideology is not bourgeois it cannot be anything), I will further suggest that insofar as they serve, promote, or justify the interests of any social groups, Addison’s essays serve the interests of the diverse groups that were represented by what these groups, their opponents, and historians call “Whigs.” This becomes clear if, again, we take into account some of the work of historians of Augustan society and political thought ignored and misread by literary critics bent on making Addison (and other eighteenth-century figures) a bourgeois ideologue. This is not, however, to say that Whig ideology is the essence of these essays, or that these essays are reducible to what might be taken as a Whig political or social statement.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Akenside got the idea for the poem during a visit of Morpeth in
       (a) 1738    (b) 1735    (c) 1730    (d) 1740
   (ii) ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ was written by
        (a) Charles Lamb    (b) Addison
        (c) David Hume    (d) None of these
   (iii) Unless all animals were allured by the beauty of their own species, Generation would be at an End, and the Earth unpeopled - According to
        (a) Addison    (b) Darwin
        (c) Charles Lamb    (d) None of these

11.7 Summary

- ‘The Pleasures of the Imagination’ examines the birth and development of English ‘high culture’ in the eighteenth century. It charts the growth of a literary and artistic world fostered by publishers, theatrical and musical impresarios, picture dealers and auctioneers, and presented to the public in coffee-houses, concert halls, libraries, theatres and pleasure gardens. In 1660, there were few professional authors, musicians and painters, no public concert series, galleries, newspaper critics or reviews. By the dawn of the nineteenth century they were all part of the cultural life of the nation.

- John Brewer’s enthralling book explains how this happened and recreates the world in which the great works of English eighteenth century art were made. Its purpose is to show how literature, painting, music and the theatre were communicated to a public increasingly avid for them. It explores the alleys and garrets of Grub Street, rummages the shelves of bookshops and libraries, peers through printsellers’ shop windows and into artists’ studios, and slips behind the scenes at Drury Lane and Covent Garden. It takes us out of Gay and Boswell’s London to visit the debating clubs, poetry circles, ballrooms, concert halls, music festivals, theatres and assemblies that made the culture of English provincial towns, and shows us how the national landscape became one of Britain’s greatest cultural treasures. It reveals to us a picture of English artistic and literary life in the eighteenth century less familiar, but more surprising, more various and more convincing than any we have seen before.

- ‘The Pleasures of the Imagination’ is a splendid cornucopia of a book. It describes the contortions of the eighteenth century as it developed as a culture...It is full of pure delight...The marvel of this book is that in writing in exuberant detail about the past, Brewer succeeds in illuminating the present...This book wears its massive scholarship lightly. I hope some of our new political masters have time to read it, for it is a history that teaches us many lessons.” PETER HALL, ‘Observer’
• “Brewer ranges over almost every corner of the English mind with sharp, darting observation…Brewer is perceptive, amusing and thorough wherever he strays. This is by far the most complete and up-to-date account of the evolving Georgian arts…We are shown round a society aiming at Rome but often hitting Babylon, with the combined attitudes of ‘fin-de-siècle’ Paris and of Las Vegas. This is a book to treasure as it treasures a past we thought we had lost.” PAT ROGERS, ‘Sunday Telegraph’

• “A model of the new cultural history…In ‘Britons’, Linda Colley highlighted the new political, patriotic and religious tides which flowed in the Georgian age, creating a fresh confidence and sense of national identity…‘The Pleasures of the Imagination’ confirms this view of the making of the public mind. It shows how the English came to feel not just strong but civilized too, polite as well as powerful. God’s chosen people, of the age of Cromwell, were reinventing themselves as Shakespeare’s heirs.”

• Akenside got the idea for the poem during a visit to Morpeth in 1738.

• Addison assumes the teleological source of the pleasures of imagination is the Supreme Creator.

11.8 Key-Words

1. Concept : General idea.

2. Symmetry : The quality of being made up of exactly similar parts facing each other or around an axis.

11.9 Review Questions

1. Clarify Addison’s distinction among pleasures of the imagination, of sense, and of the understanding. Which of these is the most refined and which the least refined?

2. Describe the salutary effects mentioned by Addison of the imaginative pleasures ultimately arising from the perception of light and color.

3. What qualities of objects in the world does Addison discus which occasion the pleasures of the imagination?

4. What two main kinds of beauty does Addison escribe and what is their origins?

5. What does he think is a final cause of aesthetic pleasure? Why does he think the Supreme Being created mankind with the capacity for experiencing pleasures of the imagination?

6. How does Addison relate the beauty of art to the beauty of nature? Why does he think the artistic beauty inferior to that of nature even though natural beauty embodies æsthetic principles?

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (c) (iii) (a)

11.10 Further Readings


2. Addison-pleasures of Imagination.
Unit 12: Steele- On The Death of Friend: Introduction

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Explain the life and works of Steele.
• Introduce ‘On the Death of Friend’

Introduction
The chief glory of the “Spectator” is, of course, the club, and it was in the essay which follows that Steele first sketched the characters composing it. The Spectator himself was Addison’s creation, and Addison also elaborated Sir Roger, though Steele originated him. Whatever may be the respective claims of Addison and Steele to the credit for the success of the “Spectator,” it is to Steele that the honor belongs of having founded its predecessor, the “Tatler,” and so of originating the periodical essay.

Steele was a warm-hearted, impulsive man, full of sentiment, improvident, and somewhat weak of will. These qualities are reflected in his writings, which are inferior to Addison’s in grace and finish, but are marked by greater spontaneity and invention. Probably no piece of writing of equal length has added so many portraits to the gallery of our literature as the first sketch of the Spectator Club which is here printed.

12.1 Biography
English man of letters in the reign of Queen Anne, is inseparably associated in the history of literature with his personal friend Joseph Addison. He cannot be said to have lost in reputation by the partnership, because he was inferior to Addison in purely literary gift, and it is Addison’s literary genius that has floated their joint work above merely journalistic celebrity; but the advantage was not all on Steele’s side, inasmuch as his more brilliant coadjutor has usurped not a little of the merit rightly due to him. Steele’s often-quoted generous acknowledgment of Addison’s services in the Tatler has proved true in a somewhat different sense from that intended by the writer: “I fared like a distressed prince who calls in a powerful neighbor to his aid; I was undone by my auxiliary; when I had once called him in I could not subsist without dependence on him.” The truth is that in this happy alliance the one was the complement of the other; and the balance of mutual advantage was much more nearly even than Steele claimed or posterity has generally allowed.
The famous literary pair were born in the same year. Steele, the senior by less than two months, was baptized on the 12th of March 1672 in Dublin. His father, also Richard Steele, was an attorney. He died before his son had reached his sixth year, but the boy found a protector in his maternal uncle, Henry Gascoigne, secretary and confidential agent to two successive dukes of Ormond. Through his influence he was nominated to the Charterhouse in 1684, and there first met with Addison. Five years afterwards he proceeded to Christ Church, Oxford, and was a postmaster at Merton when Addison was a demy at Magdalen. Their schoolboy friendship was continued at the university, and probably helped to give a more serious turn to Steele's mind than his natural temperament would have taken under different companionship. Addison's father also took an interest in the warm-hearted young Irishman; but their combined influence did not steady him sufficiently to keep his impulses within the lines of a regular career; without waiting for a degree he volunteered into the army, and served for some time as a cadet "under the command of the unfortunate duke of Ormond" (the first duke's grandson, who was attained in 1715). This escapade was made without his uncle's consent, and cost him, according to his own account, "the succession to a very good estate in the county of Wexford in Ireland." Still, he did not lack advancement in the profession he had chosen. A poem on the funeral of Queen Mary I (1695), dedicated to Lord Cutts, colonel of the Coldstream Guards, brought him under the notice of that nobleman, who took the gentleman trooper into his household as a secretary, made him an officer in his own regiment, and ultimately procured for him a captaincy in Lord Lucas's regiment of foot. His name was noted for promotion by King William, but the king's death took place before anything had been done for Captain Steele. A duel which he fought with Captain Kelly in Hyde Park in 1700, and in which he wounded his antagonist dangerously, inspired him with the dislike of the practice that he showed to the end of his life.

Steele probably owed the king's favor to a timely reference to his majesty in _The Christian Hero_, his first prose treatise, published in April 1701. The "reformation of manners" was a cherished purpose with King William and his consort, which they tried to effect by proclamation and act of parliament; and a sensible well-written treatise, deploring the irregularity of the military character, and seeking to prove by examples — the king himself among the number — "that no principles but those of religion are sufficient to make a great man", was sure of attention. Steele complained that the reception of _The Christian Hero_ by his comrades was not so respectful; they persisted in trying him by his own standard, and would not pass "the least levity in his words and actions" without protest. His uneasiness under the ridicule of his irreverent comrades had a curious result: it moved him to write a comedy. "It was now incumbent upon him", he says, "to enliven his character, for which reason he writ the comedy called _The Funeral._" Although, however, it was Steele's express purpose to free his character from the reproach of solemn dullness, and prove that he could write as smartly as another, he showed greater respect for decency than had for some time been the fashion on the stage. The purpose, afterwards more fully effected in his famous periodicals, of reconciling wit, good humor and good breeding with virtuous conduct was already deliberately in Steele's mind when he wrote his first comedy. The Funeral was produced and published in 1701, and received on the stage with favor. In his next comedy, _The Lying Lover; or, the Ladies' Friendship_, based on Pierre Corneille's _Menteur_, produced two years afterwards, in December 1703, Steele's moral purpose was directly avowed, and the play, according to his own statement, was "damned for its piety." _The Tender Husband_, an imitation of Molière's _Sicilien_, produced eighteen months later (in April 1705), though not less pure in tone, was more successful; in this play he gave unmistakable evidence of his happy genius for conceiving and embodying humorous types of character, putting on the stage the parents or grandparents of Squire Western, Tony Lumpkin and Lydia Languish. It was seventeen years before Steele again tried his fortune on the stage with _The Conscious Lovers_, the best and most successful of his comedies, produced in December 1722.
Meanwhile the gallant captain had turned aside to another kind of literary work, in which, with the assistance of his friend Addison, he obtained a more enduring reputation. There never was a time when literary talent was so much sought after and rewarded by statesmen. Addison had already been waited on in his humble lodgings in the Haymarket, and advanced to office, when his friend the successful dramatist was appointed to the office of gazetteer. This was in April or May 1707. It was Steele's first connection with journalism. The periodical was at that time taking the place of the pamphlet as an instrument for working on public opinion. The Gazette gave little opening for the play of Steele's lively pen, his main duty, as he says, having been to "keep the paper very innocent and very insipid"; but the position made him familiar with the new field of enterprise in which his inventive mind soon discerned materials for a project of his own. The Tatler made its first appearance on the 12th of April 1709. It was partly a newspaper, a journal of politics and society, published three tunes a week. Steele's position as gazetteer furnished him with special advantages for political news, and as a popular frequenter of coffeehouses he was at no loss for social gossip. But Steele not only retailed and commented on social news, a function in which he had been anticipated by Daniel Defoe and others; he also gradually introduced into the Tatler as a special feature essays on general questions of manners and morality. It is not strictly true that Steele was the inventor of the English "essay" — there were essayists before the 18th century, notably Cowley and Temple; but he was the first to use the essay for periodical purposes, and he and Addison together developed a distinct species, to which they gave a permanent character, and in which they had many imitators. As a humbler motive for this fortunate venture Steele had the pinch of impecuniosity, due rather to excess of expenditure than to smallness of income. He had £300 a year from his gazetteership (paying a tax of £45), £100 as gentleman waiter to Prince George, £850 from the Barbadoes estates of his first wife, a widow named Margaret Stretch, and some fortune by his second wife — Mrs Mary Scurlock, the "dear Prue" of his charming letters. But Steele lived in considerable state after his second marriage, and before he started the Tatler was reduced to the necessity of borrowing. The assumed name of the editor was Isaac Bickerstaff, but Addison discovered the real author in the sixth number, and began to contribute in the eighteenth. It is only fair to Steele to state that the success of the Tatler was established before Addison joined him, and that Addison contributed to only forty-two of the two hundred and seventy-one numbers that had appeared when the paper was stopped, obscurely, in January 1711. Some papers satirizing Harley appeared in the Tatler, and Steele lost or resigned the post of gazetteer. It is possible that this political recklessness may have had something to do with the sudden end of the venture.

Only two months elapsed between the stoppage of the Tatler and the appearance of the Spectator, which was the organ of the two friends from the 1st of March 1711 until the 6th of December 1712. Addison was the chief contributor to the new venture, and the history of it belongs more to his life. Nevertheless, it is to be remarked as characteristic of the two writers that in this as in the Tatler Addison generally follows Steele's lead in the choice of subjects. The first suggestion of Sir Roger de Coverley was Steele's although it was Addison that filled in the outline of a good-natured country gentleman with the numerous little whimsicalities that convert Sir Roger into an amiable and exquisitely ridiculous provincial oddity. Steele had neither the fineness of touch nor the humorous malice that gives life and distinction to Addison's picture; the Sir Roger of his original hasty sketch has good sense as well as good nature, and the treatment is comparatively commonplace from a literary point of view, though unfortunately not commonplace in its charity. Steele's suggestive vivacity gave many another hint for the elaborating skill of his friend. The Spectator was followed by the Guardian, the first number of which appeared on the 12th of March 1713. It bad a much shorter career, extending to only a hundred and seventy-six numbers, of which Steele wrote eighty-two. This was the last of his numerous periodicals in which he had the material assistance of Addison. But he continued for several years to project journals, under
various titles, some of them political, some social in their objects, most of them very short-lived. Steele was a warm partisan of the principles of the Revolution, as earnest in his political as in his other convictions. The Englishman was started in October 1733, immediately after the stoppage of the Guardian, to assail the policy of the Tory ministry. The Lover, started in February 1714, was more general in its aims; but it gave place in a month or two to the Reader, a direct counterblast to the Tory Examiner. The Englishman was resuscitated for another volume in 1715; and he subsequently projected in rapid succession three unsuccessful ventures — Town Talk, the Tea Table and Chit Chat. Three years later he started his most famous political paper the Plebeian, rendered memorable by the fact that it embroiled him with his old ally Addison. The subject of controversy between the two lifelong friends was Sunderland’s Peerage Bill. Steele’s last venture in journalism was the Theatre, 1720, the immediate occasion of which was the revocation of his patent for Drury Lane. Besides these journals he wrote also several pamphlets on passing questions — on the disgrace of Marlborough in 1711, on the fortifications of Dunkirk in 1713, on the crisis in 1714, An Apology for Himself and His Writings (important biographically) in the same year, and on the South Sea mania in 1720.

The fortunes of Steele as a zealous Whig varied with the fortunes of his party. Over the Dunkirk question he waxed so hot that he threw up a pension and a commissionership of stamps, and went into parliament as member for Stockbridge to attack the ministry with voice and vote as well as with pen. But he had not sat many weeks when he was expelled from the house for the language of his pamphlet on the Crisis, which was stigmatized as seditious. The Apology already mentioned was his vindication of himself on this occasion. With the accession of the House of Hanover his fortunes changed. Honors and substantial rewards were showered upon him. He was made a justice of the peace, deputy-lieutenant of Middlesex, surveyor of the royal stables, governor of the royal company of comedians — the lasta lucrative post — and was also knighted (1715). After the suppression of the Jacobite rebellion he was appointed one of the commissioners of forfeited estates, and spent some two years in Scotland in that capacity. In 1718 he obtained a patent for a plan for bringing salmon alive from Ireland. Differing from his friends in power on the question of the Peerage Bill he was deprived of some of his offices, but when Robert Walpole became chancellor of the exchequer in 1721 he was reinstated. With all his emoluments however the imprudent, impulsive, ostentatious and generous Steele could never get clear of financial difficulties, and he was obliged to retire from London in 1724 and live in the country. He spent his last years on his wife’s estate of Llangunnor in Wales, and, his health broken down by a paralytic seizure, died at Carmarthen on the 1st of September 1729.

12.2 Steele as a Writer

As mentioned above, in 1701, Steele published his first booklet entitled “The Christian Hero,” which was written while Steele was serving in the army, and was his idea of a pamphlet of moral instruction. “The Christian Hero” was ultimately ridiculed for what some thought was hypocrisy because he did not necessarily follow his own preaching. He was criticized for publishing a booklet about morals when he, himself, enjoyed drinking, occasional dueling, and debauchery around town. In fact, Steele even had an illegitimate child Elizabeth Ousley, whom he later adopted. Steele wrote a comedy that same year titled The Funeral. This play was met with wide success and was performed at Drury Lane, bringing him to the attention of the King and the Whig party. Next, Steele wrote The Lying Lover, which was one of the first sentimental comedies, but was a failure on stage. In 1705, Steele wrote The Tender Husband with Addison’s contributions, and later that year wrote the prologue to The Mistake, by John Vanbrugh, also an important member of the Whig Kit-Kat Club with Addison and Steele.

The Tatler, Steele’s first journal, first came out on 12 April 1709, and ran three times a week: Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. Steele wrote this periodical under a pseudonym of Isaac
Bickerstaff and gave him an entire, fully developed personality. Steele described his motive in writing *The Tatler* as “to expose the false arts of life, to pull off the disguises of cunning, vanity, and affectation, and to recommend a general simplicity in our dress, our discourse, and our behavior”. Steele founded the magazine, and although he and Addison collaborated, Steele wrote the majority of the essays; Steele wrote roughly 188 of the 271 total, Addison 42, and 36 were the pair’s collaborative works. While Addison contributed to *The Tatler*, it is widely regarded as Steele’s work.

Following the demise of *The Tatler*, the two men founded *The Spectator* and also the *Guardian*.

**In popular culture**

Steele plays a minor role in the novel *The History of Henry Esmond* by William Makepeace Thackeray. It is during his time with the Life Guards, where he is mostly referred to as Dick the Scholar and makes mention of his friend “Joe Addison.” He befriends the title character when Esmond is a boy.

### 12.3 Text-On the Death of Friends

*Dies, ni fallor, adest, quem semper acerbum, Semper honoratum, sic dii voluistis, habebo.* [“That day I shall always recollect with grief; with reverence also, for the gods so willed it”] Virgil. And now the rising day renews the year, A day for ever sad, for ever dear. — *Dryden*

**From my own Apartment, June 5.** There are those among mankind, who can enjoy no relish of their being, except the world is made acquainted with all that relates to them, and think every thing lost that passes unobserved; but others find a solid delight in stealing by the crowd, and modelling their life after such a manner, as is as much above the approbation as the practice of the vulgar. Life being too short to give instances great enough of true friendship or good will, some sages have thought it pious to preserve a certain reverence for the names of their deceased friends; and have withdrawn themselves from the rest of the world at certain seasons, to commemorate in their own thoughts such of their acquaintance who have gone before them out of this life. And indeed, when we are advanced in years, there is not a more pleasing entertainment, than to recollect in a gloomy moment the many we have parted with that have been dear and agreeable to us, and to cast a melancholy thought or two after those with whom, perhaps, we have indulged ourselves in whole nights of mirth and jollity. With such inclinations in my heart I went to my closet yesterday in the evening, and resolved to be sorrowful; upon which occasion I could not but look with disdain upon myself, that though all the reasons which I had to lament the loss of many of my friends are now as forcible as at the moment of their departure, yet did not my heart swell with the same sorrow which I felt at the time; but I could, without tears, reflect upon many pleasing adventures I have had with some, who have long been blended with common earth. Though it is by the benefit of nature, that length of time thus blots out the violence of afflictions; yet, with tempers too much given to pleasure, it is almost necessary to revive the old places of grief in our memory; and ponder step by step on past life, to lead the mind into that sobriety of thought which poises the heart, and makes it beat with due time, without being quickened with desire, or retarded with despair, from its proper and equal motion. When we wind up a clock that is out of order, to make it go well for the future, we do not immediately set the hand to the present instant, but we make it strike the round of all its hours, before it can recover the regularity of its time. Such, thought I, shall be my method this evening; and since it is that day of the year which I dedicate to the memory of such in another life as I much delighted in when living, an hour or two shall be sacred to sorrow and their memory, while I run over all the melancholy circumstances of this kind which have occurred to me in my whole life.

The first sense of sorrow I ever knew was upon the death of my father, at which time I was not quite five years of age; but was rather amazed at what all the house meant, than possessed with
a real understanding why nobody was willing to play with me. I remember I went into the room where his body lay, and my mother sat weeping alone by it. I had my battledore in my hand, and fell a-beating the coffin, and calling Papa; for, I know not how, I had some slight idea that he was locked up there. My mother caught me in her arms, and, transported beyond all patience of the silent grief she was before in, she almost smothered me in her embraces; and told me in a flood of tears, Papa could not hear me, and would play with me no more, for they were going to put him under ground, whence he could never come to us again. She was a very beautiful woman, of a noble spirit, and there was a dignity in her grief amidst all the wildness of her transport, which, methought, struck me with an instinct of sorrow, that, before I was sensible of what it was to grieve, seized my very soul, and has made pity the weakness of my heart ever since. The mind in infancy is, methinks, like the body in embryo; and receives impressions so forcible, that they are as hard to be removed by reason, as any mark with which a child is born is to be taken away by any future application. Hence it is, that good-nature in me is no merit; but having been so frequently overwhelmed with her tears before I knew the cause of any affliction, or could draw defences from my own judgement, I imbibed commiseration, remorse, and an unmanly gentleness of mind, which has since ensnared me into ten thousand calamities; from whence I can reap no advantage, except it be, that, in such a humour as I am now in, I can the better indulge myself in the softnesses of humanity, and enjoy that sweet anxiety which arises from the memory of past afflictions.

We that are very old are better able to remember things which befell us in our distant youth, than the passages of later days. For this reason it is that the companions of my strong and vigorous years present themselves more immediately to me in this office of sorrow. Untimely and unhappy deaths are what we are most apt to lament; so little are we able to make it indifferent when a thing happens, though we know it must happen. Thus we groan under life, and bewail those who are relieved from it. Every object that returns to our imagination raises different passions, according to the circumstance of their departure. Who can have lived in an army, and in a serious hour reflect upon the many gay and agreeable men that might long have flourished in the arts of peace, and not join with the imprecations of the fatherless and widows on the tyrant to whose ambition they fell sacrifices? But gallant men, who are cut off by the sword, move rather our veneration than our pity; and we gather relief enough from their own contempt of death, to make that no evil, which was approached with so much cheerfulness, and attended with so much honour. But when we turn our thoughts from the great parts of life on such occasions, and, instead of lamenting those who stood ready to give death to those from whom they had the fortune to receive it; I say, when we let our thoughts wander from such noble objects, and consider the havoc which is made among the tender and the innocent, pity enters with an unmixed softness, and possesses all our souls at once.

Here (were there words to express such sentiments with proper tenderness) I should record the beauty, innocence, and untimely death, of the first object my eyes ever beheld with love. The beauteous virgin! how ignorantly did she charm, how carelessly excel! Oh death! thou hast right to the bold, to the ambitious, to the high, and to the haughty; but why this cruelty to the humble, to the meek, to the undiscerning, to the thoughtless? Nor age, nor business, nor distress, can erase the dear image from my imagination. In the same week I saw her dressed for a ball, and in a shroud. How ill did the habit of death become the pretty trifler! I still behold the smiling earth—A large train of disasters were coming on to my memory, when my servant knocked at my closet-door, and interrupted me with a letter, attended with a hamper of wine, of the same sort with that which is to be put to sale on Thursday next, at Garraway’s coffee-house. Upon the receipt of it, I sent for three of my friends. We are so intimate, that we can be company in whatever state of mind we meet, and can entertain each other without expecting always to rejoice. The wine we found to be generous and warming, but with such a heat as moved us rather to be cheerful than frolicsome. It revived the spirits, without firing the blood. We commended it until two of the clock this
morning; and having to-day met a little before dinner, we found, that though we drank two bottles a man, we had much more reason to recollect than forget what had passed the night before.

**Self Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Steele was born in  
   (a) 1672 (b) 1680 (c) 1691 (d) None of these

   (ii) Steele began to write in  
   (a) 1702 (b) 1704 (c) 1705 (d) 1701

   (iii) Steele was baptised on the 12th March 1672 in  
   (a) Paris (b) Dublin (c) London (d) None of these

   (iv) The Funeral was published in  
   (a) 1701 (b) 1705 (c) 1703 (d) 1704

**12.4 Summary**

- English man of letters in the reign of Queen Anne, is inseparably associated in the history of literature with his personal friend Joseph Addison. He cannot be said to have lost in reputation by the partnership, because he was inferior to Addison in purely literary gift, and it is Addison’s literary genius that has floated their joint work above merely journalistic celebrity; but the advantage was not all on Steele’s side, inasmuch as his more brilliant coadjutor has usurped not a little of the merit rightly due to him. Steele’s often-quoted generous acknowledgment of Addison’s services in the Tatler has proved true in a somewhat different sense from that intended by the writer: “I fared like a distressed prince who calls in a powerful neighbor to his aid; I was undone by my auxiliary; when I had once called him in I could not subsist without dependence on him.

- Steele, the senior by less than two months, was baptized on the 12th of March 1672 in Dublin. His father, also Richard Steele, was an attorney. He died before his son had reached his sixth year, but the boy found a protector in his maternal uncle, Henry Gascoigne, secretary and confidential agent to two successive dukes of Ormond. Through his influence he was nominated to the Charterhouse in 1684, and there first met with Addison. Five years afterwards he proceeded to Christ Church, Oxford, and was a postmaster at Merton when Addison was a demy at Magdalen. Their schoolboy friendship was continued at the university, and probably helped to give a more serious turn to Steele’s mind than his natural temperament would have taken under different companionship. A duel which he fought with Captain Kelly in Hyde Park in 1700.

- Steele probably owed the king’s favor to a timely reference to his majesty in The Christian Hero, his first prose treatise, published in April 1701. The “reformation of manners” was a cherished purpose with King William and his consort, which they tried to effect by proclamation and act of parliament; and a sensible well-written treatise, deploring the irregularity of the military character, and seeking to prove by examples — the king himself among the number — “that no principles but those of religion are sufficient to make a great man”, was sure of attention. The Funeral was produced and published in 1701. Tatler made its first appearance on the 12th of April 1709. The Englishman was started in October 1733. In 1718 he obtained a patent for a plan for bringing salmon alive from Ireland

- In 1701, Steele published his first booklet entitled “The Christian Hero,” which was written while Steele was serving in the army, and was his idea of a pamphlet of moral instruction. “The Christian Hero” was ultimately ridiculed for what some thought was hypocrisy because
he did not necessarily follow his own preaching. He was criticized for publishing a booklet about morals when he, himself, enjoyed drinking, occasional dueling, and debauchery around town.

• The Tatler, Steele’s first journal, first came out on 12 April 1709. The Tatler as “to expose the false arts of life, to pull off the disguises of cunning, vanity, and affectation, and to recommend a general simplicity in our dress, our discourse, and our behavior”. Steele founded the magazine, and although he and Addison collaborated, Steele wrote the majority of the essays; Steele wrote roughly 188 of the 271 total, Addison 42, and 36 were the pair’s collaborative works. While Addison contributed to The Tatler, it is widely regarded as Steele’s work.

12.5 Key-Words
1. Sense of Sorrow : Sadness, depression
2. Sort of delight : Great pleasure

12.6 Review Questions
1. Discuss Steele as a writer
2. Briefly describe Steele’s on the death of Friend
3. Are Richard Steele and Micheal Steele brothers?
4. What is Richard Steele’s birthday?
5. When was Richard Steele born?

Answers: Self-Assessment
1. (i) (a)  (ii) (a)  (iii) (b)  (iv) (a)

12.7 Further Readings

Notes

Unit 13: Steele- On the Death of Friend-Detailed Study and Critical Appreciation

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Discuss Steele as an Essayist
• Critically examine Steele’s On the Death of Friend

Introduction

Steele, Richard (1672–1729), English essayist and dramatist. Steele’s name is associated with that of Joseph Addison, with whom he collaborated. Born in poor circumstances in Dublin, Steele was brought up by his aunt and uncle, Lady Katherine Mildmay and Henry Gascoigne. His extended family were influential Protestant gentry, but little is known of his parents. At fourteen, Steele went to the Charterhouse School, where he met Addison.

In 1689 Steele went to Oxford University, where he did not take a degree but joined the second troop of Life Guards in 1692. His first publication was a poem on the death of Queen Mary II in 1694; it was dedicated to Lord Cutts, colonel of the Coldstream Guards, who rewarded him with the rank of captain and made him his secretary. Steele had a daughter with Elizabeth Tonson. He did not acknowledge the fact at first, but later brought the child up in his home. While stationed in Suffolk as commander of a garrison, he composed The Christian Hero (1701). In this reforming tract and moral manual, Steele contrasted the passion and universal heroism of Christianity with his perception of the false reasoning of Stoicism of the Roman emperors. Steele wrote his first play, The Funeral, or Grief à la Mode, the same year. A didactic satire on hypocritical undertakers and dishonest lawyers, it was praised by William III. Unfortunately, the king died before conferring any favors on Steele. Finding promotion in the army increasingly difficult to achieve without powerful connections, Steele left in 1705 to pursue success as a writer. In his second play, The Lying Lover (1702), he continued his didactic dramatic vision, portraying virtuous characters as models for audiences to emulate, as opposed to the predominantly “immoral” characters on the Restoration stage.

In 1705, Steele married Margaret Ford Stretch. Because of his theatrical success, he was well acquainted with London society and became involved in Whig politics. He was appointed gentleman waiter to Prince George of Denmark, Queen Anne’s husband, in 1706. Engaging in the pamphlet war with satirical essayist Jonathan Swift, his public opponent, Steele wrote The Crisis, attacking the Tory ministry for its unenthusiastic support for a Protestant successor to the throne. In 1707,
after his first wife's death, Steele married Mary Scurlock. At this time he was editor of the London Gazette, the official government periodical.

Steele’s fame rests on his founding of The Tatler (1709–1711) and The Spectator (1711–1712), forerunners of modern journalism, which he wrote anonymously with Joseph Addison with the object of targeting the intellectual and political melting pots of London’s coffeehouses and bookshops. The Tatler, a series of thrice-weekly papers in which Steele planned to educate “Politick Persons,” was addressed predominantly to fashionable society, whereas The Spectator appealed to a wider audience. Using the idea of a club of different personalities, politics, culture, and foreign and domestic topics were explored in The Tatler. Steele used the figure of Isaac Bickerstaff, created by Jonathan Swift, to satirize the annual almanacs. Steele’s fundamental purpose was moral didacticism: he wished to inculcate a practical morality in an accessible style. Swift, however, attacked Steele’s loose use of syntax and the use of juxtaposition in his writing.

Published daily, The Spectator developed from The Tatler and included essays on relationships between the sexes, manners, London life, taste, and politics. The Spectator assembled a club of narrators whose personalities, eccentricities, and political viewpoints were revealed in concrete detail. Led by Mr. Spectator, the narrators included the Tory country squire Sir Roger de Coverly, and Sir Andrew Freeport, a Whig mercantilist. Steele’s contribution to The Spectator is distinguished for his use of the letter form and the dialogue between either fictional personae or a writer and a reader (real or imagined). His essays on women such as “The Education of Girls” (no. 66, 16 May 1711) reveal both his sentimentalism and his open, sympathetic stance towards women’s social and sexual status.

Steele’s desire to be more politically outspoken against the Tory ministry produced two anti-Tory periodicals, The Guardian (with Addison’s help) in 1713, and The Englishman (1713–1714), as well as several pamphlets and short-lived periodicals. Elected as M.P. for Stockbridge in 1713, his position in the House of Commons was disputed, and a Tory majority expelled him. Steele was granted a governorship of Drury Lane Theatre in 1714 to, as he expressed it in his pamphlet Town Talk, “Chastise the Vices of the Stage, and promote the Interests of Virtue and Innocence.” In 1715, he was knighted by George I, and made a surveyor of the royal stables. Steele argued publicly with Addison in 1718 over thepeerage bill, an incident that led to the revocation of the Drury Lane patent. He then began a biweekly paper called The Theater and later issued pamphlets about the South Sea Bubble. His last play, The Conscious Lovers (1722), was based on Terence’s Andria; in it Steele portrayed ideals of male and female manners and began the tradition of the sentimental comedy. The play’s success enabled him to settle his debts. Steele retired in ill health to his estate in Wales and died in Carmarthenshire in 1729.

### 13.1 Critical Appreciation

There is a sort of Delight, which is alternately mixed with Terror and Sorrow, in the Contemplation of Death. The Soul has its Curiosity more than ordinarily awakened, when it turns its Thoughts upon the Conduct of such who have behaved themselves with an Equal, a Resigned, a Cheerful, a Generous or Heroick Temper in that Extremity. We are affected with these respective Manners of Behaviour, as we secretly believe the Part of the Dying Person imitable by our selves, or such as we imagine our selves more particularly capable of. Men of exalted Minds march before us like Princes, and are, to the Ordinary Race of Mankind, rather Subjects for their Admiration than Example. However, there are no Ideas strike more forcibly upon our Imaginations; than those which are raised from Reflections upon the Exits of great and excellent Men. Innocent Men who have suffered as Criminals, tho’ they were Benefactors to Human Society, seem to be Persons of the highest Distinction, among the vastly greater Number of Human Race, the Dead. When the Iniquity of the Times brought Socrates to his Execution, how great and wonderful is it to behold him, unsupported by any thing but the Testimony of his own Conscience and Conjectures of
Hereafter, receive the Poison with an Air of Mirth and good Humour, and as if going on an agreeable Journey bespeak some Deity to make it fortunate.

When Phocion’s good Actions had met with the like Reward from his Country, and he was led to Death with many others of his Friends, they bewailing their Fate, he walking composedly towards the Place of Execution, how gracefully does he support his Illustrious Character to the very last Instant. One of the Rabble spitting at him as he passed, with his usual Authority he called to know if no one was ready to teach this Fellow how to behave himself. When a Poor-spirited Creature that died at the same time for his Crimes bemoaned himself unmanfully, he rebuked him with this Question, Is it no Consolation to such a Man as thou art to die with Phocion? At the Instant when he was to die, they asked him what commands he had for his Son, he answered, To forget this Injury of the Athenians. Nioles, his Friend, under the same Sentence, desired he might drink the Potion before him: Phocion said, because he never had denied him any thing he would not even this, the most difficult Request he had ever made.

These Instances were very noble and great, and the Reflections of those Sublime Spirits had made Death to them what it is really intended to be by the Author of Nature, a Relief from a various Being ever subject to Sorrows and Difficulties.

Epaminondas the The ban General, having received in Fight a mortal Stab with a Sword, which was left in his Body, lay in that Posture ‘till he had Intelligence that his Troops [had] obtained the Victory, and then permitted it to be drawn [out], at which Instant he expressed himself in this manner,

This is not the end of my Life, my Fellow-Soldiers; it is now your Epaminondas is born, who dies in so much Glory. It were an endless Labour to collect the Accounts with which all Ages have filled the World of Noble and Heroick Minds that have resigned this Being, as if the Termination of Life were but an ordinary Occurrence of it.

This common-place way of Thinking I fell into from an awkward Endeavour to throw off a real and fresh Affliction, by turning over Books in a melancholy Mood; but it is not easy to remove Griefs which touch the Heart, by applying Remedies which only entertain the Imagination. As therefore this Paper is to consist of any thing which concerns Human Life, I cannot help letting the present Subject regard what has been the last Object of my Eyes, tho’ an Entertainment of Sorrow.

I went this Evening to visit a Friend, with a design to rally him, upon a Story I had heard of his intending to steal a Marriage without the Privity of us his intimate Friends and Acquaintance. I came into his Apartment with that Intimacy which I have done for very many Years, and walked directly into his Bed-chamber, where I found my Friend in the Agonies of Death. What could I do? The innocent Mirth in my Thoughts struck upon me like the most flagitious Wickedness: I in vain called upon him; he was senseless, and too far spent to have the least Knowledge of my Sorrow, or any Pain in himself. Give me leave then to transcribe my Soliloquy, as I stood by his Mother, dumb with the weight of Grief for a Son who was her Honour and her Comfort, and never till that Hour since his Birth had been an Occasion of a Moment’s Sorrow to her. ‘How surprising is this Change! from the Possession of vigorous Life and Strength, to be reduced in a few Hours to this fatal Extremity! Those Lips which look so pale and livid, within these few Days gave Delight to all who heard their Utterance: It was the Business, the Purpose of his Being, next to Obeying him to whom he is going, to please and instruct, and that for no other end but to please and instruct. Kindness was the Motive of his Actions, and with all the Capacity requisite for making a Figure in a contentious World, Moderation, Good-Nature, Affability, Temperance and Chastity, were the Arts of his Excellent Life. There as he lies in helpless Agony, no Wise Man who knew him so well as I, but would resign all the World can bestow to be so near the end of such a Life. Why does my Heart so little obey my Reason as to lament thee, thou excellent Man. ... Heaven receive him, or restore him ... Thy beloved Mother, thy obliged Friends, thy helpless Servants, stand around thee without Distinction. How much wouldst thou, hadst thou thy Senses, say to each of us.
But now that good Heart bursts, and he is at rest—with that Breath expired a Soul who never indulged a Passion unfit for the Place he is gone to: Where are now thy Plans of Justice, of Truth, of Honour? Of what use the Volumes thou hast collated, the Arguments thou hast invented, the Examples thou hast followed. Poor were the Expectations of the Studious, the Modest and the Good, if the Reward of their Labours were only to be expected from Man. No, my Friend, thy intended Pleadings, thy intended good Offices to thy Friends, thy intended Services to thy Country, are already performed (as to thy Concern in them) in his Sight before whom the Past, Present, and Future appear at one View. While others with thy Talents were tormented with Ambition, with Vain-glory, with Envy, with Emulation, how well didst thou turn thy Mind to its own Improvement in things out of the Power of Fortune, in Probitity, in Integrity, in the Practice and Study of Justice; how silent thy Passage, how private thy Journey, how glorious thy End! Many have I known more Famous, some more Knowing, not one so Innocent.

Self Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Steele’s name is associated with
       (a) Hazlit  (b) Joseph Addison
       (c) Lady Katherine  (d) None of these
   (ii) Steele wrote his first play
       (a) The lying lovers  (b) The Funeral
       (c) The Tatter  (d) None of these
   (iii) In 1715 Steele was knighted by
       (a) James I  (b) George I
       (c) Charles II  (d) None of these
   (iv) Steele died in
       (a) 1729  (b) 1720  (c) 1722  (d) 1730

13.2 Summary
- Born in poor circumstances in Dublin, Steele was brought up by his aunt and uncle, Lady Katherine Mildmay and Henry Gascoigne. His extended family were influential Protestant gentry, but little is known of his parents. At fourteen, Steele went to the Charterhouse School, where he met Addison.
- In 1689 Steele went to Oxford University, where he did not take a degree but joined the second troop of Life Guards in 1692. His first publication was a poem on the death of Queen Mary II in 1694; it was dedicated to Lord Cutts, colonel of the Coldstream Guards, who rewarded him with the rank of captain and made him his secretary. Steele had a daughter with Elizabeth Tonson. He did not acknowledge the fact at first, but later brought the child up in his home. While stationed in Suffolk as commander of a garrison, he composed The Christian Hero (1701). In this reforming tract and moral manual, Steele contrasted the passion and universal heroism of Christianity with his perception of the false reasoning of Stoicism of the Roman emperors. Steele wrote his first play, The Funeral, or Grief à la Mode, the same year. A didactic satire on hypocritical undertakers and dishonest lawyers, it was praised by William III. Unfortunately, the king died before conferring any favors on Steele. Finding promotion in the army increasingly difficult to achieve without powerful connections, Steele left in 1705 to pursue success as a writer. In his second play, The Lying Lover (1702), he continued his didactic dramatic vision, portraying virtuous characters as models for audiences to emulate, as opposed to the predominantly “immoral” characters on the Restoration stage.
• Steele’s fame rests on his founding of The Tatler (1709–1711) and The Spectator (1711–1712), forerunners of modern journalism, which he wrote anonymously with Joseph Addison with the object of targeting the intellectual and political melting pots of London’s coffeehouses and bookshops. The Tatler, a series of thrice-weekly papers in which Steele planned to educate “Politick Persons,” was addressed predominantly to fashionable society, whereas The Spectator appealed to a wider audience.

• In 1715, he was knighted by George I, and made a surveyor of the royal stables. Steele argued publicly with Addison in 1718 over the peerage bill, an incident that led to the revocation of the Drury Lane patent. He then began a biweekly paper called The Theater and later issued pamphlets about the South Sea Bubble. His last play, The Conscious Lovers (1722), was based on Terence’s Andria; in it Steele portrayed ideals of male and female manners and began the tradition of the sentimental comedy. The play’s success enabled him to settle his debts. Steele retired in ill health to his estate in Wales and died in Carmarthenshire in 1729.

13.3 Key-Words
1. Influential : Having great influence on someone or something, powerful.
2. Didactic : Intended to teach particularly in having moral instruction as an ulterior motive.

13.4 Review Questions
1. Write an Introduction to Steele’s life and works.
2. Critically examine Steele’s On the Death of Friend.

13.5 Further Readings

Books
Unit 14: Hazlitt-On Genius And Common Sense-Introduction

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Objectives
Introduction
14.1 Life and Works
14.2 Success and Trouble
14.3 Solitude and Infatuation
14.4 The Spirit of the Age
14.5 Summary
14.6 Key-Words
14.7 Review Questions
14.8 Further Readings

Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about Hazlitt’s Life and Works
• Understand the essay On Genius and Common Sense

Introduction
William Hazlitt, the son of an Irish Unitarian clergyman, was born in Maidstone, Kent, on 10th April, 1778. His father was a friend of Joseph Priestley and Richard Price. As a result of supporting the American Revolution, Rev. Hazlitt and his family were forced to leave Kent and live in Ireland. The family returned to England in 1787 and settled at Wem in Shropshire. At the age of fifteen William was sent to be trained for the ministry at New Unitarian College at Hackney in London. The college had been founded by Joseph Priestley and had a reputation for producing freethinkers. In 1797 Hazlitt lost his desire to become a Unitarian minister and left the college.

While in London Hazlitt became friends with a group of writers with radical political ideas. The group included Percy Bysshe Shelley, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charles Lamb, William Wordsworth, Thomas Barnes, Henry Brougham, Leigh Hunt, Robert Southey and Lord Byron. At first Hazlitt attempted to become a portrait painter but after a lack of success he turned to writing. Charles Lamb introduced Hazlitt to William Godwin and other important literary figures in London. In 1805 Joseph Johnson published Hazlitt’s first book, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action. The following year Hazlitt published Free Thoughts on Public Affairs, an attack on William Pitt and his government’s foreign policy. Hazlitt opposed England’s war with France and its consequent heavy taxation. This was followed by a series of articles and pamphlets on political corruption and the need to reform the voting system.

Hazlitt began writing for The Times and in 1808 married the editor’s sister, Sarah Stoddart. His friend, Thomas Barnes, was the newspaper’s parliamentary reporter. Later, Barnes was to become the editor of the newspaper. In 1810 he published the New and Improved Grammar of the English Language.

Hazlitt also contributed to The Examiner, a radical journal edited by Leigh Hunt. Later, Hazlitt wrote for the Edinburgh Review, the Yellow Dwarf and the London Magazine. In these journals
Hazlitt produced a series of essays on art, drama, literature and politics. During this period he established himself as England’s leading expert on the writings of William Shakespeare.

Hazlitt wrote several books on literature including *Characters of Shakespeare* (1817), *A View of the English Stage* (1818), *English Poets* (1818) and *English Comic Writers* (1819). In these books he urged the artist to be aware of his social and political responsibilities. Hazlitt continued to write about politics and his most important books on this subject is *Political Essays with Sketches of Public Characters* (1819). In the book Hazlitt explains how the admiration of power turns many writers into “intellectual pimps and hirelings of the press.”

In 1813 Hazlitt was employed as the parliamentary reporter for the *Morning Chronicle*, the country’s leading Whig newspaper. However, in his articles, Hazlitt criticized all political parties.

Hazlitt’s marriage to Sarah ended in 1823 as a result of an affair with a maid, Sarah Walker. Hazlitt wrote an account of this relationship in his book *Liber Amoris*. In 1824 Hazlitt married Isabella Bridgewater but this relationship only lasted a year.

In the *The Spirit of the Age: Contemporary Portraits* (1825) Hazlitt provides a series of contemporary portraits including Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Robert Southey, William Cobbett, William Godwin and William Wilberforce. This was followed by *The Plain Speaker* (1826) and *Life of Napoleon* (4 volumes, 1828-30). William Hazlitt died in poverty of stomach cancer on 18th September 1830.

### 14.1 Life and Works

**Background**

The family of Hazlitt’s father were Irish Protestants who moved from the county of Antrim to Tipperary in the early 18th century. Also named William Hazlitt, Hazlitt’s father attended the University of Glasgow (where he was taught by Adam Smith), receiving a master’s degree in 1760. Not entirely content with his Presbyterian faith, he became a Unitarian minister in England. In 1764 he became pastor at Wisbech in Cambridgeshire, where in 1766 he married Grace Loftus, daughter of a recently deceased ironmonger. Of their many children, only three survived infancy. The first of these, John (later known as a portrait painter) was born in 1767 at Marshfield in Gloucestershire, where the Reverend William Hazlitt had accepted a new pastorate after his marriage. In 1770, the elder Hazlitt accepted yet another position and moved with his family to Maidstone, Kent, where his first and only surviving daughter, Margaret (usually known as “Peggy”), was born that year.

**Childhood**

House in Wem, Shropshire where the Reverend William Hazlitt and his family lived between 1787 and 1813 William, the youngest of the surviving Hazlitt children, was born in Mitre Lane, Maidstone, in 1778. In 1780, when he was two, his family began a migratory existence that was to last several years. From Maidstone his father took them to Bandon, County Cork, Ireland; and from Bandon in 1783 to the United States, where the elder Hazlitt preached, lectured, and founded the First Unitarian Church at Boston, Massachusetts. In 1786–87 the family returned to England and lived at Wem, in Shropshire. William would remember little of his years in America, save the taste of barberries.
Education

Hazlitt was educated at home and at a local school until 1793, when his father sent him to a Unitarian seminary on what was then the outskirts of London, the Unitarian New College at Hackney (commonly referred to as Hackney College). Although Hazlitt stayed there for only about two years, its impact was enormous.

The curriculum at Hackney was very broad, including a grounding in the Greek and Latin classics, mathematics, history, government, science, and, of course, religion. Much of this was traditional; however, the tutelage having been strongly influenced by eminent Dissenting thinkers of the day like Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, there was also much that was nonconformist. Priestley, whom Hazlitt had read and who was also one of his teachers, was an impassioned commentator on political issues of the day. This, along with the turmoil in the wake of the French Revolution, sparked in Hazlitt and his classmates lively debates on these issues, as they saw their world being transformed around them.

Changes were taking place within the young Hazlitt as well. While, out of respect for his father, Hazlitt never openly broke with his religion, he suffered a loss of faith, and left Hackney before completing his preparation for the ministry.

Although he rejected the Unitarian theology, Hazlitt’s time at Hackney left him with much more than religious scepticism. He had read widely and formed habits of independent thought and respect for the truth that remained with him for life. He had thoroughly absorbed a belief in liberty and the rights of man, and of the mind as an active force which, by disseminating knowledge, through both the sciences and the arts, could reinforce the natural tendency in humanity toward the good. He had had impressed upon him the ability of the individual, working both alone and within a mutually supportive community, to effect beneficial change by adhering to strongly held principles. The belief of many Unitarian thinkers in the natural disinterestedness of the human mind had also laid a foundation for the young Hazlitt’s own philosophical explorations along those lines. And, though harsh experience and disillusionment later compelled him to qualify some of his early ideas about human nature, he was left with a hatred of tyranny and persecution that he retained to his last days.

The young philosopher

Returning home, around 1795, his thoughts were directed in more secular channels, encompassing not only politics but, increasingly, modern philosophy, which he had begun to read with fascination at Hackney. He spent much of his time in intensive study of English, Scottish, and Irish thinkers like John Locke, David Hartley, George Berkeley, and David Hume, and French thinkers like Claude Adrien Helvétius, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, the Marquis de Condorcet, and Baron d’Holbach. From then on Hazlitt’s goal was to become a philosopher. His thoughts were focused on man as a social and political animal, and, even more intensely, on the philosophy of mind, what would later be called psychology.

In this period he discovered Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who became one of the most important influences on the budding philosopher’s thought, and Edmund Burke, whose writing style impressed him enormously. He was painstakingly working out a treatise on the “natural disinterestedness of the human mind”, meant to disprove the idea that man is naturally selfish, a fundamental concept in most of the philosophy of the day. Hazlitt’s treatise would not be published for a number of years, after further reading, and after other changes had occurred to alter the course of his career, but to the end of his life he would think of himself as a philosopher.

Besides residing with his father while trying to find his voice and work out his thoughts as a philosopher, he often in these years stayed with his older brother John, who had studied under Joshua Reynolds and was following a career as a portrait painter. He also spent delighted evenings at the theatre in London, but did not yet know how this too would be important to his later
writing. Mostly at this time he led a contemplative existence, still feeling frustrated in being unable to express on paper the thoughts and feelings that churned within him. The course of this existence was now to be interrupted by a life-changing event that, with its aftermath, had an impact on his career as a writer that Hazlitt in retrospect believed to have been greater than any other.

First acquaintance with poets

In January 1798, Hazlitt encountered, preaching at the Unitarian chapel in Shrewsbury, the minister Samuel Taylor Coleridge, soon much better known as a poet, critic, and philosopher. He was dazzled. “I could not have been more delighted if I had heard the music of the spheres”, he wrote years later in his essay “My First Acquaintance with Poets”. “Poetry and Philosophy had met together. Truth and Genius had embraced, under the eye and with the sanction of Religion.”

Later still, long after they had parted ways, Hazlitt would speak of Coleridge as “the only person I ever knew who answered to the idea of a man of genius”. That Hazlitt learned to express his thoughts “in motley imagery or quaint allusion”, that his understanding “ever found a language to express itself, I owe to Coleridge”, he later wrote. In conversation afterwards, Coleridge for his part expressed interest in the younger man’s germinating philosophical ideas and offered encouragement.

In April Hazlitt joined Coleridge at his residence in Nether Stowey, where they both spent time with the poet William Wordsworth. Again, Hazlitt was enraptured. While he was not immediately struck by Wordsworth’s appearance, when he observed the look in Wordsworth’s eye as he contemplated a sunset, he reflected, “With what eyes these poets see nature!” On that occasion given the opportunity to read the *Lyrical Ballads* in manuscript, Hazlitt saw that Wordsworth had the mind of a true poet, and he had created something entirely new.

At that time, the three shared a passion for the ideas of liberty and rights of man. Tramping back and forth across the countryside, they talked of poetry, philosophy, and the political movements that were changing the earth. This unity of spirit was not to last, but it validated for Hazlitt, just twenty years old, the idea that there is much to be learned and appreciated in poetry as well as in the philosophy to which he was already devoted. These experiences also encouraged him to pursue his own thinking and writing. Coleridge, on his part, later revealed that he had been highly impressed by Hazlitt’s promise as a thinker: “He sends well-headed and well-feathered Thoughts straight forwards to the mark with a Twang of the Bow-string.”

The itinerant painter

Meanwhile, the fact remained that Hazlitt had chosen not to follow a pastoral career. Although he never abandoned his goal of writing a philosophical treatise on the disinterestedness of the human mind, it had to be put aside indefinitely. Still dependent on his father, he was now obliged to earn his own living. Artistic talent seemed to run on his mother’s side of the family. Starting in 1798 he became increasingly fascinated by paintings. His brother, John, had by now become a successful painter of miniature portraits. So it occurred to William that he might earn a living similarly, and he began to take lessons from John.

Hazlitt also visited various picture galleries, and he began to get work doing portraits, painting somewhat in the style of Rembrandt. And so he managed to make something of a living for a time, travelling back and forth between London and the country, wherever he could get work. By 1802, his work was considered good enough that a portrait he had recently painted of his father was accepted for exhibition by the Royal Academy.

Later in 1802, Hazlitt was commissioned to travel to Paris and copy several works of the old masters hanging in the Louvre. This was one of the great opportunities of his life. Over a period of three months, he spent long hours in rapture studying the paintings. He later thought long and
hard about what he had seen, and this provided substance for a considerable body of art criticism some years afterward. He also had an opportunity to see Napoleon (at a distance), whom he idolised as the rescuer of the common man from the oppression of royal “Legitimacy”. Eighteen years later, Hazlitt reviewed nostalgically the “pleasure in painting, which none but painters know”, and all the delight he found in this art, in his essay “On the Pleasure of Painting”.

Back in England, Hazlitt again travelled up into the country, having obtained more work painting portraits. One commission again proved fortunate, as it brought him back in touch with Coleridge and Wordsworth. He painted portraits of both, as well as of Coleridge’s son Hartley. Always endeavouring to paint the best pictures he could, even if they failed to flatter their subjects, he produced results not found satisfactory by either poet. (And yet Wordsworth and their friend Robert Southey thought his portrait of Coleridge a better likeness than one by the celebrated James Northcote.)

In this period also a mishap occurred that shadowed his life for many years. The young Hazlitt rarely felt comfortable in the society of women, especially those of the upper and middle classes. Tormented by sexual desires, he sought the company of prostitutes and “loose women” of lower social and economic strata. During his last stay in the Lake District with Coleridge, his actions led to a near disastrous blunder, as a misunderstanding of the intentions of one local woman led to an altercation, followed by Hazlitt’s precipitous retreat from the town under cover of darkness. This strained his relationship with Coleridge and Wordsworth, which was already coming apart at the seams for other reasons.

Marriage, family, and friends

In 1803, Hazlitt met Charles Lamb and his sister Mary. There was an immediate sympathy between William and Charles, and they became fast friends. The friendship, though sometimes strained by Hazlitt’s difficult ways, lasted until the end of Hazlitt’s life. He was fond of Mary as well, and—ironically in view of her intermittent fits of insanity—he considered her the most reasonable woman he had ever met. (Coming from one whose view of women at times took a misogynistic turn, this was high praise indeed.)

Portrait of Charles Lamb by William Hazlitt, 1804

Hazlitt frequented the society of the Lambs for the next several years. He was not getting much work as a painter, but now he finally found the opportunity to complete his philosophical treatise, which was published in 1805 as *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind*. This gained him little notice as an original thinker, and no money. Hazlitt’s outrage at events then taking place in English politics in reaction to Napoleon’s wars led to his writing and publishing, at his own expense (though he had almost no money), a political pamphlet, *Free Thoughts on Public Affairs* (1806). Finally, he began to find enough work to support himself, if just barely. Although the treatise he valued above anything else he wrote was never, at least in his own lifetime, recognised for what he believed was its true worth, it brought him attention as one who had a grasp of contemporary philosophy. He therefore was commissioned to abridge and write a preface to a now obscure work of mental philosophy, *The Light of Nature Pursued* by Abraham Tucker (originally published in seven volumes from 1765 to 1777), which appeared in 1807 and may have had some influence on his own later thinking.

Hazlitt also contributed three letters to William Cobbett’s *Weekly Political Register* at this time, all scathing critiques of Thomas Malthus’s *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798 and later editions). Another project that came his way was a compilation of parliamentary speeches, released in 1807 as *The Eloquence of the British Senate*. In the prefaces to the speeches, he began to show a skill he would later develop to perfection, the art of the pithy character sketch. He was able to get more work as a portrait painter as well.
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Notes

In 1808, Hazlitt married Sarah Stoddart, a friend of Mary Lamb and sister of John Stoddart, a journalist who became editor of The Times newspaper in 1814. Shortly before the wedding, John Stoddart established a trust into which he began paying £100 per year, for the benefit of Hazlitt and his wife—this was a very generous gesture, but Hazlitt detested being supported by his brother-in-law, whose political beliefs he despised. Although incompatibilities would later drive the couple apart, at first the union seemed to work well enough. Miss Stoddart was an unconventional woman who would be accepted by one as unconventional in his way as Hazlitt, and would in turn tolerate his eccentricities. It was hardly a match of love, but at first there were signs of a certain playful, affectionate behaviour between them. They made an agreeable social foursome with the Lambs, who visited them when they set up a household in Winterslow, a village a few miles from Salisbury, Wiltshire, in southern England. The couple had three sons over the next few years, but only one survived infancy—William, born in 1811 (to be the father of William Carew Hazlitt).

Now, as the head of a family, Hazlitt was more than ever in need of money. Through William Godwin, with whom he was frequently in touch, he obtained a commission to write an English grammar, published at the end of 1809 as A New and Improved Grammar of the English Tongue. Another project that came his way was the work that was published as Memoirs of the Late Thomas Holcroft, a compilation of autobiographical writing by the recently deceased playwright, novelist, and radical political activist, together with additional material by Hazlitt himself. Though completed in 1810, this work did not see the light of day until 1816, and so provided no financial gain to satisfy the needs of a young husband and father. But Hazlitt had not abandoned his ambitions as a painter. He found opportunities for landscape painting in the environs of Winterslow, and he spent considerable time in London getting commissions for portraits.

In January 1812 Hazlitt embarked on a sometime career as a lecturer, in this first instance in a series of talks on the British philosophers, at the Russell Institution in London. A central thesis of the talks was that Thomas Hobbes, rather than John Locke, had laid the foundations of modern philosophy. After a shaky beginning, Hazlitt gained some attention (as well as much-needed money) by these lectures, and they gave him an opportunity to expound some of his own ideas.

The year 1812 also seems to have been the last in which Hazlitt entertained serious ambitions to make a living as a painter. Although he had demonstrated some talent, the results of his most impassioned efforts always fell far short of the standards he had set for himself by comparison with such masters as Rembrandt, Titian, and Raphael. Nor did his commissioned portraits often please their subjects, as he obstinately refused to sacrifice to flattery what he considered truth. But other opportunities awaited him.

The journalist

In October 1812, Hazlitt was hired by The Morning Chronicle as a parliamentary reporter. Soon he met John Hunt, publisher of The Examiner, and his younger brother Leigh Hunt, the poet and essayist, who edited the weekly paper. Hazlitt admired both as champions of liberty, and befriended especially the younger Hunt, who found work for him. He began to contribute miscellaneous essays to The Examiner in 1813, and the scope of his work for the Chronicle was expanded to include drama criticism, literary criticism, and political essays. In 1814 The Champion was added to the list of periodicals that accepted Hazlitt’s by-now profuse output of literary and political criticism. A critique of Joshua Reynolds’ theories about art appeared there as well, one of Hazlitt’s major forays into art criticism.

Having by 1814 become established as a journalist, Hazlitt had begun to earn a satisfactory living. A year earlier, with the prospect of a steady income, he had moved his family to a house at 19 York Street, Westminster, which had been occupied by the poet John Milton, whom Hazlitt admired above all other English poets except Shakespeare. As it happened, Hazlitt’s landlord was the
philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham. Hazlitt was to write considerably about both Milton and Bentham over the next few years.

His circle of friends expanded, though he never seems to have been particularly close with any but the Lambs and to an extent Leigh Hunt and the painter Benjamin Robert Haydon. His poor tolerance for any who, he thought, had abandoned the cause of liberty, along with his frequent outspokenness, even tactlessness, in social situations made it difficult for many to feel close to him, and at times he tried the patience of even Charles Lamb. His criticism of Wordsworth’s poem *The Excursion* lavished extreme praise on the poet—and equally extreme censure. Wordsworth, who seems to have been unable to tolerate anything less than unqualified praise, was enraged, and relations between the two became cooler than ever.

Though Hazlitt continued to think of himself as a “metaphysician” (less often as a painter; he had by now given up his professional ambitions along those lines), he began to feel comfortable in the role of journalist. His self-esteem received an added boost when in early 1815 he began to contribute regularly to the quarterly *The Edinburgh Review*, the most distinguished periodical on the Whig side of the political fence (its rival *The Quarterly Review* occupied the Tory side). Writing for so highly respected a publication was considered a major step up from writing for weekly papers, and Hazlitt was proud of this connection.

On 18 June 1815, Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. Having idolised Napoleon for years, Hazlitt took it as a personal blow. The event seemed to him to mark the end of hope for the common man against the oppression of “legitimate” monarchy. Profoundly depressed, he took up heavy drinking and was reported to have walked around unshaven and unwashed for weeks. He idolised and spoiled his son, William Jr., but in most respects his household grew increasingly disordered over the next year, his marriage deteriorated, and he spent more and more time away from home. As a part-time drama critic, he found an excuse to spend evening after evening at the theatre. Afterwards he spent time among those friends who could tolerate his irascibility, the number of whom dwindled as a result of his sometimes outrageous behaviour.

Hazlitt continued to produce articles on miscellaneous topics for *The Examiner* and other periodicals, including political diatribes against any whom he felt ignored or minimised the needs and rights of the common man. Defection from the cause of liberty had become easier in light of the oppressive political atmosphere in England at that time, in reaction to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Opposing this tendency, the Hunts were his primary allies. Lamb, who tried to remain uninvolved politically, tolerated his abrasiveness, and that friendship managed to survive, if only just barely in the face of Hazlitt’s growing bitterness, short temper, and propensity for hurling invective at friends and foes alike.

For relief from all that weighed on his mind, Hazlitt became a passionate player at a kind of racquet ball similar to the game of Fives (a type of handball of which he was a fan) in that it was played against a wall. He played with savage intensity, dashing around the court like a madman, drenched in sweat, and was accounted a good player. More than just a distraction from his woes, this devotion led to musings on the value of competitive sports and on human skill in general, expressed in writings like his notice of the “Death of John Cavanagh” (a celebrated Fives player) in *The Examiner* on 9 February 1817, and the essay “The Indian Jugglers” in *Table-Talk* (1821).

Early in 1817, a series of Hazlitt’s essays that had appeared in *The Examiner* in a regular column called “The Round Table” was collected in book form, including a few contributions by Leigh Hunt. Hazlitt’s contributions to *The Round Table* were written somewhat in the manner of the periodical essays of the day, a genre defined by such eighteenth-century magazines as *The Tatler* and *The Spectator*.

Some essays blend Hazlitt’s social and psychological observations in a calculatedly thought-provoking way, presenting to the reader the “paradoxes” of human nature. The first of the collected
essays, “On the Love of Life”, explains, “It is our intention, in the course of these papers, occasionally to expose certain vulgar errors, which have crept into our reasonings on men and manners... The love of life is... in general, the effect not of our enjoyments, but of our passions”.

Again, in “On Pedantry”, Hazlitt declares that “The power of attaching an interest to the most trifling or painful pursuits... is one of the greatest happinesses of our nature”. In “On Different Sorts of Fame”, “In proportion as men can command the immediate and vulgar applause of others, they become indifferent to that which is remote and difficult of attainment”. And in “On Good-Nature”, “Good nature, or what is often considered as such, is the most selfish of all the virtues...”

Many of the components of Hazlitt’s style begin to take shape in these Round Table essays. Some of his “paradoxes” are so hyperbolic as to shock when encountered out of context: “All country people hate each other”, for example, from the second part of “On Mr. Wordsworth’s Excursion”. He interweaves quotations from literature old and new. They help drive his points home, and (as some critics have felt) he used quotations as a device as well as anyone ever has, yet all too often he gets the quotes wrong. In one of his essays on Wordsworth he misquotes that very poet:

Though nothing can bring back the hour of glory in the grass, of splendour in the flower..

Though Hazlitt was still following the model of the older periodical essayists, these quirks, together with his keen social and psychological insights, began here to coalesce into a style very much his own.

14.2 Success and Trouble

In this period, the state of Hazlitt’s marriage continued its downward spiral; he was writing furiously for several periodicals to make ends meet; waiting so far in vain for the collection The Round Table to be issued as a book (which it finally was in February 1817); suffering bouts of illness; and making enemies by his venomous political diatribes. He found relief by a change of course, shifting his critical focus from the acting of Shakespeare’s plays to the substance of them. The result was Characters of Shakespear’s Plays (1817), a collection of critical essays on the drama of William Shakespeare.

His approach was something new. There had been criticisms of Shakespeare before, but either they were not comprehensive or they were not aimed at the general reading public. As Ralph Wardle put it, before Hazlitt wrote this book, “no one had ever attempted a comprehensive study of all of Shakespeare, play by play, that readers could read and reread with pleasure as a guide to their understanding and appreciation”. Somewhat loosely organised, and even rambling, the studies offer personal appreciations of the plays that are unashamedly enthusiastic. Hazlitt does not present a measured account of the plays’ strengths and weaknesses, as did Dr. Johnson, or view them in terms of a “mystical” theory, as Hazlitt thought his contemporary A.W. Schlegel did (though he approves of many of Schlegel’s judgements and quotes him liberally). Without apology, he addresses his readers as fellow lovers of Shakespeare and shares with them the beauties of what he thought the finest passages of the plays he liked best.

Readers took to it, the first edition selling out in six weeks. It received favourable reviews as well, not only by Leigh Hunt, a close friend who might have shown bias, but by Francis Jeffrey, the editor of The Edinburgh Review, a notice that Hazlitt greatly appreciated. (Hazlitt had contributed to that quarterly, had exchanged business correspondence with Jeffrey, and held him in great respect, but they had never met and were in no sense personal friends.) Jeffrey saw the book not as a learned study of Shakespeare’s plays but rather as a loving appreciation of them, and an insightful and eloquent one at that, “a book of considerable originality and genius”.

Now looking at the prospect of being out of debt, and enjoying critical and popular acclaim, Hazlitt could relax a bit and bask in the light of his growing fame.
Meanwhile, however, Hazlitt’s reputation in literary circles had become tarnished, apparently by retaliatory rumours spread by such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, whom he had continued to criticise openly for their personal failings in contrast to their earlier actual or potential accomplishments. And the worst was yet to come.

But Hazlitt soon found a new source of satisfaction, along with escape from his financial woes, in a return to the lecture hall. In early 1818 he delivered a series of talks on “the English Poets”, from Chaucer to his own time. His presentation was uneven in quality, but ultimately the lectures were judged a success. In making the arrangements for the lectures, he also met Peter George Patmore, Secretary of the Surrey Institution, where the lectures were presented, and soon to become a friend and confidant of Hazlitt’s in the most troubled period of the latter’s life.

The Surrey Institution lectures were printed in book form, followed by a collection of his drama criticism, A View of the English Stage, and the second edition of Characters of Shakespear’s Plays. Hazlitt’s career as a lecturer gained some momentum, and his growing popularity allowed him to get a collection of his political writings published as well, Political Essays, with Sketches of Public Characters. Lectures on “the English Comic Writers” soon followed, and these as well were published in book form. After them came lectures on dramatists who were Shakespeare’s contemporaries, published as Lectures on the Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth. The latter did not go over so well as lectures, but were reviewed enthusiastically after they were published.

More trouble was brewing, however. Hazlitt was attacked brutally in The Quarterly Review and Blackwood’s Magazine, both Tory publications. One Blackwood’s article mocked him as “pimpled Hazlitt”, accused him of ignorance, dishonesty, and obscenity, and incorporated vague physical threats. Though Hazlitt was rattled by these attacks, he sought legal advice and sued. The lawsuit against Blackwood’s was finally settled out of court in his favour. Yet the attacks did not entirely cease. The Quarterly Review issued a review of Hazlitt’s published lectures in which he was condemned as ignorant and his writing as unintelligible. Such partisan onslaughts brought spirited responses. One, unlike an earlier response to the Blackwood’s attack that never saw the light of day, was published, as A Letter to William Gifford, Esq. (1819; Gifford was the editor of the Quarterly). (Among other things, this pamphlet was notable for Hazlitt’s use of the term “ultracrepidarian”, which he might have coined; see Ultracrepidarianism.) In this pamphlet Hazlitt presented what amounted to an apologia for his life and work thus far and showed he was well able to defend himself. Yet Hazlitt’s attackers had done their damage. Not only was he personally shaken, he found it more difficult to have his works published, and once more he had to struggle for a living.

14.3 Solitude and Infatuation

His lecturing in particular had drawn to Hazlitt a small group of admirers. Best known today is the poet John Keats, but there were others, such as the diarist and chronicler Henry Crabb Robinson and the novelist Mary Russell Mitford. But the rumours that had been spread demonising him, along with the vilifications of the Tory press, not only hurt his pride but seriously obstructed his ability to earn a living. Income from his lectures had also proved insufficient to keep him afloat.

His thoughts drifted to gloom and misanthropy. His mood was not improved by the fact that by now there was no pretence of keeping up appearances: his marriage had failed. Years earlier he had grown resigned to the lack of love between him and Sarah. He had been visiting prostitutes and displayed more idealised amorous inclinations toward a number of women whose names are lost to history. Now in 1819, he was unable to pay the rent on their rooms at 19 York Street and his family were evicted. That was the last straw for Sarah, who moved into rooms with their son and broke with Hazlitt for good, forcing him to find his own accommodation. He would sometimes see his son and even his wife, with whom he remained on speaking terms, but they were effectively separated.
For long periods, for solace and so he could concentrate on his writing, he frequently retreated to the country, staying at “The Hut”, an inn at Winterslow, near where his wife had some property (he had come to love that countryside at the beginning of his marriage). He shut himself away like a hermit and returned to contributing to periodicals, including the recently reestablished (1820) London Magazine, to which he contributed drama criticism and miscellaneous essays. Roman road towards Middle Winterslow, and the route which Hazlitt preferred to take to the village

One idea that particularly bore fruit was that of a series of articles called “Table-Talk”. (Many were written expressly for inclusion in the book of the same name, Table-Talk; or, Original Essays, which appeared in different editions and forms over the next few years.) These were essays in the “familiar style” of the sort that had begun with Montaigne two centuries earlier, and were greatly admired by Hazlitt. Here he brought his essay writing much closer to the model of the “familiar essay” as distinct from the eighteenth-century periodical essay. The personal “I” was now substituted for the editorial “we”. In a preface to a later edition of the book, Hazlitt explained that rather than being scholarly and precise, these essays attempted to combine the “literary and the conversational”. As in a conversation between friends, the discussion would often branch off into topics related only in a general way to the main theme, “but which often threw a curious and striking light upon it, or upon human life in general”.

Though the essays were structured in the loose manner of conversations held at a table, this was a time when Hazlitt frequently secluded himself in isolation at Winterslow. His motivation is explained in one of the Table-Talk essays, “On Living to One's-Self” (January 1821), as not wanting to withdraw completely but rather to become an invisible observer of society. Also here and elsewhere in the series he weaves personal material into more general reflections on life, frequently bringing in long recollections of happy days of his years as an apprentice painter (as in “On the Pleasure of Painting”, written in December 1820) as well as other pleasurable recollections of earlier years, “hours ... sacred to silence and to musing, to be treasured up in the memory, and to feed the source of smiling thoughts thereafter” (“On Going a Journey”, written January 1822). Hazlitt also had to spend time in London in these years. In another violent contrast, a London lodging house was the stage on which the worst crisis of his life was to play itself out.

In August 1820, he rented a couple of rooms in 9 Southampton Buildings in London from a tailor named Micaiah Walker. Walker’s 19-year-old daughter Sarah, who helped with the housekeeping, would bring the new lodger his breakfast. Immediately, Hazlitt became infatuated with Miss Walker, more than 22 years his junior. His brief conversations with Walker cheered him and alleviated the loneliness that he felt from his failed marriage. He dreamed of marrying her, but that would require a divorce from Sarah Hazlitt—no easy matter. Finally, his wife agreed to grant him a Scottish divorce, which would allow him to remarry (as he could not had he been divorced in England).

Sarah Walker was, as some of Hazlitt’s friends could see, a fairly ordinary girl. She had aspirations to better herself, and a famous author seemed like a prize catch, but she never really understood Hazlitt. When another lodger named Tomkins came along, she entered into a romantic entanglement with him as well, leading each of her suitors to believe he was the sole object of her affection. With vague words, she evaded absolute commitment until she could decide which she liked better or was the more advantageous catch.

Hazlitt discovered the truth about Tomkins, and from then on his jealousy and suspicions of Sarah Walker’s real character afforded him little rest. For months, during the preparations for the divorce and as he tried to earn a living, he alternated between rage and despair, on the one hand, and the comforting if unrealistic thought that she was really “a good girl” and would accept him at last. The divorce was finalised on 17 July 1822, and Hazlitt returned to London to see his beloved—only to find her cold and resistant. They then become involved in angry altercations of jealousy and recrimination. And it was over, though Hazlitt could not for some time persuade himself to believe so. His mind nearly snapped. At his emotional nadir, he contemplated suicide.
It was with some difficulty that he eventually recovered his equilibrium. In order to ascertain Sarah’s true character, he persuaded an acquaintance to take lodgings in the Walkers’ building and attempt to seduce Sarah. Hazlitt’s friend reported that the attempt seemed to be about to succeed, but she prevented him from taking the ultimate liberty. Her behaviour was as it had been with several other male lodgers, not only Hazlitt, who now concluded that he had been dealing with, rather than an “angel”, an “impudent whore”, an ordinary “lodging house decoy”. Eventually, though Hazlitt could not know this, she had a child by Tomkins and moved in with him.

By pouring out his tale of woe to anyone he happened to meet (including his friends Peter George Patmore and James Sheridan Knowles), he was able to find a cathartic outlet for his misery. But catharsis was also provided by his recording the course of his love in a thinly disguised fictional account, published anonymously in May 1823 as Liber Amoris; or, The New Pygmalion. (Enough clues were present so that the identity of the writer did not remain hidden for long.) Critics have been divided as to the literary merits of Liber Amoris, which is quite unlike anything else Hazlitt ever wrote. Wardle suggests that it was compelling but marred by sickly sentimentality, and also proposes that Hazlitt might even have been anticipating some of the experiments in chronology made by later novelists.

One or two positive reviews appeared, such as the one in the Globe, 7 June 1823: “The Liber Amoris is unique in the English language: and as, possibly, the first book in its fervour, its vehemency, and its careless exposure of passion and weakness—of sentiments and sensations which the common race of mankind seek most studiously to mystify or conceal—that exhibits a portion of the most distinguishing characteristics of Rousseau, it ought to be generally praised”.

However, such complimentary assessments were the rare exception. Whatever its ultimate merits, Liber Amoris provided ample ammunition for Hazlitt’s detractors, and even some of his closest friends were scandalised. For months he did not even have contact with the Lambs. And the strait-laced Robinson found the book “disgusting”, “nauseous and revolting”, “low and gross and tedious and very offensive”, believing that “it ought to exclude the author from all decent society”. As ever, peace of mind proved elusive for William Hazlitt.

The philosopher, again

Unsurprisingly, there were times in this turbulent period when Hazlitt could not focus on his work. But often, as in his self-imposed seclusion at Winterslow, he was able to achieve a “philosophic detachment”, and he continued to turn out essays of remarkable variety and literary merit, most of them making up the two volumes of Table-Talk. (A number were saved for later publication in The Plain Speaker in 1826, while others remained uncollected.)

Some of these essays were in large part retrospectives on the author’s own life (“On Reading Old Books” [1821], for example, along with others mentioned above). In others, he invites his readers to join him in gazing at the spectacle of human folly and perversity (“On Will-making” [1821], or “On Great and Little Things” [1821], for example). At times he scrutinises the subtle workings of the individual mind (as in “On Dreams” [1823]); or he invites us to laugh at harmless eccentricities of human nature (“On People with One Idea” [1821]).

Other essays bring into perspective the scope and limitations of the mind, as measured against the vastness of the universe and the extent of human history (“Why Distant Objects Please” [1821/2] and “On Antiquity” [1821] are only two of many). Several others scrutinise the manners and morals of the age (such as “On Vulgarity and Affectation”, “On Patronage and Puffing”, and “On Corporate Bodies” [all 1821]).

Many of these “Table-Talk” essays display Hazlitt’s interest in genius and artistic creativity. There are specific instances of literary or art criticism (for example “On a Landscape of Nicholas Poussin” [1821] and “On Milton’s Sonnets” [1822]) but also numerous investigations of the psychology of creativity and genius (“On Genius and Common Sense” [1821], “Whether Genius Is Conscious of
Hazlitt's fascination with the extremes of human capability in any field led to his writing "The Fight" (published in the February 1822 New Monthly Magazine). This essay never appeared in the Table-Talk series or anywhere else in the author's lifetime. A direct, personal account of a prize fight, it was controversial in its time as depicting too "low" a subject. Written at a dismal time in his life—Hazlitt's divorce was pending, and he was far from sure of being able to marry Sarah Walker—the article shows scarcely a trace of his agony. Not quite like any other essay by Hazlitt, it proved to be one of his most popular and was frequently reprinted after his death.

Another article written in this period, "On the Pleasure of Hating" (1823; included in The Plain Speaker), is a pure outpouring of spleen, a distillation of all the bitterness of his life to that point. It concludes, "...have I not reason to hate and to despise myself? Indeed I do; and chiefly for not having hated and despised the world enough".

Not only do the "Table-Talk" essays frequently display "trenchant insights into human nature", they at times reflect on the vehicle of those insights and of the literary and art criticism that constitute some of the essays. "On Criticism" (1821) delves into the history and purposes of criticism itself; and "On Familiar Style" (1821 or 1822) reflexively explores at some length the principles behind its own composition, along with that of other essays of this kind by Hazlitt and some of his contemporaries, like Lamb and Cobbett.

In Table-Talk, Hazlitt had found the most congenial format for this thoughts and observations. A broad panorama of the triumphs and follies of humanity, an exploration of the quirks of the mind, of the nobility but more often the meanness and sheer malevolence of human nature, the collection was knit together by a web of self-consistent thinking, a skein of ideas woven from a lifetime of close reasoning on life, art, and literature. He illustrated his points with bright imagery and pointed analogies, among which were woven pithy quotations drawn from the history of English literature, primarily the poets, from Chaucer to his contemporaries Wordsworth, Byron, and Keats. Most often, he quoted his beloved Shakespeare and to a lesser extent Milton. As he explained in "On Familiar Style", he strove to fit the exact words to the things he wanted to express and often succeeded—in a way that would bring home his meaning to any literate person of some education and intelligence.

These essays were not quite like anything ever done before. They attracted some admiration during Hazlitt's lifetime, but it was only long after his death that their reputation achieved full stature, increasingly often considered among the best essays ever written in English. Nearly two centuries after they were written, for example, biographer Stanley Jones deemed Hazlitt's Table-Talk and The Plain Speaker together to constitute "the major work of his life", and critic David Bromwich called many of these essays "more observing, original, and keen-witted than any others in the language".

In 1823 Hazlitt also published anonymously Characteristics: In the Manner of Rochefoucauld's Maxims, a collection of aphorisms modelled explicitly, as Hazlitt noted in his preface, on the Maximes (1665–1693) of the Duc de La Rochefoucauld. Never quite as cynical as La Rochefoucauld's, many, however, reflect his attitude of disillusionment at this stage of his life. Primarily, these 434 maxims took to an extreme his method of arguing by paradoxes and acute contrasts.

There are some persons who never succeed, from being too indolent to undertake anything; and others who regularly fail, because the instant they find success in their power, they grow indifferent, and give over the attempt.
But they also lacked the benefit of Hazlitt’s extended reasoning and lucid imagery, and were never included among his greatest works. Recovery and second marriage

At the beginning of 1824, though worn out by thwarted passion and the venomous attacks on his character following Liber Amoris, Hazlitt was beginning to recover his equilibrium. Pressed for money as always, he continued to write for various periodicals, including The Edinburgh Review. To The New Monthly Magazine he supplied more essays in the “Table-Talk” manner, and he produced some art criticism, published in that year as Sketches of the Principal Picture Galleries of England. He also found relief, finally, from the Sarah Walker imbroglio. In 1823, Hazlitt had met Isabella Bridgwater (née Shaw), who married him in March or April 1824, of necessity in Scotland, as Hazlitt’s divorce was not recognised in England. Little is known about this Scottish-born widow of a planter in the West Indies, or about her interaction with Hazlitt. She may have been attracted to the idea of marrying a well-known author. For Hazlitt, she offered an escape from loneliness and to an extent from financial worries, as she possessed an independent income. The arrangement seems to have had a strong element of convenience for both of them. Certainly Hazlitt nowhere in his writings suggests that this marriage was the love match he had been seeking, nor does he mention his new wife at all.

In any case, the union afforded the two of them the opportunity to travel. First, they toured parts of Scotland, then, later in 1824, began a European tour lasting over a year.

14.4 The Spirit of the Age

Before Hazlitt and his new bride set off for the continent, he submitted, among the miscellany of essays that year, one to the New Monthly on “Jeremy Bentham”, the first in a series entitled “Spirits of the Age”. Several more of the kind followed over the next few months, at least one in the Examiner. Together with some newly written, and one brought in from the “Table-Talk” series, they were collected in book form in 1825 as The Spirit of the Age: Or, Contemporary Portraits.

These sketches of twenty-five men, prominent or otherwise notable as characteristic of the age, came easily to Hazlitt. In his days as a political reporter he had observed many of them at close range. Others he knew personally, and for years their philosophy or poetry had been the subject of his thoughts and lectures.

There were philosophers, social reformers, poets, politicians, and a few who did not fall neatly into any of these categories. Bentham, Godwin, and Malthus, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Byron were some of the most prominent writers; Wilberforce and Canning were prominent in the political arena; and a few who were hard to classify, such as The Rev. Edward Irving, the preacher, William Gifford, the satirist and critic, and the recently deceased Horne Tooke, a lawyer, politician, grammarian, and wit.

Many of the sketches presented their subjects as seen in daily life. We witness, for example, Bentham “tak[ing] a turn in his garden” with a guest, espousing his plans for “a code of laws ‘for some island in the watery waste’”, or playing the organ as a relief from incessant musings on vast schemes to improve the lot of mankind. As Bentham’s neighbour for some years, Hazlitt had had good opportunity to observe the reformer and philosopher at first hand.

He had already devoted years to pondering much of the thinking espoused by several of these figures. Thoroughly immersed in the Malthusian controversy, for example, Hazlitt had published A Reply to the Essay on Population as early as 1807, and the essay on Malthus is a distillation of Hazlitt’s earlier criticisms.

Where he finds it applicable, Hazlitt brings his subjects together in pairs, setting off one against the other. So here he points out that, for all the limitations of Godwin’s reasoning, as given in that essay, Malthus comes off worse: “Nothing...could be more illogical...than the whole of Mr. Malthus’s
reasoning applied as an answer...to Mr. Godwin’s book”. Most distasteful to Hazlitt was the application of “Mr. Malthus’s ‘gospel’”, greatly influential at the time. Many in positions of power had used Malthus’s theory to deny the poor relief in the name of the public good, to prevent their propagating the species beyond the means to support it; while on the rich no restraints whatsoever were imposed.

Yet, softening the asperities of his critique, Hazlitt rounds out his sketch by conceding that “Mr. Malthus’s style is correct and elegant; his tone of controversy mild and gentlemanly; and the care with which he has brought his facts and documents together, deserves the highest praise”.

His portraits of such Tory politicians as Lord Eldon are unrelenting, as might be expected. But elsewhere his characterisations are more balanced, more even-tempered, than similar accounts in past years. Notably, there are portraits of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey, which are, to an extent, essences of his former thoughts about these poets—and those thoughts had been profuse. He had earlier directed some of his most vitriolic attacks against them for having replaced the humanistic and revolutionary ideas of their earlier years with staunch support of the Establishment. Now he goes out of his way to qualify his earlier assessments.

In “Mr. Wordsworth”, for example, Hazlitt notes that “it has been said of Mr. Wordsworth, that ‘he hates conchology, that he hates the Venus of Medicis.’” (Hazlitt’s own words in an article some years back). Indirectly apologising for his earlier tirade, Hazlitt here brings in a list of writers and artists, like Milton and Poussin, for whom Wordsworth did show appreciation.

Coleridge, whom Hazlitt had once idolised, gets special attention, but, again, with an attempt to moderate earlier criticisms. At an earlier time Hazlitt had dismissed most of Coleridge’s prose as “dreary trash”. Much of The Friend was “sophistry”. The Statesman’s Manual was not to be read “with any patience”. A Lay Sermon was enough to “make a fool...of any man”. For betraying their earlier liberal principles, both Coleridge and Southey were “sworn brothers in the same cause of righteous apostacy”.

Now, again, the harshness is softened, and the focus shifts to Coleridge’s positive attributes. One of the most learned and brilliant men of the age, Coleridge may not be its greatest writer—but he is its “most impressive talker”. Even his “apostacy” is somewhat excused by noting that in recent times, when “Genius stopped the way of Legitimacy...it was to be...crushed”, regrettably but understandably leading many former liberals to protect themselves by siding with the powers that be.

Southey, whose political about-face was more blatant than that of the others, still comes in for a measure of biting criticism: “not truth, but self-opinion is the ruling principle of Mr. Southey’s mind”. Yet Hazlitt goes out of his way to admire where he can. For example, “Mr. Southey’s prose-style can scarcely be too much praised”, and “In all the relations and charities of private life, he is correct, exemplary, generous, just”.

Hazlitt contrasts Scott and Byron; he skewers his nemesis Gifford; he praises—not without his usual strictures—Jeffrey; and goes on to portray, in one way or another, such notables as Mackintosh, Brougham, Canning, and Wilberforce.

His praise of the poet Thomas Campbell has been cited as one major instance where Hazlitt’s critical judgement proved wrong. Hazlitt can scarcely conceal his enthusiasm for such poems as Gertrude of Wyoming, but neither the poems nor Hazlitt’s judgement of them have withstood the test of time. His friends Hunt and Lamb get briefer coverage, and—Hazlitt was never one to mince words—they come in for some relatively gentle chiding amid the praise. One American author makes an appearance, Washington Irving, under his pen name of Geoffrey Crayon.

In this manner twenty-five character sketches combine to “form a vivid panorama of the age”. Through it all, the author reflects on the Spirit of the Age as a whole, as, for example, “The present
is an age of talkers, and not of doers; and the reason is, that the world is growing old. We are so far advanced in the Arts and Sciences, that we live in retrospect, and doat on past achievements”.

Some critics have thought the essays in *The Spirit of the Age* highly uneven in quality and somewhat hastily thrown together, at best “a series of perceptive but disparate and impressionistic sketches of famous contemporaries”. It has also been noted, however, that the book is more than a mere portrait gallery. A pattern of ideas ties them together. No thesis is overtly stated, but some thoughts are developed consistently throughout.

Roy Park has noted in particular Hazlitt’s critique of excessive abstraction as a major flaw in the period’s dominant philosophy and poetry. (“Abstraction”, in this case, could be that of religion or mysticism as well as science.) This is the reason, according to Hazlitt, why neither Coleridge, nor Wordsworth, nor Byron could write effective drama. More representative of the finer spirit of the age was poetry that turned inward, focusing on individual perceptions, projections of the poets’ sensibilities. The greatest of this type of poetry was Wordsworth’s, and that succeeded as far as any contemporary writing could.

Even if it took a century and a half for many of the book’s virtues to be realised, enough was recognised at the time to make the book one of Hazlitt’s most successful. Unsurprisingly the Tory *Blackwood’s Magazine* lamented that the pillory had fallen into disuse and wondered what “adequate and appropriate punishment there is that we can inflict on this rabid caitiff”. But the majority of the reviewers were enthusiastic. For example, the *Eclectic Review* marvelled at his ability to “hit off a likeness with a few artist-like touches” and *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, with a few reservations, found his style “deeply impregnated with the spirit of the masters of our language, and strengthened by a rich infusion of golden ore…”

**European tour**

On 1 September 1824, Hazlitt and his wife began a tour of the European continent, crossing the English Channel by steamboat from Brighton to Dieppe and proceeding from there by coach and sometimes on foot to Paris and Lyon, crossing the Alps in Savoy, then continuing through Italy to Florence and Rome, the most southerly point on their route. Crossing the Apennines, they travelled to Venice, Verona, and Milan, then into Switzerland to Vevey and Geneva. Finally they returned via Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France again, arriving at Dover, England, on 16 October 1825.

There were two extended stops on this excursion: Paris, where the Hazlitts remained for three months; and Vevey, Switzerland, where they rented space in a farmhouse for three months. During those lengthy pauses, Hazlitt accomplished some writing tasks, primarily submitting an account of his trip in several instalments to *The Morning Chronicle*, which helped to pay for the trip. These articles were later collected and published in book form in 1826 as *Notes of a Journey through France and Italy* (despite the title, there is also much about the other countries he visited, particularly Switzerland).

This was an escape for a time from all the conflicts, the bitter reactions to his outspoken criticisms, and the attacks on his own publications back in England. And, despite interludes of illness, as well as the miseries of coach travel and the dishonesty of some hotel keepers and coach drivers, Hazlitt managed to enjoy himself. He reacted to his sight of Paris like a child entering a fairyland: “The approach to the capital on the side of St. Germain’s is one continued succession of imposing beauty and artificial splendour, of groves, of avenues, of bridges, of palaces, and of towns like palaces, all the way to Paris, where the sight of the Thuilleries completes the triumph of external magnificence....”

He remained with his wife in Paris for more than three months, eagerly exploring the museums, attending the theatres, wandering the streets, and mingling with the people. He was especially glad to be able to return to the Louvre and revisit the masterpieces he had adored twenty years
ago, recording for his readers all of his renewed impressions of canvases by Guido, Poussin, and Titian, among others.

He also was pleased to meet and befriend Henri Beyle, now better known by his *nom de plume* of Stendhal, who had discovered much to like in Hazlitt’s writings, as Hazlitt had in his. Finally he and his wife resumed the journey to Italy. As they advanced slowly in those days of pre-railway travel (at one stage taking nearly a week to cover less than two hundred miles), Hazlitt registered a running commentary on the scenic points of interest. On the road between Florence and Rome, for example,

Towards the close of the first day’s journey ... we had a splendid view of the country we were to travel, which lay stretched out beneath our feet to an immense distance, as we descended into the little town of Pozzo Borgo. Deep valleys sloped on each side of us, from which the smoke of cottages occasionally curled: the branches of an overhanging birch-tree or a neighbouring ruin gave relief to the grey, misty landscape, which was streaked by dark pine-forests, and speckled by the passing clouds; and in the extreme distance rose a range of hills glittering in the evening sun, and scarcely distinguishable from the ridge of clouds that hovered near them.

Hazlitt, in the words of Ralph Wardle, “never stopped observing and comparing. He was an unabashed sightseer who wanted to take in everything available, and he could recreate vividly all he saw”.

Yet frequently he showed himself to be more than a mere sightseer, with the painter, critic, and philosopher in him asserting their influence in turn or at once. A splendid scene on the shore of Lake Geneva, for example, viewed with the eye of both painter and art critic, inspired the following observation: “The lake shone like a broad golden mirror, reflecting the thousand dyes of the fleecy purple clouds, while Saint Gingolph, with its clustering habitations, shewed like a dark pitchy spot by its side; and beyond the glimmering verge of the Jura ... hovered gay wreaths of clouds, fair, lovely, visionary, that seemed not of this world....No person can describe the effect; but so in Claude’s landscapes the evening clouds drink up the rosy light, and sink into soft repose!”

Likewise, the philosopher in Hazlitt emerges in his account of the following morning: “We had a pleasant walk the next morning along the side of the lake under the grey cliffs, the green hills and azure sky....the snowy ridges that seemed close to us at Vevey receding farther into a kind of lofty background as we advanced.... The speculation of Bishop Berkeley, or some other philosopher, that distance is measured by motion and not by the sight, is verified here at every step”.

He was also constantly considering the manners of the people and the differences between the English and the French (and later, to a lesser extent, the Italians and Swiss). Did the French really have a “butterfly, airy, thoughtless, fluttering character”? He was forced to revise his opinions repeatedly. In some ways the French seemed superior to his countrymen. Unlike the English, he discovered, the French attended the theatre reverently, respectfully, “the attention ... like that of a learned society to a lecture on some scientific subject”.And he found culture more widespread among the working classes: “You see an apple-girl in Paris, sitting at a stall with her feet over a stove in the coldest weather, or defended from the sun by an umbrella, reading Racine and Voltaire”.

Trying to be honest with himself, and every day discovering something new about French manners that confounded his preconceptions, Hazlitt was soon compelled to retract some of his old prejudices. “In judging of nations, it will not do to deal in mere abstractions”, he concluded. “In countries, as well as individuals, there is a mixture of good and bad qualities; yet we attempt to strike a general balance, and compare the rules with the exceptions”.

As he had befriended Stendhal in Paris, so in Florence, besides visiting the picture galleries, he became friends with Walter Savage Landor. He also spent much time with his old friend Leigh Hunt, now in residence there.
Hazlitt was ambivalent about Rome, the farthest point of his journey. His first impression was one of disappointment. He had expected primarily the monuments of antiquity. But, he asked, “what has a green-grocer’s stall, a stupid English china warehouse, a putrid trattoria, a barber’s sign, an old clothes or old picture shop or a Gothic palace ... to do with ancient Rome?” Further, “the picture galleries at Rome disappointed me quite”. Eventually he found plenty to admire, but the accumulation of monuments of art in one place was almost too much for him, and there were also too many distractions. There were the “pride, pomp, and pageantry” of the Catholic religion, as well as having to cope with the “inconvenience of a stranger’s residence at Rome....You want some shelter from the insolence and indifference of the inhabitants....You have to squabble with every one about being cheated, to drive a hard bargain in order to live, to keep your hands and your tongue within strict bounds, for fear of being stilettoed, or thrown into the Tower of St. Angelo, or remanded home. You have much to do to avoid the contempt of the inhabitants....You must run the gauntlet of sarcastic words or looks for a whole street, of laughter or want of comprehension in reply to all the questions you ask....

Venice presented fewer difficulties, and was a scene of special fascination for him: “You see Venice rising from the sea”, he wrote, “its long line of spires, towers, churches, wharfs ... stretched along the water’s edge, and you view it with a mixture of awe and incredulity”. The palaces were incomparable: “I never saw palaces anywhere but at Venice”. Of equal or even greater importance to him were the paintings. Here there were numerous masterpieces by his favourite painter Titian, whose studio he visited, as well as others by Veronese, Giorgione, Tintoretto, and more.

On the way home, crossing the Swiss Alps, Hazlitt particularly desired to see the town of Vevey, the scene of Rousseau’s 1761 novel *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, a love story that he associated with his disappointed love for Sarah Walker. He was so enchanted with the region even apart from its personal and literary associations that he remained there with his wife for three months, renting a floor of a farmhouse named “Gelamont” outside of town, where “every thing was perfectly clean and commodious”. The place was for the most part an oasis of tranquility for Hazlitt. As he reported:

Days, weeks, months, and even years might have passed on much in the same manner.... We breakfasted at the same hour, and the tea-kettle was always boiling...; a lounge in the orchard for an hour or two, and twice a week we could see the steam-boat creeping like a spider over the surface of the lake; a volume of the Scotch novels..., or M. Galignani’s Paris and London Observer, amused us till dinner time; then tea and a walk till the moon unveiled itself, “apparent queen of the night,” or the brook, swoln with a transient shower, was heard more distinctly in the darkness, mingling with the soft, rustling breeze; and the next morning the song of peasants broke upon refreshing sleep, as the sun glanced among the clustering vine-leaves, or the shadowy hills, as the mists retired from their summits, looked in at our windows.

Hazlitt’s time at Vevey was not passed entirely in a waking dream. As at Paris, and sometimes other stopping points such as Florence, he continued to write, producing one or two essays later included in *The Plain Speaker*, as well as some miscellaneous pieces. A side trip to Geneva during this period led him to a review of his *Spirit of the Age*, by Francis Jeffrey, in which the latter takes him to task for striving too hard after originality. As much as Hazlitt respected Jeffrey, this hurt (perhaps the more because of his respect), and Hazlitt, to work off his angry feelings, dashed off the only verse from his pen that has ever come to light, “The Damned Author’s Address to His Reviewers”, published anonymously on 18 September 1825, in the London and Paris Observer, and ending with the bitterly sardonic lines, “And last, to make my measure full,/Teach me, great Jeffrey, to be dull!”

Much of his time, however, was spent in a mellow mood. At this time he wrote “Merry England” (which appeared in the December 1825 *New Monthly Magazine*). “As I write this”, he wrote, “I am sitting in the open air in a beautiful valley.... Intent upon the scene and upon the thoughts that stir
within me, I conjure up the cheerful passages of my life, and a crowd of happy images appear before me”.

The return to London in October was a letdown. The grey skies and bad food compared unfavorably with his recent retreat, and he was suffering from digestive problems (these recurred throughout much of his later life), though it was also good to be home. But he already had plans to return to Paris.

“The old age of artists”

As comfortable as Hazlitt was on settling in again to his home on Down Street in London in late 1825 (where he remained until about mid-1827), the reality of earning a living again stared him in the face. He continued to provide a stream of contributions to various periodicals, primarily The New Monthly Magazine. The topics continued to be his favourites, including critiques of the “new school of reformers”, drama criticism, and reflections on manners and the tendencies of the human mind. He gathered previously published essays for the collection The Plain Speaker, writing a few new ones in the process. He also oversaw the publication in book form of his account of his recent Continental tour.

But what he most wanted was to write a biography of Napoleon. Now Sir Walter Scott was writing his own life of Napoleon, from a strictly conservative point of view, and Hazlitt wanted to produce one from a countervailing, liberal perspective. Really, his stance on Napoleon was his own, as he had idolised Napoleon for decades, and he prepared to return to Paris to undertake the research. First, however, he brought to fruition another favourite idea.

Always fascinated by artists in their old age (see “On the Old Age of Artists”), Hazlitt was especially interested in the painter James Northcote, student and later biographer of Sir Joshua Reynolds, and a Royal Academician. Hazlitt would frequently visit him—by then about 80 years old—and they conversed endlessly on men and manners, the illustrious figures of Northcote’s younger days, particularly Reynolds, and the arts, particularly painting.

Northcote was at this time a crochety, slovenly old man who lived in wretched surroundings and was known for his misanthropic personality. Hazlitt was oblivious to the surroundings and tolerated the crotchettiness. Finding congeniality in Northcote’s company, and feeling many of their views to be in alignment, he transcribed their conversations from memory and published them in a series of articles entitled “Boswell Redivivus” in The New Monthly Magazine. (They were later collected under the title Conversations of James Northcote, Esq., R.A.) But there was little in common between these articles and Boswell’s life of Johnson. Hazlitt felt such a closeness to the old artist that in his conversations, Northcote was transformed into a kind of alter ego. Hazlitt made no secret of the fact that the words he ascribed to Northcote were not all Northcote’s own but sometimes expressed the views of Hazlitt as much as Hazlitt’s own words.

Some of the conversations were little more than gossip, and they spoke of their contemporaries without restraint. When the conversations were published, some of those contemporaries were outraged. Northcote denied the words were his; and Hazlitt was shielded from the consequences to a degree by his residing in Paris, where he was at work on what he thought would be his masterpiece.

The last conversation (originally published in The Atlas on 15 November 1829, when Hazlitt had less than a year to live) is especially telling. Whether it really occurred more or less as given, or was a construct of Hazlitt’s own imagination, it provides perspective on Hazlitt’s own position in life at that time.

In words attributed to Northcote: “You have two faults: one is a feud or quarrel with the world, which makes you despair, and prevents you taking all the pains you might; the other is a carelessness and mismanagement, which makes you throw away the little you actually do, and brings you into difficulties that way.”
Hazlitt justifies his own contrary attitude at length: “When one is found fault with for nothing, or for doing one’s best, one is apt to give the world their revenge. All the former part of my life I was treated as a cipher; and since I have got into notice, I have been set upon as a wild beast. When this is the case, and you can expect as little justice as candour, you naturally in self-defence take refuge in a sort of misanthropy and cynical contempt for mankind.” And yet on reflection, Hazlitt felt that his life was not so bad after all:

The man of business and fortune ... is up and in the city by eight, swallows his breakfast in haste, attends a meeting of creditors, must read Lloyd’s lists, consult the price of consols, study the markets, look into his accounts, pay his workmen, and superintend his clerks: he has hardly a minute in the day to himself, and perhaps in the four-and-twenty hours does not do a single thing that he would do if he could help it. Surely, this sacrifice of time and inclination requires some compensation, which it meets with. But how am I entitled to make my fortune (which cannot be done without all this anxiety and drudgery) who do hardly any thing at all, and never any thing but what I like to do? I rise when I please, breakfast at length, write what comes into my head, and after taking a mutton-chop and a dish of strong tea, go to the play, and thus my time passes.

He was perhaps overly self-disparaging in this self-portrait, but it opens a window on the kind of life Hazlitt was leading at this time, and how he evaluated it in contrast to the lives of his more overtly successful contemporaries.

**Hero worship**

In August 1826, Hazlitt and his wife set out for Paris again, so he could research what he hoped would be his masterpiece, a biography of Napoleon, seeking “to counteract the prejudiced interpretations of Scott’s biography”. Hazlitt “had long been convinced that Napoleon was the greatest man of his era, the apostle of freedom, a born leader of men in the old heroic mould: he had thrilled to his triumphs over ‘legitimacy’ and suffered real anguish at his downfall”.

This did not work out quite as planned. His wife’s independent income allowed them to take lodgings in a fashionable part of Paris; he was comfortable, but also distracted by visitors and far from the libraries he needed to visit. Nor did he have access to all the materials that Scott’s stature and connections provided him with for his own life of Napoleon. Hazlitt’s son also spent time with them, and there were conflicts between him and his father which also drove a wedge between Hazlitt and his second wife, and that marriage was now deteriorating rapidly.

None of his books were selling at all well, and thus time also had to be spent churning out more articles to pay expenses. Despite all the distractions, a few essays written at this time proved to be among his finest, such as “On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth”, published in *The Monthly Magazine* (not to be confused with the similarly named *New Monthly Magazine*) in March 1827. The essay “On a Sun-Dial”, which appeared late in 1827, may have been written on an interpolated second tour to Italy with his wife and son.

Finally, after Hazlitt returned to London with his son in August 1827, he was shocked to discover that his wife, still in Paris, was leaving him. He settled in modest lodgings on Half-Moon Street in London, and from then on fought a continual battle against poverty, regularly forced to grind out a stream of articles, mostly undistinguished, just to pay expenses. Relatively little is known of Hazlitt’s other activities in this period. He spent as much time, apparently, at Winterslow as he did in London. Some meditative essays emerged from this stay in his favourite country retreat, and he also made progress with his life of Napoleon. But he also found himself struggling against bouts of illness, nearly dying at Winterslow in December 1827. Two volumes — the first half — of the Napoleon biography appeared in 1828, only to have the publisher fail soon thereafter. This meant even more financial difficulties for the author, and what little evidence we have of his activities at the time, apart from a stream of hastily written articles turned out to pay the bills, consists in large part of begging letters to publishers for advances of money.
The easy life he had spoken of to Northcote had largely vanished by the time that conversation was published about a year before his death. By then he was overwhelmed by the degradation of poverty, frequent bouts of physical as well as mental illness—depression caused by his failure to find true love and by his inability to bring to fruition his defence of the man he worshipped as a hero of liberty and fighter of despotism.

Although Hazlitt retained a few devoted admirers, his reputation among the general public had been destroyed by the cadre of reviewers in Tory periodicals whose efforts Hazlitt had excoriated in “On the Jealousy and the Spleen of Party”. According to John Wilson of Blackwood’s Magazine, for example, Hazlitt had already “been excommunicated from all decent society, and nobody would touch a dead book of his, any more than they would the body of a man who had died of the plague”.

This dark period was marked by a stream of short articles for weekly magazines like The Atlas, written to generate desperately needed cash. Nor has time been kind to the life of Napoleon itself. However much Hazlitt hoped it would be his masterpiece, it was not merely a financial failure. Although its four volumes represent his longest work, that work, as was eventually demonstrated, is a hodge-podge of mostly borrowed materials, poorly integrated, only about a fifth consisting of Hazlitt’s own words. Here and there, a few inspired passages stand out, such as the following:

I have nowhere in any thing I may have written declared myself to be a Republican; nor should I think it worth while to be a martyr and a confessor to any form or mode of government. But what I have staked health and wealth, name and fame upon, and am ready to do so again and to the last gasp, is this, that there is a power in the people to change its government and its governors. Hazlitt managed to complete The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte shortly before his death, but did not live to see it published in its entirety.

Last years

Plaque in Bouverie Street, London, marking the site of William Hazlitt’s house. The site of Hazlitt’s grave in the churchyard of St Anne’s, Soho, with a new memorial commissioned following a campaign led by Tom Paulin.

Few details remain of Hazlitt’s daily life in his last years. Much of his time was spent by choice in the bucolic setting of Winterslow. But he needed to be in London for business reasons. There, he seems to have exchanged visits with some of his old friends, but few details of these occasions were recorded. Often he was seen in the company of his son and son’s fiancee. Otherwise, he continued to produce a stream of articles to make ends meet.

In 1828, Hazlitt found work reviewing for the theatre again (for The Examiner). In playgoing he found one of his greatest consolations. One of his most notable essays, “The Free Admission”, arose from this experience. As he explained there, attending the theatre was not merely a great solace in itself; the atmosphere was conducive to contemplating the past, not just memories of the plays themselves or his reviewing of past performances, but the course of his whole life. In words written within his last few months, the possessor of a free admission to the theatre, “ensconced in his favourite niche, looking from the ‘loop-holes of retreat’ in the second circle ... views the pageant of the world played before him; melts down years to moments; sees human life, like a gaudy shadow, glance across the stage; and here tastes of all earth’s bliss, the sweet without the bitter, the honey without the sting, and plucks ambrosial fruits and amaranthine flowers (placed by the enchantress Fancy within his reach,) without having to pay a tax for it at the time, or repenting of it afterwards.”

He found some time to return to his earlier philosophical pursuits, including popularised presentations of the thoughts expressed in earlier writings. Some of these, such as meditations on “Common Sense”, “Originality”, “The Ideal”, “Envy”, and “Prejudice”, appeared in The Atlas in early 1830. At some point in this period he summarised the spirit and method of his life’s work as...
a philosopher, which he had never ceased to consider himself to be; but “The Spirit of Philosophy” was not published in his lifetime. He also began contributing once again to The Edinburgh Review, paying better than the other journals, it helped stave off hunger.

After a brief stay on Bouvier Street in 1829, sharing lodgings with his son, Hazlitt moved into a small apartment at 6 Frith Street, Soho. He continued to turn out articles for The Atlas, The London Weekly Review, and now The Court Journal. Plagued more frequently by painful bouts of illness, he began to retreat within himself. Even at this time, however, he turned out a few notable essays, primarily for The New Monthly Magazine. Turning his suffering to advantage, he described the experience, with copious observations on the effects of illness and recovery on the mind, in “The Sick Chamber”. In one of his last respites from pain, reflecting on his personal history, he wrote, “This is the time for reading. ... A cricket chirps on the hearth, and we are reminded of Christmas gambols long ago. ... A rose smells doubly sweet ... and we enjoy the idea of a journey and an inn the more for having been bed-rid. But a book is the secret and sure charm to bring all these implied associations to a focus. ... If the stage [alluding to his remarks in “The Free-Admission”] shows us the masks of men and the pageant of the world, books let us into their souls and lay open to us the secrets of our own. They are the first and last, the most home-felt, the most heart-felt of our enjoyments”. At this time he was reading the novels of Edward Bulwer in hopes of reviewing them for The Edinburgh Review.

Such respites from pain did not last. Though a few visitors cheered these days, toward the end he was frequently too sick to see any of them. By September 1830, Hazlitt was confined to his bed, with his son in attendance, his pain so acute that his doctor kept him drugged on opium much of the time. His last few days were spent in delirium, obsessed with some woman, which in later years gave rise to speculation: was it Sarah Walker? Or was it, as biographer Stanley Jones believes, more likely to have been a woman he had met more recently at the theatre? Finally, with his son and a few others in attendance, he died on 18 September. His last words were reported to have been “Well, I’ve had a happy life”.

William Hazlitt was buried in the churchyard of St Anne’s Church, Soho in London on 23 September 1830, with only his son William, Charles Lamb, P.G. Patmore, and possibly a few other friends in attendance.

Self Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Hazlitt lost his desire to become a unitarian minister and left the college
      (a) 1797          (b) 1785          (c) 1795          (d) 1780
   (ii) Hazlitt’s first book, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action’ was published in
        (a) 1810          (b) 1800          (c) 1805          (d) 1815
   (iii) New and Improved Grammar of the English language was published in
        (a) 1810          (b) 1805          (c) 1815          (d) 1820
   (iv) In 1803, Hazlitt met .......
        (a) Bacon          (b) Addison
        (c) Charles Lamb   (d) None of these

14.5 Summary
France and its consequent heavy taxation. This was followed by a series of articles and pamphlets on political corruption and the need to reform the voting system.

• Hazlitt began writing for The Times and in 1808 married the editor's sister, Sarah Stoddart. His friend, Thomas Barnes, was the newspaper's parliamentary reporter. Later, Barnes was to become the editor of the newspaper. In 1810 he published the New and Improved Grammar of the English Language.

• In 1813 Hazlitt was employed as the parliamentary reporter for the Morning Chronicle.

• Hazlitt was educated at home and at a local school until 1793, when his father sent him to a Unitarian seminary on what was then the outskirts of London, the Unitarian New College at Hackney (commonly referred to as Hackney College). Although Hazlitt stayed there for only about two years, its impact was enormous.

• In April Hazlitt joined Coleridge at his residence in Nether Stowey, where they both spent time with the poet William Wordsworth. Again, Hazlitt was enraptured. While he was not immediately struck by Wordsworth's appearance, when he observed the look in Wordsworth's eye as he contemplated a sunset, he reflected, “With what eyes these poets see nature!” On that occasion given the opportunity to read the Lyrical Ballads in manuscript, Hazlitt saw that Wordsworth had the mind of a true poet, and he had created something entirely new.

• Hazlitt also visited various picture galleries, and he began to get work doing portraits, painting somewhat in the style of Rembrandt. And so he managed to make something of a living for a time, travelling back and forth between London and the country, wherever he could get work. By 1802, his work was considered good enough that a portrait he had recently painted of his father was accepted for exhibition by the Royal Academy.

• Hazlitt frequented the society of the Lambs for the next several years. He was not getting much work as a painter, but now he finally found the opportunity to complete his philosophical treatise, which was published in 1805 as An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind. This gained him little notice as an original thinker, and no money. Hazlitt's outrage at events then taking place in English politics in reaction to Napoleon's wars led to his writing and publishing, at his own expense (though he had almost no money), a political pamphlet, Free Thoughts on Public Affairs (1806). Finally, he began to find enough work to support himself, if just barely. Although the treatise he valued above anything else he wrote was never, at least in his own lifetime, recognised for what he believed was its true worth, it brought him attention as one who had a grasp of contemporary philosophy. He therefore was commissioned to abridge and write a preface to a now obscure work of mental philosophy, The Light of Nature Pursued by Abraham Tucker (originally published in seven volumes from 1765 to 1777), which appeared in 1807 and may have had some influence on his own later thinking.

• In 1808, Hazlitt married Sarah Stoddart, a friend of Mary Lamb and sister of John Stoddart, a journalist who became editor of The Times newspaper in 1814. Shortly before the wedding, John Stoddart established a trust into which he began paying £100 per year, for the benefit of Hazlitt and his wife—this was a very generous gesture, but Hazlitt detested being supported by his brother-in-law, whose political beliefs he despised.Although incompatibilities would later drive the couple apart, at first the union seemed to work well enough.

• In October 1812, Hazlitt was hired by The Morning Chronicle as a parliamentary reporter.

• Hazlitt continued to produce articles on miscellaneous topics for The Examiner and other periodicals, including political diatribes against any whom he felt ignored or minimised the needs and rights of the common man. Defection from the cause of liberty had become easier in light of the oppressive political atmosphere in England at that time, in reaction to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Opposing this tendency, the Hunts were his
primary allies. Lamb, who tried to remain uninvolved politically, tolerated his abrasiveness, and that friendship managed to survive, if only just barely in the face of Hazlitt’s growing bitterness, short temper, and propensity for hurling invective at friends and foes alike.

• Hazlitt discovered the truth about Tomkins, and from then on his jealousy and suspicions of Sarah Walker’s real character afforded him little rest. For months, during the preparations for the divorce and as he tried to earn a living, he alternated between rage and despair, on the one hand, and the comforting if unrealistic thought that she was really “a good girl” and would accept him at last. The divorce was finalised on 17 July 1822, and Hazlitt returned to London to see his beloved—only to find her cold and resistant. They then become involved in angry altercations of jealousy and recrimination. And it was over, though Hazlitt could not for some time persuade himself to believe so. His mind nearly snapped. At his emotional nadir, he contemplated suicide.

• Many of these “Table-Talk” essays display Hazlitt’s interest in genius and artistic creativity.

• In *Table-Talk*, Hazlitt had found the most congenial format for this thoughts and observations.

• Before Hazlitt and his new bride set off for the continent, he submitted, among the miscellany of essays that year, one to the *New Monthly* on “Jeremy Bentham”, the first in a series entitled “Spirits of the Age”. Several more of the kind followed over the next few months, at least one in the *Examiner*. Together with some newly written, and one brought in from the “Table-Talk” series, they were collected in book form in 1825 as *The Spirit of the Age: Or, Contemporary Portraits*.

• Hazlitt had published *A Reply to the Essay on Population* as early as 1807

• Hazlitt contrasts Scott and Byron; he skewers his nemesis Gifford; he praises—not without his usual strictures—Jeffrey; and goes on to portray, in one way or another, such notables as Mackintosh, Brougham, Canning, and Wilberforce.

• Hazlitt was ambivalent about Rome, the farthest point of his journey. His first impression was one of disappointment. He had expected primarily the monuments of antiquity. But, he asked, “what has a green-grocer’s stall, a stupid English china warehouse, a putrid trattoria, a barber’s sign, an old clothes or old picture shop or a Gothic palace ... to do with ancient Rome?” Further, “the picture galleries at Rome disappointed me quite”. Eventually he found plenty to admire, but the accumulation of monuments of art in one place was almost too much for him, and there were also too many distractions. There were the “pride, pomp, and pageantry” of the Catholic religion, as well as having to cope with the “inconvenience of a stranger’s residence at Rome....You want some shelter from the insolence and indifference of the inhabitants....You have much to do to avoid the contempt of the inhabitants....You must run the gauntlet of sarcastic words or looks for a whole street, of laughter.

• Hazlitt justifies his own contrary attitude at length: “When one is found fault with for nothing, or for doing one’s best, one is apt to give the world their revenge. All the former part of my life I was treated as a cipher; and since I have got into notice, I have been set upon as a wild beast. When this is the case, and you can expect as little justice as candour, you naturally in self-defence take refuge in a sort of misanthropy and cynical contempt for mankind.” And yet on reflection, Hazlitt felt that his life was not so bad after all.

### 14.6 Key-Words

1. Solitude : It is a state of seclusion or isolation, i.e., lack of contact with people.

2. Infatuation : It is a state of being completely carried away by unreasoned passion or love.
14.7 Review Questions

1. Introduce Hazlitt as an essayist.
2. Discuss life and works of Hazlitt.
3. Why Hazlitt is regarded as the young philosopher?
4. Explain solitude and infatuation presented in Hazlitt essays.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (c) (iii) (a) (iv) (c)

14.8 Further Readings

1. P.S. Sastri, Hazlitt selected essays, Doaba House, Delhi.
2. Geoffrey Keynes, selected essays of William Hazlitt 1778 to 1830.
Unit 15: Hazlitt—On Genius and Common Sense: Detailed Study

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Introduce Hazlitt and his writings
• Discuss on Genius and Common Sense

Introduction
Charles Lamb introduced Hazlitt to William Godwin and other important literary figures in London. In 1805 Joseph Johnson published Hazlitt’s first book, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action. The following year Hazlitt published Free Thoughts on Public Affairs, an attack on William Pitt and his government’s foreign policy. Hazlitt opposed England’s war with France and its consequent heavy taxation. This was followed by a series of articles and pamphlets on political corruption and the need to reform the voting system. Hazlitt began writing for The Times and in 1808 married the editor’s sister, Sarah Stoddart. His friend, Thomas Barnes, was the newspaper’s parliamentary reporter. Later, Barnes was to become the editor of the newspaper. In 1810 he published the New and Improved Grammar of the English Language. Hazlitt also contributed to The Examiner, a radical journal edited by Leigh Hunt. Later, Hazlitt wrote for the Edinburgh Review, the Yellow Dwarf and the London Magazine. In these journals Hazlitt produced a series of essays on art, drama, literature and politics. During this period he established himself as England’s leading expert on the writings of William Shakespeare.

Hazlitt wrote several books on literature including Characters of Shakespeare (1817), A View of the English Stage (1818), English Poets (1818) and English Comic Writers (1819). In these books he urged the artist to be aware of his social and political responsibilities. Hazlitt continued to write about politics and his most important books on this subject is Political Essays with Sketches of Public Characters (1819). In the book Hazlitt explains how the admiration of power turns many writers into “intellectual pimps and hirelings of the press.”

15.1 On Genius and Common Sense
We hear it maintained by people of more gravity than understanding, that genius and taste are strictly reducible to rules, and that there is a rule for everything. So far is it from being true that the finest breath of fancy is a definable thing, that the plainest common sense is only what Mr. Locke would have called a mixed mode, subject to a particular sort of acquired and undefinable tact. It is asked,
“If you do not know the rule by which a thing is done, how can you be sure of doing it a second time?” And the answer is, “If you do not know the muscles by the help of which you walk, how is it you do not fall down at every step you take?

In art, in taste, in life, in speech, you decide from feeling, and not from reason; that is, from the impression of a number of things on the mind, from which impression is true and well founded, though you may not be able to analyse or account for it in the several particulars. In a gesture you use, in a look you see, in a tone you hear, you judge of the expression, propriety, and meaning from habit, not from reason or rules; that is to say, from innumerable instances of like gestures, looks, and tones, in innumerable other circumstances, variously modified, which are too many and too refined to be all distinctly recollected, but which do not therefore operate the less powerfully upon the mind and eye of taste. Shall we say that these impressions (the immediate stamp of nature) do not operate in a given manner till they are classified and reduced to rules, or is not the rule itself grounded, upon the truth and certainty of that natural operation?

How then can the distinction of the understanding as to the manner in which they operate be necessary to their producing their due and uniform effect upon the mind? If certain effects did not regularly arise out of certain causes in mind as well as matter, there could be no rule given for them: nature does not follow the rule, but suggests it. Reason is the interpreter and critic of nature and genius, not their law-giver and judge. He must be a poor creature indeed whose practical convictions do not in almost all cases outrun his deliberate understanding, or who does not feel and know much more than he can give a reason for. Hence the distinction between eloquence and wisdom, between ingenuity and common sense. A man may be dexterous and able in explaining the grounds of his opinions, and yet may be a mere sophist, because he only sees one-half of a subject. Another may feel the whole weight of a question, nothing relating to it may be lost upon him, and yet he may be able to give no account of the manner in which it affects him, or to drag his reasons from their silent lurking-places. This last will be a wise man, though neither a logician nor rhetorician. Goldsmith was a fool to Dr. Johnson in argument; that is, in assigning the specific grounds of his opinions: Dr. Johnson was a fool to Goldsmith in the fine tact, the airy, intuitive faculty with which he skimmed the surfaces of things, and unconsciously formed his Opinions. Common sense is the just result of the sum total of such unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, and called out by the occasion. Genius and taste depend much upon the same principle exercised on loftier ground and in more unusual combinations.

I am glad to shelter myself from the charge of affectation or singularity in this view of an often debated but ill-understood point, by quoting a passage from Sir Joshua Reynolds’s Discourses, which is full, and, I think, conclusive to the purpose. He says:—

‘I observe, as a fundamental ground common to all the Arts with which we have any concern in this Discourse, that they address themselves only to two faculties of the mind, its imagination and its sensibility.

‘All theories which attempt to direct or to control the Art, upon any principles falsely called rational, which we form to ourselves upon a supposition of what ought in reason to be the end or means of Art, independent of the known first effect produced by objects on the imagination, must be false and delusive. For though it may appear bold to say it, the imagination is here the residence of truth. If the imagination be affected, the conclusion is fairly drawn; if it be not affected, the reasoning is erroneous, because the end is not obtained; the effect itself being the test, and the only test, of the truth and efficacy of the means.

‘There is in the commerce of life, as in Art, a sagacity which is far from being contradictory to right reason, and is superior to any occasional exercise of that faculty which supersedes it and does not wait for the slow progress of deduction, but goes at
once, by what appears a kind of intuition, to the conclusion. A man endowed with this faculty feels and acknowledges the truth, though it is not always in his power, perhaps, to give a reason for it; because he cannot recollect and bring before him all the materials that gave birth to his opinion; for very many and very intricate considerations may unite to form the principle, even of small and minute parts, involved in, or dependent on, a great many things:—though these in process of time are forgotten, the right impression still remains fixed in his mind.

‘This impression is the result of the accumulated experience of our whole life, and has been collected, we do not always know how or when. But this mass of collective observation, however acquired, ought to prevail over that reason, which, however powerfully exerted on any particular occasion, will probably comprehend but a partial view of the subject; and our conduct in life, as well as in the arts, is or ought to be generally governed by this habitual reason: it is our happiness that we are enabled to draw on such funds. If we were obliged to enter into a theoretical deliberation on every occasion before we act, life would be at a stand, and Art would be impracticable.

‘It appears to me therefore’ (continues Sir Joshua) ‘that our first thoughts, that is, the effect which any thing produces on our minds on its first appearance, is never to be forgotten; and it demands for that reason, because it is the first, to be laid up with care. If this be not done, the artist may happen to impose on himself by partial reasoning; by a cold consideration of those animated thoughts which proceed, not perhaps from caprice or rashness (as he may afterwards conceive), but from the fulness of his mind, enriched with the copious stores of all the various inventions which he had ever seen, or had ever passed in his mind. These ideas are infused into his design, without any conscious effort; but if he be not on his guard, he may reconsider and correct them, till the whole matter is reduced to a commonplace invention.

‘This is sometimes the effect of what I mean to caution you against; that is to say, an unfounded distrust of the imagination and feeling, in favour of narrow, partial, confined, argumentative theories, and of principles that seem to apply to the design in hand, without considering those general impressions on the fancy in which real principles of sound reason and of much more weight and importance, are involved, and, as it were, lie hid under the appearance of a sort of vulgar sentiment. Reason, without doubt, must ultimately determine everything; at this minute it is required to inform us when that very reason is to give way to feeling.’

Mr. Burke, by whom the foregoing train of thinking was probably suggested, has insisted on the same thing, and made rather a perverse use of it in several parts of his _Reflections on the French Revolution; and Windham in one of his Speeches has clenched it into an aphorism—‘There is nothing so true as habit.’ Once more I would say, common sense is tacit reason. Conscience is the same tacit sense of right and wrong, or the impression of our moral experience and moral apprehensions on the mind, which, because it works unseen, yet certainly, we suppose to be an instinct, implanted in the mind; as we sometimes attribute the violent operations of our passions, of which we can neither trace the source nor assign the reason, to the instigation of the Devil! I shall here try to go more at large into this subject, and to give such instances and illustrations of it as occur to me.

One of the persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to Government and been included in a charge for high treason in the year 1794, had retired soon after into Wales to write an epic poem and enjoy the luxuries of a rural life. In his peregrinations through that beautiful scenery, he had arrived one fine morning at the inn at Llangollen, in the romantic valley of that name. He had ordered his breakfast, and was sitting at the window in all the dalliance of expectation when a face
passed, of which he took no notice at the instant—but when his breakfast was brought in presently after, he found his appetite for it gone—the day had lost its freshness in his eye—he was uneasy and spiritless; and without any cause that he could discover, a total change had taken place in his feelings. While he was trying to account for this odd circumstance, the same face passed again—it was the face of Taylor the spy; and he was longer at a loss to explain the difficulty. He had before caught only a transient glimpse, a passing side-view of the face; but though this was not sufficient to awaken a distinct idea in his memory, his feelings, quicker and surer, had taken the alarm; a string had been touched that gave a jar to his whole frame, and would not let him rest, though he could not at all tell what was the matter with him. To the flitting, shadowy, half-distinguished profile that had glided by his window was linked unconsciously and mysteriously, but inseparably, the impression of the trains that had been laid for him by this person;—in this brief moment, in this dim, illegible short-hand of the mind he had just escaped the speeches of the Attorney and Solicitor-General over again; the gaunt figure of Mr. Pitt glared by him; the walls of a prison enclosed him; and he felt the hands of the executioner near him, without knowing it till the tremor and disorder of his nerves gave information to his reasoning faculties that all was not well within. That is, the same state of mind was recalled by one circumstance in the series of association that had been produced by the whole set of circumstances at the time, though the manner in which this was done was not immediately perceptible. In other words, the feeling of pleasure or pain, of good or evil, is revived, and acts instantaneously upon the mind, before we have time to recollect the precise objects which have originally given birth to it. The incident here mentioned was merely, then, one case of what the learned understand by the association of ideas: but all that is meant by feeling or common sense is nothing but the different cases of the association of ideas, more or less true to the impression of the original circumstances, as reason begins with the more formal development of those circumstances, or pretends to account for the different cases of the association of ideas. But it does not follow that the dumb and silent pleading of the former (though sometimes, nay often, mistaken) is less true than that of its babbling interpreter, or that we are never to trust its dictates without consulting the express authority of reason. Both are imperfect, both are useful in their way, and therefore both are best together, to correct or to confirm one another. It does not appear that in the singular instance above mentioned, the sudden impression on the mind was superstition or fancy, though it might have been thought so, had it not been proved by the event to have a real physical and moral cause. Had not the same face returned again, the doubt would never have been properly cleared up, but would have remained a puzzle ever after, or perhaps have been soon forgot.—By the law of association as laid down by physiologists, any impression in a series can recall any other impression in that series without going through the whole in order; so that the mind drops the intermediate links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more striking effects of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the strongest hold of it. By doing this habitually and skillfully with respect to the various impressions and circumstances with which our experience makes us acquainted, it forms a series of unpremeditated conclusions on almost all subjects that can be brought before it, as just as they are of ready application to human life; and common sense is the name of this body of unassuming but practical wisdom. Common sense, however, is an impartial, instinctive result of truth and nature, and will therefore bear the test and abide the scrutiny of the most severe and patient reasoning. It is indeed incomplete without it. By ingrafting reason on feeling, we ‘make assurance double sure.’

‘Tis the last key-stone that makes up the arch... Then stands it a triumphal mark! Then men Observe the strength, the height, the why and when It was erected; and still walking under,Meet some new matter to look up, and wonder.

But reason, not employed to interpret nature, and to improve and perfect common sense and experience, is, for the most part, a building without a foundation. The criticism exercised by reason, then, on common sense may be as severe as it pleases, but it must be as patient as it is severe. Hasty, dogmatical, self-satisfied reason is worse than idle fancy or bigoted prejudice. It is
systematic, ostentatious in error, closes up the avenues of knowledge, and ‘shuts the gates of wisdom on mankind.’ It is not enough to show that there is no reason for a thing that we do not see the reason of it: if the common feeling, if the involuntary prejudice sets in strong in favour of it, if, in spite of all we can do, there is a lurking suspicion on the side of our first impressions, we must try again, and believe that truth is mightier than we. So, in ordering a definition of any subject, if we feel a misgiving that there is any fact or circumstance omitted, but of which we have only a vague apprehension, like a name we cannot recollect, we must ask for more time, and not cut the matter short by an arrogant assumption of the point in dispute. Common sense thus acts as a check-weight on sophistry, and suspends our rash and superficial judgments. On the other hand, if not only no reason can be given for a thing, but every reason is clear against it, and we can account from ignorance, from authority, from interest, from different causes, for the prevalence of an opinion or sentiment, then we have a right to conclude that we have mistaken a prejudice for an instinct, or have confounded a false and partial impression with the fair and unavoidable inference from general observation. Mr. Burke said that we ought not to reject every prejudice, but should separate the husk of prejudice from the truth it encloses, and so try to get at the kernel within; and thus far he was right. But he was wrong in insisting that we are to cherish our prejudices ‘because they are prejudices’: for if all are well founded, there is no occasion to inquire into their origin or use; and he who sets out to philosophise upon them, or make the separation Mr. Burke talks of in this spirit and with this previous determination, will be very likely to mistake a maggot or a rotten canker for the precious kernel of truth, as was indeed the case with our Political sophist.

Did u know? Common sense is only a judge of things that fall under common observation, or immediately come home to the business and bosoms of men.

There is nothing more distinct than common sense and vulgar opinion. This is of the very essence of its principle, the basis of its pretensions. It rests upon the simple process of feeling, — it anchors in experience. It is not, nor it cannot be, the test of abstract, speculative opinions. But half the opinions and prejudices of mankind, those which they hold in the most unqualified approbation and which have been instilled into them under the strongest sanctions, are of this latter kind, that is, opinions not which they have ever thought, known, or felt one tittle about, but which they have taken up on trust from others, which have been palmed on their understandings by fraud or force, and which they continue to hold at the peril of life, limb, property, and character, with as little warrant from common sense in the first instance as appeal to reason in the last. The ultima ratio regum proceeds upon a very different plea. Common sense is neither priestcraft nor state-policy. Yet ‘there’s the rub that makes absurdity of so long life,’ and, at the same time, gives the sceptical philosophers the advantage over us. Till nature has fair play allowed it, and is not adulterated by political and polemical quacks (as it so often has been), it is impossible to appeal to it as a defence against the errors and extravagances of mere reason. If we talk of common sense, we are twitted with vulgar prejudice, and asked how we distinguish the one from the other; but common and received opinion is indeed ‘a compost heap’ of crude notions, got together by the pride and passions of individuals, and reason is itself the thrall or manumitted slave of the same lordly and besotted masters, dragging its servile chain, or committing all sorts of Saturnalian licenses, the moment it feels itself freed from it. — If ten millions of Englishmen are furious in thinking themselves right in making war upon thirty millions of Frenchmen, and if the last are equally bent upon thinking the others always in the wrong, though it is a common and national prejudice, both opinions cannot be the dictate of good sense; but it may be the infatuated policy of one or both
governments to keep their subjects always at variance. If a few centuries ago all Europe believed in the infallibility of the Pope, this was not an opinion derived from the proper exercise or erroneous direction of the common sense of the people; common sense had nothing to do with it—they believed whatever their priests told them. England at present is divided into Whigs and Tories, Churchmen and Dissenters; both parties have numbers on their side; but common sense and party spirit are two different things. Sects and heresies are upheld partly by sympathy, and partly by the love of contradiction; if there was nobody of a different way of thinking, they would fall to pieces of themselves. If a whole court say the same thing, this is no proof that they think it, but that the individual at the head of the court has said it; if a mob agree for a while in shouting the same watchword, this is not to me an example of the sensus communis, they only repeat what they have heard repeated by others. If indeed a large proportion of the people are in want of food, of clothing, of shelter—if they are sick, miserable, scorned, oppressed—an d if each feeling it in himself, they all say so with one voice and one heart, and lift up their hands to second their appeal, this I should say was but the dictate of common sense, the cry of nature. But to waive this part of the argument, which it is needless to push farther,—I believe that the best way to instruct mankind is not by pointing out to them their mutual errors, but by teaching them to think rightly on indifferent matters, where they will listen with patience in order to be amused, and where they do not consider a definition or a syllogism as the greatest injury you can offer them.

There is no rule for expression. It is got at solely by feeling, that is, on the principle of the association of ideas, and by transferring what has been found to hold good in one case (with the necessary modifications) to others. A certain look has been remarked strongly indicative of a certain passion or trait of character, and we attach the same meaning to it or are affected in the same pleasurable or painful manner by it, where it exists in a less degree, though we can define neither the look itself nor the modification of it. Having got the general clue, the exact result may be left to the imagination to vary, to extenuate or aggravate it according to circumstances. In the admirable profile of Oliver Cromwell after—, the drooping eyelids, as if drawing a veil over the fixed, penetrating glance, the nostrils somewhat distended, and lips compressed so as hardly to let the breath escape him, denote the character of the man for high-reaching policy and deep designs as plainly as they can be written. How is it that we decipher this expression in the face? First, by feeling it. And how is it that we feel it? Not by re-established rules, but by the instinct of analogy, by the principle of association, which is subtle and sure in proportion as it is variable and indefinite. A circumstance, apparently of no value, shall alter the whole interpretation to be put upon an expression or action and it shall alter it thus powerfully because in proportion to its very insignificance it shows a strong general principle at work that extends in its ramifications to the smallest things. This in fact will make all the difference between minuteness and subtlety or refinement; for a small or trivial effect may in given circumstances imply the operation of a great power. Stillness may be the result of a blow too powerful to be resisted; silence may be imposed by feelings too agonising for utterance. The minute, the trifling and insipid is that which is little in itself, in its causes and its consequences; the subtle and refined is that which is slight and evanescent at first sight, but which mounts up to a mighty sum in the end, which is an essential part of an important whole, which has consequences greater than itself, and where more is meant than meets the eye or ear. We complain sometimes of littleness in a Dutch picture, where there are a vast number of distinct parts and objects, each small in itself, and leading to nothing else. A sky of Claude’s cannot fall under this censure, where one imperceptible gradation is as it were the scale to another, where the broad arch of heaven is piled up of endlessly intermediate gold and azure tints, and where an infinite number of minute, scarce noticed particulars blend and melt into universal harmony. The subtlety in Shakespear, of which there is an immense deal scattered everywhere up and down, is always the instrument of passion, the vehicle of character. The action of a man pulling his hat over his forehead is indifferent enough in itself, and generally speaking,
may mean anything or nothing; but in the circumstances in which Macduff is placed, it is neither insignificant nor equivocal. What! man, ne’er pull your hat upon your brows, etc.

It admits but of one interpretation or inference, that which follows it:—

Give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak, Whispers the o’er-fraught heart, and
bids it break.

The passage in the same play, in which Duncan and his attendants are introduced, commenting on the beauty and situation of Macbeth’s castle, though familiar in itself, has been often praised for the striking contrast it presents to the scenes which follow.—The same look in different circumstances may convey a totally different expression. Thus the eye turned round to look at you without turning the head indicates generally slyness or suspicion; but if this is combined with large expanded eyelids or fixed eyebrows, as we see it in Titian’s pictures, it will denote calm contemplation or piercing sagacity, without anything of meanness or fear of being observed. In other cases it may imply merely indolent, enticing voluptuousness, as in Lely’s portraits of women. The languor and weakness of the eyelids give the amorous turn to the expression. How should there be a rule for all this beforehand, seeing it depends on circumstances ever varying, and scarce discernible but by their effect on the mind? Rules are applicable to abstractions, but expression is concrete and individual. We know the meaning of certain looks, and we feel how they modify one another in conjunction. But we cannot have a separate rule to judge of all their combinations in different degrees and circumstances, without foreseeing all those combinations, which is impossible; or if we did foresee them, we should only be where we are, that is, we could only make the rule as we now judge without it, from imagination and the feeling of the moment. The absurdity of reducing expression to a preconcerted system was perhaps never more evidently shown than in a picture of the Judgment of Solomon by so great a man as N. Poussin, which I once heard admired for the skill and discrimination of the artist in making all the women, who are ranged on one side, in the greatest alarm at the sentence of the judge, while all the men on the opposite side see through the design of it. Nature does not go to work or cast things in a regular mould in this sort of way. I once heard a person remark of another, ‘He has an eye like a vicious horse.’ This was a fair analogy. We all, I believe, have noticed the look of a horse’s eye just before he is going to bite or kick. But will any one, therefore, describe to me exactly what that look is? It was the same acute observer that said of a self-sufficient, prating music-master, ‘He talks on all subjects at sight’—which expressed the man at once by an allusion to his profession. the coincidence was indeed perfect. Nothing else could compare with the easy assurance with which this gentleman would volunteer an explanation of things of which he was most ignorant, but the nonchalance with which a musician sits down to a harpsichord to play a piece he has never seen before. My physiognomical friend would not have hit on this mode of illustration without knowing the profession of the subject of his criticism; but having this hint given him, it instantly suggested itself to his ‘sure trailing.’ The manner of the speaker was evident; and the association of the music-master sitting down to play at sight, lurking in his mind, was immediately called out by the strength of his impression of the character. The feeling of character and the felicity of invention in explaining it were nearly allied to each other. The first was so wrought up and running over that the transition to the last was very easy and unavoidable. When Mr. Kean was so much praised for the action of Richard in his last struggle with his triumphant antagonist, where he stands, after his sword is wrested from him, with his hands stretched out, ‘as if his will could not be disarmed, and the very phantoms of his despair had a withering power,’ he said that he borrowed it from seeing the last efforts of Painter in his fight with Oliver. This assuredly did not lessen the merit of it. Thus it ever is with the man of real genius. He has the feeling of truth already shrined in his own breast, and his eye is still bent on Nature to see how she expresses herself. When we thoroughly understand the subject it is easy to translate from one language into another. Raphael, in muffling up the figure of Elymas the Sorcerer in his garments, appears to have extended the idea of blindness even
Notes

to his clothes. Was this design? Probably not; but merely the feeling of analogy thoughtlessly suggesting this device, which being so suggested was retained and carried on, because it flattered or fell in with the original feeling. The tide of passion, when strong, overflows and gradually insinuates itself into all nooks and corners of the mind. Invention (of the best kind) I therefore do not think so distinct a thing from feeling as some are apt to imagine. The springs of pure feeling will rise and fill the moulds of fancy that are fit to receive it. There are some striking coincidences of colour in well-composed pictures, as in a straggling weed in the foreground streaked with blue or red to answer to a blue or red drapery, to the tone of the flesh or an opening in the sky:—not that this was intended, or done by the rule (for then it would presently become affected and ridiculous), but the eye, being imbued with a certain colour, repeats and varies it from a natural sense of harmony, a secret craving and appetite for beauty, which in the same manner soothes and gratifies the eye of taste, though the cause is not understood. Tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions, etc., and the being consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others. One of the most remarkable instances of this sort of faculty is the following story, told of Lord Shaftesbury, the grandfather of the author of the Characteristics. He had been to dine with Lady Clarendon and her daughter, who was at that time privately married to the Duke of York (afterwards James II.), and as he returned home with another nobleman who had accompanied him, he suddenly turned to him, and said, ‘Depend upon it, the Duke has married Hyde’s daughter.’ His companion could not comprehend what he meant; but on explaining himself, he said, ‘Her mother behaved to her with an attention and a marked respect that it is impossible to account for in any other way; and I am sure of it.’ His conjecture shortly afterwards proved to be the truth. This was carrying the prophetic spirit of common sense as far as it could go.

Sentiment has the same source as that here pointed out. Thus the Ranz des Vaches, which has such an effect on the minds of the Swiss peasantry, when its well-known sound is heard, does not merely recall to them the idea of their country, but has associated with it a thousand nameless ideas, numberless touches of private affection, of early hope, romantic adventure and national pride, all which rush in (with mingled currents) to swell the tide of fond remembrance, and make them languish or die for home. What a fine instrument the human heart is! Who shall touch it? Who shall fathom it? Who shall ‘sound it from Its lowest note to the top of its compass?’ Who shall put his hand among the strings, and explain their wayward music? The heart alone, when touched by sympathy, trembles and responds to their hidden meaning!

Genius or originality is, for the most part, some strong quality in the mind, answering to and bringing out some new and striking quality in nature.

Imagination is, more properly, the power of carrying on a given feeling into other situations, which must be done best according to the hold which the feeling itself has taken of the mind. In new and unknown combinations the impression must act by sympathy, and not by rule, but there can be no sympathy where there is no passion, no original interest. The personal interest may in some cases oppress and circumscribe the imaginative faculty, as in the instance of Rousseau: but in general the strength and consistency of the imagination will be in proportion to the strength and depth of feeling; and it is rarely that a man even of lofty genius will be able to do more than carry on his own feelings and character, or some prominent and ruling passion, into fictitious and uncommon situations. Milton has by allusion embodied a great part of his political and personal history in the chief characters and incidents of Paradise Lost. He has, no doubt, wonderfully...
adapted and heightened them, but the elements are the same; you trace the bias and opinions of
the man in the creations of the poet. Shakespear (almost alone) seems to have been a man of genius
raised above the definition of genius. ‘Born universal heir to all humanity,’ he was ‘as one, in
suffering all who suffered nothing;’ with a perfect sympathy with all things, yet alike indifferent
to all: who did not tamper with Nature or warp her to his own purposes; who ‘knew all qualities
with a learned spirit,’ instead of judging of them by his own predilections; and was rather ‘a pipe
for the Muse’s finger to play what stop she pleas’d,’ than anxious to set up any character or
pretensions of his own. His genius consisted in the faculty of transforming himself at will into
whatever he chose: his originality was the power of seeing every object from the exact point of
view in which others would see it. He was the Proteus of human intellect. Genius in ordinary is a
more obstinate and less versatile thing. It is sufficiently exclusive and self-willed, quaint and
peculiar. It does some one thing by virtue of doing nothing else: it excels in some one pursuit by
being blind to all excellence but its own. It is just the reverse of the cameleon; for it does not
borrow, but lends its colour to all about it; or like the glow-worm, discloses a little circle of
gorgeous light in the twilight of obscurity, in the night of intellect that surrounds it. So did
Rembrandt. If ever there was a man of genius, he was one, in the proper sense of the term. He
lived in and revealed to others a world of his own, and might be said to have invented a new view
of nature. He did not discover things out of nature, in fiction or fairy land, or make a voyage to the
moon ‘to descry new lands, rivers or mountains in her spotty globe,’ but saw things in nature that
every one had missed before him and gave others eyes to see them with. This is the test and
triumph of originality, not to show us what has never been, and what we may therefore very
easily never have dreamt of, but to point out to us what is before our eyes and under our feet,
though we have had no suspicion of its existence, for want of sufficient strength of intuition, of
determined grasp of mind, to seize and retain it. Rembrandt’s conquests were not over the ideal,
but the real. He did not contrive a new story or character, but we nearly owe to him a fifth part of
painting, the knowledge of chiaroscuro—a distinct power and element in art and nature. He had
a steadiness, a firm keeping of mind and eye, that first stood the shock of ‘fierce extremes’ in light
and shade, or reconciled the greatest obscurity and the greatest brilliancy into perfect harmony;
and he therefore was the first to hazard this appearance upon canvas, and give full effect to what
he saw and delighted in. He was led to adopt this style of broad and startling contrast from its
congeniality to his own feelings: his mind grappled with that which afforded the best exercise to
its master-powers: he was bold in act, because he was urged on by a strong native impulse.
Originality is then nothing but nature and feeling working in the mind. A man does not affect to
be original: he is so, because he cannot help it, and often without knowing it. This extraordinary
artist indeed might be said to have had a particular organ for colour. His eye seemed to come in
contact with it as a feeling, to lay hold of it as a substance, rather than to contemplate it as a visual
object. The texture of his landscapes is ‘of the earth, earthy’—his clouds are humid, heavy, slow;
his shadows are ‘darkness that may be felt,’ a ‘palpable obscure’; his lights are lumps of liquid
splendour! There is something more in this than can be accounted for from design or accident:
Rembrandt was not a man made up of two or three rules and directions for acquiring genius.
I am afraid I shall hardly write so satisfactory a character of Mr. Wordsworth, though he too, like
Rembrandt, has a faculty of making something out of nothing, that is, out of himself, by the
medium through which he sees and with which he clothes the barrenest subject. Mr. Wordsworth
is the last man to ‘look abroad into universality,’ if that alone constituted genius: he looks at home
into himself, and is ‘content with riches fineless.’ He would in the other case be ‘poor as winter,’
if he had nothing but general capacity to trust to. He is the greatest, that is, the most original poet
of the present day, only because he is the greatest egotist. He is ‘self-involved, not dark.’ He sits
in the centre of his own being, and there ‘enjoys bright day.’ He does not waste a thought on
others. Whatever does not relate exclusively and wholly to himself is foreign to his views. He
contemplates a whole-length figure of himself, he looks along the unbroken line of his personal identity. He thrusts aside all other objects, all other interests, with scorn and impatience, that he may repose on his own being, that he may dig out the treasures of thought contained in it, that he may unfold the precious stores of a mind for ever brooding over itself. His genius is the effect of his individual character. He stamps that character, that deep individual interest, on whatever he meets. The object is nothing but as it furnishes food for internal meditation, for old associations. If there had been no other being in the universe, Mr. Wordsworth’s poetry would have been just what it is. If there had been neither love nor friendship, neither ambition nor pleasure nor business in the World, the author of the Lyrical Ballads need not have been greatly changed from what he is—might still have ‘kept the noiseless tenour of his way,’ retired in the sanctuary of his own heart, hallowing the Sabbath of his own thoughts. With the passions, the pursuits, and imaginations of other men he does not profess to sympathise, but ‘finds tongues in the trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything.’ With a mind averse from outward objects, but ever intent upon its own workings, he hangs a weight of thought and feeling upon every trifling circumstance connected with his past history. The note of the cuckoo sounds in his ear like the voice of other years; the daisy spreads its leaves in the rays of boyish delight that stream from his thoughtful eyes; the rainbow lifts its proud arch in heaven but to mark his progress from infancy to manhood; an old thorn is buried, bowed down under the mass of associations he has wound about it; and to him, as he himself beautifully says.

The meanest flow’r that blows can give Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears. It is this power of habitual sentiment, or of transferring the interest of our conscious existence to whatever gently solicits attention, and is a link in the chain of association without rousing our passions or hurting our pride, that is the striking feature in Mr. Wordsworth’s mind and poetry. Others have left and shown this power before, as Wither, Burns, etc., but none have felt it so intensely and absolutely as to lend to it the voice of inspiration, as to make it the foundation of a new style and school in poetry. His strength, as it so often happens, arises from the excess of his weakness. But he has opened a new avenue to the human heart, has explored another secret haunt and nook of nature, ‘sacred to verse, and sure of everlasting fame.’ Compared with his lines, Lord Byron’s stanzas are but exaggerated common-place, and Walter Scott’s poetry (not his prose) old wives’ fables. There is no one in whom I have been more disappointed than in the writer here spoken of, nor with whom I am more disposed on certain points to quarrel; but the love of truth and justice which obliges me to do this, will not suffer me to blench his merits. Do what he can, he cannot help being an original-minded man. His poetry is not servile. While the cuckoo returns in the spring, while the daisy looks bright in the sun, while the rainbow lifts its head above the storm

Yet I’ll remember thee, Glencairn, And all that thou hast done for me!

Sir Joshua Reynolds, in endeavouring to show that there is no such thing as proper originality, a spirit emanating from the mind of the artist and shining through his works, has traced Raphael through a number of figures which he has borrowed from Masaccio and others. This is a bad calculation. If Raphael had only borrowed those figures from others, would he, even in Sir Joshua’s sense, have been entitled to the praise of originality? Plagiarism, in so far as it is plagiarism, is not originality. Salvator is considered by many as a great genius. He is what they call an irregular genius. My notion of genius is not exactly the same as theirs. It has also been made a question; whether there is not more genius in Rembrandt’s Three Trees than in all Claude Lorraine’s landscapes. I do not know how that may be; but it was enough for Claude to have been a perfect landscape-painter.

Capacity is not the same thing as genius. Capacity may be described to relate to the quantity of knowledge, however acquired; genius, to its quality and the mode of acquiring it. Capacity is power over given ideas combinations of ideas; genius is the power over those which are not given, and for which no obvious or precise rule can be laid down. Or capacity is power of any sort;
genius is power of a different sort from what has yet been shown. A retentive memory, a clear understanding, is capacity, but it is not genius. The admirable Crichton was a person of prodigious capacity; but there is no proof (that I know) that he had an atom of genius. His verses that remain are dull and sterile. He could learn all that was known of any subject; he could do anything if others could show him the way to do it. This was very wonderful; but that is all you can say of it. It requires a good capacity to play well at chess; but, after all, it is a game of skill, and not of genius. Know what you will of it, the understanding still moves in certain tracks in which others have trod it before, quicker or slower, with more or less comprehension and presence of mind. The greatest skill strikes out nothing for itself, from its own peculiar resources; the nature of the game is a thing determinate and fixed: there is no royal or poetical road to checkmate your adversary. There is no place for genius but in the indefinite and unknown. The discovery of the binomial theorem was an effort of genius; but there was none shown in Jedediah Buxton’s being able to multiply 9 figures by 9 in his head. If he could have multiplied 90 figures by 90 instead of 9, it would have been equally useless toil and trouble. He is a man of capacity who possesses considerable intellectual riches: he is a man of genius who finds out a vein of new ore. Originality is the seeing nature differently from others, and yet as it is in itself. It is not singularity or affectation, but the discovery of new and valuable truth. All the world do not see the whole meaning of any object they have been looking at. Habit blinds them to some things; shortsightedness to others. Every mind is not a gauge and measure of truth. Nature has her surface and her dark recesses. She is deep, obscure, and infinite. It is only minds on whom she makes her fullest impressions that can penetrate her shrine or unveil her Holy of Holies. It is only those whom she has filled with her spirit that have the boldness or the power to reveal her mysteries to others. But Nature has a thousand aspects, and one man can only draw out one of them. Whoever does this is a man of genius. One displays her force, another her refinement; one her power of harmony, another her suddenness of contrast; one her beauty of form, another her splendour of colour. Each does that for which he is best fitted by his particular genius, that is to say, by some quality of mind into which the quality of the object sinks deepest, where it finds the most cordial welcome, is perceived to its utmost extent, and where again it forces its way out from the fulness with which it has taken possession of the mind of the student. The imagination gives out what it has first absorbed by congeniality of temperament, what it has attracted and moulded into itself by elective affinity, as the lodestone draws and impregnates iron. A little originality is more esteemed and sought for than the greatest acquired talent, because it throws a new light upon things, and is peculiar to the individual. The other is common; and may be had for the asking, to any amount.

The value of any work is to be judged of by the quantity of originality contained in it. A very little of this will go a great way. If Goldsmith had never written anything but the two or three first chapters of the Vicar of Wakefield or the character of a Village Schoolmaster, they would have stamped him a man of genius. The editors of Encyclopedias are not usually reckoned the first literary characters of the age. The works of which they have the management contain a great deal of knowledge, like chests or warehouses, but the goods are not their own. We should as soon think of admiring the shelves of a library; but the shelves of a library are useful and respectable. I was once applied to, in a delicate emergency, to write an article on a difficult subject for an Encyclopedia, and was advised to take time and give it a systematic and scientific form, to avail myself of all the knowledge that was to be obtained on the subject, and arrange it with clearness and method. I made answer that as to the first, I had taken time to do all that I ever pretended to do, as I had thought incessantly on different matters for twenty years of my life; that I had no particular knowledge of the subject in question, and no head for arrangement; and that the utmost I could do in such a case would be, when a systematic and scientific article was prepared, to write marginal notes upon it, to insert a remark or illustration of my own (not to be found in former Encyclopedias), or to suggest a better definition than had been offered in the text. There are two sorts of writing.
The first is compilation; and consists in collecting and stating all that is already known of any question in the best possible manner, for the benefit of the uninformed reader. An author of this class is a very learned amanuensis of other people's thoughts. The second sort proceeds on an entirely different principle: instead of bringing down the account of knowledge to the point at which it has already arrived, it professes to start from that point on the strength of the writer's individual reflections; and supposing the reader in possession of what is already known, supplies deficiencies, fills up certain blanks, and quits the beaten road in search of new tracts of observation or sources of feeling. It is in vain to object to this last style that it is disjointed, disproportioned, and irregular. It is merely a set of additions and corrections to other men's works, or to the common stock of human knowledge, printed separately. You might as well expect a continued chain of reasoning in the notes to a book. It skips all the trite, intermediate, level common-places of the subject, and only stops at the difficult passages of the human mind, or touches on some striking point that has been overlooked in previous editions. A view of a subject, to be connected and regular, cannot be all new. A writer will always be liable to be charged either with paradox or common-place, either with dulness or affectation. But we have no right to demand from any one more than he pretends to. There is indeed a medium in all things, but to unite opposite excellencies is a task ordinarily too hard for mortality. He who succeeds in what he aims at, or who takes the lead in any one mode or path of excellence, may think himself very well off. It would not be fair to complain of the style of an Encyclopedia as dull, as wanting volatile salt; nor of the style of an Essay because it is too light and sparkling, because it is not a caput mortuum. So it is rather an odd objection to a work that it is made up entirely of 'brilliant passages'—at least it is a fault that can be found with few works, and the book might be pardoned for its singularity. The censure might indeed seem like adroit flattery, if it were not passed on an author whom any objection is sufficient to render unpopular and ridiculous. I grant it is best to unite solidity with show, general information with particular ingenuity. This is the pattern of a perfect style; but I myself do not pretend to be a perfect writer. In fine, we do not banish light French wines from our tables, or refuse to taste sparkling Champagne when we can get it because it has not the body of Old Port. Besides, I do not know that dulness is strength, or that an observation is slight because it is striking. Mediocrity, insipidity, want of character is the great fault.

Mediocribus esse poetis Non Dii, non homines, non concessere columnae. Neither is this privilege allowed to prose-writers in our time any more than to poets formerly. It is not then acuteness of organs or extent of capacity that constitutes rare genius or produces the most exquisite models of art, but an intense sympathy with some one beauty or distinguishing characteristic in nature. Irritability alone, or the interest taken in certain things, may supply the place of genius in weak and otherwise ordinary minds. As there are certain instruments fitted to perform certain kinds of labour, there are certain minds so framed as to produce certain chef-d’œuvres in art and literature, which is surely the best use they can be put to. If a man had all sorts of instruments in his shop and wanted one, he would rather have that one than be supplied with a double set of all the others. If he had them twice over, he could only do what he can do as it is, whereas without that one he perhaps cannot finish any one work he has in hand. So if a man can do one thing better than anybody else, the value of this one thing is what he must stand or fall by, and his being able to do a hundred other things merely as well as anybody else would not alter the sentence or add to his respectability; on the contrary, his being able to do so many other things well would probably interfere with and encumber him in the execution of the only thing that others cannot do as well as he, and so far be a drawback and a disadvantage. More people, in fact, fail from a multiplicity of talents and pretensions than from an absolute poverty of resources. I have given instances of this elsewhere. Perhaps Shakespear's tragedies would in some respects have been better if he had never written comedies at all; and in that case his comedies might well have been spared, though they must have cost us some regret. Racine, it is said, might have rivalled Moliere in comedy; but he gave up the cultivation of his comic talents to devote himself wholly to the tragic Muse. If, as
the French tell us, he in consequence attained to the perfection of tragic composition, this was better than writing comedies as well as Molière and tragedies as well as Crebillon. Yet I count those persons fools who think it a pity Hogarth did not succeed better in serious subjects. The division of labour is an excellent principle in taste as well as in mechanics. Without this, I find from Adam Smith, we could not have a pin made to the degree of perfection it is. We do not, on any rational scheme of criticism, inquire into the variety of a man’s excellences, or the number of his works, or his facility of production. Venice Preserved is sufficient for Otway’s fame. I hate all those nonsensical stories about Lope de Vega and his writing a play in a morning before breakfast. He had time enough to do it after. If a man leaves behind him any work which is a model in its kind, we have no right to ask whether he could do anything else, or how he did it, or how long he was about it. All that talent which is not necessary to the actual quantity of excellence existing in the world, loses its object, is so much waste talent or talent to let. I heard a sensible man say he should like to do some one thing better than all the rest of the world, and in everything else to be like all the rest of the world. Why should a man do more than his part? The rest is vanity and vexation of spirit. We look with jealous and grudging eyes at all those qualifications which are not essential; first, because they are superfluous, and next, because we suspect they will be prejudicial. Why does Mr. Kean play all those harlequin tricks of singing, dancing, fencing, etc.? They say, ‘It is for his benefit.’ It is not for his reputation. Garrick indeed shone equally in comedy and tragedy. But he was first, not second-rate in both. There is not a greater impertinence than to ask, if a man is clever out of his profession. I have heard of people trying to cross-examine Mrs. Siddons. I would as soon try to entrap one of the Elgin Marbles into an argument. Good nature and common sense are required from all people; but one proud distinction is enough for any one individual to possess or to aspire to.

Self-Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Gold Smith was a fool to
   (a) Dr. Johnson    (b) Hazlitt    (c) Goldsmith    (d) None of these
   (ii) Dr. Johnson was fool to
        (a) Hazlitt    (b) Goldsmith    (c) Joshua Renolds    (d) None of these
   (iii) Genius and ........ depend much upon the same principle
         (a) Stupidity    (b) Intelligence    (c) Taste    (d) Panchent
   (iv) Common sense is neither .......... craft nor state policy
        (a) Genius    (b) Wise    (c) Learned    (d) Priest

15.2 Summary

- This essay is a remarkable enunciation of theme that common sense is rarely found. The so-called common sense is truly uncommon. It is a rare quality and one who possesses it is really enviable. Many so-called wise men in different branches of life do not possess it. Very few have it without knowing that they have it. It is known only from its results. It reveals as a necessary condition that the owner is free from all pretension.
- The common man laughs at the scholar for not having common sense. But the former mistakes bigotry to be the same as common sense. It is a kind of mental instinct and it feels the air of
truth and propriety. The piling up of knowledge destroys natural simplicity and restricts the unbiased freedom of mind.

- Common sense is characterised by a sound and impartial judgement on everything concerning the activities of man. It is treated as wisdom when it is combined with great attainments and with a capacity to think. We do not have an instance of one person combining in himself the practical and theoretical kinds of wisdom. There are many who are wise in the affairs of the world and in the activities involving their own interests. But in judging general questions people fall victims of their own weakness or vanity.

- For instance, a person may be an excellent scholar combing in himself varied talents. He would show his want of common sense in a trivial thing like giving a tip. He may be well versed in law and have all the arguments ready. But he forgets that in given situation he has to deal with the impalpable essences like interest and custom. He fails to checkmate a police officer or a customs official with the help of his syllogisms and authorities.

- One acquires wisdom as he realises that he must strike a compromise with existing circumstances. Life demands a modification of our convictions. We have proofs of this throughout our lives. Here common sense effectively function. A few like Hampden may agree to go to the jail instead of paying ‘ship-money’. Such instances are exceptions. Normally, our lives are governed more by our feelings, not by our logical arguments. We cannot afford to ignore the importance of feeling. But there are some who are victims of argument, just as some are extremely particular about minute details. The former seeks an argument for everything, while the other needs facts to support a conclusion. The latter are deficient in common sense. Their ideas are local and literal. They fail to grasp the whole problem. They forget their principles in their quest for proofs.

- The Scotch have this matter-of-fact understanding. They believe that their land has no equal. Everything Scotch is considered to be great, including the beggars of Scotland. But women are best fitted to set right such fantastic attitudes. They lose common sense only when they go beyond this sphere of feeling and observation and when they accept the opinions of their learned husbands.

- A country-shoemaker understands shoe-making, though he knows nothing about the problem of Catholics in England. The old woman in the village believes that she will be burnt at the stake because she was told so by those who, according to her, are supposed to know better. Such vulgar errors have nothing to do with common sense. Common sense is a collection of true experiences, while common place is made of cant phrases. A common place book is filled with trite and affected platitudes.

- Affectation put an end to common sense, for the latter requires utmost simplicity and sincerity. A liar has not common sense because he is always busy putting on false appearances. The conceited person does not have common sense because he colours everything with the hues of his own personality. Great talkers sacrifice truth in trying to make a fine speech or to express a fine sentiment. They look at nature only to find out what they can say about it. Passionate people do not show common sense. Coleridge acquired knowledge by painful methodical labour. But being phlegmatic he is half a philosopher and half a clown. Since poets seek to create a world according to their own imagination they can do very well without common sense.

- There is no remedy for want of tact and insight into human affairs. The only remedy that can be suggested is a study of Fielding’s great novel Tom Jones. The most absurd characters are those who act in opposition to their better knowledge. The capricious and the fickle, the perverse and the obstinate, the idle and the vicious have only biased wills, not deficient understandings. The greatest fools in practice are some times the wisest men in theory. They
can give the best advice to others, though they do not follow it in their own lives. They see and approve the better course, and follow the worse. Their judgements are clear and just, though their habits and affections follow the wrong way. They escape from reason and common sense.

- This is a remarkable essay. By common sense Hazlitt only means natural good sense of a practical kind in every day affairs. It is tact or social good sense. It involves sincerity and it is based on a valid insight into human affairs.

15.3 Key-Words

1. Rare : not common
2. Its price : Originally this was said of wisdom. See Job, 28.18 'the price of wisdom is above rubies’ and Proverbs, 8.11 'wisdom is better than rubies’
3. Pedant : one who prides in his scholarship.
4. Fairly worth the seven : from Pope’s Moral Essays, Epistle 4.43. The medieval schools had seven sciences. These are grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy.
5. Does not consist with : is not compatible with
6. Warn and trammel : give a bias to, hamper.
7. Common sense : natural good sense of a practical kind in every day affairs. It is social good sense, tact.
8. 'Comes home to ... men' : from the Dedication of Bacon’s Essays.
9. Of the later ... instance : one and the same person having both kinds of wisdom, namely, practical and theoretical kinds.

15.4 Review Questions

1. Briefly discuss Hazlitt’s essay On Genius and Common Sense.
2. What does Hazlitt want to indicate by Common Sense? Explain

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a)  (ii) (b)  (iii) (c)  (iv) (d)

15.5 Further Readings

1. P.S. Sastri, Hazlitt selected essays, Doaba House, Delhi.
2. Geoffrey Keynes, selected essays of William Hazlitt 1778 to 1830.
Unit 16: Hazlitt--On Genius and Common Sense: Critical Appreciation

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Understand Hazlitt literary style and taste
• Examine critically Hazlitt’s essay On Genius and Common Sense

Introduction
Hazlitt’s literary tastes are catholic. He read widely and wisely. He knew intimately the literature of the Elizabethan age. He brought his sympathetic insight into an understanding of the Restoration drama, admired Pope for his technical virtuosity, and joined no group to condemn or praise any period in its entirety. Cazamian observed: “he it was who traced the first roads, marked out the vantage points and gauged the heights on the virgin soil of Romanticism, and almost in every case his literary judgment remains that of today; he anticipates the future, and sees with the eyes of posterity”. His remarks on Shakespeare, Pope, Burns, and Coleridge show his understanding and estimate of the nature of genius. Though he looks like Sainte-Beuve, “he is”, says Hugh Walker, “not so safe as the French critic; he is not so careful; he lacks the lucidity of style which apparently is the inalienable birthright of all French critics; but there is more vigour in him than there is in the southern writer, less of that cool detachment which may chill the enthusiastic but which is a healthy corrective against prejudice”. But is should be noted that his study of literature was imperfect, and that there were large gaps which he never cared to fill. Thus forgetting his own incomplete knowledge, he spoke of the rugged metre of Chaucer, and admired the Greek spirit in Pope’s translation of Homer. Evidently he did not grasp the Greek spirit of Homer. Though he did not read well, he could write about the authors in a nonchalant way. It is a casual approach based on a defective knowledge that appears at times in the Lectures on English Poets. Yet he is never without his characteristic gusto which makes the literary text he examines breathe vitality. He presents his grasp of the text with a personal love. As Saintsbury remarked: ‘where Hazlitt is inadequate, he more instructive than many men’s adequacy could be, and where he is not, he
prepares us for that ineffable and half-reluctant outburst on Coleridge”. Speaking of his now attitude towards his contemporaries, Hazlitt remarked: “I would speak of the living poets as I have spoken of the dead; but I cannot speak of them with the same reverence because I do not feel it”. His comments are frank and blunt, and they emerge from his honesty and sincerity.

Hazlitt’s literary criticism is at times a “prodigious variation” on the subject. He continues to say, without being tired, what poetry is and what it is not in his Lectures on English Poets. At other times he reveals a peculiar attitude exemplified in his treatment of specific texts and authors. This attitude is best expressed in the words: “I somehow felt it as a point of honour not to make my hearers think less highly of some of these old writers that I myself did of them. If I have praised an author, it was because I liked him; if I have quoted a passage if was because it pleased me in the reading; if I have spoken contemptuously of any one, it has been reluctantly”. At still other times he was led by his prejudices and pre-conceived ideas, or by his own incompatible mental traits. He was “often a creature of prejudice, of prejudice so irrational as to make him uncritical. His very individuality, his originality, is sometimes a snare; he never enjoyed running in double harness, and he sometimes kicks over the traces from sheet wilfulness.

Hazlitt’s literary theory is clearly expressed in three essays. These are “On Poetry in General”, “On Gusto”, and “Why the Arts are not Progressive”.

In these essays we find that poetry is “the language of the imagination and the passions”. In his approach to poetry he sought to understand “the internal character, the living principle” and to arrive at an acceptable standard for the “improvement of taste”. The ideas expressed in these essays are not vague, in spite of Mr. Watson’s Cavalier attitude of Hazlitt; for Mr. Watson fails to see Hazlitt’s theory in the context of the Romantic theory of poetry. Since Mr. Watson bandies about vague terms like “analysis” and “descriptions”, he finds vagueness wherever the critic avoided it. Hazlitt was a highly sensitive student of literature, and therefore succeeds in articulating what we feel in the presence of great literature. Accordingly he observers that “poetry is literature and with a rare common sense which always attended his ecstasies, he read and wrote with a gusto. There is always a “continuity of impression” in all that he wrote. This is a criticism which is always fresh and original. It is not therefore surprising to find that he was the first to discover many important authors. Even when Johnson was half-hearted in his attitude to the novelists, Hazlitt wrote on them with admirable tact and taste. Candidly does he express even here his like and dislikes. This is an intimately personal kind of criticism which is not burdened by an abstract literary theory. He was eager to recreate for himself and for his readers the experience out of which a given work of art may have sprung. He did to take kindly to the oblique poetry of Danne; but he was sympathetic to the metaphysical poets. In emphasizing Milton’s “Force of Imagination”, he drew attention to the nature and value of the epic as a literary genre. He refers to those “superior, happy spirits who slid through life on the rollers of learning”. He presented Dryden and People, who were disliked by many Romantic poets and critics, as poets who should be popular because they are poet of art who “polished life”. In such critical appraisals we notice his “extraordinary fertility and felicity in judgement, of individual authors, books, or pieces”

16.1 Basic Principle of Hazlitt Essays

The basic principle he followed as a literary critic was expressed by him thus: “I have undertaken merely to read over a set of authors with the audience, as I would do with a friend, to point out a favourite passage, to explain an objection; or of a remark or a theory as it occurs to state it in illustration of the subject: but neither tire him nor puzzle myself with pedantic rules and pragmatical
formulas of criticism that can do no good to any body. I do not come to the task with a pair of compasses or a ruler in my pocket to see whether a poem is round or square, or to measure its mechanical dimensions, like a metre. In a word, I have endeavoured to feel what is good and to give a reason for the faith that was in me, when necessary and when in my power. This is what I have done and what I must continue to do”. He attempted to see how far ad in what way he could justify the impressions he received from the literary texts. Always alive to the significance of situation, character, phrase or word, he tried to rationalise his judgements. Starting with an assumption that life and literature form an organic whole, he gave an account of the critical intelligence in the essays “On the Conversation of Authors” and “On the Ignorance of the Learned”. This account is ably illustrated by appropriate texts. Thus we have an individualistic criticism which breathes his feelings, intuitions, and imagination.

Yet Hazlitt’s conclusions are not sporadic utterances of a lay mind. They were based on long and repeated encounters with the great work of literature; and they were ably reasoned out. Even if he condemns Sidney’s Arcadia as being perverse, he gives his reasons.

His central theory appears in the essay “Thoughts on Taste” There we read: “Genius is the power of producing excellence; taste is the power of perceiving the excellence thus produced in its several sorts and degrees, with all their force of refinement, distinctions and connections. In other words, taste is strictly the power of being properly affected by works of genius. It is the proportioning admiration to power, pleasure to beauty; it is entire sympathy with the finest impulses of imagination, not antipathy, not indifference to them”. The critic must have taste which is a form empathy. The artist reads human interest, Values, and feelings into his objects; and the critic reads or finds his values, feelings and interests in the work of art. This explains the ever-present of gusto of Hazlitt, and also his antipathies. This doctrine of empathy is the foundation of much criticism that Hazlitt gave. In this criticism we notice his unique admiration for his authors, and his pleasure and sympathy in defining or describing his experience of the works. The kind of taste he enunciated is an active reaction of a keen and sensitive mind, and it becomes the work of genius when he embodies it in words. The resulting criticism is both on expression and a communication. Though he could not divine the actual nature of the creative process, he was richly compensated by a fine taste, a vigorous understanding, a disposition to argue coherently, and a living speech. For example, he observes with tact and with a modulated response born of a sensitivity, what happened when he met Lamb for the first time: It was at Godwin’s that I met him with Holcroft and Coleridge, when they were disputing fiercely which was the best-man as he was, or man as he is to be. ‘Give me’, says Lamb, ‘man as he is not to be’. This saying was the beginning of a friendship between us, which I believe still continues”. This passage tells us more about Lamb and Hazlitt than all the works written by them or on them.

Hazlitt was guilty of many errors in his critical evaluations. But these are not many if we remember that he lived in an age which did not possess any sound textual scholarship as we understand it today. He was never worried by the sources of a text, for “the play is the thing”.

16.2 Wit, Humour, Irony and Satire

Wit is based on the activity of the intellect. The critical disposition on Hazlitt made him exercise his wit very powerfully. He speaks of “a conceited fellow.... who talks always and every where on this subject (Kantian philosophy). He wears the categories round his neck like a pearl-chain; he plays off the primary and transcendental qualities like rings on his fingers. He talks of the Kantian system whole he dances: he talks of it while he dines, he talks of it to his children, to his apprentices, to his customers”. This person displays his knowledge of philosophy every where; and this is a symptom of an incurable disease. Hazlitt loved philosophy deeply; and yet he wanted philosophy to keep to its own proper sphere. One should be aware of his limitations. Even this awareness can be made to look witty. He notes that “Goldsmith consoled himself that there were places where he
too was admired”. The wit here is implicit in the word “too”. Such a wit has its target in that which lacks a sense of proportion. Generally in Hazlitt wit is fused with irony: and then we have the pure delight involving the animal spirits. When this is aided by exaggeration, the result is the embodiment of what is called the grotesque.

Hazlitt’s wit is blended with irony and satire. Irony is that mental characteristic which transforms an unpleasant phrase, word, or idea into a pleasant one. It has an element of sarcasm. In satire the critical activity is present, and it is directed towards the unpleasant and unacceptable modes of behaviour; or it exposes to ridicule certain drawbacks and weaknesses which make man unpleasant. Hazlitt was more ironical and satirical. His insight into the real nature of human life and his prejudices led him to point out those failing of man which need correction. This frame of mind does not make one generous and sympathetic. Even if he had to acknowledge the merit of others, Hazlitt did it rather grudgingly. In acquiring the tone of irony from swift, Jane Austen and others, Hazlitt was helped also by his earnestness. He admired Wordsworth, and yet we are told that the poet looked “more gaunt and Don Quixote-like”.

In the essay “On the Ignorance of the Learned” we have a Hazlitt who was alert to the shortcomings of a mere bookish individual. The man of a single idea becomes the object of satire. The learned one does not breathe the common air, for he is a parasite living on the ideas of others; and hence he becomes a “literary drudge”. He is one “who knows the most of what is farthest removed from common life and actual observation, that is of the least practical utility”. The most learned man is then one who has lost touch with the actualities of life. This is both witty and satirical. The satire becomes biting when we read that the scholar “must be ignorant even of looks” since the use of books is never taught by books.

A mild satirical his appears when we read that Wordsworth “did not own the obligation, and stated some distinction without a difference, in defence of his claim to originality. Any the slightest variation would be sufficient for this purpose in his mind”. Sarcasm and irony are blended here, and the under current of humour does not prevent our admiration for the poet. Elsewhere Hazlitt exposes vanity with the aid of an elegant wit.

When irony and satire appear in an exaggerated manner and when these are aided by wit, we have the grotesque. In the achievement of grotesque portraiture, Hazlitt is superb. Thus when he met Wordsworth for the first time, he was “Dan Quixote-like. He was quaintly dressed in a brown fustian jacket and striped pantaloons. There was something of a roll, lounge in his gait, not unlike his own Peter Bell”. This grotesque picture is lovable since there is a warmth of affection in the delineation. It borders on fun.

Fun involves the evocation of the animal spirits. It rouses the mind and the body into a fresh enjoyment of vigour. This appears in the case of a person who longs to be conspicuous and who yearns for applause. Such a one, he says, “must envelop himself in a halo of mystery- he must ride in an equipage of opinion—he must walk with a train of self-concept it following him—he must surround himself with a cortege of prejudices, like the signs of Zodiac”. This is crushing and yet boisterous.

Humour is based on insight into the human condition, and it is born of a sympathy with mankind. It has been well said that the “dull, phlegmatic, retiring humour is not in a fair way to be corrected, but confirmed and rendered desperate”. Following this method, Hazlitt offers lively strokes of humour. At times this humour can hit the target hard. Thus we have Hunt who “requires not only to be appreciated, but to have a select circle of admirers and devotees to feel himself quite at home”. We have only to remember here that Hazlitt was a good friend of Hunt. There is humour born of sympathy when we read that Hunt ‘has a set of bye-phrases and quaint allusions always at hand to produce a laugh’. Sympathy and antipathy are blended when Hazlitt finds a target in himself or in his friends. He observes the long hair of Coleridge swinging like theatre and poetry. It has a flexibility which slides into unexpected forms.
Humour and irony are blended in the picture of Hunt given in “The Indian Jugglers”: “Hunt is too versatile for a professional man, not dull enough for a political drudge, too gay to be happy, too thoughtless to be rich. He wants the enthusiasm of the poet, the severity of the prose-writer, and the application of the man of business”. Here is a fine picture of the society in which both Hunt and Hazlitt lived. When he talks of the contemporary society, Hazlitt can be extremely sarcastic. Thus he states that “it is a maxim with me that stage-coaches, and consequently stage-coachmen are respectable in proportion to the distance they have to travel”. Elsewhere he said that “footmen are no party of Christianity”. Such instances reveal the operation of the comic spirit which aims at correcting human attitudes, outlook, or behaviour.

There are many instances of innocent humour in Hazlitt’s writings. He refers to a doctor whose regimen harmed him. The doctor “assured me that the whole pharmacopeia contained nothing comparable to the prescription he had given me; and as a proof of its undoubted efficacy, said, that he had one gentleman with my complaint under his hand for the last fifteen years”. At lucid intervals and in moments of felicity Hazlitt gives us such sentences which bring him closer to Lamb and other great humorists.

16.3 Observations of Style

Hazlitt wrote an essay “On Familiar Style”. This essay gives us in broad outline the salient features of Hazlitt’s own style. It is a style which is neither simple, nor ornate, nor grotesque. It is a familiar style which demands a great effort on the part of the writer because it is not common or colloquial. If one writes as he likes, it may become a cheap style. The familiar style is characterised by precision and purity of expression. It is the golden mean between the simple and the ornate forms of expression. It is opposed to the Johnsonese style. It is equally opposed to the loose, unconnected form of expression. The familiar style requires first the selection of the best appropriate word form among those in common use; and it next demands the proper arrangement of such words. This arrangement is governed by the idiom of the language and by the genius of the writer. These two principles give ease, force, and perspicuity to the style and make it read like normal conversation. This is because it avoids the pedantic and rhetorical devices or tricks. At the same time, this familiar style carries the writer’s accent and intonation and his own inflection of the words, thereby it becomes a personal style.

The familiarly style, says Hazlitt, is determined by the theme, by the persons addressed to, and by the writer’s attitude to his theme and to his listeners. It is also determined by the familiar association of sound with sense. Such an expression opens the mind and heart of the writer to the listener or reader. This is achieved by observing simplicity and propriety. As a result the familiar style is realised only with difficulty. For instance, when an author has to express the idea of motion, he may have a score of words ready to jump into the sentence. But he must examine and find out which particular word will fit exactly into his meaning. If one word fits in, he must then see whether it harmonises with the other sounds in the sentence. The word here is to a symbol of an idea or feeling; nor is it a translation of his thought or feelings into sound. The word must be an exact equivalent of the idea or feeling. As Hazlitt put it, “out of eight or ten words equally common, equally intelligible, with nearly equal pretensions, it is a matter of some nicety and discrimination to pick out the very one, the perferableness of which is scarcely perceptible, but decisive”. The choice of the right word is then the first major factor in the concept of familiar style.

Hazlitt observes that Johnson’s style does not attach significance to discrimination, selection, or variety in the choice of words. Johnson employs many polysyllabic words derived from Greek or Latin. A native Englishman would normally use pure Anglo-Saxon word to express his feelings, emotions, and basic thoughts. One can easily acquire a mastery over polysyllabic words and thereby appear to have a dignified style. But such a style will have neither the charm nor the sweetness nor the effectiveness of the familiar style. The Johnsonese is affected and stilled; and
Hazlitt rejects it in spite of his great love for Johnson’s writings.
The familiar style involves hard task. One has to use common words without appearing to be low or vulgar. This is because this style is neither quaint nor vulgar which employs living and vigorous words and phrases that are in universal use. Such expressions include “cut with a knife” and “cut a piece of wood”, not “cut an acquaintance”. The last one is rejected as it belongs to slang; and it may be accepted if it becomes as part of normal usage. In outlining this principle, Hazlitt of glory, shining inscriptions, the figures of a transparency”. The images employed by such writers have little to do with their feelings; and then the images become adventitious. The ignorance of the writer is also revealed by the absence of any relation between the word and the thing, between the object and the feeling, and between the image ad its context. The writer of such a passage is “the plagiarist of words”, a writer revelling in obscurity and in far-fetched words.
Hazlitt’s emphasis was therefore on a style that is not far different from the language of conversation. This style is informal and yet literary; and it demands a clarity in working, a mastery of vocabulary, an alert mind, and a sensitive approach to words and things. The writer must love his words.

16.4 Hazlitt’s Style

Stevenson, himself a great stylist, observed: “We may all be mighty fine fellows, but none of us can write like William Hazlitt”. It is a style which is vigorous and English and which has no idiosyncrasy. As Hazlitt remarked, “I hate my style to be known, as I hate all idiosyncrasy”. The style of Hazlitt is one of the glorious worthies of English literature.

Hazlitt’s style was moulded by the influences he received from the Elizabethan writers, the poets and dramatists of the Restoration, the prose writers of the eighteenth century, and his contemporaries like Wordsworth and Coleridge. These influences and his native gifts gave him a “lively and substantial” style which is “buoyant without being forthy, glittering with no tinsel frippery”. This style is easy, incisive, homely, picturesque, and vigorous, since he emulated Burke who “Poured out his mind on paper”. Rejecting the pedantic devices like antithesis and parallelism, he arrived at a forked, playful, and trimmed style. Trusting like a musician the immediate impact of the sounds of words, he came to develop a style that is nearer the spoken tongue It can be read aloud with great effect.

In this style the dominant factor is the intellect. Since the cultivation of a good style is not an instance of the mechanical skill, it is not possible to achieve perfection here.

16.5 Critical Appreciation

A wonderfully apt, succinct characterization of Leigh Hunt appears in a recent popular literary history: “Leigh Hunt (1784-1859) was a gifted and industrious man of letters, who spent much of his working life in the company of men of genius.” A better brief estimation would be hard to find, but it points to a special problem. How does one write about a writer whose work was more than a century ago if that writer was not himself a genius? How do you talk about a man of considerable talent who, it is asserted, never wrote anything absolutely of the first rank but whose work you nevertheless wish to commend? In reading the scholarly critical literature on Hunt, again and again one finds condemning, or at best apologetic, assessments. “[Hunt’s criticism] lacks theoretical power, as his loose derivative theory of the imagination shows. He has little judgment However important as a middleman of romantic ideas and tastes he lacks real distinction of mind.” “Hunt [employing the critical vocabulary of romanticism] is using these terms for the emotional aura that surrounds them, and all precision of meaning is lost.” “We should acknowledge at the outset... that Hunt’s intellectual faculties for synthesis were not of the first order and that he was not especially interested in theoretical matters.” One has to sympathize with the scholars who
have come to these assessments because a fair judgment must discriminate, and in the comparison with his great contemporaries, Shelley, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Hazlitt — geniuses all — Hunt is left behind. If that is the case, however, why do we bother to remember him?

In saying that Hunt was not a genius in the way that his great contemporaries were, I was thinking of Hazlitt’s discussion in the essays “On Genius and Common Sense” that appeared in *Table Talk* (1821). If we cannot praise Hunt for his genius, we can perhaps praise him for his common sense and, by studying the term and his embodiment of it, appreciate a quality, important to the romantic critics, that is by no means contemptible, nor even always easily achieved. Approaching him in this vein, we may approximate the view held by his great contemporary admirers. Shelley, for instance, dedicated *The Cenci* to Hunt thus: “Had I known a person more highly endowed than yourself with all that it becomes a man to possess, I had solicited for the work the ornament of his name.... One of simpler, and, in the highest sense of the word, of purer life and manners I never knew.” When a writer as serious in his ideals as Shelley speaks this way, saying he uses his words “in the highest sense,” we know he doesn’t simply mean that Hunt is a pleasant man without notable vulgarities of manner or motive. Hazlitt, too, has judicious but high praise for Hunt. In *The Spirit of the Age* (1825) he notes the faults in Hunt’s writing, which are that “he perhaps takes too little pains, and indulges in too much wayward caprice.” But he also says, “He is the only poet or literary man we ever knew who... united rare intellectual acquirements with outward grace and natural gentility.” Furthermore “a wit and a poet, Mr. Hunt is also distin guished by fineness of tact and sterling sense.” Compare this praise with a sentence from the first essay “On Genius and Common Sense”: “Tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions,& c. and the being consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others.” Hazlitt uses this sentence to introduce his culminating example of the quality of common sense, Lord Shaftesbury’s discovery of Anne Hyde’s secret marriage to the Duke of York from subtle changes in her mother’s bearing toward her. “This,” Hazlitt concludes, “was carrying the prophetic spirit of common sense as far as it could go.” If we consider Hazlitt’s remarks carefully, it thus seems that something akin to the “prophetic spirit of common sense” is one of the “rare intellectual acquirements” he attributes to Hunt when praising his “fineness of tact and sterling sense.”

So far as “prophetic spirit” goes, even Hunt’s severest detractors agree that he had an uncanny ability to discover and encourage young poetic talent. Stephen F. Fogle, for instance, recognizing Hunt’s great contributions to practical criticism, says, “To have brought out in *The Examiner* one of the most influential papers of the day, the first published work of John Keats, and to have used its power to assist both Keats and Shelley is an act of prescience from which nothing can detract.”

Amy Lowell earlier created the phrase that subsequent writers have seized as the most favorable and least controversial judgment they could make concerning Hunt’s critical achievement, though even she feels obliged to disclaim any illusions that he was greater than he should be: “Hunt was not a great creator certainly, but he was a great introducer .... I can never forget that it was his Imagination and Fancy which first taught me what poetry was. There is no better text-book for the appreciation of poetry than that volume.” James B. Misenheimer, Jr. elaborates on Lowell’s concept of “introducer,” in a similarly defensive way:

Although his own creative powers were not great, his appreciation of creative ability in others was wide and sound.... Hunt had an almost uncanny power to single out good poets and good works and to make independent evaluations that would stand the test of time.

But when Hazlitt referred to the “prophetic spirit of common sense” he surely meant something other than a good record of accurate prediction. Among the liberal romantics of Hunt’s acquaintance, the notion of prophecy had a special force. Let us consider Shelley’s use of the term in his “Defence of Poetry” which, like Hazlitt’s essay “On Genius and Common Sense,” first appeared in the world in 1821, the crucial year in which Hunt began his Italian adventure and his renewed hopes
for the liberal cause. Shelley’s discussion of the prophetic spirit, not of common sense precisely, but of poetry in general, must have buoyed Hunt’s spirits for the task he was undertaking. Shelley optimistically describes an inevitable progress in human society and human morality led by and expressed by the poets:

[The poets] are not only the authors of language and of music;... they are the institutors of laws, and founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the True, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion Poets .... Poets.... were called, in the earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets; a poet essentially comprises and unites both these characters. For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and fruit of latest time.

The special appeal such a passage would have for Hunt is its sense of a powerful sweep of society forward into ever better institutions, manners, and enjoyments, precisely the sort of movement that he too served as a liberal editor and man of letters. To be associated in this kind of constructive activity with two of the most powerful poets of his time was the purpose of his emigration to Italy. Because Leigh Hunt’s knowledge of Shelley’s and Hazlitt’s theoretical essays was so close and so basic to his own critical attitudes, some further attention to the details of their thought will help place Hunt’s contribution to romantic criticism in its proper frame. In Shelley’s “Defence of Poetry,” “imagination” — that workhorse term of romanticism — refers to a class of mental actions that compose from individual thoughts, “as from elements,” other more complex thoughts which are synthesized integrities or unities. Poetry is defined as “the expression of the imagination” or, in other words, as the creation or synthesis of these unities. Furthermore, “poetry is connate with the origin of man,” because to be human means to engage in the process of perceiving or constructing these unities. In a lyrical but completely empirical formulation that John Locke would not have disagreed with, Shelley states, “Man is an instrument over which a series of external and internal impressions are driven.” This experiential process is delightful, and the child or the primitive man will try to express in voice and gesture both its delight and its shaping of these impressions into the most comprehensive unities possible. And indeed as the experiential impressions fade, he will try to prolong them by those expressions he has associated with them. These expressions constitute the products and history of the poetic or synthesizing spirit. At the earliest stages man delights in the external world; then comes self-consciousness, social consciousness, and finally civilized societal awareness. At each stage imagination strives to create those unified expressions of experience that assure the keenest delight: “For there is a certain order or rhythm belonging to each of these classes of mimetic representation from which the hearer and the spectator receive an intenser and purer pleasure than from any other: the sense of an approximation to this order has been called taste by modern writers.”

In the earliest stages of human development, Shelley continues, every individual can express this order well. Shelley rather cumbersomely calls this power of expression the “faculty of approximation to the beautiful.” As time goes on some persons are recognized to possess the faculty to a much higher degree than others, and to them is granted the specialized task of expressing the fundamental human order most fully so that “the pleasure resulting from the manner in which they express the
influence of society or nature upon their own minds, communicates itself to others, and gathers a sort of reduplication from that community.” The poets, in other words, are those who express the truest vision of humanity — the most comprehensively integrated and the most accordant with “pleasure.” And this vision the rest of society receives and assimilates to itself. Thus it is that the poets, “who imagine and express this indestructible order,” become the institutors, the founders, the teachers, and the prophets. For Shelley, then, the poets are practical people of thought and action leading forward the evolutionary march of human knowledge and institutions. And when we are looking for sources of Leigh Hunt’s literary principles we might remember this essay. Shelley, a true genius, provided a coherent, rational structuring of literary principles, including answers to those questions that occupied several of the greater romantic writers: what is a poet? and what does a poet do? And to this structure, in part, Leigh Hunt, a man of taste and common sense, assimilated his own thought. If we accept this view of the matter, we can get a little closer to understanding what quality Hunt possessed that enabled him to be the great discoverer, nurturer, and introducer of literary genius to his age. Remember again Shelley’s remark: “There is a certain order or rhythm belonging to each of these classes of mimetic representation, from which the hearer and spectator receive an intenser and purer pleasure than from any other: the sense of an approximation to this order has been called taste by modern writers.”

Let us turn now to the essay by Hunt’s other great critical friend, who commended him for his “fineness of tact and sterling sense.” Begin again with the passage from “On Genius and Common Sense” quoted earlier. “Tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions, &c. and the being consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others.” Just as Shelley did, Hazlitt bases his model of human experience and thought in “feeling,” or what the British empirical philosophers called impression. He says, “in art, in taste, in life, in speech, you decide from feeling, and not from reason; that is, from the impression of a number of things on the mind, which impression is true and well-founded though you may not be able to analyze or account for it in the several particulars” [my emphasis]. A little further on he calls these impressions “the immediate stamp of nature.” The single or unified impression that results from “the impression of a number of things” clearly involves a synthesis of many elements into an integrated experience which includes a power to respond, express, or, as he says, “judge.” Hazlitt elaborates more fully upon the power of judgment and expression at the level of ordinary experience, the level he calls “common sense.” “Common sense is the just result of the sum-total of such unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, and called out by the occasion. Genius and taste depend upon much the same principle exercised on loftier ground and in more unusual combinations.”

“Common sense” for Hazlitt is a powerful and firm guide to action. It is the “just result” of “the sum-total” of the unconscious impressions that constitute experience. Common sense, then, is accurate human feeling, directly representative of a pure humanity uncontaminated by prejudice, false refinement, or vulgar opinion. It is easily tainted, but in persons of genuine tact or finesse it can function as “the prophetic spirit of common sense.” And it is on the basis of this common sense that loftier acts of genius or taste occur. Hunt stood between Hazlitt and Shelley, these literary men of genius, highly regarded by both for powers of taste and judgment, remarkable because grounded in a pure and honest common sense. As a critic, editor, and representer of ideals they believed in, according to their own testimony, these men found none more capable of understanding and supporting them — and their genius — than Leigh Hunt.

To follow this last point a little further, let us consider Hazlitt’s other term. If Hunt is exemplary of common sense, fineness of tact, indeed “sterling” sense, what is it that sets “genius” apart? Hazlitt says the man of real genius “has the feeling of truth already shrined in his own breast, and his eye is still bent on nature to see how she expresses herself.” Based on his own self-awareness,
his own experience of the fundamental human order, the man of genius looks for accordant expressions on the part of nature herself. But the man of common sense does this too, does he not? How else could he regard her but in the light of his fundamental interpretive finesse or tact unless it be with something less appropriate, like prejudice or vanity. The difference, then, is that the man of genius creates new relationships with nature which common sense never realized before. “Genius or originality is, for the most part, some strong quality in the mind, answering to and bringing out some new and striking quality in nature [Hazlitt's emphasis].” Apparently the “prophetic spirit” of common sense in some persons of extreme capacity, which sets them over into a new category of intellect, can enter or realize uncharted territories of internal or external nature and thus open them more fully to experience. What genius discovers, once revealed, is available to all persons of common sense. Those persons, however, do not merely passively receive what genius has given them. Rather they themselves, having been shown the way, must positively reenact the discovery, extending by imagination their own stores of passion or feeling into the revealed area of experience.

The creations of imagination, syntheses of various impressions, organize themselves for Hazlitt around particular strong passions, not according to structured forms: “[In acts of association] any impression in a series can recall any other impression in that series without going through the whole in order: so that the mind drops the intermediate links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more striking effects of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the strongest hold of it.’ The organizing nodes of mental syntheses, in Hazlitt’s view, are not rational, esthetic, or logical arrangements and structures of impressions, but rather strong predominating passions, elemental in force, to which all other impressions are drawn, as to a magnet.

A key point to be observed in Hazlitt’s critical theory is that imagination belongs as well to the person of common sense, the person of taste, and the person of genius. Imagination, based on feeling, responsive to external and internal impressions according to the modes of a fundamental human order of experience, is the power that communicates between them. And the fact that imagination operates throughout the scale of cognition from the just-awakening common sense to the loftiest genius means that a common instrument for expression or communication exists whereby the discoveries of genius can be assimilated into the community at large; and, thus, the liberal march of progress is effected. If the geniuses are the innovators and leaders of moral, cultural, or artistic reform, persons of reliable common sense are needed to consolidate and establish the reformation. Shelley recognized in Leigh Hunt such a person and invited him to Italy on that basis.

This essay has devoted considerable space to reviewing fundamental critical principles expressed by two romantic creators who were closest to Hunt during, probably, the most crucial year of his life. One reason to conduct such a review, is that Hunt’s intelligence and critical reputation have been attacked by influential scholars who have not considered the relevant context, but instead have denigrated his work because it has not explicated Coleridge. In fact, the primary elements in Hunt’s critical principles owe far more to Hazlitt and Shelley, whom he assimilated and represented to the general reading public. A second reason for reviewing Shelley and Hazlitt, especially the latter, is that they define a process, as it were a social program of art at its highest levels of influence over the progressive tendencies of humankind, which explains precisely what Hunt’s position and what his work amounted to in the romantic scheme of things. Hazlitt’s depiction of genius and common sense provides the clearest model of what we may assume Hunt’s relation to his greater contemporaries to be. It is a model which explains in more detail and gives significant depth to the character Amy Lowell gave us of Hunt as “a great introducer.” Hunt had a power of taste, in the high sense defined by Shelley and Hazlitt, that was effective in its own time and can still instruct in its own right, and complete our awareness of that splendid age of literary art. Let us consider an example.

Before turning to one of Hunt’s best pieces of practical criticism, let us address Hazlitt’s mild
censure of his writing in The Spirit of the Age: “he perhaps takes too little pains, and indulges in too much wayward caprice.” This applies to much of Hunt’s vast production as a literary journalist, and it has been made the occasion for critical abuse and ridicule. But we need to focus on his best work, as we do for the greater geniuses of his age. A “balanced” judgment of Wordsworth would reveal that the volume of his mediocre verse exceeds that of his irreplaceable poetry by a considerable margin. And the same proportion would exist for Byron and many other writers.

Indeed Hunt himself remarks on this general fact in his discussion of Middleton, Dekker, and Webster in In Imagination and Fancy (1844): “When about to speak of these and other extraordinary men of the days of Shakespeare... I wasted a good deal of time in trying to find out how it was that, possessing, as most of them did, such a pure vein of poetry... they wrote so much that is not worth reading, sometimes not fit to be read. I might have considered that, either from self-love, or necessity, or both, too much writing is the fault of all ages and of every author.” This is not the only place in Hunt’s writings where he intimates a shortcoming of his own in this regard. But there are many examples where the trenchancy of his style and the vigor of his common sense combine with delightful effect.

The example we turn to, recalling Hazlitt’s distinction between common sense and vulgar opinion, is Hunt’s defense of the unconventional genius of Byron’s Don Juan against its canning, hypocritically moral detractors. In The Examiner of October 31, 1819, he writes, “Don Juan is accused of being an ‘immoral’ work, which we cannot discover.” He describes the situation in Canto I leading to the mutual seduction of Juan and Julia. “This, it is said, has tendency to corrupt the minds of ‘us youth,’ and to make us think lightly of breaking the matrimonial contract. But if to do this be immoral, we can only say that Nature is immoral.” He goes on, “Lord Byron does no more than relate the consequences of certain absurdities. If he speaks slightingly of the ties between a girl and a husband old enough for her father, it is because the ties themselves are slight. He does not ridicule the bonds of Marriage generally, or where they are formed as they should be: he merely shows the folly and wickedness of setting forms and opinions against nature.” Clearly Hunt is speaking with the insight of unblemished common sense, as Hazlitt discussed it, and from this base is opening to his readers the opportunity to respond justly to the work against the conventionally antisexual morality that was already forming this early in the nineteenth century.

In fact, with a clearheaded awareness of powerful forces within human nature that William Blake would not have disdained, Hunt wittily attacks the moralists straight on.

There are a set of prudish and very suspicious moralists who endeavor to make vice appear to inexperienced eyes much more hateful than it really is. They would correct Nature;—and they always overreach themselves. Now the said prudes... are constantly declaiming on the deformity of vice, and its almost, total want of attraction. The consequence is, that when they are found to have deceived (as they always are) and immoral indulgence is discovered to be not without its charms. — the minds of young persons are apt to confound their true with their false maxims.

Because Hunt’s stand here — for common sense and for human nature — links him with several of the great geniuses of his age, notably Shelley and William Blake as well as Byron, it is worth quoting a little further from this review. Lacking an independent income, having many children to feed, entirely dependent on an accepting public for his maintenance, Hunt shows courageous fidelity to the standards of common sense as well as a keen, “prescient” anticipation of the long-running history and resolution of this issue. Discussing Canto II, Hunt says, We suppose there has been some sermonizing on the description of the delight arising from the “illicit intercourse” of Juan and Haidee. People who talk in this way can perceive no distinctions.

He goes on to describe briefly the circumstance of those lovers, removed from the artificial constraints of society. Then, But what is there to blame in a beautiful and affectionate girl who gives way to a passion for a young shipwrecked human creature bound to her by gratitude as well as love? ... Does she not receive, as well as bestow, more real pleasure (for that is the question) in
the enjoyment of a first and deep passion, than in becoming the wife of some brother in iniquity to whom her pirating father would have trucked her for lucre?

The ironic cadences of that last sentence cut to the bone, not merely as wit but as incisive criticism of social sickness in his age. Hunt interprets Byron more deeply perhaps than Byron intended. In a sense, Hunt extends Byron’s poem to a level of application that the apparent levity and flippancy of Byron’s tone might not otherwise reach with the general reader. Hunt reveals in Byron that which Byron’s tone might have concealed. Finally, the concluding paragraph of Hunt’s review is surely an example of tact and finesse yielding “the prophetic spirit of common sense.” It is short, but to students of romanticism it cannot but suggest the struggles of Los with Vala in The Four Zoas or of Los with his Spectre in Jerusalem, which Blake was working out at the very time Hunt was writing. Here is the paragraph. The fact is, at the bottom of all these questions, that many things are made vicious, which are not so by nature; and many things made virtuous, which are only so by calling and agreement: and it is on the horns of this self-created dilemma, that society is continually writhing and getting desperate.

For another exhibit of Leigh Hunt’s role as romantic critic, let us turn to his only extended effort at theoretical exposition, the essay “What Is Poetry?” which opens the 1844 volume Imagination and Fancy. This essay has been most severely — and strangely — denigrated by scholars in the past quarter century. The negative estimates concerning Hunt’s intelligence and critical achievement quoted at the beginning of this discussion are directed mainly at the 1844 essay. The essay has received more mockery than sympathetic reading in recent years. Ernest Bernbaum in 1929 called it “one of the clearest and most comprehensive, though not the profoundest, treatment of the subject by any of the Romantics.” But M. H. Abrams wittily set the tone for contemporary reception of the essay by reminding his readers of a critical joke made at Hunt’s expense in the previous century. After summarizing differences between Coleridge, Hazlitt, Shelley, and Byron in the definition of poetry, Abrams quips, “Finally Leigh Hunt reconciled these differences by the simple device of a definition which, as David Masson has remarked, is ‘constructed on the principle of omitting nothing that anyone would like to see included’.”

It seems to have been the elaborateness of Hunt’s opening definition that has led his detractors to deny him judgment or distinction of mind. Yet it seems to me that if one reads his opening paragraph, keeping in mind the relevant background of Hazlitt, Shelley, and the other great critical geniuses of the era, one may well be enlightened, pleased, and indeed impressed by the distinguished qualities of mind revealed. Hunt gives an imaginatively integrated account of romantic poetic theory that begins with a lucid, tightly structured outline, that is developed with clarity and cogency, and that ends with a fruitful juxtaposition of passages from Milton, Coleridge, and Shelley, which resonate with new significance in the context he has prepared for them. Perhaps by 1844 the principles expressed are no longer revolutionary. But neither are Hunt’s intentions revolutionary. They are, rather, “to furnish such an account, in an essay, of the nature and requirements of poetry, as may enable readers in general to give an answer on those points to themselves and others” [Hunt’s emphasis].

Turning to the essay, one discovers that Masson’s and Abrams’s word is not precisely accurate. The paragraph in question is not a “definition” according to the meaning by which one expects a man of abstract thought to summarize a topic or concept broadly and memorably in a short pithy expression. Rather, Hunt’s paragraph is an announcement and outline of the aspects of his subject to be covered at length in the essay, all brought together in a connected, if full, statement of his intent (current academic rhetoricians call such a passage occurring at the beginning of an essay the thesis statement). Indeed Hunt’s 1844 essay might seem to lack the lightning flashes of genius used by the romantic essayists, but Hunt’s procedure ably organizes for the wider, though educated Victorian reading public the complex theories of the romantic innovators. Here is the opening statement of “What Is Poetry?”
Poetry, strictly and artistically so called, that is to say, considered not merely as poetic feeling, which is more or less shared by all the world, but as the operation of that feeling such as we see it in the poet’s book, is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power, embodying and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy, and modulating its language on the principle of variety in uniformity. Its means are whatever the universe contains; and its end, pleasure and exaltation. Poetry stands between nature and convention, keeping alive among us the enjoyment of the external and spiritual world: it has constituted the most enduring fame of nations; and next to Love and Beauty, which are its parents, is the greatest proof to man of the pleasure to be found in all things, and of the probable riches of infinitude.

Every point that Hunt develops in the 46 pages of his essay is touched on in this outline, and the transitions he will develop in full are intimated. Each of the topics can be paralleled in an important precursor essay by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Shelley, or others, but Hunt richly illustrates each and treats it with his own taste and good sense. Notice the opening distinction between poetry as the actual expressions in the poet’s book and a more general poetic feeling “which is more or less shared by all the world.” This has been regarded by Stephen F. Fogle, among others, as so much soft and meaningless verbiage padding out an already overblown statement. [27] Although “general poetic feeling” is a concept easily and often sentimentalized, Hunt is making an important point here, one already commented on in relation to Shelley’s “Defence of Poetry.” Hunt wishes to insist that what the poets express in their books is not foreign, alien, effeminate, or imaginary. Rather, poets express a fundamental human order shared by all members of the species, an order expressible with greatest comprehensives and pleasurable by the best poets in their achievements of greatest truth and beauty.

The concepts of truth and beauty, as well as two others equally important to Hazlitt and Shelley, are referred to then in the section of Hunt’s outline that might properly be singled out as the “definition.” The more limited “definition” reads “Poetry ... is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power.” Each of these key terms receives further elaboration.

• “Poetry is a passion, because it seeks the deepest impressions; and because it must undergo, in order to convey them.” The poet must feel, and feel deeply, the myriad impressions that nature and his own responses play across his sensibility. He must willingly undergo these feelings if he is genuinely to register and thus be able to express truly the fundamental human order.

• “It is a passion for truth, because without truth the impression would be false or defective.” “Truth” here means an accurate registration of the realities of nature. In Hazlitt’s terminology passion for truth would involve the distinction between common sense and vulgar opinion. The passion for truth, for instance, is what Hunt showed to be operative in Byron’s attack on hypocrical moralities in his review of *Don Juan*.

• “It is a passion for beauty, because its office is to exalt and refine by means of pleasure, and because beauty is nothing but the loveliest form of pleasure.” Hunt is referring here to Shelley’s notion of beauty as the degree of expression approximating most closely to the fundamental order or rhythm of experience from which, accordingly, the purest and most intense degree of pleasure ensues. Thus he calls it the “loveliest,” meaning the most desirable, the most pleasing form of pleasure. It must be remembered also that, in his time, Hunt would need to distinguish by some such adjective the pleasure he is discussing because of the Benthamite Utilitarian scheme to reduce all pleasures to the same qualitative level.

• Finally, “It is a passion for power, because power is impression triumphant, whether over the poet, as desired by himself, or over the reader, as affected by the poet.” Only by feeling deeply, by “ardent subjection of one’s self to emotion” can one realize the pleasure, the beauty, the truth, and so on. In a way this axiom repeats the earlier three, but by stating it in this form, Hunt is able to recall Hazlitt’s doctrine that the synthesis or ordering of experience, poetry triumphant, occurs across the nodes of most intense feeling or impression.
These few passages, I believe, illustrate how vividly Hunt’s essay picks up and redeploy the concepts of his great precursors. One or two further comments must suffice for this demonstration. Hunt’s discussion of imagination and fancy has been much discussed by Wellek, Fogle, Thompson, and others, who do or do not believe he knew what he was talking about. Those who think he did not know insist that he was trying to explain Coleridge but could not. I would simply agree with James R. Thompson that in the distinction he makes between the two terms, “It is more likely... that Hunt’s reference is to the preface of Wordsworth’s 1815 edition in which he attempts to justify his classifications” than it is to Biographia Literaria. To me, Hunt’s discussion of imagination and fancy is sufficiently compatible with Wordsworth’s to demonstrate a reasoned and intelligent position on his part rather than the dim-witted pretense at understanding implied by Wellek.

One further example: Fogle is remarkably disturbed by Hunt’s mention of love and beauty in the final clause of his outline. Fogle writes, “To make Poetry the child of Love and Beauty... is to create a family group that defies analysis .... One would like to ask what the exact qualities of Love and Beauty are that are reproduced in their child Poetry.” The answer to Fogle is rather simple. Hunt has claimed that poetry “is the greatest proof to man of the pleasure to be found in all things, and of the probable riches of infinitude.” This is easy enough to interpret in the light of poetry’s relation to the fundamental order of experience between man and nature. Maybe the phrase “probable riches of infinitude” refers to transcendent implications, like Wordsworth’s “Intimations of Immortality”; but that need not concern us for the present. Hunt also says, however, that two qualities, love and beauty, are even greater proofs of these felicities than poetry is, and furthermore, it is apparently these greater qualities that by their conjunction give birth to poetry. This is the assertion that has confused.

The discussion so far concerning the meaning of “Beauty” for Hunt and Shelley explains how she might be called the giver of felicity and the mother of poetry. But how does “Love” enter the picture? Realizing that we are reading the last clause of Hunt’s topical outline for his essay, if we turn to the last topic developed, we find another quotation from Shelley’s “Defence of Poetry,” wherein the bridegroom appeareth. The first part of the quoted passage alludes again to the progressive recovery of the beauty of existence through poetic expressions which use external nature to reveal the exalted humanity of our interior spirit: poetry represents or “impersonates” objects, which then stand as “memorials of that gentle and exalted content” — human feeling and human being — “which extends itself over all thoughts and actions with which it co-exists.” It is also notable that this part of Shelley’s paragraph describes the activity of the poet himself, the maker of the book proper which Hunt distinguished in the opening phrases of his essay. Reading on into the second half of the quoted passage, we see that “Love” is the new concept introduced. Additionally, it becomes apparent by the last sentence of the passage that the perspective has shifted away from the poet who makes the book to the reader of the book, the receiver of the effects of poetry, which are explicitly stated in this instance to be moral in character. In commenting on his choice of this passage, Hunt calls it a “peroration.” As a good Latinist Hunt would know that the basic meaning of the word is not simply a fancy passage of prose, but the concluding rhetorical summation of the primary point of a discourse. But in fact the passage is not, in Shelley’s “Defence,” the peroration. It comes from the early middle of the essay and is merely one among a number of parallel ideas. But the passage is Hunt’s peroration. By his selection and placement of Shelley’s paragraph, he makes it the rhetorical conclusion of his own essay. He assimilates his thought to it and ties conclusively together the various threads of his critical exposition.

The great secret of morals is love, or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another, and of many others: the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause.

Though Shelley’s expression of his critical genius is compact and intense, it can be explicatd
simply enough. Love, he says, is a going out from our own selfish nature to an identification of ourselves with the beautiful, which, as we know by now, is the most intense and comprehensive realization of the fundamental order. The instrument of this going out and identification is the imagination, or that capacity of the mind whereby “true” and “beautiful” syntheses of our impressions are achieved. At first, poetry expresses the imagination of the poet, the man of genius; but, equally important, once expressed by genius, the poetry affects the imagination of the man of common sense, causing his basic humanity to go beyond its personal embodiment to awareness of unity — identification — with the universal order of humanity.

Hunt has chosen a complex passage from Shelley to stand as his summation, but his choice reveals deep critical insight and an editor’s keen skill as he incorporates the passage and its reverberations with his own ideas. The dual perspective of the paragraph as it shifts from poet to reader reenacts the passage of insight from genius to common sense. In the first half of the passage the poet extends his own humanity, his own sense of fundamental order, out to nature to represent or “impersonate” it and make it partake of this order. Then, as described in the second half of the passage, the reader recognizes his own deepest self in this impersonation of nature and other beings. Thus not only is that deepest self evoked, but it is also extended into imaginative identification — love — with the order (the beautiful) in persons not himself. Because of this identification — at the deepest level of common humanity, benevolence, goodwill, tolerance, and so forth, the profoundest acts of moral good are brought about. Poetry achieves this end by acting upon the cause of this end, which is, simply, the imaginative perception of beauty or fundamental order.

There is another sense of the word love evoked in Hunt’s quotation from Shelley that goes beyond the ideal of imaginative identification with the fundamental order of beauty. In distinguishing between beauty and love, Hunt overleaps the kind of dangerous aestheticism or solipsistic indulgence which might rest satisfied in a “Palace of Art” (a topic written on by Tennyson in his poem of that name first published in 1832 and in revised form in 1842, respectively twelve and two years before Hunt’s essay appeared). Hunt emphasizes instead the active progression in knowledge and being that accords with his liberal social hopes for mankind. The two words depict a staged response to perception of the fundamental human order. The first stage is simply the most comprehensive and pleasurable apprehension of this order, experienced as beauty. The second stage, however, is the sense of this beauty made self-conscious and active. This is the stage called love. Relatively speaking, beauty might be experienced in a passive or receptive mode of pure delight — a passion and hence a power, but a quiescent, inwardly absorbed one, perhaps not even fully cognizant. But love, more self-conscious and explicitly active in its association with moral good, as Shelley’s passage stipulates, unites itself with the quieter state. And the union of quiescent receptive power with active outgoing power, both emanating from perception of the fundamental human order, results in a new birth of expression, a new utterance of the fundamental order — a new utterance of power, passion, truth, and beauty, which we recall was Hunt’s basic definition of poetry. Keeping in mind the dual aspect of imagination that Hunt evoked by selecting this particular passage from Shelley’s essay, involving both the reader of the poem and its maker, let us note that the utterance or expression of the reader will be active and moral whereas the utterance of the poet proper will be cognitive and verbal. It is in this rich sense that Hunt refers to poetry as the child of love and beauty.

Hunt’s formulation, then, is another redeployment of the powerful romantic concepts concerning poetry, art, and social responsibility created by his great precursors. His is not so complex as their fuller analyses, but neither does it merely mimic, nor does it distort in its greater simplicity. His remarks resonate with theirs. Is this resonance absolutely essential to our understanding of romantic literary theory? Rationally, perhaps it is not. But romantic literary theory emphasizes other qualities than the coldly rational. It cares for pleasure, taste, and passion, too. And the pleasure of knowing Leigh Hunt at his best and appreciating his intelligence, his taste, and his passion for literature, just as his great contemporaries knew and appreciated it, is available to us still in his finer work. It is integral to the even richer pleasure of knowing the era we recall as the romantic age of genius and common sense.
Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

(i) Hazlitt On Genius and Common Sense appeared in Table talk in

(a) 1821  (b) 1830  (c) 1810  (d) 1825

(ii) ‘The Examiner’ published in

(a) 1819  (b) 1821  (c) 1825  (d) 1820

(iii) Fogle is remarkably disturbed by mention of love and beauty in the final clause of his outline.

(a) Hazlitt  (b) Coleridge  (c) Hunt  (d) None of these

16.6 Summary

• Hazlitt’s literary tastes are catholic. He read widely and wisely. He knew intimately the literature of the Elizabethan age. He brought his sympathetic insight into an understanding of the Restoration drama, admired Pope for his technical virtuosity, and joined no group to condemn or praise any period in its entirety. Cazamian observed: “he it was who traced the first roads, marked out the vantage points and gauged the heights on the virgin soil of Romanticism, and almost in every case his literary judgment remains that of today; he anticipates the future, and sees with the eyes of posterity”. His remarks on Shakespeare, Pope, Burns, and Coleridge show his understanding and estimate of the nature of genius.

• Hazlitt’s literary criticism is at times a “prodigious variation” on the subject. He continues to say, without being tired, what poetry is and what it is not in his Lectures on English Poets. At other times he reveals a peculiar attitude exemplified in his treatment of specific texts and authors.

• Hazlitt’s literary theory is clearly expressed in three essays. These are “On Poetry in General”, “On Gusto”, and “Why the Arts are not Progressive”. In these essays we find that poetry is “the language of the imagination and the passions”. In his approach to poetry he sought to understand “the internal character, the living principle” and to arrive at an acceptable standard for the “improvement of taste”.

• The basic principle he followed as a literary critic was expressed by him thus: “I have undertaken merely to read over a set of authors with the audience, as I would do with a friend, to point out a favourite passage, to explain an objection; or of a remark or a theory as it occurs to state it in illustration of the subject: but neither tire him nor puzzle myself with pedantic rules and pragmatical formulas of criticism that can do no good to any body.

• Hazlitt was guilty of many errors in his critical evaluations. But these are not many if we remember that he lived in an age which did not possess any sound textual scholarship as we understand it today. He was never worried by the sources of a text, for “the play is the thing”.

• Hazlitt wrote an essay “On Familiar Style”. This essay gives us in broad outline the salient features of Hazlitt’s own style. It is a style which is neither simple, nor ornate, nor grotesque. It is a familiar style which demands a great effort on the part of the writer because it is not common or colloquial. If one writes as he likes, it may become a cheap style. The familiar style is characterised by precision and purity of expression.

• Hazlitt observes that Johnson’s style does not attach significance to discrimination, selection, or variety in the choice of words. Johnson employs many polysyllabic words derived from Greek or Latin. A native Englishman would normally use pure Anglo-Saxon word to express his feelings, emotions, and basic thoughts.

• “Common sense” for Hazlitt is a powerful and firm guide to action. It is the “just result” of “the sum-total” of the unconscious impressions that constitute experience. Common sense, then, is accurate human feeling, directly representative of a pure humanity uncontaminated...
Notes

by prejudice, false refinement, or vulgar opinion. It is easily tainted, but in persons of genuine tact or finesse it can function as “the prophetic spirit of common sense.”

• In The Examiner of October 31, 1819, he writes, “Don Juan is accused of being an ‘immoral’ work, which we cannot discover.

• In Hazlitt’s terminology passion for truth would involve the distinction between common sense and vulgar opinion.

• The two words depict a staged response to perception of the fundamental human order.

16.7 Key-Words

1. Douceur : tip
3. Puffendorf : Samuel Von Puffendorf (1632 —1694), a German jurist who wrote on equity and on international law.
4. The statues at large : the complete body of the existing and operating Acts of Parliament, as they were originally enacted.
5. Premises : Statements of facts from which conclusions can be drawn logically.
6. Tide-waiter : Customs officer
7. Syllogism : argument stated in the strict logical form.
8. Reductio ad absurdum : an argument which shows that absurdity results if we assumes the opposite of what has to be proved.

16.8 Review Questions

1. Discuss Hazlitt as a literary critic.
2. Explain humour, irony and satire in Hazlitt essays.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (c)

16.9 Further Readings

1. P.S. Sastri, Hazlitt selected essays, Doaba House, Delhi.
2. Geoffrey Keynes, selected essays of William Hazlitt 1778 to 1830.
Unit 17: Hazlitt - On The Ignorance of The Learned: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Discuss Hazlitt as an essayist
• Explain On the Ignorance of the Learned

Introduction

William Hazlitt, the son of an Irish Unitarian clergyman, was born in Maidstone, Kent, on 10th April, 1778. His father was a friend of Joseph Priestley and Richard Price. As a result of supporting the American Revolution, Rev. Hazlitt and his family were forced to leave Kent and live in Ireland. The family returned to England in 1787 and settled at Wem in Shropshire. At the age of fifteen William was sent to be trained for the ministry at New Unitarian College at Hackney in London. The college had been founded by Joseph Priestley and had a reputation for producing freethinkers. In 1797 Hazlitt lost his desire to become a Unitarian minister and left the college.

While in London Hazlitt became friends with a group of writers with radical political ideas. The group included Percy Bysshe Shelley, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charles Lamb, William Wordsworth, Thomas Barnes, Henry Brougham, Leigh Hunt, Robert Southey and Lord Byron. At first Hazlitt attempted to become a portrait painter but after a lack of success he turned to writing. Charles Lamb introduced Hazlitt to William Godwin and other important literary figures in London. In 1805 Joseph Johnson published Hazlitt’s first book, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action. The following year Hazlitt published Free Thoughts on Public Affairs, an attack on William Pitt and his government’s foreign policy. Hazlitt opposed England’s war with France and its consequent heavy taxation. This was followed by a series of articles and pamphlets on political corruption and the need to reform the voting system.

Hazlitt began writing for The Times and in 1808 married the editor’s sister, Sarah Stoddart. His friend, Thomas Barnes, was the newspaper’s parliamentary reporter. Later, Barnes was to become the editor of the newspaper. In 1810 he published the New and Improved Grammar of the English Language.

In 1813 Hazlitt was employed as the parliamentary reporter for the Morning Chronicle, the country’s leading Whig newspaper. However, in his articles, Hazlitt criticized all political parties. Hazlitt also contributed to The Examiner, a radical journal edited by Leigh Hunt. Later, Hazlitt wrote for
the *Edinburgh Review*, the Yellow Dwarf and the London Magazine. In these journals Hazlitt produced a series of essays on art, drama, literature and politics. During this period he established himself as England’s leading expert on the writings of William Shakespeare.

Hazlitt wrote several books on literature including *Characters of Shakespeare* (1817), *A View of the English Stage* (1818), *English Poets* (1818) and *English Comic Writers* (1819). In these books he urged the artist to be aware of his social and political responsibilities. Hazlitt continued to write about politics and his most important books on this subject is *Political Essays with Sketches of Public Characters* (1819). In the book Hazlitt explains how the admiration of power turns many writers into “intellectual pimps and hirelings of the press.”

Hazlitt’s marriage to Sarah ended in 1823 as a result of an affair with a maid, Sarah Walker. Hazlitt wrote an account of this relationship in his book *Liber Amoris*. In 1824 Hazlitt married Isabella Bridgewater but this relationship only lasted a year.

In the *The Spirit of the Age: Contemporary Portraits* (1825) Hazlitt provides a series of contemporary portraits including Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Robert Southey, William Cobbett, William Godwin and William Wilberforce. This was followed by *The Plain Speaker* (1826) and *Life of Napoleon* (4 volumes, 1828-30). William Hazlitt died in poverty of stomach cancer on 18th September 1830.

### 17.1 William Hazlitt: Philosopher, Essayist, and Critic

Among the many great essayists of the Romantic era, considered one of the best is William Hazlitt. The London born actor Hazlitt was extremely trenchant essayist, and a blunt and overall carping critic known for arguing over a vast field of topics such as government and politics of England. When writing “On the Pleasure of Hating” and his other essays, William Hazlitt was influenced most prominently by his life and schooling, other great writers, and his literary experience.

Hazlitt’s father was a minister who was known for his radical political beliefs influenced Hazlitt in the sense that he grew up with the same political values and stayed faithful to those beliefs until his death. These radical tendencies are also believed to be the reason for his fighting. Hazlitt was always known to argue and fight, and this was a source of happiness for him. At first following in his father’s footsteps, Hazlitt went to college in London studying and learning in the field of ministry; however, the young William Hazlitt withdrew from these plans. After giving up the field of ministry, Hazlitt then began to explore the fields of philosophy, politics, and literature that made him the tough critic and quintessential writer that he became known as.

Continuing his young life, Hazlitt attended Hackney College in London to study philosophy as a teenager and young adult. While interested in philosophy, he wrote books and lectures on the subject, further expanding his experience and diversity of literary fields. Hazlitt then changed his interests another time by switching his focus onto politics and the French Revolution, which Hazlitt was in favor of. Not only was Hazlitt a huge supporter of the French Revolution, but also supported the French ruler, Napoleon Bonaparte. Contrary to the opinions of many people, Hazlitt viewed Napoleon as a hero rather than a power-hungry emperor. The reason for William Hazlitt’s opinions on Napoleon can best be supported by the fact that he was extremely radical in his politics, because many other radical politicians shared the same views of the French emperor Napoleon. Throughout Hazlitt’s younger years, he explored philosophy, politics, and literature while he grew as a writer. The diversity of his literary abilities created his convincing style.

Also playing a vital role in the development of influences in Hazlitt’s writing is the influence of great writers such as William Shakespeare and Wordsworth. For example, “the dialect of this poetics of power depends upon an interplay of Shakespearean and Wordsworthian influences upon Hazlitt.” Shakespeare was an especially important influence in the sense that Hazlitt was known for writing essays on Shakespeare. William Shakespeare gave Hazlitt “an awareness that
character may be fate, yet only personality bestows some measure of freedom.” In addition to Shakespeare, he also exhibited great insight regarding the literary works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. By studying Coleridge, Hazlitt was able to continue developing his impressionistic criticism, including its most important trait, gusto. Gusto was the zest or hearty keen enjoyment that Hazlitt used within his essays not only to appeal to those that agree with him, but also those that may contradict his beliefs. This gusto also is to be found within the essay “On the Pleasure of Hating,” where Hazlitt appeals to all audiences throughout the essay by allowing his writings to apply to everyone.

From Wordsworth, Hazlitt took “a new consciousness of how a writer could begin again despite the strength and persistence of cultural traditions.” Also from Wordsworth, Hazlitt became more advanced in the originality of writing by learning to replace subject matter with subjectivity. By studying writers such as Wordsworth, Shakespeare, Coleridge, and others, Hazlitt was influenced by his writing not only by gaining his gusto, which has been noted as his dominate trait, but he developed a style all his own.

Also extremely important in influencing Hazlitt’s writing is his vast and well-rounded knowledge and experience in the field of literature. When he became interested in politics, he began working for Parliament for the Morning Chronicle as a reporter. Also he began work on many essays that were collected in books such as Original Essays on Men and Manners, The Plain Speaker: Opinions on Books, Men, and Things, and Table Talk. He also wrote for many magazines including London Magazine, the Examiner, and New Monthly Magazine. As a critic and writer, “these helped establish Hazlitt as a tough, outspoken, and independent-minded critic.” Being the tough critic that he is, Hazlitt was able to earn the respect of other literary writers; however, he lost friends in the process. But this was the nature of Hazlitt’s behavior, and this is what made him the great critic that he was. He was never afraid to challenge another writer or critic, and always stood by his beliefs. Even if it meant damaging relationships with another person.

While Hazlitt gave lectures on philosophy, writings covered far more than this field. He wrote on the subjects of ethics, politics, and economics as well. He further expanded his experience in literature as he began work in journalism, working for The Morning Chronicle. He worked up from a journalist all the way to becoming the drama critic. Also, he was writing essays here and there for other periodicals such as the Edinburgh Review and Leigh Hunt’s Examiner. Hazlitt continued to work while he published more works such as Liber Amoris: Or, The New Pygmalion, The Spirit of the Age: Or Contemporary Portraits, and The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, which was his final work. He also contributed essays to many volumes. The broad range of literary experience gives him the edge over others, and has him more prepared in his writings. He learned to “make them [Hazlitt’s ideas for essays] personal without reducing their vitality.” For example, in Hazlitt’s essay, “On the Pleasure of Hating”, he writes of a spider crawling across the floor where he sits:

But as I do not start up and seize upon the straggling caitiff, as he would upon a hapless fly within his toils, he takes heart, and ventures on with mingled cunning, impudence and fear. As he passes me, I lift up the matting to assist his escape, am glad to get rid of the unwelcome intruder, and shudder at the recollection after it is gone . . . I bear the creature no illwill, but still I hate the very sight of it. The spirit of malevolence survives the practical exertion of it.

In the essay, Hazlitt makes his ideas personal by referring to his self, and stating how he feels on the subject.

From his schooling as a young man, his father’s radical beliefs, studying writers such as Shakespeare, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, to working for uncountable and various jobs for papers and magazines, Hazlitt grew as a writer and was greatly influenced by all of these variables when he wrote the essay “On the Pleasure of Hating” and the entirety of his other literary works. Although he never was widely known or received great fame during his lifetime, he is now one of the greatest critics and essayists of the Romantic era.
17.2 Text-On the Ignorance of the Learned

“For the more languages a man can speak,
   His talent has but sprung the greater leak;
   And, of the industry he has spent upon’t,
   Must full as much some other way discount.

The Hebrew, Chaldee, and the Syriac
   Do, like their letters, set men’s reason back,
   And turn their wits that strive to understand it
   (Like those that write the characters) left-handed.

Yet he that is but able to express
   No sense at all in several languages,
   Will pass for learned more than he that’s known
   To speak the strongest reason in his own”.

Butler (Samuel)

The description of persons who have the fewest ideas of all others are mere authors and readers. It is better to be able neither to read nor write than to be able to do nothing else. A lounger who is ordinarily seen with a book in his hand is (we may be almost sure) equally without the power or inclination to attend either to what passes around him or in his own mind. Such a one may be said to carry his understanding about with him in his pocket, or to leave it at home on his library shelves. He is afraid of venturing on any train of reasoning, or of striking out any observation that is not mechanically suggested to him by passing his eyes over certain legible characters; shrinks from the fatigue of thought, which, for want of practice, becomes insupportable to him; and sits down contented with an endless, tiresome succession of words and half-formed images, which fill the void of the mind, and continually efface one another. Learning is, in too many cases, but a foil to common sense; a substitute for true knowledge. Books are less often made use of as ‘spectacles’ to look at nature with, than as blinds to keep out its strong light and shifting scenery from weak eyes and indolent dispositions. The book-worm wraps himself up in his web of verbal generalities, and sees only the glimmering shadows of things reflected from the minds of others Nature puts him out. The impressions of real objects, stripped of the disguises of words and voluminous roundabout descriptions, are blows that stagger him; their variety distracts, their rapidity exhausts him; and he turns from the bustle, the noise, and glare, and whirling motion of the world about him (which he has not an eye to follow in his fantastic changes, nor an understanding to reduce to fixed principles), to the quite monotony of the dead languages, and the less startling and more intelligible combinations of the letters of the alphabet. It is well, it is perfectly well. ‘Leave me to my repose’, is the motto of the sleeping and dead. You might as well ask the paralytic to leap from his chair and throw away his crutch, or, without a miracle, to ‘take up his bed and walk’, as expect the learned reader to throw down his book and think for himself. He clings to it for his intellectual support; and his dread of being left to himself is like the horror of a vacuum. He can only breathe a learned atmosphere, as other men breath common air. He is a borrower of sense. He has no ideas of his own, and must live on those of other people. The habit of supplying our ideas from foreign sources ’enfeebles all internal strength of thought’ as a course of dram drinking destroys the tone of the stomach. The faculties of the mind, when not exerted, or when cramped by custom and authority, become listless, torpid, and unfit for the purposes of thought or action. Can we wonder at the languor and lassitude which is thus produced by a life of learned sloth and ignorance; by poring over lines and syllables that excite little more idea or interest than if they were the characters of an unknown tongue, till the eye closes on vacancy, and the book drops from the feeble hand! I would rather be a wood-cutter, or the meanest hind, that all day ’sweats in the eye of Phoebus,
and at night sleeps in Elysium’, than wear out my life so, ‘twixt dreaming and awake. The learned author differs from the learned student in this, that the one transcribes what the other reads. The learned are mere literary drudges. If you set them upon original compositions their heads turn, they don’t know where they are. The indefatigable readers of books are like the everlasting copiers of pictures, who, when they attempt to do anything of their own, find they want an eye quick enough, and hand steady enough, and colours bright enough, to trace the living forms of nature.

Anyone who has passed through the regular gradations of a classical education, and is not made a fool by it, may consider himself as having had a very narrow escape. It is an old remark, that boys who shine at school do not make the greatest figure when they grow up and come out into the world. The things, in fact, which a boy is set to learn at school, and on which his success depends, are things which do not require the exercise either of the highest or the most useful faculties of the mind. Memory (and that of the lowest kind) is the chief faculty called into play in conning over and repeating lessons by rote in grammar, in languages, in geography, arithmetic, etc., so that he who has the most of this technical memory, with the least turn for other things, which have a stronger and more natural claim upon his childish attention, will make the most forward school-boy. The jargon containing the definitions of the parts of speech, the rules for casting up an account, or the inflections of a Greek verb, can have no attraction to the tyro of ten years old, except as they are imposed as a task upon him by others, of from his feeling the want of sufficient relish or amusement in other things. A lad with a sickly constitution and no very active mind, who can just retain what is pointed out to him, and has neither sagacity to distinguish, nor spirit to enjoy for himself, will generally be at the head of his form. An idler at school, on the other hand, is one who has high health and spirits, who has the free use of his limbs, with all his wits about him, who feels the circulation of his blood and the motion of his heart, who is ready to laugh and cry in a breath, and who had rather chase a ball or a butterfly, feel the open air in his face, look at the fields or the sky, follow a winding path, or enter with eagerness into all the little conflicts and interests of his acquaintances and friends, than doze over a musty spelling-book, repeat barbarous distichs, after his master, sit so many hours pinioned to a writing-desk, and receive his reward for the loss of time and pleasure in paltry prize-medals at Christmas and Midsummer. There is indeed a degree of stupidity which prevents children from learning the usual lessons, or ever arriving at these puny academic honours. But what passes for stupidity is much oftener a want of interest, of a sufficient motive to fix the attention and force a reluctant application of the dry and unmeaning pursuits of school learning. The best capacities are as much above this drudgery as the dullest are beneath it. Our men of the greatest genius have not been most distinguished for their acquirements at school or at the university.

_The enthusiast Fancy was a truant ever._

Gray and Collins were among the instances of this wayward disposition. Such persons do not think so highly of the advantages, nor can they submit their imaginations so servilely to the trammels of strict scholastic discipline. There is a certain kind and degree of intellect in which words take root, but into which things have not power to penetrate. A mediocrity of talent, with a certain slenderness of moral constitution, is the soil that produces the most brilliant specimens of successful prize-essays and Greek epigrammatists. It should not be forgotten that the least respectable character among modern politicians was the cleverest boy at Eton.

Learning is the knowledge of that which is not generally known to others, and which we can only derive at second-hand from books or other artificial sources. The knowledge of that which is before us, or about us, which appeals to our experience, passions, and pursuits, to the bosom and businesses of men, is not learning. Learning is the knowledge of that which none but the learned know. He is the most learned man who knows the most of what is farthest removed from common life and actual observation, that is of the least practical utility, and least liable to be brought to the test of experience, and that, having been handed down through the greatest number of intermediate
stages, is the most full of uncertainty, difficulties and contradictions. It is seeing with the eyes of others, hearing with their ears, and pinning our faith on their understandings. The learned man prides himself in the knowledge of names and dates, not of men or things. He thinks and cares nothing about his next-door neighbours, but is deeply read in the tribes and castes of the Hindoos and Calmuc Tartars. He can hardly find his way into the next street, though he is acquainted with the exact dimensions of Constantinople and Pekin. He does not know whether his oldest acquaintance is a knave or a fool, but he can pronounce a pompous lecture on all the principal characters in history. He cannot tell whether an object is black or white, round or square, and yet he is a professed master of the laws of optics and rules of perspective. He knows as much of what he talks about as a blind man does of colours. He cannot give a satisfactory answer to the plainest question, nor is he ever in the right in any one of his opinions upon any one matter of fact that really comes before him, and yet he gives himself out for an infallible judge on all those points, of which it is impossible that he or any other person living should know anything but by conjecture.

He is expert in all the dead and in most of the living languages; but he can neither speak his own fluently, nor write it correctly. A person of this class, the second Greek scholar of his day, undertook to point out several solecisms in Milton’s Latin style; and in all is own performance there is hardly a sentence of common English. Such was Dr. — Such is Dr. —. Such was not Porson [Richard Porson (1759-1808)]. He was an exception that confirmed the general rule, — a man that, by uniting talent and knowledge with learning, made the distinction between them more striking and palpable.

A mere scholar, who knows nothing but books, must be ignorant even of them. ‘Books do not teach the use of books.’ How should he know anything of a work who knows nothing of the subject of it? The learned pedant is conversant with books only as they are made of other books, and those again of others, without end. He parrots those who have parroted others. He can translate the same word into ten different languages, but he knows nothing of the thing which it means in any one of them. He stuffs his head with authorities built on authorities, with quotations quoted from quotations, while he locks up his senses, his understanding, and his heart. He is unacquainted with the maxims and manners of the world; he is to seek in the characters of individuals. He sees no beauty in the face of nature or of art. To him ‘the mighty world of eye and ear’ is hid; and ‘knowledge’, except at one entrance, ‘quite shut out’. His pride takes part with his ignorance, and his self-importance rises with the number of things of which he does not know the value, and which he therefore despises as unworthy of his notice. He knows nothing of pictures,—‘of the colouring of Titian, the grace of Raphael, the purity of Domenichino, the corregioscity of Correggio, the learning of Poussin, the airs of Guido, the taste of the Caracci, or the grand contour of Micheal Angelo’,—of all those glories of the Italian and miracles of the Flemish school, which have filled the eyes of mankind with delight, and to the study and imitation of which thousands have in vain devoted their lives. These are to him as if they had never been, a mere dead letter, a by-word; and no wonder, for he neither sees nor understands their prototypes in nature. A print of Rubins’ Watering place, or Claude’s Enchanted Castle, may be hanging on the walls of his rooms for months without his once perceiving them; and if you point them out to him he will turn away from them. The language of nature, or of art (which is another nature), is one that he does not understand. He repeats indeed the names of Apelles and Phidias, because they are to be found in classic authors, and boasts of their works as prodigies, because they no longer exist; or when he sees the finest remains of Grecian art actually before him in the Elgin Marbles, takes no other interest in them than as they lead to a learned dispute, and (which is the same thing) a quarrel about the meaning of a Greek particle. He is equally ignorant of music; he ‘knows no touch of it’, from the strains of the all-accomplished Mozart to the Shepherd’s pipe upon the mountain. His ears are nailed to his books; and deadened with the sound of the Greek and Latin tongues, and the din and smithery of school-learning. Does he know anything more of poetry? He knows the number of feet in a verse, and of acts in a play; but of the soul or spirit he knows nothing. He can
turn a Greek ode into English, or a Latin epigram into Greek verse; but whether either is worth the trouble he leaves to the critics. Does he understand ‘the act and practique part of life’ better than ‘the theorique’? No. He knows no liberal or mechanic art, no trade or occupation, no game of skill or chance. Learning ‘has no skill in surgery’, in agriculture, in building, or in working in wood or in iron; it cannot make any instrument of labour, or use it when made; it cannot handle the plough or the spade, or the chisel or the hammer; it knows nothing of hunting or hawking, fishing or shooting, of horses or dogs, of fencing or dancing, or cudgel-playing, or bowls or cards, or tennis, or anything else. The learned professor of all arts and sciences cannot reduce any one of them to practice, though he may contribute an account of them to an Encyclopedia. He has not the use of his hands or of his feet; he can neither run, nor walk, nor swim; and he considers all those who actually understand and can exercise any of these arts of body or mind as vulgar and mechanical men,—though to know almost any one of them in perfection requires long time and practice, with powers originally fitted, and a turn of mind particularly devoted to them. It does not require more than this to enable the learned candidate to arrive, by painful study, at a doctor’s degree and a fellowship, and to eat, drink and sleep the rest of his life!

The thing is plain. All that men really understand is confined to a very small compass; to their daily affairs and experience; to what they have an opportunity to know and motives to study or practise. The rest is affectation and imposture. The common people have the use of their limbs; for they live by their labour or skill. They understand their own business and the characters of those they have to deal with; for it is necessary that they should. They have eloquence to express their passions, and wit at will to express their contempt and provoke laughter. Their natural use of speech is not hung up in monumental mockery, in an obsolete language; nor is there sense of what is ludicrous, or readiness at finding out allusions to express it, buried in collections of Anas. You will hear more good things on the outside of a stage-coach from London to Oxford than if you were to pass a twelve month with the undergraduates, or heads of colleges, of that famous university; and more home truths are to be learnt from listening to a noisy debate in an ale house than from attending to a formal one in the House of Commons. An elderly country gentlewoman will often know more of character, and be able to illustrate it by more amusing anecdotes taken from the history of what has been said, done, and gossiped in a country town for the last fifty years, than the best blue-stocking of the age will be able to glean from that sort of learning which consists in an acquaintance with all the novels and satirical poems published in the same period.

People in towns, indeed are woefully deficient in a knowledge of character, which they see only in the bust, not as a whole-length. People in the country not only know all that has happened to a man, but trace his virtues or vices, as they do his features, in their descent through several generations, and solve some contradiction in his behaviour by a cross in the breed half a century ago. The learned know nothing of the matter, either in town or country. Above all, the mass of society have common sense, which the learned in all ages want. The vulgar are in the right when they judge for themselves; they are wrong when they trust to their blind guides. The celebrated nonconformist divine, Baxter, was almost stoned to death by the good women of Kidderminster, for asserting from the pulpit that ‘hell was paved with infants’ skulls’; but, by the force of argument, and of learned quotations from the Fathers, the reverend preacher at length prevailed over the scruples of his congregation, and over reason and humanity.

Such is the use which has been made of human learning. The labourers in this vineyard seem as if it was their object to confound all common sense, and the distinctions of good and evil, by means of traditional maxims and preconceived notions taken upon trust, and increasing in absurdity with increase of age. They pile hypotheses on hypotheses, mountain high, till it is impossible to come to the plain truth on any question. They see things, not as they are, but as they find them in books, and ‘wink and shut their apprehension up’, in order that they may discover nothing to interfere with their prejudices or convince them of their absurdity. It might be supposed that the height of human wisdom consisted in maintaining contradictions and rendering nonsense sacred.
Notes

There is no dogma, however fierce or foolish, to which these persons have not set their seals, and tried to impose on the understandings of their followers, as the will of Heaven, clothed with all the terrors and sanctions of religion. How little has the human understanding been directed to find out the true and useful! How much ingenuity has been thrown away in defense of creeds and systems! How much time and talents have been wasted in theological controversy, in law, in politics, in verbal criticism, in judicial astrology and in finding out the art of making gold! What actual benefit do we reap from the writings of a Laud or Whitgift, or of Bishop Bull or Bishop Waterland, or Prideaux’ Connections or Beausobre, or Calmet, or St Augustine, or Puffendorf, or Vattel, or from the more literal but equally learned and unprofitable labours of Scaliger, Cardan, and Scippius? How many grains of sense are there in their thousand folio or quarto volumes? What would the world lose if they were committed to the flames tomorrow? Or are they not already ‘gone to the vault of all the Capulets’? Yet all these were oracles in their time, and would have scoffed at you or me, at common sense and human nature, for differing with them. It is our turn to laugh now.

To conclude this subject. The most sensible people to be met with in society are men of business and of the world, who argue from what they see and know, instead of spinning cobweb distinctions of what things ought to be. Women have often more of what is called good sense then men. They have fewer pretensions; are less implicated in theories; and judge of objects more from their immediate and involuntary impression on the mind, and, therefore, more truly and naturally. They cannot reason wrong; for they do not reason at all. They do not think or speak by rule; and they have in general more eloquence and wit, as well as sense, on that account. By their wit, sense and eloquence together, they generally contrive to govern their husbands. Their style, when they write to their friends (not for the booksellers), is better than that of most authors. — Uneducated people have most exuberance of invention and the greatest freedom from prejudice. Shakespeare’s was evidently an uneducated mind, both in the freshness of his imagination and the variety of his views; as Milton’s was scholastic, in the texture both of his thoughts and feelings. Shakespeare had not been accustomed to write themes at school in favour of virtue or against vice. To this we owe the unaffected but healthy tone of his dramatic morality. If we wish to know the force of human genius we should read Shakespeare. If we wish to see the insignificance of human learning we may only study his commentators.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) Hazlitt’s family settled at
       (a) Maidstone   (b) Shropshire
       (c) Hackney     (d) None of these
   (ii) Hazlitt was employed as the Parliamentary reporter for the Morning Chronicle.
        (a) 1813     (b) 1812   (c) 1815     (d) 1810
   (iii) ‘Characters of Shakespeare’ was written by
          (a) Hazlitt   (b) Charles Lamb
          (c) Coleridge (d) William Wordsworth
   (iv) Leigh Hunt edited a radical journal entitled
        (a) The Examiner   (b) Edinburgh Review
        (c) English Poets   (d) None of these

17.3 Summary

- William Hazlitt has a sharp, idiomatic, familiar style. His is the pure diction and aphorism. Consciousness and propriety of words and phrases is a great characteristic of him. Its true’s
to say in the least possible space. There is always in the style of Hazlitt a certain amount of refine taste which becomes his most marked characteristic. In whatever that Hazlitt did he had an enthusiasm and a courageous spirit. It was this that enabled him to say things with a conviction and spirited. He was keen to keep in his memory certain experiences that he had come across—books that he had read, plays which he had seen; pictures that he had admired, actually, the fact was that he liked to say something’s he liked and to say them in his own way critically. In his present essay while defining artistic sensibility in the piece of art, he is fearlessly expressing an honest and individual opinion. He has his own enjoyment and his own gift for evoking unnoticed beauties. Here his judgments are based on his emotional relations rather than an objectively applied principle.

- In style Hazlitt in fact strongly contrasts with the elaborate or chest ration of the complex sentence and the magic of the delicate word tracery which we have seen in de quinsy. His brief, abrupt sentences have the vigor and directness which his views demand. His lectures are mainly of simplicity and something of the looseness of organization which is typical of good conversation. For example, “learning is in too many cases, but a foil to common sense; a substitute for true knowledge”.

- “The faculties of mind, when not exerted, or when not exerted, or when cramped by custom and authority, becomes listless, torpid, and unfit for the purposes of thought or action”.

- On the Ignorance of the Learned. “There is gusto in the coloring of Titian. Not only do his heads seem to think – his bodies seem to feel”.

- “The infinite quantity of dramatic invention in Shakespeare takes from his gusto. The power he delights to show is not intense, but discursive”.

- People, who have been nourished on the Victorian model and have grown priggish, murmur at the lack of amoral purpose in Hazlitt. It is no doubt a fact that in Hazlitt one does not discover any of such moral purpose; a theory or a principle as one finds in Ruskin, Carlyle and Arnold, neither is there the shallowness and railing of a pessimist. He has an abiding faith in human nature, a devotion to beauty and a belief and honesty –all these things being clearly exhibited in a clear and courageous style that he possessed.

- The somewhat discursive manner of his writings is a strong point with him as well as a weakness. His style is forcible and spontaneous; it progresses by means of successive traits which issue from one and the same central act of perception; subjected to the continuous light of consciousness and examined in turn under all its aspects. Such a device ensures movements, sincerity and a telling force of style. But this discontinuity in an order which is wholly organic is not entirely happy. It gives no safety against repetition and prolixity at times it wearies that mind that cannot readily perceive the logical sequence of thought, the point of departure or the goal. At bottom, extremely English and national, Hazlitt’s critical method finds, in the sufficiency of composition, the defect of its quality. Our present essay On Gusto is no exception in this manner.

17.4 Key-Words

1. Discursive manner : In a rambling manner
2. Prolixity : Long-windedness, an excess of words

17.5 Review Questions

1. Explain Hazlitt as an essayist.
2. What Hazlitt try to provide to the readers by On the Ignorance of the Learned?
3. Write a short note On the Ignorance of the Learned.
17.6 Further Readings

1. P.S. Sastri, Hazlitt selected essays, Doaba House, Delhi.
2. Geoffrey Keynes, selected essays of William Hazlitt 1778 to 1830.
Unit 18: Hazlitt - On The Ignorance of The Learned: Critical Appreciation cum Analysis

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Discuss Major Works of Hazlitt
• Examine critically On the Ignorance of the Learned.

Introduction
William Hazlitt was one of the leading prose writers of the Romantic period. Influenced by the concise social commentary in Joseph Addison’s eighteenth-century magazine, the Spectator, and by the personal tone of the essays of Michel de Montaigne, Hazlitt was one of the most celebrated practitioners of the “familiar” essay. Characterized by conversational diction and personal opinion on topics ranging from English poets to washerwomen, the style of Hazlitt’s critical and autobiographical writings has greatly influenced methods of modern writing on aesthetics. His literary criticism, particularly on the Lake poets, has also provided readers with a lens through which to view the work of his Romantic contemporaries.

18.1 Biographical Information
Hazlitt was born in Wem, Shropshire, and educated by his father, a Unitarian minister whose radical political convictions influenced the reformist principles that Hazlitt maintained throughout his life. In 1793 Hazlitt entered Hackney Theological College, a Unitarian seminary, where he studied philosophy and rhetoric and began writing the treatise on personal identity titled An Essay on the Principles of Human Action (1805). During this time Hazlitt began to question his Christian faith and, considering himself unsuited to the ministry, withdrew from the College and returned to Wem.

In 1798 Hazlitt was introduced to Samuel Taylor Coleridge whose eloquence and intellect inspired him to develop his own talents for artistic expression. Shortly afterward he followed the example of his older brother, John, and began to pursue a career as a painter. Hazlitt lived in Paris and studied the masterpieces exhibited in the Louvre, particularly portraits painted by such Italian...
masters as Raphael and Leonardo, whose technique he adopted. Commissioned by Coleridge and William Wordsworth to paint their portraits, Hazlitt spent the summer of 1803 at their homes in the Lake District. His political views and quarrelsome nature, however, offended the poets. Moreover, his moral conduct was suspect, and his friendship with them ended when he was forced to leave the Lake District in fear of reprisals for his assault on a woman. As a painter, Hazlitt achieved little success. He moved to London in 1804 and began to direct his energies toward writing.

In London Hazlitt became a close friend of Charles and Mary Lamb, at whose weekly social gatherings he became acquainted with literary society. Through the Lambs he also met Sarah Stoddart, whom he married in 1808. During this time Hazlitt wrote philosophical works that were criticized for their dense prose style. In 1811 Hazlitt began working as a journalist; he held the positions of parliamentary correspondent for the *Morning Chronicle*, drama critic and political essayist for Leigh Hunt’s *Examiner*, and columnist for the *Edinburgh Review*. The liberal political views expressed in Hazlitt’s writing incurred resentment from the editors of and contributors to Tory journals such as *Blackwood’s Magazine* and the *Quarterly Review*, who attacked Hazlitt’s works and his character. In 1818 Hazlitt published a collection of his lectures on English literature and in 1822 John Scott of the *London Magazine* invited him to contribute essays to a feature entitled “Table-Talk.” The reflective pieces he wrote were well received and are now among Hazlitt’s most acclaimed works. During this period of success, however, Hazlitt’s marriage was failing and he became involved in an unfortunate affair with the daughter of an innkeeper. He chronicled his obsession with this young woman in *Liber Amoris; or, the New Pygmalion* (1823). After a divorce from his wife, Hazlitt entered into a second unsuccessful marriage with a rich widow. He continued to write until his death in 1830, producing numerous essays, a series of sketches on the leading men of letters of the early nineteenth century entitled *The Spirit of the Age* (1825), and a biography of Napoleon Bonaparte (1826-30).

### 18.2 Major Works

Hazlitt’s most important works are often divided into two categories: literary criticism and familiar essays. Of his literary criticism Hazlitt wrote, “I say what I think: I think what I feel. I cannot help receiving certain impressions from things; and I have sufficient courage to declare (somewhat abruptly) what they are.” Representative of his critical style is *Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays* (1817), which contains subjective, often panegyrical commentary on such individual characters as Macbeth, Othello, and Hamlet. This work introduces Hazlitt’s concept of “gusto,” a term he used to refer to qualities of passion and energy that he considered necessary to great art. In accord with his impressionistic approach to literature, Hazlitt’s concept of gusto also suggests that a passionate and energetic response is the principal criterion for gauging whether or not a work achieves greatness. Hazlitt felt that Shakespeare’s sonnets lacked gusto and judged them as passionless and unengaging despite the “desperate cant of modern criticism.” Hazlitt was no less opinionated on the works of his contemporaries. In the final section of *Lectures on the English Poets* (1812) he criticized Coleridge and Wordsworth, whose emphasis on nature and the common aspects of life acknowledged, in his view, “no excellence but that which supports its own pretensions.” In addition to literature, Hazlitt also focused on drama and art in his critical essays, many of which are collected in *A View of the English Stage* (1818) and *Sketches of the Principal Picture-Galleries in England* (1824).

The many and varied familiar essays that Hazlitt wrote for magazine publication and collected in the volumes of *The Round Table*, *Table-Talk*, and *The Plain Speaker* are usually considered his finest works. Critics differentiate between the essays of *The Round Table* and those in *Table-Talk* and *The Plain Speaker*: the former contain observations on “Literature, Men, and Manners” in a style that tends to imitate the essays of Addison and Montaigne, while the latter focus on Hazlitt’s personal
experiences in a more original, conversational style. Often beginning with an aphorism, Hazlitt’s familiar essays are characterized by informal diction and an emotional tone. This informal style, in Hazlitt’s words, “promises a greater variety and richness, and perhaps a greater sincerity, than could be attained by a more precise and scholastic method.” Hazlitt described his essays as “experimental” rather than “dogmatical,” in that he preferred to use the model of common conversation to discuss ordinary human experiences rather than to write in what he believed was the abstract and artificial style of conventional nonfiction prose. Among other things, Hazlitt’s essays express discomfort with his reputation as irascible (“On Good Nature”), attack those who question his abilities as a writer (“The Indian Juggler”), extol the benefits of common sense, which, he felt, comprises “true knowledge” (“On the Ignorance of the Learned”), and otherwise defend his character.

18.3 Critical Reception

Hazlitt’s critics had a wide range of reactions to the style and content of his familiar writing. Hazlitt’s political opinions caused bitter antagonism with Coleridge and Wordsworth, as well as a great majority of his countrymen. Modern critics Harold Bloom and Lionel Trilling, however, consider Hazlitt to be “the pre-eminent master in English” in the genre of the familiar essay. In addition, many modern critics note Hazlitt’s unique ability to write on a wide range of literary subjects with a depth of taste John Keats considered one of “three things superior in the modern world.”

While modern literary historians generally agree on Hazlitt’s acumen as a critic and essayist, lively debate has continued since Hazlitt’s death on the merit of Liber Amoris, which—for good or ill—has become Hazlitt’s most puzzling legacy. An account of Hazlitt’s infatuation with Sarah Walker, Liber Amoris has been considered alternatively a pathetic attempt at catharsis, a precursor of Freudian psychoanalytic method, a personal confession, an analysis of the idea of infatuation, a critique of Romanticism, and, according to Gerald Lahey, “a parable of the entire Romantic period trying to come to terms with its flawed visionary conception of reality.” Recently the critical treatment of Liber Amoris has become something of a gauge for determining the relevance of Hazlitt’s familiar style for contemporary readers: if this, the most personal of Hazlitt’s writings, has merit beyond its autobiographical curiosity, the familiar essay may remain an effective genre in the modern period and Hazlitt’s position as a forebearer of modern literary practices will be secured.

18.4 On the Ignorance of the Learned—Critical Appreciation

This is the eighth essay in in Table Talk and it offers an intimate insight into the mind of Hazlitt. Himself learned in the old-fashioned way, he can look at the learned in a half-serious and half-humorous way.

Author and reader have the fewest ideas. There were important Rings in life than reading and writing. A person with a boo in his band has generally neither power nor inclination to note what is around him or what is in his own mind. Such a one carries his understanding in his pocket, not in his mind. He is afraid of arguing systematically on any subject, and he cannot make any unborrowed observation. He cannot think. In many cases learning is a foil to common sense, a substitute for true knowledge. Books are employed to keep the readers away from the external world. The bookworm sees only the shadows of things as they are reflected from the minds of others. Hence nature puts him out. He cannot bear the impressions of real objects. He is distracted by their variety and rapidity. Like the sleeping and the dead, he prefers to be left to his own repose. If you ask him to think for himself, it is like asking the lame one to walk without his crutches. He borrows ideas and lives on them. When the mental faculties are not exerted or when
they get cramped, they become useless for thought or action. The life of learned sloth and ignorance thus produces of kind of inertia. The learned author transcribes something and it is read by the learned student. The learned are only literary drudges.

A rigorous classical education deprives the mind of any freshness of outlook. The boys who shine at school fail to make a work in real life. What is needed to pass creditably at an examination, is not the highest or the most useful mental faculty. One needs only memory. The young student is subjected to a study of useless things and he fails to relish them. The one who succeeds in this mind of study is a boy with a sickly constitution, having no active mind. The idler at school has health and high spirits. He has all his wits about him and he enjoys everything in the world around him. When a student is said to be a stupid, it means the absence of interest, the absence of a motive to concentrate and an unwillingness to pursue the dry and unmeaning things that go by the name of learning. Men of great genius have not been distinguished scholars at school. Such were Gray and Collins who could not surrender their imagination to the chains of scholastic discipline. To be a prize-winner in an essay competition at school one must have mediocre talents and a slender moral constitution.

Learning in the knowledge of something not known to others, and it is derived at second-hand. If we have the knowledge of the past or of the present, if we have a knowledge which appeals to the feelings and activities of men, it is not learning. Learning is that knowledge which only the learned know. This knowledge is farthest removed from common life and actual observation. It has no utility and it cannot be tested by experience. It is charged with uncertainty, difficulties and contradictions. The learned man does not use his own senses. He cares nothing for his neighbours, though he knows everything about distant and remote peoples. He can give the dimensions of Constantinople, though he cannot find his way into the next street. He cannot judge his friends, but he can lecture on the characters found in history. He is never in the right in any one of his opinions, though he talks as an infallible judge. He is an expert in languages, though he cannot speak his own fluently, Dr. Bentley thus pointed many solecisms in Milton’s Latin style though Bentley could not write ordinary English. Porson was a Greek scholar and a good writer in English.

If a scholar knows nothing but books, he must be ignorant even of books. Books do not teach the use of books. The pedant is acquainted only with books that are made of other books. He knows the meaning of a word, not the things to which it refers. His mind is stored with references, quotations, and authorities. He has no touch with life and its ways. He does see beauty in nature or in art. His pride in his scholarship is accompanied with his ignorance of the things. His self-importance becomes greater as his ignorance of the value of things increases. He talks about painters and sculptors without being able to appreciate their work; for he cannot appreciate the originals of these works existing in the universe. He is ignorant of music too, for his ears are nailed to his books. He knows the number of feet in a line, or the number of acts in a drama. But he knows nothing of poetry or drama. He does not know any liberal art, nor a mechanical art, nor any game of skill or chance. Scholarship is useless in many important walks of life. The scholar will write on all these things, without being able to do any one of these. By painful study he takes his Doctor’s degree, becomes a fellow of his college or university, and leads a monotonous life. What he really understand is limited to the small range of their daily life and experience. Everything else they claim of understand is an affectation. The common people use their limbs and work. They know their business and they understand the people with whom they have dealings. They express their passions clearly; and they succeed in expressing their contempt or in provoking laughter. They do not fall back on authorities on such occasions. We have more good things outside a college campus, and more home truths in an ale-house. The elderly country gentle woman knows more of human character, and she can give better examples from life, than the fashionable ladies who talk of literature in their parlours. People in the towns know human nature
only one parts. In the country the people know the virtues or vices of a man and trace them to several generations. The man of society has common sense, and the learned lack it. The unlearned one is always right when he judges anything by himself; and he goes wrong when he trusts to the opinions of the learned.

The labourers is learning accept blindly traditional maxims and preconceived notions. Then they find it hard to come at the plain truth on any question because of the accumulation of theories. They see things as they find them in the books. They Preserve contradictions and render nonsense scared. They cherish dogmas and refuse to find out the true and the useful. Thus the scholars have wasted their intelligence and understanding in defending creeds and theories of law. The same wastage is to be found in the discussions concerning politics, alchemy, astrology, and words. The labours of these scholars like Land, Bull, Waterland, St. Augustine, Puffendorf and Vattel in the theology and law have yielded no useful results. The same is true of the theorists like Scaliger, Cardan, and Scioppius. Their works fill the vaults. Though they were important personalities in their time, we laugh at them today.

The most sensible people are the men of business. They argue from what they see and know. Women have more good sense than men. They have fewer false claims and they are not committed to theories like fanatics. They judge things more truly and naturally on the basis of their immediate impressions. They do not think or speak in accordance with a set of rules, and therefore, they have more eloquence, wit, and common sense. This enables them to govern their husbands. Their style is better when they write to their friends.

The uneducated are more inventive and they are free from prejudice. Thus the uneducated mind of Shakespeare reveals a freshness of imagination, and he has a variety of ideas. Milton was scholastic in his thoughts and feelings. Since Shakespeare was not trained as a scholar, he has an unaffected and healthy tone of dramatic morality. We should read Shakespeare, if we want to know the force of human genius. We can know the insignificance of human learning by going through the writings of Shakespeare’s commentators.

Hazlitt himself did not have a formal scholastic education Hence his violent treatment of the training of a scholar.

**Self Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Hazlitt began writing the treatise on personal identity titled
   (a) An essay on the Principles of Human Action
   (b) Morning Chronicle
   (c) Edinburgh Review
   (d) London Magazine

   (ii) Hazlitt was introduced to Samuel Taylor Coleridge in
   (a) 1798 (b) 1795 (c) 1790 (d) 1785

   (iii) On the Ignorance of the Learned is the ...... essay in Table Talk.
   (a) Second (b) Fourth
   (c) Fifth (d) Eighth

   (iv) The boys who shine at schools ...... to make a work in real life
   (a) Succeed (b) Fail
   (c) Both a and b (d) None of these
18.5 Summary

- One of the triumvirate of eminent romantic essayists—Lamb, De Quincy and Hazlitt—Hazlitt is the least mannered or rather eccentric. While in Lamb’s and De Quincy emotion and imagination relegated the fast and the analytical to the insignificant, Hazlitt’s is a futile blend of emotion and thought, passion and logic imagination and analysis, the real and the romantic. However, he is famous for the lucidity and brilliance, in both style and content, of his many essays. Fully endowed with the ability of soaring in an imaginative flight, as in his essays On the Picturesque and Ideal and On a Sundial, his dominating bias was however for a union of romantic temperament and classical vigour. The resulting essays, including Common Sense on Fashion, On the want of Money and On Nicknames have the fine-wrought grace of the golden mean. His prose displays the same discrimination between the vulgar and the otiose, for he had a Wordsworthian faith in the simple and the sincere.

- The Round Table, Table Talk and The Plain Speaker cover a variety of subjects ranging from art and philosophy to politics and prizefighting. These works helped to establish Hazlitt’s reputation as the most versatile critic of his day. The Spirit of the Age, a work that is regarded as his critical masterpiece, contains valuable biographical sketches of these writers and of other contemporary intellectual leaders. William Hazlitt was not only acquainted with that point of view as it appeared in books, but had the advantage of knowing the authors personally, and hearing their informal discussions of of individual writers. Further, Hazlitt lectured extensively on English drama: Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays, Lectures on the English Poets, Views of the English Stage, Essays on the English Comic Writers, and Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth. With these works Hazlitt established himself as one of the foremost literary critics of the romantic period and as a master of the informal essay.

- The romantics are renowned for expatiating at length upon the relatively trivial, and Hazlitt is no exception. Hazlitt has the romanticism to turn the humble topic of nicknames into an elaborate and animated discussion. A Juliet may contend that ‘a rose called by any other name would smell as sweet’, but Hazlitt describes how nicknames alter our perception of a person. To use the analogy of reflection used by Addison, the same person appears distorted when seen through the medium of nicknames.

- Whether in his literary essays on in his essays about everyday life, Hazlitt amazes the reader with his logical rigour. He points out that the basis of nicknames is a perception of difference or distinction: ‘The only meaning of those vulgar nicknames... is that others differ from you in some respect or other’ (whether it be opinion, dress, clime or complexion).

- Ironically, those who give nicknames often forget that those who have been given such opprobrious names have the same right to confer equally repulsive nicknames on the same principle of difference. Further, nicknames, as he points out with admirable logic, are effective only because they do not require any material proof, any causal evidence. Finally nicknames are much more effective than direct charges simply because while direct charges can be refuted, ‘a nickname baffles reply by the very vagueness of the influences from it’. Hazlitt also answers the question as to whom or what kind of men uses nicknames. He feels that it is the hidden enemies, the cowards and the hypocrites who use nicknames.

- Hazlitt is the erudite among the romantic essayists, like Coleridge among the romantic poets. He uses ordinary proverbs – ‘Give a dog an ill name and hang him’ – as well as learned or foreign phrases, such as causa causal causa causatic. But his greatest virtuosity lies in his idolizations of literary quotations from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, Cymbeline, Julius Caesar, as well as numerous others from Southey, Foxe, Male, Voltare & so on.
• But Hazlitt is no analytical Bacon, for his analysis and erudition are always tempered by a romantic and personal passion.

• He reproaches the ‘vulgarity’ and ‘violence’ of those who give nicknames. On the other hand, he evidences his personal pathos and gentleness when he speaks of the endearing use of nicknames by a man like Dr. Johnson who called Goldsmith ‘Goldy’. Hazlitt’s humour is evident in the recounting of an anecdote about how an entire hall reverberated with the name of ‘Dr. Topping’ when he initially failed to respond to his name.

• As for his prose, Hazlitt the romantic has a greater affinity with Wordsworth than with Lamb. While Lamb is notorious for his idiosyncratic words and phrases, Hazlitt takes meticulous care to render them comprehensible the deity. In his essay On Familiar Style he objects to Dr. Johnson’s classical use of language for his tale, ‘opaque words’ and ‘words with the greatest number of syllables’. His very beginning suggests the lucidity of his language.

• This is a more important subject than it seems at first sight. The variety of his sentence construction is the other hand, evident in occasional complex structures: “What are one half the convulsions of the civilized world-The frequent overthrow of states and kingdoms - the shock and hostile encounters of mighty continents.” Here to quote few more lucid phrases: “The art of pleasing consists in being pleased.

• In his essay “On the ignorance of the learned”, William Hazlitt says, about the learned people, “He Knows as much of what he talks about, as a blind man does of colors.” Hazlitt in his essay on the ‘Ignorance of the Learned’ teaches much the same doctrine. Its general truth is indisputable, though Bagehot himself makes exception in favor of Sir Walter Scott. But the two famous critics are united in their conviction that learned people are generally dull, and that books which are the work of habitual writers are not amusing.

18.6 Key-Words

1. For the more : from Samuel Butler’s (1612 — 1680) Hudibras, a satire.
2. Chaldee : the language of Chaldeans
4. Lounger : Idler, one who saunters or strolls.
5. In his pocket : In the book which he keeps in his pocket.
6. Efface : remove, obliterate
7. Spectacles : media of vision
8. Puts him out : disconcerts, confuses, annoys, or irritates him.

18.7 Review Questions

1. Briefly explain the essay ‘On the Ignorance of the Learned.’
2. What are Hazlitt major works? Discuss.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (d) (iv) (b)

18.8 Further Readings

1. P.S. Sastri, Hazlitt selected essays, Doaba House, Delhi.
2. Geoffrey Keynes, selected essays of William Hazlitt 1778 to 1830.
Unit 19: David Hume- Of Essay Writing: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about David Hume’s life and works
• Discuss Of Essay Writing by Hume

Introduction
David Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume is often grouped with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others as a British Empiricist.

Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic “science of man” that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In stark opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behavior, saying: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” A prominent figure in the sceptical philosophical tradition and a strong empiricist, he argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding instead that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. Thus he divides perceptions between strong and lively “impressions” or direct sensations and fainter “ideas”, which are copied from impressions. He developed the position that mental behaviour is governed by “custom”, that is acquired ability; our use of induction, for example, is justified only by our idea of the “constant conjunction” of causes and effects. Without direct impressions of a metaphysical “self”, he concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.

Hume advocated a compatibilist theory of free will that proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles. Hume also examined the normative is–ought problem. He held notoriously ambiguous views of Christianity, but famously challenged the argument from design in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1777).
Kant credited Hume with waking him up from his “dogmatic slumbers” and Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, and other movements and thinkers. The philosopher Jerry Fodor proclaimed Hume’s Treatise “the founding document of cognitive science”. Also famous as a prose stylist, Hume pioneered the essay as a literary genre and engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume’s influence on his economics and political philosophy), James Boswell, Joseph Butler, and Thomas Reid.

19.1 Life and Works

David Hume, originally David Home, son of Joseph Home of Chirnside, advocate, and Katherine Falconer, was born on 26 April 1711 (Old Style) in a tenement on the north side of the Lawnmarket in Edinburgh. He changed the spelling of his name in 1734, because the fact that his surname ‘Home’ was pronounced ‘Hume’ in Scotland was not known in England. Throughout his life Hume, who never married, spent time occasionally at his family home at Ninewells by Chirnside, Berwickshire, which had belonged to his family since the sixteenth century.

Education

An engraving of Hume from his The History of England Vol. I (1754) Hume attended the University of Edinburgh at the unusually early age of twelve (possibly as young as ten) at a time when fourteen was normal. At first he considered a career in law, but came to have, in his words, “an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of Philosophy and general Learning; and while [my family] fancied I was poring over Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the Authors which I was secretly devouring.” He had little respect for the professors of his time, telling a friend in 1735, “there is nothing to be learnt from a Professor, which is not to be met with in Books.”

Hume made a philosophical discovery that opened up to him “…a new Scene of Thought,” which inspired him “…to throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it.” He did not recount what this “Scene” was, and commentators have offered a variety of speculations. Due to this inspiration, Hume set out to spend a minimum of ten years reading and writing. He came to the verge of nervous breakdown, after which he decided to have a more active life to better continue his learning.

Career

As Hume’s options lay between a travelling tutorship and a stool in a merchant’s office, he chose the latter. In 1734, after a few months occupied with commerce in Bristol, he went to La Flèche in Anjou, France. There he had frequent discourse with the Jesuits of the College of La Flèche. As he had spent most of his savings during his four years there while writing A Treatise of Human Nature, he resolved “to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except the improvements of my talents in literature”. He completed the Treatise at the age of 26.

Although many scholars today consider the Treatise to be Hume’s most important work and one of the most important books in Western philosophy, the critics in Great Britain at the time did not agree, describing it as “abstract and unintelligible”. Despite the disappointment, Hume later wrote, “Being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I soon recovered from the blow and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country”. There, he wrote the Abstract Without revealing his authorship, he aimed to make his larger work more intelligible.

After the publication of Essays Moral and Political in 1744, Hume applied for the Chair of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. However, the position was
given to William Cleghorn, after Edinburgh ministers petitioned the town council not to appoint Hume because he was seen as an atheist.

During the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion, Hume tutored the Marquis of Annandale (1720–92), who was officially described as a “lunatic”. This engagement ended in disarray after about a year. But it was then that Hume started his great historical work The History of England, which took fifteen years and ran over a million words, to be published in six volumes in the period between 1754 and 1762, while also involved with the Canongate Theatre. In this context, he associated with Lord Monboddo and other Scottish Enlightenment luminaries in Edinburgh. From 1746, Hume served for three years as secretary to Lieutenant-General St Clair, and wrote *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, later published as *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. The Enquiry proved little more successful than the *Treatise*.

Hume was charged with heresy, but he was defended by his young clerical friends, who argued that—as an atheist—he was outside the Church’s jurisdiction. Despite his acquittal, Hume failed to gain the chair of philosophy at the University of Glasgow.

It was after returning to Edinburgh in 1752, as he wrote in *My Own Life*, that “the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office from which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a large library”. This resource enabled him to continue historical research for *The History of England*.

Hume achieved great literary fame as a historian. His enormous *The History of England*, tracing events from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688, was a best-seller in its day. In it, Hume presented political person as a creature of habit, with a disposition to submit quietly to established government unless confronted by uncertain circumstances. In his view, only religious difference could deflect people from their everyday lives to think about political matters.

Hume’s volume of *Political Discourses* (published by Kincaid & Donaldson, 1752) was the only work he considered successful on first publication.

Religion

Tomb of David Hume in Edinburgh Hume wrote a great deal on religion. The question of what were Hume’s personal views on religion is a difficult one. The Church of Scotland seriously considered bringing charges of infidelity against him.

In works such as *On Superstition and Enthusiasm*, Hume specifically seems to support the standard religious views of his time and place. This still meant that he could be very critical of the Catholic Church, referring to it with the standard Protestant epithets and descriptions of it as superstition and idolatry as well as dismissing what his compatriots saw as uncivilised beliefs. He also considered extreme Protestant sects, which he called *enthusiasts*, to be corrupters of religion. Yet he also put forward arguments that suggested that polytheism had much to commend it in preference to monotheism.

It is likely that Hume was sceptical both about religious belief (at least as demanded by the religious organisations of his time) and of the complete atheism promoted by such contemporaries as Baron d’Holbach. Paul Russell suggests that perhaps Hume’s position is best characterised by the term “irreligion”. O’Connor (2001, p19) writes that Hume “did not believe in the God of standard theism... but he did not rule out all concepts of deity”. Also, “ambiguity suited his purposes, and this creates difficulty in definitively pinning down his final position on religion”. When asked if he was an atheist, Hume would say he did not have enough faith to believe there was no god.

The perception of Hume as an atheist with an axe to grind is an oversimplification and contrasts his views on extremist positioning. Hanvelt dubs Hume as an Aristotelian in his view that rhetoric is a form of ethical studies, which ultimately make it political.

Later Years

From 1763 to 1765, Hume was secretary to Lord Hertford in Paris. He met and later fell out with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He wrote of his Paris life, “I really wish often for the plain roughness of
The Poker Club of Edinburgh ... to correct and qualify so much lusciousness.” For a year from 1767, Hume held the appointment of Under Secretary of State for the Northern Department. In 1768 he settled in Edinburgh where he lived from 1771 until his death in 1776 at the south-west corner of St. Andrew’s Square in Edinburgh’s New Town, at what is now 21 Saint David Street. (A popular story, consistent with some historical evidence, suggests the street was named after Hume.) James Boswell saw Hume a few weeks before his death (which was from some form of abdominal cancer). Hume told him he sincerely believed it a “most unreasonable fancy” that there might be life after death. This meeting was dramatized in semi-fictional form for the BBC by Michael Ignatieff as Dialogue in the Dark. Hume asked that he be interred in a “simple roman tomb.” In his will he requests that it be inscribed only with his name and the year of his birth and death, “leaving it to Posterity to add the Rest.” It stands, as he wished it, on the south-western slope of Calton Hill, in the Old Calton Cemetery.

19.2 As Historian of England

In 1754 to 1762 Hume published the History of England, a 6-volume work of immense sweep, which extends, says its subtitle, “From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688”. Inspired by Voltaire’s sense of the breadth of history, Hume widened the focus of history, away from merely Kings, Parliaments, and armies, to literature and science as well. He argued that the quest for liberty was the highest standard for judging the past, and concluded that after considerable fluctuation, England at the time of his writing had achieved “the most entire system of liberty, that was ever known amongst mankind.”

Hume’s coverage of the political upheavals of the 17th century relied in large part on the Earl of Clarendon’s History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (1646-69). Generally Hume took a moderate Royalist position and thought revolution was unnecessary. Hume’s indeed was considered a Tory history, and emphasized religious differences more than constitutional issues. He was anti-Presbyterian, anti-Puritan, anti-Whig, and pro-monarchy. Historians have debated whether Hume posited a universal unchanging human nature, or allowed for evolution and development. Hume was an early cultural historian of science. His short biographies of leading scientists explored the process of scientific change. He developed new ways of seeing scientists in the context of their times by looking at how they interacted with society and each other. He covers over forty scientists, with special attention paid to Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton. Hume awarded the palm of greatness to William Harvey.

The History sold well and was influential for nearly a century when it was superseded by Goldsmith’s history (which itself was partly plagiarized from Hume’s). By 1894, there were at least 50 editions. There was also an often-reprinted abridgement, The Student’s Hume (1859).

Thought

A statue of Hume by Alexander Stoddard on the Royal Mile in Edinburgh In the introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes “Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, more or less, to human nature ... Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man”. Also, “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, and the method for this science assumes “experience and observation” as the foundations of a logical argument. Because “Hume’s plan is to extend to philosophy in general the methodological limitations of Newtonian physics”, Hume is characterised as an empiricist. Until recently, Hume was seen as a forerunner of the logical positivist movement; a form of anti-metaphysical empiricism. According to the logical positivists, unless a statement could be verified by experience, or else was true or false by definition (i.e. either tautological or contradictory), then it was meaningless (this is a summary statement of their verification principle). Hume, on this view, was a proto-positivist, who, in his philosophical writings, attempted to demonstrate how
ordinary propositions about objects, causal relations, the self, and so on, are semantically equivalent to propositions about one’s experiences.

Many commentators have since rejected this understanding of Humean empiricism, stressing an epistemological, rather than a semantic reading of his project. According to this view, Hume’s empiricism consisted in the idea that it is our knowledge, and not our ability to conceive, that is restricted to what can be experienced. To be sure, Hume thought that we can form beliefs about that which extends beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as custom and the imagination, but he was skeptical about claims to knowledge on this basis.

Induction

Few philosophers are as associated with induction as David Hume; but Hume himself rarely used the term and when he did, he used it to support a point he was arguing. He made no indication that he saw any problem with induction. Induction became associated with Hume only in the early twentieth century; John Maynard Keynes may have been the first to draw the connection. The connection is now standard, but is based on what current scholars mean by “induction”, not how Hume used the term in his writings.

The cornerstone of Hume’s epistemology is the problem of induction. This may be the area of Hume’s thought where his scepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced. Understanding the problem of induction is central to grasping Hume’s philosophical system.

The problem concerns the explanation of how we are able to make inductive inferences. Inductive inference is reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved; as Hume says, it is a question of how things behave when they go “beyond the present testimony of the senses, and the records of our memory”. Hume notices that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner; i.e., that patterns in the behaviour of objects will persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present. This persistence of regularities is sometimes called Uniformitarianism or the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

Hume’s argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties, and both of these are inadequate. The two sorts are: (1) demonstrative reasoning, and (2) probable reasoning. With regard to (1), Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is “consistent and conceivable” that nature might stop being regular. Turning to (2), Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past, as this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question: it would be circular reasoning. Thus no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences.

Hume’s solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human ability to make inductive inferences. He asserts that “Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable [sic] necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel”. Although many modern commentators have demurred from Hume’s solution, some have notably concurred with it, seeing his analysis of our epistemic predicament as a major contribution to the theory of knowledge. For example, philosopher John D. Kenyon writes:

Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment in the study, but the forces of nature will soon overcome that artificial skepticism, and the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief.

Causation

The notion of causation is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation. There are three main interpretations of Hume’s theory
of causation represented in the literature: (1) the logical positivist; (2) the skeptical realist; and (3) the quasi-realist.

The logical positivist interpretation is that Hume analyses causal propositions, such as “A caused B”, in terms of regularities in perception: “A caused B” is equivalent to “Whenever A-type events happen, B-type ones follow”, where “whenever” refers to all possible perceptions.

power and necessity... are... qualities of perceptions, not of objects... felt by the soul and not perceived externally in bodies This view is rejected by sceptical realists, who argue that Hume thought that causation amounts to more than just the regular succession of events. When two events are causally conjoined, a necessary connection underpins the conjunction:

Shall we rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By no means ... there is a necessary connexion to be taken into consideration.

Hume held that we have no perceptual access to the necessary connection, hence skepticism, but we are naturally compelled to believe in its objective existence, ergo realism. He thus concluded that there are no necessary connections, only constant conjunctions.

Referring to the Law of Causality, Hume wrote, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause.” It has been argued that, while Hume did not think causation is reducible to pure regularity, he was not a fully fledged realist either: Simon Blackburn calls this a quasi-realist reading. On this view, talk about causal necessity is an expression of a functional change in the human mind, whereby certain events are predicted or anticipated on the basis of prior experience. The expression of causal necessity is a “projection” of the functional change onto the objects involved in the causal connection: in Hume’s words, “nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion.”

The Self

According to the standard interpretation of Hume on personal identity, he was a bundle theorist, who held that the self is nothing but a bundle of experiences (“perceptions”) linked by the relations of causation and resemblance; or, more accurately, that the empirically warranted idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle. This view is forwarded by, for example, positivist interpreters, who saw Hume as suggesting that terms such as “self”, “person”, or “mind” referred to collections of “sense-contents”. A modern-day version of the bundle theory of the mind has been advanced by Derek Parfit in his Reasons and Persons (1986).

However, some philosophers have criticised the bundle-theory interpretation of Hume on personal identity. They argue that distinct selves can have perceptions that stand in relations of similarity and causality with one another. Thus perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct “bundles” before they can be associated according to the relations of similarity and causality: in other words, the mind must already possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Since the bundle-theory interpretation portrays Hume as answering an ontological question, philosophers who see Hume as not very concerned with such questions have queried whether the view is really Hume’s, or “only a decoy”. Instead, it is suggested, Hume might have been answering an epistemological question, about the causal origin of our concept of the self. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume declares himself dissatisfied with his account of the self in Book 1 of the Treatise, and the question of why he is dissatisfied has received a number of different answers. Another interpretation of Hume’s view of the self has been argued for by James Giles. According to this view, Hume is not arguing for a bundle theory, which is a form of reductionism, but rather for an eliminative view of the self. That is, rather than reducing the self to a bundle of perceptions, Hume is rejecting the idea of the self altogether. On this interpretation Hume is proposing a ‘No-Self Theory’ and thus has much in common with Buddhist thought. Alison Gopnik has argued that Hume was in a position to learn about Buddhist thought during his time in France in the 1730s.
Practical Reason

Hume’s anti-rationalism informed much of his theory of belief and knowledge, in his treatment of the notions of induction, causation, and the external world. But it was not confined to this sphere, and permeated just as strongly his theories of motivation, action, and morality. In a famous sentence in the *Treatise*, Hume circumscribes reason’s role in the production of action: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. It has been suggested that this position can be lucidly brought out through the metaphor of “direction of fit”: beliefs—the paradigmatic products of reason—are propositional attitudes that aim to have their content fit the world; conversely, desires—or what Hume calls passions, or sentiments—are states that aim to fit the world to their contents. Though a metaphor, it has been argued that this intuitive way of understanding Hume’s theory that desires are necessary for motivation “captures something quite deep in our thought about their nature”. Hume’s anti-rationalism has been very influential, and defended in contemporary philosophy of action by neo-Humeans such as Michael Smith and Simon Blackburn.  The major opponents of the Humean view are cognitivists about what it is to act for a reason, such as John McDowell, and Kantians, such as Christine Korsgaard.

Ethics

Is–ought problem Hume’s views on human motivation and action formed the cornerstone of his ethical theory: he conceived moral or ethical sentiments to be intrinsically motivating, or the providers of reasons for action. Given that one cannot be motivated by reason alone, requiring the input of the passions, Hume argued that reason cannot be behind morality.

Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. Hume’s sentimentalism about morality was shared by his close friend Adam Smith, and Hume and Smith were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of Francis Hutcheson.

Hume’s theory of ethics has been influential in modern day metaethical theory, helping to inspire various forms of emotivism, error theory and ethical expressivism and non-cognitivism and Allan Gibbard.

Free Will, Determinism, and Responsibility

Hume, along with Thomas Hobbes, is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of freedom and determinism. The thesis of compatibilism seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist belief that human beings are part of a deterministic universe, whose happenings are governed by the laws of physics.

Hume argued that the dispute about the compatibility of freedom and determinism has been kept afloat by ambiguous terminology: From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot... we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the expression. Hume defines the concepts of “necessity” and “liberty” as follows:

Necessity: “the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together..” Liberty: “a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will. Hume then argues that, according to these definitions, not only are the two compatible, but Liberty requires Necessity. For if our actions were not necessitated in the above sense, they would “...have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other.” But if our actions are not thus hooked up to the will, then our actions can never be free: they would be matters of “chance; which is universally allowed not to exist”.

Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that in order to be held morally responsible, it is required that our behaviour be caused, i.e. necessitated, for Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and
perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. This argument has inspired modern day commentators. However, it has been argued that the issue of whether or not we hold one another morally responsible does not ultimately depend on the truth or falsity of a metaphysical thesis such as determinism, for our so holding one another is a non-rational human sentiment that is not predicated on such theses. For this influential argument, which is still made in a Humean vein, see P. F. Strawson’s essay, *Freedom and Resentment*.

### 19.3 Problem of Miracles

In his discussion of miracles in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (Section 10) Hume defines a miracle as “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent”. Given that Hume argues that it is impossible to deduce the existence of a Deity from the existence of the world (for he says that causes cannot be determined from effects), miracles (including prophecy) are the only possible support he would conceivably allow for theistic religions.

Hume discusses everyday belief as often resulted from probability, where we believe an event that has occurred most often as being most likely, but that we also subtract the weighting of the less common event from that of the more common event. In the context of miracles, this means that a miraculous event should be labelled a miracle only where it would be even more unbelievable (by principles of probability) for it not to be. Hume mostly discusses miracles as testimony, of which he writes that when a person reports a miraculous event we [need to] balance our belief in their veracity against our belief that such events do not occur. Following this rule, only where it is considered, as a result of experience, less likely that the testimony is false than that a miracle occur should we believe in miracles.

Although Hume leaves open the possibility for miracles to occur and be reported, he offers various arguments against this ever having happened in history:

- People often lie, and they have good reasons to lie about miracles occurring either because they believe they are doing so for the benefit of their religion or because of the fame that results.
- People by nature enjoy relating miracles they have heard without caring for their veracity and thus miracles are easily transmitted even where false.
- Hume notes that miracles seem to occur mostly in “ignorant” and “barbarous” nations and times, and the reason they don’t occur in the “civilized” societies is such societies aren’t awed by what they know to be natural events.
- The miracles of each religion argue against all other religions and their miracles, and so even if a proportion of all reported miracles across the world fit Hume’s requirement for belief, the miracles of each religion make the other less likely.

Despite all this Hume observes that belief in miracles is popular, and that “The gazing populace receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition and promotes wonder”. Critics have argued that Hume’s position assumes the character of miracles and natural laws prior to any specific examination of miracle claims, and thus it amounts to a subtle form of begging the question. They have also noted that it requires an appeal to inductive inference, as none have observed every part of nature or examined every possible miracle claim (e.g., those yet future to the observer), which in Hume’s philosophy was especially problematic.

Hume’s main argument concerning miracles is the following. Miracles by definition are singular events that differ from the established Laws of Nature. The Laws of Nature are codified as a result of past experiences. Therefore a miracle is a violation of all prior experience. However the probability that something has occurred in contradiction of all past experience should always be judged to be
less than the probability that either my senses have deceived me or the person recounting the miraculous occurrence is lying or mistaken, all of which I have past experience of. For Hume, this refusal to grant credence does not guarantee correctness – he offers the example of an Indian Prince, who having grown up in a hot country refuses to believe that water has frozen. By Hume’s lights this refusal is not wrong and the Prince is thinking correctly; it is presumably only when he has had extensive experience of the freezing of water that he has warrant to believe that the event could occur. So for Hume, either the miraculous event will become a recurrent event or else it will never be rational to believe it occurred. The connection to religious belief is left inexplicit throughout, save for the close of his discussion wherein Hume notes the reliance of Christianity upon testimony of miraculous occurrences and makes an ironic remark that anyone who “is moved by faith to assent” to revealed testimony “is aware of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.”

**Design Argument**

Anthropic principle and Problem of evil One of the oldest and most popular arguments for the existence of God is the design argument: that order and “purpose” in the world bespeaks a divine origin. Hume gave a criticism of the design argument in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Firstly, Hume argued that for the design argument to be feasible, it must be true that order and purpose are observed only when they result from design. But order is often observed to result from presumably mindless processes like the generation of snowflakes and crystals. Design can account for only a tiny part of our experience of order. Second, that the design argument is based on an incomplete analogy: because of our experience with objects, we can recognise human-designed ones, comparing for example a pile of stones and a brick wall. But in order to point to a designed universe, we would need to have an experience of a range of different universes. As we only experience one, the analogy cannot be applied. Next, even if the design argument is completely successful, it could not in and of itself establish a robust theism; one could easily reach the conclusion that the universe’s configuration is the result of some morally ambiguous, possibly unintelligent agent or agents whose method bears only a remote similarity to human design. Furthermore, if a well-ordered natural world requires a special designer, then God’s mind (being so well-ordered) also requires a special designer. And then this designer would likewise need a designer, and so on ad infinitum. We could respond by resting content with an inexplicably self-ordered divine mind; but then why not rest content with an inexplicably self-ordered natural world? Finally, Hume advanced a version of the Anthropic Principle. Often, where it appears that an object has a particular feature in order to secure some goal, is in fact the result of a filtering process. That is, the object wouldn’t be around did it not possess that feature, and the perceived purpose is only interesting to us as a human projection of goals onto nature. This mechanical explanation of teleology anticipated the notion of natural selection.

**19.4 Political and Economic Theory**

**Political Theory**

It is difficult to categorize Hume’s political affiliations. His thought contains elements that are, in modern terms, both conservative and liberal, as well as ones that are both contractarian and utilitarian, though these terms are all anachronistic. Thomas Jefferson banned Hume’s *History* from the University of Virginia, fearing that it “has spread universal toryism over the land”. Yet, Samuel Johnson thought Hume “a Tory by chance... for he has no principle. If he is anything, he
is a Hobbist”. His central concern is to show the importance of the rule of law, and stresses throughout his political Essays the importance of moderation in politics. This outlook needs to be seen within the historical context of eighteenth century Scotland, where the legacy of religious civil war, combined with the relatively recent memory of the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite risings, fostered in a historian such as Hume a distaste for enthusiasm and factionalism that appeared to threaten the fragile and nascent political and social stability of a country that was deeply politically and religiously divided. He thinks that society is best governed by a general and impartial system of laws, based principally on the “artifice” of contract; he is less concerned about the form of government that administers these laws, so long as it does so fairly (though he thought that republics were more likely to do so than monarchies).

Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious tyranny. However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain’s two political parties, the Whigs and the Tories. Hume writes My views of things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of persons to Tory prejudices.

McArthur says that Hume believed that we should try to balance our demands for liberty with the need for strong authority, without sacrificing either. McArthur characterizes Hume as a ‘precautionary conservative’, whose actions would have been “determined by prudential concerns about the consequences of change, which often demand we ignore our own principles about what is ideal or even legitimate”. He supported liberty of the press, and was sympathetic to democracy, when suitably constrained. Douglass Adair has argued that Hume was a major inspiration for James Madison’s writings, and the Federalist No. 10 in particular. Hume was also, in general, an optimist about social progress, believing that, thanks to the economic development that comes with the expansion of trade, societies progress from a state of “barbarism” to one of “civilisation”. Civilised societies are open, peaceful and sociable, and their citizens are as a result much happier. It is therefore not fair to characterise him, as Leslie Stephen did, as favouring “…that stagnation which is the natural ideal of a skeptic.”

Though it has been suggested Hume had no positive vision of the best society, he in fact produced an essay titled Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, which lays out what he thought was the best form of government. His pragmatism shone through, however, in his caveat that we should only seek to implement such a system should an opportunity present itself, which would not upset established structures. He defended a strict separation of powers, decentralisation, extending the franchise to anyone who held property of value and limiting the power of the clergy. The Swiss militia system was proposed as the best form of protection. Elections were to take place on an annual basis and representatives were to be unpaid. It is also important to note that the ideal commonwealth laid out by Hume was held to be ideal only for the British Isles in the 18th century. According to Hume “good constitutions... will ensure that the private interest of men, even of bad men, will controlled and directed as to serve and produce the public good. Such is the aim of free government, which Hume calls the “happiest” society... Liberty in the sense of free government is, Hume says, “the perfection of civil society”... The wise statement in attempting to improve a constitution will adapt his innovations to the “ancient fabric”, so as not to disturb society. His caution may be reinforced by reflections on the limits of human foresight”.

Contributions to Economic Thought

Through his discussions on politics, Hume developed many ideas that are prevalent in the field of economics. This includes ideas on private property, inflation, and foreign trade.

In contrast to Locke, Hume believes that private property isn’t a natural right. Hume argues it is justified, because resources are limited. Private property would be an unjustified, “idle ceremonial”, if all goods were unlimited and available freely. Hume also believed in an unequal distribution of
property, because perfect equality would destroy the ideas of thrift and industry. Perfect equality would thus lead to impoverishment.

**Influence**

Attention to Hume’s philosophical works grew after the German philosopher Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from “dogmatic slumbers”.

According to Schopenhauer, “there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and Schleiermacher taken together”.

A. J. Ayer (1936), introducing his classic exposition of logical positivism, claimed: “The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume.” Albert Einstein (1915) wrote that he was inspired by Hume’s positivism when formulating his Special Theory of Relativity. Hume was called “the prophet of the Wittgensteinian revolution” by N. Phillipson, referring to his view that mathematics and logic are closed systems, disguised tautologies, and have no relation to the world of experience. David Fate Norton (1993) asserted that Hume was “the first post-sceptical philosopher of the early modern period”.

Hume’s Problem of Induction was also of fundamental importance to the philosophy of Karl Popper. In his autobiography, *Unended Quest*, he wrote: “Knowledge ... is objective; and it is hypothetical or conjectural. This way of looking at the problem made it possible for me to reformulate Hume’s problem of induction”. This insight resulted in Popper’s major work *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*.

“I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified”.

**19.5 Text—Of Essay Writing**

The legent Part of Mankind, who are not immers’d in the animal Life, but employ themselves in the Operations of the Mind, may be divided into the learned and conversible.

The Learned are such as have chosen for their Portion the higher and more difficult Operations of the Mind, which require Leisure and Solitude, and cannot be brought to Perfection, without long Preparation and severe Labour. The conversible World join to a sociable Disposition, and a Taste of Pleasure, an Inclination to the easier and more gentle Exercises of the Understanding, to obvious Reflections on human Affairs, and the Duties of common Life, and to the Observation of the Blemishes or Perfections of the particular Objects, that surround them. Such Subjects of Thought furnish not sufficient Employment in Solitude, but require the Company and Conversation of our Fellow-Creatures, to render them a proper Exercise for the Mind: And this brings Mankind together in Society, where every one displays his Thoughts and Observations in the best Manner he is able, and mutually gives and receives Information, as well as Pleasure.

The Separation of the Learned from the conversible World seems to have been the great Defect of the last Age, and must have had a very bad Influence both on Books and Company: For what Possibility is there of finding Topics of Conversation fit for the Entertainment of rational Creatures, without having Recourse sometimes to History, Poetry, Politics, and the more obvious Principles, at least, of Philosophy? Must our whole Discourse be a continued Series of gossipping Stories and idle Remarks? Must the Mind never rise higher, but be perpetually Stun’d and worn out with endless Chat Of WILL did this, and NAN said that.*2  This wou’d be to render the Time spent in Company the most unentertaining, as well as the most unprofitable Part of our Lives.

On the other Hand, Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded from the World and good Company. By that Means, every Thing of what we call Belles Lettres* became totally barbarous, being cultivated by Men without any Taste of Life or Manners, and without that Liberty and Facility of Thought and Expression, which can only be acquir’d by
Conversation. Even Philosophy went to Wrack by this moaping recluse Method of Study, and became as chimerical in her Conclusions as she was unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of Delivery. And indeed, what cou’d be expected from Men who never consulted Experience in any of their Reasonings, or who never search’d for that Experience, where alone it is to be found, in common Life and Conversation?

’Tis with great Pleasure I observe, That Men of Letters, in this Age, have lost, in a great Measure, that Shyness and Bashfulness of Temper, which kept them at a Distance from Mankind; and, at the same Time, That Men of the World are proud of borrowing from Books their most agreeable Topics of Conversation. ’Tis to be hop’d, that this League betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds, which is so happily begun, will be still farther improv’d to their mutual Advantage; and to that End, I know nothing more advantageous than such Essays as these with which I endeavour to entertain the Public. In this View, I cannot but consider myself as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation; and shall think it my constant Duty to promote a good Correspondence betwixt these two States, which have so great a Dependence on each other. I shall give Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour to import into Company whatever Commodities I find in my native Country proper for their Use and Entertainment. The Balance of Trade we need not be jealous of, nor will there be any Difficulty to preserve it on both Sides. The Materials of this Commerce must chiefly be furnish’d by Conversation and common Life: The manufacturing of them alone belongs to Learning.

As ’twou’d be an unpardonable Negligence in an Ambassador not to pay his Respects to the Sovereign of the State where he is commission’d to reside; so it wou’d be altogether inexcusable in me not to address myself, with a particular Respect, to the Fair Sex, who are the Sovereigns of the Empire of Conversation. I approach them with Reverence; and were not my Countrymen, the Learned, a stubborn independent Race of Mortals, extremely jealous of their Liberty, and unaccustom’d to Subjection, I shou’d resign into their fair Hands the sovereign Authority over the Republic of Letters. As the Case stands, my Commission extends no farther, than to desire a League, offensive and defensive, against our common Enemies, against the Enemies of Reason and Beauty, People of dull Heads and cold Hearts. From this Moment let us pursue them with the severest Vengeance: Let no Quarter be given, but to those of sound Understandings and delicate Affections; and these Characters, ’tis to be presum’d, we shall always find inseparable.

To be serious, and to quit the Allusion before it be worn thread-bare, I am of Opinion, that Women, that is, Women of Sense and Education (for to such alone I address myself) are much better Judges of all polite Writing than Men of the same Degree of Understanding; and that ’tis a vain Pannic, if they be so far terrify’d with the common Ridicule that is levell’d against learned Ladies, as utterly to abandon every Kind of Books and Study to our Sex. Let the Dread of that Ridicule have no other Effect, than to make them conceal their Knowledge before Fools, who are not worthy of it, nor of them. Such will still presume upon the vain Title of the Male Sex to affect a Superiority above them: But my fair Readers may be assur’d, that all Men of Sense, who know the World, have a great Deference for their Judgment of such Books as ly within the Compass of their Knowledge, and repose more Confidence in the Delicacy of their Taste, tho’ unguided by Rules, than in all the dull Labours of Pedants and Commentators. In a neighbouring Nation, equally famous for good Taste, and for Gallantry, the Ladies are, in a Manner, the Sovereigns of the learned World, as well as of the conversible; and no polite Writer pretends to venture upon the Public, without the Approbation of some celebrated Judges of that Sex. Their Verdict is, indeed, sometimes complain’d of; and, in particular, I find, that the Admirers of Corneille, to save that great Poet’s Honour upon the Ascendant that Racine began to take over him, always said, That it was not to be expected, that so old a Man could dispute the Prize, before such Judges, with so young a Man as his Rival. But this Observation has been found unjust, since Posterity seems to
have ratify’d the Verdict of that Tribunal: And Racine, tho’ dead, is still the Favourite of the Fair Sex, as well as of the best Judges among the Men. There is only one Subject, on which I am apt to distrust the Judgment of Females, and that is, concerning Books of Gallantry and Devotion, which they commonly affect as high flown as possible; and most of them seem more delighted with the Warmth, than with the justness of the Passion. I mention Gallantry and Devotion as the same Subject, because, in Reality, they become the same when treated in this Manner; and we may observe, that they both depend upon the very same Complexion. As the Fair Sex have a great Share of the tender and amorous Disposition, it perverts their Judgment on this Occasion, and makes them be easily affected, even by what has no Propriety in the Expression nor Nature in the Sentiment. Mr. Addison’s elegant Discourses of Religion have no Relish with them, in Comparison of Books of mystic Devotion: And Otway’s Tragedies are rejected for the Rants of Mr. Dryden.*3

Wou’d the Ladies correct their false Taste in this Particular; Let them accustom themselves a little more to Books of all Kinds: Let them give Encouragement to Men of Sense and Knowledge to frequent their Company: And finally, let them concur heartily in that Union I have projected betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds. They may, perhaps, meet with more Complaisance from their usual Followers than from Men of Learning; but they cannot reasonably expect so sincere an Affection: And, I hope, they will never be guilty of so wrong a Choice, as to sacrifice the Substance to the Shadow.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

(i) David Hume was a
(a) British Philosopher
(b) French Philosopher
(c) Scottish Philosopher
(d) None of these

(ii) David Hume was born on
(a) 26 April 1712
(b) 26 April 1712
(c) 26 April 1715
(d) None of these

(iii) Hume was called the .......... of the Wittgensteinian revolution
(a) Father
(b) Pioneer
(c) Prophet
(d) None of these

19.6 Summary

- Hume advocated a compatibilist theory of free will that proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles. Hume also examined the normative is–ought problem. He held notoriously ambiguous views of Christianity, but famously challenged the argument from design in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1777).

- Hume achieved great literary fame as a historian. His enormous *The History of England*, tracing events from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688, was a best-seller in its day. In it, Hume presented political person as a creature of habit, with a disposition to submit quietly to established government unless confronted by uncertain circumstances. In his view, only religious difference could deflect people from their everyday lives to think about political matters.

- Hume’s volume of *Political Discourses* (published by Kincaid & Donaldson, 1752) was the only work he considered successful on first publication.

- From 1763 to 1765, Hume was secretary to Lord Hertford in Paris.
In 1754 to 1762 Hume published the *History of England*, a 6-volume work of immense sweep, which extends, says its subtitle, “From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688”.

Hume’s coverage of the political upheavals of the 17th century relied in large part on the Earl of Clarendon’s *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (1646-69). Generally Hume took a moderate Royalist position and thought revolution was unnecessary. Hume’s indeed was considered a Tory history, and emphasized religious differences more than constitutional issues. He was anti-Presbyterian, anti-Puritan, anti-Whig, and pro-monarchy. Historians have debated whether Hume posited a universal unchanging human nature, or allowed for evolution and development.

Hume was an early cultural historian of science. His short biographies of leading scientists explored the process of scientific change. He developed new ways of seeing scientists in the context of their times by looking at how they interacted with society and each other. He covers over forty scientists, with special attention paid to Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton. Hume awarded the palm of greatness to William Harvey.

Hume’s anti-rationalism informed much of his theory of belief and knowledge, in his treatment of the notions of induction, causation, and the external world. But it was not confined to this sphere, and permeated just as strongly his theories of motivation, action, and morality. In a famous sentence in the *Treatise*, Hume circumscribes reason’s role in the production of action: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. It has been suggested that this position can be lucidly brought out through the metaphor of “direction of fit”: beliefs—the paradigmatic products of reason—are propositional attitudes that aim to have their content fit the world; conversely, desires—or what Hume calls passions, or sentiments—are states that aim to fit the world to their contents. Though a metaphor, it has been argued that this intuitive way of understanding Hume’s theory that desires are necessary for motivation “captures something quite deep in our thought about their nature”. Hume’s anti-rationalism has been very influential, and defended in contemporary philosophy of action by neo-Humeans such as Michael Smith and Simon Blackburn. The major opponents of the Humean view are cognitivists about what it is to act for a reason, such as John McDowell, and Kantians, such as Christine Korsgaard.

Hume, along with Thomas Hobbes, is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of freedom and determinism. The thesis of compatibilism seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist belief that human beings are part of a deterministic universe, whose happenings are governed by the laws of physics.

Hume argued that the dispute about the compatibility of freedom and determinism has been kept afloat by ambiguous terminology: From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot... we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the expression. Hume defines the concepts of “necessity” and “liberty” as follows:

- Miracles by definition are singular events that differ from the established Laws of Nature. The Laws of Nature are codified as a result of past experiences.
- Hume gave a criticism of the design argument in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.
- Design can account for only a tiny part of our experience of order.
- Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious tyranny. However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain’s two political parties, the Whigs and the Tories. Hume writes My views of things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of persons to Tory prejudices.
19.7 Key-Words
1. Empiricism: The theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience.
2. Skepticism: Doubt about the truth of something.

19.8 Review Questions
1. What is the problem of miracle? Discuss.
2. Discuss Hume’s life and works.
3. Write a short note on Of Essay Writing by David Hume.

Answers: Self-Assessment
1. (i) (c) (ii) (b) (iii) (c)

19.9 Further Readings
1. David Hume, selected Essays Oxford World Classics, Oxford University Press.
Unit 20: David Hume-Of Essay Writing: Critical Appreciation and Analysis

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Understand Hume’s context and Terminology
• Discuss Hume’s Essay on Taste and on Tragedy
• Analyse Hume’s Of Essay Writing

Introduction
David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Edinburgh, and was trained for the law. He early showed an eager interest in philosophy, and devoted himself to study with such intensity as to injure his health. He traveled in France more than once, and was on intimate terms with such men as d’Alembert, Turgot, and Rousseau, for the last of whom he found a pension and a temporary refuge in England.

Hume is most celebrated for his philosophical writings, in which he carried the empirical philosophy of Locke to the point of complete skepticism. He wrote also a “History of England” in eight volumes, and a large number of treatises and essays on politics, economics, ethics, and esthetics. The following essay, “Of the Standard of Taste,” is a typical example of his clear thinking and admirable style. “He may be regarded,” says Leslie Stephen, “as the acutest thinker in Great Britain of the eighteenth century, and the most qualified interpreter of its intellectual tendencies.”

20.1 Context
Hume’s aesthetic theory received limited attention until the second half of the Twentieth Century, when interest in the full range of Hume’s thought was enlivened by the gradual recognition of his importance among philosophers writing in English. Unfortunately, many discussions of Hume’s aesthetics concentrate on a single late essay, “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757). This emphasis misrepresents the degree to which Hume’s aesthetic theory is integrated into his philosophical system.
The “Advertisement” to his first publication, A Treatise of Human Nature, promises that if the first two volumes find suitable “approbation,” the project will conclude with “the examination of morals, politics, and criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of human nature”. Sadly, the Treatise was not a success and Hume limited the third and final volume to the topic “Of Morals.” He never produced his systematic treatment of politics and criticism and so never completed his new “science” of human nature. Those topics would be handled piecemeal in several collections of short essays, the “polite” writing that brought him the publishing success he desired.

Hume’s concept of criticism is not interchangeable with either aesthetics or philosophy of art. These now-familiar labels were not available to Hume when he published his Treatise in 1739 and 1740. The Abbé Charles Batteux did not defend the idea of grouping the arts together in an investigation of fine art until 1746. Hume knew and drew from the French tradition leading to and following from Batteux’s work. Under this influence, his essays occasionally refer to the “the finer arts” of painting, music, sculpture, and poetry. He never uses the expression “fine art” and he was probably not aware of Alexander Baumgarten’s Reflections on Poetry of 1735, the work that introduced the term “aesthetics.” The thesis that aesthetic judgments are completely distinct from moral judgments would not receive its modern formulation until Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790), after Hume’s death in 1776. So Hume’s aesthetics occupies a pivotal niche between the appearance of fine art theory and Kant’s defense of an independent aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment – a defense clearly influenced by Kant’s reading of Hume’s essays and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.

Hume’s theory is most firmly rooted in the work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson. From the older tradition, elegantly expounded by Addison in numerous essays written between 1709 and 1715, Hume retains the idea that the values within the scope of criticism are essentially pleasures of the human imagination. Although Hume acknowledges cases where beauty seems a merely sensory pleasure, he emphasizes beauty’s status as a cognitive pleasure. Taking beauty as his paradigm case of such a value, Hume combines Addison’s theory of taste as an operation of imagination with Hutcheson’s proposal that emotions are the foundation of moral judgment. Elaborating on the “inner sense” theory, Hume endorses Hutcheson’s stance on the general question of the nature of both moral and aesthetic value. Value judgments are expressions of taste rather than reasoned analysis. Values cannot be addressed except in the context of a general theory about our shared human nature. Although recognition of aesthetic and moral beauty is a manifestation of taste (and perhaps they cannot ultimately be distinguished from one another), taste must not be dismissed as subjective, idiosyncratic preference.

Granted, Hume has many other influences. His celebrated essay on taste, for example, draws heavily on French thought, particularly on that of the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos. Nonetheless, a reading that emphasizes “Of the Standard of Taste” at the expense of the Treatise and Enquiries shortchanges the theory’s complexity.

Within this framework of concerns and influences, Hume is neither interested in working out a theory of art (in contributing to philosophy of art) nor in analyzing aesthetic properties (in doing aesthetics). Due to the seamless connection he posits between moral and aesthetic value, much of his technical discussion of aesthetics appears only as an illustration of his moral theory. Other details of Hume’s aesthetics emerge in contexts where he expounds his theory of imaginative association, elaborates on the value of delicacy of taste (DOT), and denies that his appeal to sentiment leads to skepticism about value distinctions.

Thus, the two essays that appear to summarize Hume’s aesthetics are best understood as applications of a larger philosophical account of human nature, including our social nature. The construction of each essay suggests a purpose of working out details of the larger project in the face of an obvious counterexample. Those counterexamples are the relativity of taste (SOT) and the pleasure we take in tragic fiction (OT). Yet their limited purpose does not detract from their continuing
importance. They provide insight into perennial problems and so serve as the historical foundation for subsequent attempts to defend a subjectivist aesthetic theory.

Unfortunately, numerous interpretative challenges arise from Hume’s scattered presentation, his range of references, and his eighteenth-century assumptions about art. Like many of his contemporaries, Hume regards “poetry and the polite authors” as the most important arts (PW 3, 19). Poetry differs from the other arts in being designed for the primary purpose of giving pleasure (SOT, 277). When using the terms “art” and “artist,” Hume sometimes means any human artifice and any skilled designer (in one context, an “artist” is someone who repairs a clock (EHU, 87)). In contexts where he can only be taken to be interested in the narrower category of fine art, Hume variously mentions painting, statuary, architecture, dance, poetry, and music. But he places poetry among the arts of eloquent public discourse.

Hume assumes that every product of human labor has some definite purpose, with only a limited subset of art being produced for the sake of pleasure alone. (He is skeptical about appeals to teleological or final causes in nature.) Houses will be designed and built apart from any need to satisfy our taste for beauty, and representational art will be produced in order to provide visual information. The interesting questions are why houses and visual representations also appeal to taste, and what this appeal tells us about the relative contributions of human nature and education as conditions for appropriate responses to our surroundings.

So what label best summarizes Hume’s theory of moral and aesthetic taste? It may be easier to specify which labels do not fit his theory than to attach one to it. He rejects normative realism. (There is considerable controversy on the question of whether Hume is a realist regarding matters of fact. Putting that issue to one side, he clearly denies that normative judgments have the same degree of objectivity that holds for matters of fact.) Hume is equally at pains to deny that reason provides an adequate foundation for judgments of taste. Is he therefore a subjectivist? Not if subjectivism implies that such judgments are arbitrary. He is not a relativist, for the main point of the essay on taste is that some judgments of taste are superior to others. Nor, in his own terms, is he a skeptic regarding aesthetic properties and value judgments. Despite his philosophical view that beauty is not a real property of things, Hume never questions the meaningfulness of general practice of making aesthetic judgments. Because the verdicts of taste are sentiments, devoid of truth-value, there is no opportunity for the conflicts and failures of reason that give rise to philosophical skepticism.

**Hume’s Terminology**

Hume regards the natural capacity of taste as fundamental to the human ability to make moral and aesthetic judgments. Like his predecessors, Hume sees an analogy between an “inner sense” for beauty and the sense of taste for food and drink. Natural, general laws guide both. Both permit of education and refinement and thus better and worse responses. Both produce sentiments or feelings of approval and disapproval. But only the “mental” taste, the exercise of which is involved in moral and aesthetic judgment, admits of refinement through “the interposition” of ideas.

Hume’s eighteenth-century terminology includes a pair of terms no longer in general use. In his basic nomenclature, “taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty” assigns either “approbation” or “disapprobation” (or some combination of both) to objects of taste (T, 547n). Approbation is “a
peculiar delight” (T, 298) and a “particular kind of pleasure” (T, 472). It feels different from other pleasures. He variously characterizes approbation as a feeling of approval, liking, or affection. A beautiful object or action strikes us as amiable, agreeable, and desirable. Hume describes the feeling of disapprobation as one of disapproving, disliking, and contempt. An ugly object or vicious action feels odious, disagreeable, and undesirable.

In the eighteenth-century context of moral theory, “sentiment” is a generic label for emotions. (Hume’s theory is sometimes identified as “sentimentalism,” but that term has unfortunate modern connotations.) In Hume’s technical vocabulary, all emotions are impressions, not ideas. The sentiments associated with beauty and ugliness are reflective impressions. They are not “impressions of the senses.” Instead, they are responses to sensory impressions.

Hume is an inner sense theorist who treats aesthetic pleasure as an instinctive and natural human response. Successful art exploits our natural sentiments by employing appropriate composition and design. Only empirical inquiry can establish reliable ways to elicit the approval of taste.

Beauty is a feeling of approbation, and an original, simple impression of the mind. Impressions are contrasted with ideas, which he alternatively calls “thoughts.” Ideas are “copies” of impressions, and seldom have the force or clarity of the experiences they copy. For Hume, experiencing beauty is a necessary condition for thinking about the idea of beauty. An individual cannot construct the idea of beauty out of other ideas, which is equivalent to saying that the idea derives from the proper sentiment of approbation (T, 469). In the complete absence of the operations of taste, thoughts about beauty would not occur.

Hume seems to equate perception of beauty with the experience of the sentiment. (This equation underlies the problem of whether all tastes are equal). Does he distinguish between the critic’s experience of the sentiment and the judgment or verdict? If a verbal pronunciation that an object is beautiful is nothing more than an expression or report of the speaker’s sentiment, then Hume faces the difficulty that a critic’s verdict is not really a recommendation of the object. If your pronouncement that a piece of music is beautiful means no more than that you have felt a certain pleasure upon hearing it, then your verdict expresses your pleasure without saying anything about the music’s capacity to please others. So although critics issue judgments of taste based on their own sentiments, a judgment of taste must involve something more than a pleasing or displeasing sentiment.

Hume observes that there is a difference between expressing one’s own sentiments and making a moral distinction. When someone speaks of another’s behavior as “vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience to concur with him” (EPM, 272). Moral and aesthetic judgment requires “steady and general points of view” (T, 581–82; see also SOT, 276), common to others (EPM, 272). Hume’s various descriptions of this point of view invite conflicting interpretations. However, it clearly requires the critic to reflect upon the relationship between the sentiment and its object.

Whether we call them “aesthetic judgments” or “judgments of taste,” aesthetic verdicts are unlike ordinary judgments about matters of fact. Matters of fact are relevant states of affairs, which render complex ideas either true or false. The same cannot be said about verdicts arising from the operations of taste. Sentiment, and sentiment alone, determines that a particular object is or is not beautiful. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in geometry may be
proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must give immediate pleasure (EPM, 171).

We do not infer that a sunset is beautiful and so deserving of approbation. We see the sunset, and the visual impressions please us. If we have the proper point of view, we are justified in saying that the sunset is beautiful. This verdict is more than a report or expression of the sentiment, yet the sentiment is an irreplaceable element of the judgment. A parallel claim is made of moral discrimination. “Pleasure and pain,” he insists, are the “essence” of beauty and deformity (T, 299).

But how does a a literary work “give immediate pleasure”? Taste is the capacity to respond with approbation and disapprobation. But how does taste relate to Hume’s various remarks about “perceptions” and “discernments” of beauty, of our “judging” a work, and of critics who “give judgment” and who “give” or “pronounce” a “verdict” or “recommendation” (SOT, passim)?

One of Hume’s most puzzling claims is that taste is an “immediate” response. In his extended treatment of the passions and emotions in the Treatise, Hume says that “immediate” feelings are ones that do not involve the “interposition” of ideas (T, 275). Some pleasures and pains are “immediate” in the sense that they are impressions that immediately accompany other impressions (e.g., the experience of a very hot flame is accompanied by an experience of pain). How does a literary work “give immediate pleasure”?

Taken literally, Hume appears to claim that literary works are beautiful independent of the audience’s ability to assign ideas or meanings to the words. But this is certainly not Hume’s position. The solution is that there is “mental, as well as bodily taste” (SOT, 274). Moral and aesthetic discrimination depend on mental taste. The requisite sentiments are spontaneous products of the mind, but they are not uninformed responses.

Mental taste normally requires some intervening thought process. So the pleasures and pains of aesthetic judgment are not immediate in being direct responses to other impressions.

Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection.

Mental taste arises in response to ideas that arise in response to impressions (e.g., viewing a photograph occasions thoughts about the place pictured, leading to thoughts about experiences one had or might have there, and the thoughts arising in this imaginative process are pleasurable or painful). Hume regards this “immediacy” of taste as entirely compatible with the influence of intellectual and imaginative faculties.

Taste is immediate and spontaneous, yet the application of “good sense” and “reason” improves it (SOT, 277). Taste is not improved by reasoning from a priori normative principles. Moral and aesthetic discriminations “are not conclusions of reason” (T, 457). Neither results from a mere “comparing of ideas” (T, 463). However, taste can be influenced by consultation of “general rules of art” or “rules” that “are founded only on experience and observation” (SOT, 270). Mental taste involves reason in the sense of “sound understanding,” which ultimately depends on imaginative associations of ideas. So taste involves imaginative pleasure, as Addison proposed. This doctrine of imaginative pleasure has no special connection with creativity or with the capacity to produce art.
To summarize Hume on taste, aesthetic and moral response is “immediate” in the sense that the feeling occurs spontaneously in anyone who makes customary imaginative associations. Hume wants to emphasize that a critic does not infer the presence of beauty. Yet he also acknowledges the relevance of sound understanding to taste. This combination of doctrines has implications for the practice of justifying judgments of taste, and becomes the focus of the essay “Of the Standard of Taste.” Knowing that a sonnet has the same form as a second, beautiful sonnet will not offer any reason to think that they are equally fine poems. Only a reading of the sonnet can support claims about its beauty. However, Hume’s theory should be interpreted with caution, against the backdrop of his other claims about moral and aesthetic distinctions. The general, natural principles of taste are supplemented by learned rules, so that knowledge of other sonnets contributes to a more accurate or refined evaluation of the merits and flaws of a particular sonnet. His subjectivism does not lead to relativism. Not every sentiment is equally good.

20.2 Of Essay Writing: Critical Analysis

“Of Essay Writing” appeared in 1742 in Volume two of Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political, but was removed from all subsequent editions of that text published during Hume’s life. The text file here is based on the 1875 Green and Grose edition. Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.

Of Essay Writing

The elegant part of mankind, who are not immersed in the animal life, but employ themselves in the operations of the mind, may be divided into the learned and conversible. The learned are such as have chosen for their portion the higher and more difficult operations of the mind, which require leisure and solitude, and cannot be brought to perfection, without long preparation and severe labour. The conversible world join to a sociable disposition, and a taste of pleasure, an inclination to the easier and more gentle exercises of the understanding, to obvious reflections on human affairs, and the duties of common life, and to the observation of the blemishes or perfections of the particular objects, that surround them. Such subjects of thought furnish not sufficient employment in solitude, but require the company and conversation of our fellow-creatures, to render them a proper exercise for the mind: and this brings mankind together in society, where everyone displays his thoughts and observations in the best manner he is able, and mutually gives and receives information, as well as pleasure. The separation of the learned from the conversible world seems to have been the great defect of the last age, and must have had a very bad influence both on books and company: for what possibility is there of finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures, without having recourse sometimes to history, poetry, politics, and the more obvious principles, at least, of philosophy? Must our whole discourse be a continued series of gossiping stories and idle remarks? Must the mind never rise higher, but be perpetually Stun’d and worn out with endless chat Of Will did this, and Nan said that? This would be to render the time spent in company the most unentertaining, as well as the most unprofitable part of ourlives. On the other hand, learning has been as great a loser by being shut up in colleges and cells, and secluded from the world and good company. By that means, every thing of what we call Belles Lettres became totally barbarous, being cultivated by men without any taste of life or manners, and without that liberty and facility of thought and expression, which can only be acquired by conversation. Even philosophy went to wrack by this moaping recluse method of study, and became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was unintelligible in her stile and manner of delivery. And indeed, what could be expected from men who never consulted experience in any of their reasonings, or who never searched for that experience, where alone it is to be found, in common life and conversation? Tis with great pleasure I observe, that men of letters, in this age, have lost, in a great measure, that shyness and bashfulness of temper, which kept them at a distance from mankind; and, at the same time, that men of the world are proud of borrowing from books their most agreeable topics of conversation. Tis to be hoped, that this league betwixt the learned and conversible worlds, which is so happily begun, will be still farther improved, to their mutual advantage; and to that end, I know nothing more advantageous.
than such Essays as these with which I endeavour to entertain the public. In this view, I cannot but
consider myself as a kind of resident or ambassador from the dominions of learning to those of
conversation; and shall think it my constant duty to promote a good correspondence betwixt these
two states, which have so great a dependence on each other. I shall give intelligence to the learned
of whatever passes in company, and shall endeavour to import into company whatever commodities
I find in my native country proper for their use and entertainment. The balance of trade we need
not be jealous of, nor will there be any difficulty to preserve it on both sides. The materials of this
commerce must chiefly be furnished by conversation and common life: the manufacturing of them
alone belongs to learning. As 't would be an unpardonable negligence in an ambassador not to pay
his respects to the sovereign of the state where he is commissioned to reside; so it would be
altogether inexcusable in me not to address myself, with a particular respect, to the fair sex, who
are the sovereigns of the empire of conversation. I approach them with reverence; and were not
my countrymen, the learned, a stubborn independent race of mortals, extremely jealous of their
liberty, and unaccustomed to subjection, I should resign into their fair hands the sovereign authority
over the republic of letters. As the case stands, my commission extends no farther, than to desire
alliance, offensive and defensive, against our common enemies, against the enemies of reason and
beauty, people of dull heads and cold hearts. From this moment let us pursue them with these
verest vengeance: let no quarter be given, but to those of sound understandings and delicate
affections; and these characters, 'tis to be presumed, we shall always find in separate. To be
serious, and to quit the allusion before it be worn thread-bare, I am of opinion, that women, that
is, women of sense and education (for to such alone I address myself) are much better judges of all
polite writing than men of the same degree of understanding; and that 'tis a vain pannic, if they
be so far terrified with the common ridicule that is levelled against learned ladies, as utterly to
abandon every kind of books and study to our sex. Let the dread of that ridicule have no other
effect, than to make them conceal their knowledge before fools, who are not worthy of it, nor of
them. Such will still presume upon the vain title of the male sex to affect a superiority above them:
but my fair readers may be assured, that all men of sense, who know the world, have a great
difference for their judgment of such books are within the compass of their knowledge, and repose
more confidence in the delicacy of their taste, though unguided by rules, than in all the dull
labours of pedants and commentators. In a neighbouring nation, equally famous for good taste,
and forgallantry, the ladies are, in a manner, the sovereigns of the learned world, as well as of the
conversable; and no polite writer pretends to venture upon the public, without the approbation of
some celebrated judges of that sex. Their verdict is, indeed, sometimes complained of; and, in
particular, I find, that the admirers of Corneille, to save that great poet's honour upon the ascendant
that Racine began to take over him, always said, that it was not to be expected, that so old a man
could dispute the prize, before such judges, with so young a man as his rival. But this observation
has been found unjust, since posterity seems to have ratified the verdict of that tribunal: and
Racine, though dead, is still the favourite of the fair sex, as well as of the best judges among the
men. There is only one subject, on which I am apt to distrust the judgment of females, and that is,
concerning books of gallantry and devotion, which they commonly affect as high flown as possible;
and most of them seem more delighted with the warmth, than with the justness of the passion. I
mention gallantry and devotion as the same subject, because, in reality, they become the same
when treated in this manner; and we may observe, that they both depend upon the very same
complexion. As the fair sex have a great share of the tender and amorous disposition, it perverts
their judgment on this occasion, and makes them be easily affected, even by what has no propriety
in the expression nor nature in the sentiment. Mr. Addison's elegant discourses of religion have
no relish with them, in comparison of books of mystic devotion: and Otway's tragedies are rejected
for the rants of Mr. Dryden. Would the ladies correct their false taste in this particular; let them
accustom themselves a little more to books of all kinds: let them give encouragement to men of
sense and knowledge to frequent their company: and finally, let them concur heartily in that
union I have projected betwixt the learned and conversible worlds. They may, perhaps, meet with more complaisance from their usual followers than from men of learning; but they cannot reasonably expect so sincere an affection: and, I hope, they will never be guilty of so wrong a choice, as to sacrifice the substance to the shadow.

David Hume was one of the most influential philosophers of modern times. Hume argued that man gains knowledge through experience and that we should be skeptical of all other knowledge. Hume analyzed various aspects of life, but was probably best recognized for his theory of causality. Hume set up criteria for determining cause and effect. These criteria explained his skepticism about causality and why he came to the conclusion that humans were not capable of discovering truth.

In order to fully understand Hume’s analysis of causality, we must first understand the importance he placed on the senses. Hume is skeptical of all that is not in some way connected to our senses. Hume separated human perceptions into two distinct categories: impressions and ideas. Impressions include sensations and emotions. They are original and more forceful and lively than ideas. They are what we see, hear, feel, love or hate. Ideas are copies or reflections of impressions and are less lively than the original impression. For example, if I place my hand on a hot pan and feel the heat, I have an impression. Later, when I go over the experience in my thoughts, I may recall the heat, I may remember the burning pain, but I cannot truly experience the sensation again. That reflection upon my experience is an idea. Hume also believed that there are simple and complex impressions and ideas. The impression of the color red, for example, is simple. Whereas a red cup can be separated into parts and is therefore is complex. Simple and complex ideas are always derived from simple impressions. Hume thought that because of this, there are no innate ideas, and that all ideas must come from experience, and therefore relies on our senses. If humans were to have no senses they would continue Reading This Essay

- Hume concludes that cause is “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.”

David Hume’s views on aesthetic theory and the philosophy of art are to be found in his work on moral theory and in several essays. Although there is a tendency to emphasize the two essays devoted to art, “Of the Standard of Taste” and “Of Tragedy,” his views on art and aesthetic judgment are intimately connected to his moral philosophy and theories of human thought and emotion. His theory of taste and beauty is not entirely original, but his arguments generally display the keen analysis typical of his best work. Hume’s archaic terminology is occasionally an obstacle to appreciating his analysis, inviting conflicting readings of his position.

20.3 Beauty and Taste in Hume’s Moral Theory

Subjectivism

Hume proposes that feeling, not thought, informs us that an object is beautiful or ugly, or that an action exhibits virtue or vice: “The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration” (T, 471). The feeling or sentiment is itself an aesthetic or moral discrimination. It is prior to, and the basis of, any subsequent expression of praise or admiration. The sentiment is the beauty of the object and it is the virtue of desirable human action. Sentiment is the sole source of values governing human activity. Taste is a “productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” That new creation is “beauty and deformity, virtue and vice” (EPM, 294). However, the sentiment is calm rather than violent, so an unphilosophical perspective treats it as a property “of the object” (S, 218).

This moral and aesthetic subjectivism attracts Hume for the same reason that it attracts Hutcheson. The appeal to sentiment offers a middle position between the two prevailing theories within
English letters, Hobbesian egoism and ethical rationalism. Hutcheson holds that virtue and beauty are not qualities of the people and things to which they are attributed. We may speak as if objects and people have moral and aesthetic properties, but the relevant property is merely an “idea raised in us.” Hume alters Hutcheson’s theory by imposing his own philosophical vocabulary, making beauty an impression rather than an idea. But they agree that to describe a person as virtuous or an object as beautiful is to make a claim about their tendency to cause a certain response. Is it imprudent and “too strong,” Hume asks Hutcheson, to summarize the thesis in the following terms? “[W]hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind” (T, 469). But virtue and beauty are not strictly analogous to secondary qualities, such as heat and cold, because a critic’s claim that a work is beautiful involves an element of endorsement that does not arise in the observation that ice is cold.

Hume defends the centrality of sentiment with the following reasoning. Recognitions of virtue and beauty require particular sentiments in human observers. If the discriminations of taste took place without these sentiments, we would lack any motivation to do what we regard as moral. Moral and aesthetic judgments have practical consequences that mere reason lacks. So taste differs from the assent that characterizes understanding or reason. Although taste responds to real qualities of objects, we cannot replace the exercise of taste with the assent of reason.

But taste is a fallible indicator of beauty and deformity. The underlying sentiments never “refer” to anything in their cause (SOT, 268). Feelings do not represent any aspect of their occasioning objects, and they are easily attached to objects other than their cause (T, 280). (As with any causal relationship, such as the causal link between smoke and fire, an isolated effect does not refer back to its cause, nor does it provide us with information about the nature of the object or event that causes it. If we experience smoke but have never experienced fire, the smoke will tell us nothing about the nature of fire.) As effects of our interaction with the world, sentiments cannot reliably inform us about the nature of their causes. It will not always be clear, prior to careful attention and reflection, which features of a work of art are responsible for our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. On Hume’s analysis, the chain running from cause to effect turns out to be extremely complex, for the relationship is indirect and “the human body is a mighty complicated machine” with many “secret powers”. Knowing this, good critics pronounce their verdicts only after they clarify how their own sentiments relate to the object that is being evaluated (SOT, 270–71).

The Dispositional Analysis

Our sentiments obey general principles governing our species. Yet we must be able to make judgments of taste immediately, without having to be aware of the laws governing them.

Hume’s acknowledgment of regular, predictable causes of the moral and aesthetic sentiment is sometimes taken as an indication that Hume is not a genuine subjectivist. On this reading, he equates beauty and virtue with dispositional properties of external objects. Attributions of moral and aesthetic properties to objects indicate a speaker’s acknowledgment of the object’s tendency to produce the sentiment. There are passages that suggest such a reading: “beauty is such an order and constitution of parts, as ... is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul”.

Despite such passages, it is questionable whether Hume really offers a dispositional analysis. A dispositional analysis tells us which properties would exist if certain conditions were satisfied. A simplified dispositional analysis treats “Cork is buoyant” as equivalent in meaning to “If a piece of cork is placed in water, it floats.” A simplified dispositional analysis of beauty treats “This object is beautiful” as equivalent in meaning to “If anyone perceives this object under ideal conditions, a sentiment of approbation accompanies the perception.” On this account, beauty is
distinct from the sentiment of approbation. The sentiment is incorporated into the analysis, but the sentiment is not itself a dispositional property.

Suppose that Hume regards beauty as a dispositional property. Like the dispositional terms “buoyant” and “brittle,” “beauty” could be predicated of objects, generating judgments that are true or false for different objects. Statements attributing dispositional properties to objects are true even if the appropriate conditions are never satisfied (e.g., “This vase is brittle” can be true despite the fact that the vase never gets broken). Yet Hume clearly denies that judgments of taste are truth-valued, and he denies that it makes sense to make inferences about an object’s beauty in advance of the requisite sentiment (S, 219).

Hume famously argues that, in order to clarify any idea, “we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived” (EHU, 22). If beauty is a dispositional property, then one arrives at the idea of beauty by associating particular causes with particular effects under specific conditions. In Hume’s terminology, a dispositional idea of beauty would be the idea of a complex relation of cause and effect. It would be a causal principle, and we could not employ the idea prior to formulating such a principle. Yet, once again, Hume denies an implication of the dispositional analysis. The sentiment of approbation is our only source for our idea of beauty, and there are cases where we recognize beauty in advance of any reasoning about the beautiful object (EPM, 173).

Furthermore, if Hume regards beauty as a dispositional property, he has a model close at hand in Hutcheson’s analysis. But Hume avoids offering any such account. Aside from a willingness to identify several ways that works of art must fail to please refined taste, Hume ignores the traditional and familiar project of criticism, the stipulation of rules for successful art. He does not try to identify the properties of objects that regularly cause the sentiment of approbation. Instead, he recognizes that any established correlation between sentiment and objective properties might be defeated by the next example that we encounter (SOT, 270). Despite the existence of “general principles of approbation or blame,” taste depends on too many variables (“incidents and situations”) to offer a detailed dispositional analysis (SOT, 271).

Passages endorsing a dispositional account might be slips of the pen. Or, more likely, Hume does not believe that it is possible to define evaluative terms. They are indefinable, primitive terms. Hume emphasizes that “certain qualities in objects” are the occasions for our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation (SOT, 273). Formal design is one such quality (SOT 271; T, 299, 364). The existence of occasioning qualities provides theoretical support for the possibility of a convergence of refined taste. So our primitive evaluative terms are not arbitrarily applied. Nonetheless, it is irresponsible to endorse any particular thing or action in advance of the verdict of unprejudiced taste.

**Imagination and Point of View**

Informed understanding makes a vital contribution to most aesthetic and moral judgment (EPM, 173; SOT, 277). For Hume, taste is improved by practice in making “comparisons” among objects (SOT, 275) and by the employment of “good sense” (SOT, 277).

Hume blurs traditional distinctions between thinking and imagining. Thoughts would not extend beyond our actual experiences were it not for the imaginative associations established by the force of repetition or “custom” (T, 170; EHU, 43). Learned associations encourage us to rearrange our ideas in intelligible patterns, permitting us to create ideas of things never actually experienced (e.g., fictitious creatures or distant places). Imagination also creates chains of associated ideas, encouraging thoughts to move rapidly from one idea to another.

Good taste therefore presupposes an active imagination. Suppose one wakes in the morning and smells the distinctive aroma of coffee, and the experience is pleasurable. This appreciation depends on a learned, imaginative association: the smell brings to mind its cause, the brewing coffee, and
its purpose, the consumption of the coffee. The agreeable sentiment is a response to this complex
association of impressions and ideas, not to the smell alone. Critical evaluation is therefore highly
contextual: “The passion, in pronouncing its verdict, considers not the object simply, as it is in
itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances, which attend it” (S, 224).

But Hume does not regard imagination as a free and unrestrained activity. Human thought is
constrained by a relatively small set of permanent principles of imaginative association (T, 10, 225;
EHU, 24). Although poets may “profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy” (T,
225), their poetry has little chance of pleasing others if their “fancy” or imagination employs
irregular associations. The universal principles of imaginative association allow artists to predict
how their representational and narrative designs will move audiences.

Hume recognizes a very small class of cases for which imagination association is not needed to
recognize beauty. In these cases, initial impressions of the mere “form” of a material object generate
approbation (T, 364). Such cases are more typical of natural beauty than art (EPM, 173). So
imagination is not always necessary for discovering beauty. Pleasing form is sometimes sufficient.
However, “‘tis seldom we rest there” (T, 363).

So Hume does not advocate a simple causal relationship between form and sentiment. In most cases,
our beliefs about the object alter our sentiments. Forms are generally most pleasing when “the order
and construction of parts” (T, 299) suggests a corresponding utility for humans or expresses agreeable
emotions. These suggestions need not be accurate in order to trigger approbation and disapprobation.
A particular object might appear balanced, graceful, and beautiful despite our knowledge of its
limited utility (T, 584). Objects may displease taste despite their genuine utility.

A house may displease me by being ill-contrived for the convenience of the owner; and yet I may
refuse to give a shilling towards the rebuilding of it. Sentiments must touch the heart, to make
them control our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them
influence our taste. When a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and
disagreeable; though we be fully assured of the solidity of the workmanship. ‘Tis a kind of fear,
which causes this sentiment of disapprobation; but the passion is not the same with that which we
feel, when obliged to stand under a wall, that we really think tottering and insecure. The seeming
tendencies of objects affect the mind: And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those,
which proceed from the real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these
emotions are so different in their feeling, that they may often be contrary, without destroying each
other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy are esteemed beautiful upon
account of their strength, though we could wish that they were entirely destroyed. The imagination
adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, from those
which arise from our particular and momentary situation (T, 586–87).

It is tempting to read such passages as foreshadowing the subsequent theory of aesthetic response
as “disinterested” pleasure. Hume uses the term “disinterest” as the contrary of “self-love” (EPM,
296), but he does not use the term in relation to aesthetic sentiment. Hume’s “common,” “universal,”
or “general view of things” is a simpler proposal. He wants to remind us that we cannot expect the
agreement of others if we judge things from a limited and prejudiced perspective (EPM, 272).

Relations of form and function can operate at an extremely abstract level: “A building, whose
doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion: as ill adapted
to the figure of a human creature, for whose service the fabric was intended” (EPM, 212–13). Those
who respond with sentiment are moved by “imaginary” and general consequences, not simply
utility for the person passing judgment (EPM, 217–18). Furthermore, formal design itself can
convey emotions which influence aesthetic response: “There is no rule in painting or statuary
more indispensable than that of balancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness
on their proper centre of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced, is ugly; because it conveys
the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain” (EPM, 245).
Thus, Hume blocks the conclusion that all taste is equal by distinguishing between two points of view that we can adopt toward any person, object, or action. We can respond from the point of view of our own self-interest. But this response is prejudiced and often produces “a false relish” (EPM, 173). Or we can respond from the general point of view, a reflective evaluation that is not motivated by self-interest. The general point of view is influenced by myriad beliefs about the object and its context. For example, believing that something is rare greatly magnifies our pleasure (S, 224). Where self-interest might make me jealous of your new home and will interfere with the sentiment of beauty, a reflective response will allow me to appreciate its construction and design. For Hume, normative conflicts can only be resolved by moving to a properly informed general perspective, with “just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained” (EPM, 173). The essay on taste defends this position and outlines a theory of how critics can place themselves in such a position: when any work is addressed to the public, though I should have a friendship or enmity with the author, I must depart from this situation; and considering myself as a man in general, forget, if possible, my individual being and my peculiar circumstances. A person influenced by prejudice, complies not with this condition; but obstinately maintains his natural position, without placing himself in that point of view, which the performance supposes (SOT, 276–77).

Hume also invokes the operation of a sympathetic sentiment. Since sympathy plays an important role in his moral theory (T, 577; EPM, 225), he must include it in his aesthetic theory if he is to sustain the close ties he posits between morals and aesthetics. The general point of view takes notice of pleasure that the object is fitted to bring to other people. The idea of their benefit generates sympathetic pleasure, increasing the sentiment of approbation (T, 364–65).

However, the claim that almost all judgments of beauty involve some element of sympathy becomes harder to maintain in cases of fine art. It is not clear how the appreciation of a sonnet or melody involves an idea of the value it has for others. Hume frequently talks as if artistic beauty is entirely a question of formal design. Hume seems to think that the utility of some art is the pleasure it affords (e.g., with poetry), as if he advocates an early art-for-art’s sake position. But the fact that a poem pleases someone else does not encourage sympathetic approbation for the poem. Hume may have an answer to this difficulty. He hypothesizes a connection between form in art and the appearance of utility. He offers examples of basic design in painting (T, 364–65) and of “unharmonious” literature (EPM, 224). Reading begins with impressions of dark shapes arranged in lines on white pages. Readers silently associate the printed text with aural ideas (the voice of a human speaker). Through imaginative association, literary forms have expressive human characters that elicit sympathetic pleasure and pain. Because Hume does not operate with assumptions about the uniqueness of fine art, his theory cuts across the distinction between fine art and rhetoric. Good design and eloquence are beautiful and desirable in all artifacts and speech, not merely in fine art (E).

Where appropriate, the refined taste of a good critic will weigh the relative contributions of all aspects of the object of taste. Formal design is a contributing excellence and not the sole focus of aesthetic discrimination. To arrive at a proper moral judgment, “all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame” (EPM, 290). Aesthetic discrimination works in the same way (EPM, 291). In some situations, a single inharmonious element can upset the beauty of the whole. Hume discusses such cases in “Of the Standard of Taste.” But then what of tragic literature, in which sympathy produces ongoing unease? How can there be an impression of approbation for a tragic play? Hume addresses this problem in “Of Tragedy.”

In the wake of reader-response criticism, Hume is frequently challenged for not making enough allowances for the legitimate differences that readers bring to the same piece of writing. No two
readers will respond with the same associations of ideas. So how can Hume hypothesize a convergence of critical response? As a criticism of Hume, this reply backfires. Hume concedes, “each mind perceives a different beauty” (SOT, 268). But he recognizes an even more radical problem. He admits that every stable object is really a “fiction” posited by the operations of imagination and sentiment. We always “bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observed in our mere perceptions” (T, 197). However, this philosophical grasp of the situation has no practical effect in making anyone skeptical of the existence of houses, trees, and books. It does not detract from the truth and falsity of what we ordinarily say about them. Novels and plays and paintings are not special cases. Admitting that they call for complex operations of imagination does not differentiate them from other objects and should not count against the possibility of critical judgment.

The crux of the problem is the difference between saying that Hamlet is a play by William Shakespeare and saying that Hamlet is a flawed play. The former claim expresses a matter of fact; the latter expresses a normative judgment. Both stem from complex imaginative associations. The presence of imaginative thought poses no special problem for the convergence of evaluative discrimination. The problem is how sentiment, as the source of value, is subject to principled dispute. Hume directly confronts this problem in “Of the Standard of Taste.”

20.4 Hume’s Essay on Taste

Hume tells us that “Of the Standard of Taste” was written in some haste and exists only to permit publication of other essays (HL 2, 253). On the advice of Philip Stanhope, Hume removed “Of the Immortality of the Soul” and “Of Suicide” from a planned volume of new essays. His publisher informed him that the resulting volume was too slim to print, bind, and sell. Hume then brought the book to an acceptable length by penning a new essay, “Of the Standard of Taste.” Hume made nearly two hundred editorial corrections over the subsequent twenty years and multiple editions, the majority of which involve punctuation. He never altered his argument. The essay is his last word on any topic in “criticism.”

Hume reminds us of the radical difference in kind between matters of fact and the pronouncements of sentiment. Verdicts of sentiment lack a truth-value. So it is surprising to find him endorsing the position that many judgments of taste are “absurd and ridiculous” (SOT, 269). Small differences affect taste, yet most people notice only “the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object” (SOT, 278). Only judges with a more refined taste will respond to the “universal” appeal of superior art. Because refinement demands considerable practice, such critics are few in numbers.

It is tempting to read Hume’s argument as a move away from his signature subjectivism and toward some brand of normative realism. But a careful reading of the text reveals that nothing is said to deny his earlier support for subjectivism and there are no direct endorsements of realism. The standard of taste should provide rules for “confirming one sentiment, and condemning another” (SOT, 268). It must explain why the sentiments of some critics are better and worse, not which are true and false in any absolute sense. This explanation is accompanied by closely associated criteria for identifying good critics: “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character” (SOT, 278).

After several stabs at identifying the standard of taste, Hume identifies it as the consensus or “joint verdict” of “true critics” (SOT, 278–79). But it does not follow that the same set of critics will serve as the standard for every work of art. Different critics are better or worse at evaluating different kinds of things, so the critical pronouncements of better critics invalidate the claims of unqualified critics.

Hume ultimately grants that even the best critics will fail to elicit universal agreement with their verdicts. Yet he sticks to his motivating insight, borrowed from Hutcheson, that sentiment is the
essence of evaluation. Even the worst critic says nothing false in foolishly saying that one work is better than another, however prejudiced the sentiment. Yet even the best critics—those with the most refined taste—will retain some immoveable preferences. Even the best critics will display a variety of responses. But if their differences are “blameless,” there is no interference of prejudice (SOT, 280). The problem of finding a standard of taste leads Hume to the problem of deciding which disagreements are blameless, in order to distinguish them from prejudices that disqualify a sentiment as a public recommendation.

Hume highlights two sources that contribute to differences of sentiment among qualified critics: basic dispositions of character, and moral differences arising from cultural differences (SOT, 280).

Today, we are more likely to notice a third source of disagreement, Hume’s recognition that each kind of object has its own species of beauty. Becoming a qualified judge of epic poetry does not contribute to being a qualified judge of architecture. Addison is a better writer than John Locke, but the comparison assumes that they are both writing philosophy (EHU, 7). We can compare John Milton and John Ogilby, and only a false critic would rank Ogilby above Milton (SOT, 269). But it makes no sense to compare Milton and Addison, for Milton is a poet, not a philosopher.

Furthermore, different cultures employ different customs when handling the same artistic medium. “You will never convince a man, who is not accustomed to Italian music, and has not an ear to follow its intricacies, that a Scotch tune is not preferable” (S, 217). So the good critic must overcome the challenge of cultural prejudice. “A critic of a different age or nation, who should peruse this discourse, must have all these circumstances in his eye, and must place himself in the same situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment of the oration” (SOT, 276). Hume emphasizes the great difficulties involved in overcoming the prejudices of one’s time and place (SOT, 281–82).

Many readers balk at Hume’s willingness to grant a strong influence of moral judgment upon aesthetic evaluation (SOT, 283–84). Hume discusses the moral failing of several plays (SOT, 284) and of the Koran, considered as a literary “performance” (SOT, 267). How can Hume reconcile this position with his endorsement of Batteux’s influential thesis, in which the mechanical arts are distinguished from fine art by the fact that the latter exists only to provide pleasure? (“Of Tragedy” proceeds as if literature exists solely to provide the pleasure of the experience.) But there is also a side of Hume that refuses to distinguish between literature and other, “practical” writing. Every work of art is evaluated according to its distinctive purpose, with poetry alone singled out as having the purpose of “pleasing” the imagination (SOT, 277). Ultimately, there is very little art that Hume might treat as art-for-art’s-sake.

There should be no great surprise that Hume insists that moral judgments must sometimes enter into our aesthetic evaluations. Hume does not offer a sharp distinction between moral and aesthetic taste. Evaluations that subsequent aesthetic theories regard as a purely aesthetic are, for Hume, concluding sentiments following numerous observations of contributing strengths and weaknesses. When a work of art represents human activity, then Hume’s account of moral evaluation requires that moral sentiment accompany apprehension of the action. The fictional status of the work weakens our sympathetic response, but the mere sequence of ideas will be sufficient to produce weaker versions of the sentiments that one would have if one were faced with the actual events. Given Hume’s moral theory, there is no possibility of suspending our moral response. Moral sentiments are natural and immediate. At best, one can gain a better understanding of the cultural context responsible for the work, so that one’s moral sentiments will not be negative through mere prejudice. Hume’s theory of sentiments requires that if we are going to have an aesthetic evaluation of a play’s plotting and language, then we are also going to have a moral response to its display of virtue and vice. Both must enter into our final sentiment of approbation or disapprobation.

Although Hume emphasizes the variety of responses that different groups and individuals have with the same works, some sources of preference are “blameless” (SOT, 280) and “innocent” (SOT,
Despite myriad differences, there are two basic types of taste: vulgar taste and refined taste. Given his thorough anti-realism about values, Hume cannot dismiss vulgar taste as subjective and mistaken. Hume has a different strategy for recommending refined taste as the more objective of the pair. Vulgar taste is more idiosyncratic and capricious. Refined taste is more properly rule-governed and stable. The two are equally subject to “rules,” but the person of refined taste is better informed about the material.

Hume’s contrast of vulgar and refined taste parallels his general treatment of the doxastic positions of the vulgar and the wise (T, 150; EHU, 110). Vulgar thinking is dominated by “the first influence of general rules” upon the mind. Such rules are instinctively but “rashly formed” to regulate the imagination. If these rules are allowed to govern thought in the absence of further reflection and refinement, the result is prejudice instead of wisdom. (T, 146, 150) The wise, in contrast, take care to survey the broadest possible range of experience, allowing a “second influence of general rules” to supplant the first. In this manner, the “capricious and uncertain” ideas of the vulgar give way to “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding” and the superior judgments of the wise (T, 150). As for the normative question of why the refined judgments of the wise are preferable to the rash prejudices of the vulgar, Hume is content that moral sense assigns approbation to the “original instincts” underlying moral and aesthetic taste (T, 619).

Having argued that we can overcome prejudice and make superior assessments of ordinary matters of fact, Hume imports his contrast of vulgarity and wisdom into his aesthetic theory. Sound understanding makes inferences and arrives at a belief. Beliefs influence taste. Although a judgment of taste terminates in a reflective passion, rather than in a belief with a truth-value, taste employs operations of the imagination subject to rules internalized by the judging subject. Consequently, the contrast between first and second influences of general rules applies as much to taste as to “wisdom.” Vulgar taste should betray the same degree of capriciousness and prejudice as vulgar reasoning. Good taste, in contrast, should be more stable, for it will display “a certain point of view” appropriate to its object (SOT, 276). Refined taste reflects what Hume elsewhere calls the “more general” view. As with moral response, good taste meets with approbation while a prejudiced taste “loses all credit and authority” (SOT, 277). However, as a matter of interpretation, Hume’s references to a requisite “delicacy of imagination” (SOT, 272) complicate and obscure the account, for it is not clear what this delicacy is, nor how it contributes to a more settled, general view.

So what are the rules of taste, over and above any rules or principles involved in sound judgment about the object of taste? Surprisingly, Hume never offers a clear case of one. At least two proposals about such rules can be extracted from Hume’s example of Sancho’s kin and the hogshedd of wine, Hume’s “evidence” that there are general rules of taste (SOT, 272–73). On the one hand, it is tempting to read the rules as strictly parallel with the empirical laws discussed in the Treatise and first Enquiry. If so, they are causal laws specifying which properties and combinations of properties cause what kind and degree of pleasure. An example might be, “An aftertaste of iron or leather reduces the pleasure taken in an otherwise good wine.” Unfortunately, such rules seem suitable only for arriving at some probability about the likely effect of drinking such wine. Applying such a rule may result in a belief about the wine, but knowing the rule would not encourage the requisite sentiment. Where we can find them, rules of this sort are useful for separating true from pretend critics, if only in allowing us to point out inconsistencies in critical response (SOT 273–74).

But general rules of taste have a second function. Even if rules “had never been methodized” (SOT, 273), their existence supports the view that practice and comparison improves taste (SOT, 275). Those with adequate experience of a particular art form will perceive cases with greater accuracy. The existence of rules gives reason to agree that practice heightens the subject’s awareness of disruptive impressions (the taste of iron) and missing impressions (no fruity bouquet), resulting in a more reflective adjudication of the whole experience. They will also direct the imagination to expect various combinations of properties in light of one’s recognition that it is a thing of a specific
kind. Properly amended to reflect mental rather than bodily taste, the story of Sancho’s kinsmen underlies the whole argument of “The Standard of Taste.” Even if the rule has not been formalized, the wine taster will operate as if reasoning from a rule (e.g., “since this is red wine, it will have a fruity bouquet but no hint of leather or iron”). The experienced reader or viewer will approach art with “the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason” (SOT, 278), discovering the true character of the object within “the disorder, in which they are presented” (SOT, 273).

### 20.5 Hume’s Essay on Tragedy

The motivating issue in “Of Tragedy” is that of unpleasant emotion as a positive feature of a work. Hume proposes to explain how “a well-written tragedy” is pleasing when that pleasure appears to depend on “sorrow, terror, anxiety,” and other naturally disagreeable emotions (OT, 258).

Originally published beside “Of the Standard of Taste” in Four Dissertations, “Of Tragedy” is a peculiar essay. Its engagement with the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos confirms Hume’s strong interest in French aesthetics. Yet the essay says little about the topic of tragedy, and what it says is combined with discussions of melodramas and historical writing. Its real topic is the experience of conflicting emotions directed simultaneously at a single object, a topic treated in the Treatise. Because the pleasure offered by tragedy and melodrama depends on and is proportionate with their capacity to arouse grief, fear, and other unpleasant passions, Hume uses literature and theater as an occasion to elaborate on his theory of mixed emotions. As Hume formulates it, the problem is to explain the nature of the relationship between our approbation, which is pleasurable, and the presence of “sorrow, terror, anxiety,” and other naturally disagreeable emotions (OT, 258). The solution, Hume claims, is that any emotion “which attends a passion, is easily converted into it, though in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to each other” (T, 419).

So “Of Tragedy” grapples with a very different set of problems than “Of the Standard of Taste.” In the essay on taste, the unchallenged appearance of vice is treated as a flaw, and unpleasant emotion is a defect. But when “Of Tragedy” identifies a flaw in Nicholas Rowe’s The Ambitious Stepmother, the play’s defect is not the endorsement of vice. Instead, its flaw is the staging of action that is “too bloody and atrocious” (OT, 264). But why is “shocking” spectacle a flaw that leads to general disapprobation? Is it simply a question of the degree of shock? But why should that prevent the audiences from “converting” the shock into a “contrary” and pleasurable experience, as Hume claims happens with terror and anxiety? The obstacle does not seem to be moral in nature, of the sort explored in “Of the Standard of Taste” where Hume discusses a work’s failure to direct proper disapprobation at vicious manners. The essay on taste suggests that the same content would not be a flaw if proper adjustments were made. But “Of Tragedy” does not call attention to the moral dimension of Rowe’s play. So “Of Tragedy” is a discourse on an interesting puzzle about human psychology, namely the fact that unpleasant elements can be either strengths or ruinous defects. “Of Tragedy” says nothing about moralism and art.

Hume’s account of tragic pleasure has two components. First, different features of the work must generate the viewer’s agreeable and disagreeable responses. Disagreeable aspects contribute to our general approbation because those properties are balanced by naturally agreeable properties. Second, a general psychological principle explains how it is possible for competing emotions to produce a complex, pleasing sentiment. Borrowed from the Treatise (T, 419), that principle holds that when the same object produces different passions, even those “of a contrary nature,” then the subordinate passion can be “converted” into the predominant (OT, 262). “Of Tragedy” combines these two ideas. Our natural delight in “imitation” provides a strong and predominant passion. The naturally disagreeable emotions aroused by the plot provide a subordinate and contrary
emotion, the “movement” of which “fortifies” the predominant passion. Unless the negative emotion becomes predominant, the overall effect of a well-written tragedy will be an audience “pleased in proportion as they are afflicted” (OT 258).

Although Hume illustrates his general principle with numerous examples, few readers claim to understand or accept his theory. Hume thinks it is obvious that Rowe’s play fails due to its gory and shocking spectacle, which tips the balance in the wrong direction. But the obvious reply is that many viewers enjoy the spectacle of violence. Hume basically says so: “The English theatre abounds too much with such shocking images” (OT, 265). How can Hume contend that the play is ruined when so many viewers enjoy it? For there is no appeal except to sentiment.

Hume must think that shocking spectacle satisfies vulgar taste but not refined taste. “Of the Standard of Taste” posits differences in audience members to account for different responses. Hume’s sketchy theory in “Of Tragedy” is compatible with most people enjoying aesthetically uninteresting works, for routine design readily delights most people (SOT, 276). But a refined taste is equally sensitive to all facets of the work, including formal design. Just as the wine tasted funny to Sancho’s kinsmen (SOT, 272–73), a run-of-the-mill work “gives pain” to true critics (SOT, 276). Only the best critics worry about the absence of genius.

The rules of taste endorsed in “Of the Standard of Taste” facilitate habituated expectations based on previous experiences with similar art. Aesthetic pleasure frequently depends on “custom” (T, 299) and on associations and expectations developed by the life experiences of the intended audience. If audience expectations are violated by excessive violence, and if there is no compensating reward for its inclusion, then the work has been improperly staged for its intended audience. But works that merely satisfy expectations will please the less discerning critics. Hence “shocking images” that are routine in English theater will please the audience. The same gory spectacle and “dismal” stories, insufficiently “softened” by genius and eloquence, will displease a refined taste (OT 265).

Unfortunately, this interpretation merely heightens the problem. What is it that rewards vulgar taste? Why does violent spectacle attract anyone to routine, predictable potboilers? Natural sympathy should arouse uneasiness at the gory spectacle, yet the vulgar have no compensating reward. Brilliant language is surely an attraction of Shakespeare’s Othello, but no such achievement is to be found in most of the popular fiction that reliably delights its audience. Hume even implies that the vulgar do not attend to “eloquence” and similar formal achievement. However, the mere fact of “imitation” seems insufficient to explain the predominant pleasure in the face of this material. Is it the spectacle’s “exactness of imitation” (SOT, 276)? But that would seem to be a compensating pleasure in all but the most inept production, and would lead us to expect that vulgar audiences would respond with equal pleasure to almost any inferior work that meets their expectations. But this is simply not the case. “Of Tragedy” does not meet the standards of argument and insight set by Hume’s other contributions to aesthetics.

20.6 David Hume—A Critical Analysis

David Hume (1711-76) is one of the greatest philosophers of the Enlightenment. Writing as an independent intellectual he made significant contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion and ethics. He is widely reputed as a brilliant although skeptical critic of every kind of dogmatism and of any pretension to establish objectively valid foundations of human knowledge. Except for the abstract ideas of mathematics and immediate experiential impressions he did not believe that there is anything in our mind that deserved full trust and the honorific title of truth. Consequently, metaphysics and philosophy were, for him, at best a good pastime (see his A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739, and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748). In view of these assertions it is surprising to find out that Hume, on the other hand, had not dismissed judging of artworks as just a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. Despite his low opinion of metaphysical pursuits he had a very strong appreciation for the arts and possessed himself a
pretty subtle aesthetic sense. In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757) he advances the claim that evaluating art should not be regarded as arbitrary and entirely relativist. Hume composed this essay (the last before his death) in order to meet the demand of his publisher who needed about 20 pages to fill in the gap that emerged after two other (possibly too “atheistic”) essays were removed from the planned collection. The essay is “derivative” as it heavily depends on some French and British authors of the time but it still represents an original piece, probably the most important work in Aesthetics before Kant.

Although an “opportunistic” product of Hume’s literary activity, the essay is a masterpiece of elegance and style. Its polished and subtle manner of exposition proves, however, to be very deceptive. It creates the impression that the argumentation flows smoothly and clearly from the beginning to the end whereas in reality it abounds with reversals and almost all provided explanations raise more questions than they manage to answer. A careful student should be mindful of many snares intentionally or unintentionally laid down throughout the course of Hume’s analysis.

Variety of Taste: In keeping with his empiricist epistemology Hume starts with a factual statement about the existing variety of taste and opinion. He focuses on the former as the latter proves to be less egregious.

The variety of human taste stretches over different individuals (even siblings may have different taste), across different cultures and throughout different historical periods.

Hume was more interested in art criticism (judging art) than in the philosophy of art as an effort to explain the essence of art. He was particularly intrigued by the question whether our judgments on art are subjective and relativist or objective and universalizable. This explains why he talks about taste (the receptive side) rather than about the artwork itself (the creative side). For Hume, taste denotes the capacity to respond with approbation or disapprobation to external stimuli. If the stimulus is an artistic one the ensuing taste should be understood as the “refined ability to perceive quality in any artwork”. This ability corresponds, roughly speaking, to what we would call “aesthetic experience” in general (Hume didn’t use the word Aesthetics yet). If likes and dislikes are expressed in value judgments we regard them as judgments of taste. Whether there is a standard of taste is an open issue that allows arguing for both sides (the debate parallels somewhat the debate about the relativity of moral norms).

Relativity

People react to different taste with surprise and mistrust. The label (epithet) “barbarous” (supposedly denoting the low taste or the lack of taste) is culturally conditioned. It does not tell us anything universally valid (except that it is used with the same arrogance by different people for contrary things). It cannot serve as the criterion of taste since it simply reflects our preference for our taste. It is an expression of conceit.

The differences in aesthetic taste are too obvious and great to be denied. Hume contends that they are in fact greater than they appear. The true extent of the differences is covered by linguistic generalities that indicate universal approval or disapproval. But these generalities conceal the differences in particulars. In almost all cultures there is a consensus in evaluating positively certain epithets. For instance

Almost all Hume’s examples in this essay are taken from one single art - literature. We wish he could have provided some non-literary examples as well but this preference for literary arts was the signature of the time.
Discrepancy
The apparent consensus in words expressing aesthetic attitudes stands in stark contrast with a seeming disagreement in words expressing our ordinary or theoretical views about reality. Upon examination, however, we realize that they are in fact reversed. In this regard, the apparent differences in taste and opinion prove to be deeper where they appear lesser and the other way round. Here is how they differ:

Resolution
Differences in opinion (belief) could be in many cases resolved by clarifying the language (purely verbal disagreements) and resorting to the facts. In science we can advance different theories (paradigms) to account for the phenomena (for instance the corpuscular or the wave theory of light) but we can disagree only temporarily about the facts. For example, what is the tallest building in the world?

In contrast, disagreements in taste typically become greater once the illusion of verbal agreement from general discourse is replaced by a closer scrutiny of facts. After we check the reference of generally accepted aesthetic terms we realize that our appreciation of these facts is different. All people value beauty and regard ugliness as repulsive but they disagree what objects are beautiful and what are ugly. Beauty is not something rational (size and order) or objective (beauty in itself) but only an effect on the mind.

The arts as the object of taste have many more things in common with morals than with the sciences. The arts and morals are both more grounded in sentiments than in reason. The verbal unanimity is not a result of universal reasoning but a sheer effect of the inner logic of language. This is why both art and morality accept universal precepts while hopelessly differing in practical application. The following table details the similarities between art and morality as well as their common opposition to science. In science language creates apparent disagreements while in art it creates apparent agreements.

| Hume does not see a big difference between artistic and moral values. What as a pleasurable sentiment translates in approbation in taste closely corresponds to the sentiment of approbation within our heart: “virtue is whatever mental action or quality gives a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation”. |

Moral Unanimity
The unanimity in morals is also more apparent than real. The apparent universality of moral principles is commonly ascribed to the workings of human reason. In reality, its source is the inculcated positive validation of certain terms (virtues: justice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity).

However, the content and the application of these terms may be very different; so much so that sometimes they represent a kind of relations that are called contrarieties (for instance, black and white). Thus it is conceivable that the content of the above virtues, if transferred to another culture, could be regarded as injustice, inhumanity, stinginess, imprudence and mendacity.

Example 1: Homer’s general moral precepts are similar to Fenelon’s, but the morality of their heroes is different as it could be. For instance, Homer praises the heroism of Achilles and the prudence of Odysseus (Ulysses) as general virtues. But this type of heroism contains a lot of cruelty while the prudence of Odysseus borders with fraud and slyness.
The content of Homeric virtues separates his heroes from Odysseus’ son Telemachus as portrayed by Fenelon. While his father is rather mendacious for modern standards he is truthful to the bone and never departs from his noble values.

Example 2: Hume’s second example introduces a comparison between two moralities: Islamic and English. The Quran (Alcoran) praises equity, justice, temperance, meekness, charity, as our Western culture does, but from the point of view of English morality the content of Mohammedan virtues equals treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry. This remark does not sound very politically correct (especially in conjunction with the contention that the Koran presents a “wild and absurd performance”) but Hume’s intention is rather to show (partly in a biased Eurocentric way) the discrepancy between the universality of the accepted precepts and the real sentiments on both sides rather than to assert the superiority of English morality over Arabic mores. At the end of the essay he finds that many events in the Bible present a similar picture of cruelty and inhumanity which he repudiates equally because the most sacred text of the Judeo-Christian tradition not only does not condemn the vicious manners of some biblical heroes but even condones them (cf. God commands the destruction of Jericho and Ai).

Conclusion: There is no standard of morality that universally distinguishes right and wrong. There are no eternal moral norms, only historically and culturally conditioned habits disguised into seeming general precepts. But this generality is more linguistic than real.

Merit: The value of general precepts, commandments and duties is very spurious. The effectiveness of such precepts is questionable. Formulating universal ethical principles is a big stretch. Their strength does not surpass the meaning of the words used. Their import is purely verbal - at best they explicate the implicit positive connotation of certain expressions. For instance by commending charity, virtue, etc., we say that that these notions ar conceived as commendable. It is safer to follow the ‘inculcated’ (intended) meaning of these words than to derive universal maxims of conduct based on some supposed objective obligations. The writers, preachers and legislators who go for the latter are doomed to be less convincing than what the sheer word semantics suggest. Only what is already contained in the connotation resonates - everything else is a chimera.

Hume’s reasoning could be summarized in the following way: Moral precepts either state what is already meant by language or they go beyond it. If the former they are redundant, if the latter they overreach their boundaries.

Application: The same reasoning should apply to aesthetic terms. They, being just condensed expressions of sentiments (of pleasure or displeasure), include some approbation or disapprobation - but they do not warrant any universal and objective rules about objects.

In Search of a Standard

Claims: One would expect, based on Hume’s general stance and the above observations, that he is going to assert the inescapability of utter subjectivism and relativism in matters of taste. Surprisingly, however, he makes a series of non-skeptical and non-relativist claims:
1. It is natural to seek a standard of taste.
2. Such a standard of taste exists.
3. The standard of taste can reconcile different sentiments.
4. The standard of taste allows to evaluate different tastes as to their quality and thus decides which one is to be preferred.
Comprehensiveness vs. Discrimination Notice that (3) and (4) are not identical claims. The former suggests the existence of a general and more comprehensive rule, the latter only something that could be used in discriminatory way so that different artworks and aesthetic judgments could be ranked. Hume hopes to be able to find at least (4) if it turns out that the sentiments of men are so different that they cannot be possibly harmonized (3). But throughout the essay he vacillates between these two kinds of standards (the more ambitious one and the more discriminative one).

Objection One kind of philosophy (skeptical) opposes the idea that there is any standard of taste. It asserts the equal right of every personal evaluation. In that respect, it agrees with one strain of common sense which preaches the equal value of all taste. These are the main characteristics of this position:

The refusal of any standard of taste is based on one fundamental distinction that sharply separates the nature of sentiments from that of judgments. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between taste and opinion. The former is a matter of feelings, the latter of facts. Other differences could be represented as follows:

As Hume states at the beginning of the essay, there is a huge variety of taste (sentiments) and opinion (judgments). While all sentiments regarding one and the same object are right, only one opinion out of many possible could be right. We can conclusively resolve factual disputes by matching opinions with relevant facts, we cannot but “acquiesce” to our subjective feelings in matters of what we like or dislike. Taste is a kind of sentiment and therefore subjective. There is a parallel between bodily and mental taste to the effect that both are subjective.

Beauty - Deformity Beauty and deformity are not objective qualities. They exist only in the mind as the sentiments of blame and approbation exist in our heart. Some people will regard object beautiful that others perceive as ugly. Therefore it is fruitless to seek the real beauty and deformity as is fruitless to seek the real sweet or real bitter.

The prominence of taste and beauty in the discussion of art is defining for the 18th century aesthetics. Hume is here under influence of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) who held that beauty is not a quality of objects but a subjective idea. Another point of agreement with his contemporaries: mental (aesthetic) taste is very similar in its functioning and status with physiological (bodily) taste. Hume pursues this analogy throughout the essay. What makes something sweet or bitter is the disposition of the organs that are aroused by the perception of certain object. The same holds true of beauty and deformity. The disposition of our organs (that is, its previous or current condition) decides what we’ll like or dislike. If we put our left hand in a bucket with cold water while holding the right hand in the bucket with hot water and then both immerse in a vessel. Aesthetic sentiments like beauty and perfection are in fact more subjective than bodily taste because aesthetic feelings depend ml with lukewarm water we’ll have two different sensations.

Aesthetic sentiments like beauty and perfection are in fact more subjective than bodily taste because aesthetic feelings depend more on the consciousness of the perceiving individual and are therefore more idiosyncratic. Therefore it is in vain to seek objective, “real”, “true” beauty. However, there is another strain of common sense (and another kind of philosophy, although not named by Hume). It recognizes the obvious differences in quality between various artists and artworks and asserts the objectivity and inequality of taste. Some judgments of taste are just plainly wrong whereas some other are obviously right. This position (represented by Thomas Reid) is characterized by the following features:

1. Philosophy Objectivist Criticism
2. Common Sense 2nd Type
3. Standard Yes
4. Justification Inequality of Taste
5. Formula According to Rules
6. Outcome Disagreements Irrelevant

Grading The crucial evidence in favor of the non-subjectivity of taste is the possibility of grading artists and the products of art. It would be foolish to claim that there is no difference in rank and quality between a sheer translator, like John Ogilby, and a great poet of a John Milton’s stature, or between a mediocre essayist like John Bunyan and a great one like Joseph Addison.

Absurdity Even if somebody would advance the view that these differences do not matter and that the judgments of taste regarding these artists are all equal nobody would pay attention to such a claim because it is in itself implausible and irrelevant. Hume pronounces the sentiment of such a critic absurd and ridiculous despite the previous contention that all sentiments are right.

Similes Any attempt to equalize and level all artists is not less implausible than to negate obvious differences in physical size. It is an “extravagant paradox” or “palpable absurdity”. To deny evident qualitative differences would be tantamount to an easily falsifiable factual assertion that a pond is equal to the ocean or a molehill to the great rock of the Tenerife island.

• Small  Big   Mediocre Great
• Mole-hill Tenerife   Bunyan Addison
• Pond Ocean   Ogilby Milton

Disproportion The principle of equality among different tastes cannot be applied to the objects of ostensibly different value and quality. Both experts and regular people realize that great artworks are much more valuable than the “kitsch” products of popular culture even if they like the latter. Everyone agrees that accomplished artists can do more and better than amateurs, etc. Hume notes that this discrepancy is obvious to common sense as well. It is acknowledged by it despite the wide acceptance of the proverb De gustibus non disputandum est.

• Conclusion All artworks are not equally good.
• All artists are not equally accomplished.
• All judgments of taste are not right.

Dilemma The question Hume is facing now is which of the two positions is right. It seems that Hume has to choose between an utterly subjective relativism and the abstract objectivity of aesthetic principles. Apparently this is a difficult choice for a radical empiricist who still believes that his judgment on aesthetic matters is not equal to the taste of a boor.

**Rules and Principles of Taste**

Whether aesthetic judgments are objective and universal or subjective and relativistic is one of the most hotly debated issues in Aesthetics.

Relativism: It is clear that Hume does not espouse aesthetic relativism even though it would be consistent with his general theory of sentiments and his contention that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.

Objectivism: However, he does not accept objectivism either. Especially not in the form of a priori rules of composition or “abstract conclusions” derived from eternal and steady relations of ideas. He remains convinced that the rules of art are not rational, universal and necessary. “It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasoning a priori...”

Solution: So what is Hume’s solution to the above problem of two contradictory views on taste? He does not have a straight one; he rather struggles to get around the unpleasant dilemma of choosing between relativism and objectivism. What he suggests sounds like a middle way (an intermediate ground) between these two extremes: he accepts that differences in rank and quality are too evident to be ignored but still clings to his starting belief that aesthetic judgments are just expressions of our sentiments which do not represent anything in objects.
Rules: In a nutshell, his solution is: There are general rules but they are all empirical and contingent. They are more a summary of what pleases than an explanation of what constitutes good art. Therefore they are not universally binding.

Note: Unfortunately, Hume does not give a single example of these rules and principles that would allow us to get a grasp of their nature. As some authors have noticed, he proceeds as if they do not really exist or in fact are not really rules.

Compromise Anyway, he defines his position on these rules by means of the following four statements:
1. Rules exist.
2. They are empirical (experiential not logical).
3. They are general (comprising all cultures and all ages).
4. But they are based on sentiments (that what pleases overall).

As irregularities can please (falsehood, metaphor, perversion), exact rules do not work in art. As far as the source and nature of these rules are concerned, Hume rejects the rationalist theory of their origin and adopts a thoroughly empirical view. The contrast between what he regards as the real rules and those that are commonly envisioned but not existent could be represented in the following way:
1. Rules of Composition   Real Illusionary
2. Origin Experience Reasoning a priori
3. Status General Observation Abstract Conclusions / Exactness
4. Validation Factual Pleasure Eternal Norms

If the standard of taste is based on experience and derived from the observations of common sentiments then the supposed “rules of compositions” cannot be but sheer empirical generalizations of what is accepted. All the more so as they are not necessary. What matters is whether something pleases or not, for pleasant sentiments decide ultimately what should count as a rule.

Exactness Owing to their empirical nature the rules do not apply geometrically and in a formulaic manner. The role of art criticism is not to enforce these rules mechanically by suppressing any departure from them. A work composed exactly according to a steady canon of hard rules would be dull and unconvincing. The Middle These admonitions resemble Aristotle’s statements on the right method of ethics. It seems that Hume has transferred some of these ideas into the realm of aesthetics (right measure, lack of scientific exactness, need to create the right disposition and identify the right situation for judging, etc.)

• Poetry Geometric Exactness General Rules
• Possession Not Yes
• Nature Scientific Observation Genius

Genius If there are some rules they should be binding, that is to say, we need to see them defining taste. Still Hume insists that the rules discovered by acute observation are binding for poetry. But he does not state a single one that could be tested as binding. On the contrary, he says that we cannot engineer any great art by simply following the rules. On the other hand he allows that they could be discovered by inspiration (genius) as well. Hume was too much of a connoisseur not to realize that art emerges in a creative and innovative way.

Genius and taste were the privileged topics of the 18th century aesthetics. It is noteworthy that Hume allows the possibility of a shortcut in the painstaking empirical process of ascertaining the rule - it is a possibility open to exceptional creators or individuals with a true taste.

Expressions: Throughout the essay Hume uses several expressions when speaking about these rules. They indicate both the various aspects of these rules as well as his uncertainty about their true status. These are his main four phrases with their prevalent significations:

LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY
1. General Rules of Art What pleases in all times and countries
2. General Rules of Composition Avowed Patterns
3. General Rules of Beauty Established Models
4. General Principles of Approbation Uniform Sentiments

The common trait in all these formulas is that they all presume the recipient’s position rather than any objective features of the artwork.

Exceptions Another reason why universal, abstract and mechanical rules are not possible in art is that art allows deformities and distortions of every kind. We simply cannot regulate art if we do not want to kill its spontaneity. The flexible rules of art do not rule out every single aberration. Distortion is permissible in art as well as falsehood and fiction. A departure from the rules could still yield a great artwork despite some deformities.

• These deformities are overpowered by qualities.
• Some deformities can please. In that case they are not faults.
• Some rules are a matter of inspiration.

Hume’s example of a successful artwork that includes distortions and exaggerations is Ariosto’s Furious Orlando. From visual arts he could have cited El Greco or Alessandro Magnasco with their overextended figures and exaggerated movements. Deformities How these artworks please notwithstanding their fantastic sallies? Hume’s answer is that they please in spite of their transgressions owing to some other qualities that in fact represent these rules. The pleasure arising from these qualities must overpower the displeasure stemming from deformities, that is to say, the negative impact of transgressions must not surpass the total tally of positive qualities.

The most Hume is ready to allow for deformities and exaggerations is that they could occur without compromising all artistic value; inventiveness and “clarity of expression” render the violations of rules non-important. But Hume vehemently denies that aesthetic quality could reside in these violations themselves. According to Hume, Ariosto’s poem pleases owing to its charms and accomplishments, not because of its imperfections and deformities.

An artwork can combine and in reality combines perfections with the components that are less than perfect. The chart below brings a pretty exhaustive inventory of these aspects in Ariosto:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deformity</th>
<th>Improbable monstrous fiction</th>
<th>Bizarre mixture of serious and comic</th>
<th>Want of coherence</th>
<th>Continual interruptions</th>
<th>Charm</th>
<th>Force of expression</th>
<th>Clarity of expression</th>
<th>Variety of inventions</th>
<th>Natural pictures of passion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Principle

Deformities do not please. Nobody can enjoy them. If the rules of composition are derived from what generally pleases, then we cannot say that deformities are being enjoyed because that would contradict the very nature of the rules extracted from pleasurable emotions (approval of object). We can say in general: Nothing that does not please is art. In general, rules contribute to the increase of pleasure. Rules of Art = Increase of Satisfaction On the other hand, what pleases cannot be a fault.

If departures from the rules please they are not deformities. Hence art criticism must adjust its normative judgments to what actually pleases. Therefore the fact that a supposed fault pleases does not undermine the standing of art criticism if it acknowledges the fact. The above principles tying taste with pleasure delineate the realm of art. This equation between pleasure and art threatens to compromise the distinction between good and bad art since “bad art” could be very popular (take Thomas Kinkade or Jack Vittriano). Notice, however, that Hume does not proclaim the principle “Everything that pleases is art”; he does not say “Nothing that pleases is not art.” either.
Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) “Of Essay Writing” appeared in
       (a) 1742  (b) 1740  (c) 1741  (d) None of these
   (ii) Hume’s death took place in
       (a) 1776  (b) 1745  (c) 1773  (d) 1765
   (iii) Part of mankind divided into
       (a) Learned  (b) Conversible  (c) Both (a) and (b)  (d) None of these

20.7 Summary

• Hume is most celebrated for his philosophical writings, in which he carried the empirical philosophy of Locke to the point of complete skepticism. He wrote also a “History of England” in eight volumes, and a large number of treatises and essays on politics, economics, ethics, and esthetics. The following essay, “Of the Standard of Taste,” is a typical example of his clear thinking and admirable style. “He may be regarded,” says Leslie Stephen, “as the acutest thinker in Great Britain of the eighteenth century, and the most qualified interpreter of its intellectual tendencies.”

• Hume’s aesthetic theory received limited attention until the second half of the Twentieth Century, when interest in the full range of Hume’s thought was enlivened by the gradual recognition of his importance among philosophers writing in English. Unfortunately, many discussions of Hume’s aesthetics concentrate on a single late essay, “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757). This emphasis misrepresents the degree to which Hume’s aesthetic theory is integrated into his philosophical system.

• Hume’s theory is most firmly rooted in the work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson.

• Hume regards the natural capacity of taste as fundamental to the human ability to make moral and aesthetic judgments.

• Beauty is a feeling of approbation, and an original, simple impression of the mind. Impressions are contrasted with ideas, which he alternatively calls “thoughts.

• Taste is the capacity to respond with approbation and disapprobation.

• One of Hume’s most puzzling claims is that taste is an “immediate” response.

• “Of Essay Writing” appeared in 1742 in Volume two of Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political, but was removed from all subsequent editions of that text published during Hume’s life. The text file here is based on the 1875 Green and Grose edition. Spelling and punctuation have been modernized. Of Essay Writing The elegant part of mankind, who are not immersed in the animal life, but employ themselves in the operations of the mind, may be divided into the learned and conversible. The learned are such as have chosen for their portion the higher and more difficult operations of the mind, which require leisure and solitude, and cannot be brought to perfection, without long preparation and severe labour. The conversible world join to a sociable disposition, and a taste of pleasure, an inclination to the easier and more gentle exercises of the understanding, to obvious reflections on human affairs, and the duties of common life, and to the observation of the blemishes or perfections of the particular objects, that surround them. Such subjects of thought furnish not sufficient employment in solitude, but require the company and conversation of our fellow-creatures, to render them a proper exercise for the mind: and this brings mankind together in society, where everyone displays his thoughts and observations in the best manner he is able, and mutually gives and receives information, as well as pleasure.

• David Hume was one of the most influential philosophers of modern times. Hume argued that man gains knowledge through experience and that we should be skeptical of all other
knowledge. Hume analyzed various aspects of life, but was probably best recognized for his theory of causality. Hume set up criteria for determining cause and effect. These criteria explained his skepticism about causality and why he came to the conclusion that humans were not capable of discovering truth.

- Hume separated human perceptions into two distinct categories: impressions and ideas.
- Ideas are copies or reflections of impressions and are less lively than the original impression.
- David Hume’s views on aesthetic theory and the philosophy of art are to be found in his work on moral theory and in several essays. Although there is a tendency to emphasize the two essays devoted to art, “Of the Standard of Taste” and “Of Tragedy,” his views on art and aesthetic judgment are intimately connected to his moral philosophy and theories of human thought and emotion. His theory of taste and beauty is not entirely original, but his arguments generally display the keen analysis typical of his best work. Hume’s archaic terminology is occasionally an obstacle to appreciating his analysis, inviting conflicting readings of his position.
- Hume was more interested in art criticism (judging art) than in the philosophy of art as an effort to explain the essence of art. He was particularly intrigued by the question whether our judgments on art are subjective and relativist or objective and universalizable. This explains why he talks about taste (the receptive side) rather than about the artwork itself (the creative side). For Hume, taste denotes the capacity to respond with approbation or disapprobation to external stimuli. If the stimulus is an artistic one the ensuing taste should be understood as the “refined ability to perceive quality in any artwork”. This ability corresponds, roughly speaking, to what we would call “aesthetic experience” in general (Hume didn’t use the word Aesthetics yet). If likes and dislikes are expressed in value judgments we regard them as judgments of taste. Whether there is a standard of taste is an open issue that allows arguing for both sides (the debate parallels somewhat the debate about the relativity of moral norms).

20.8 Key-Words

1. Empirical : Based on concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic.
2. Interpretative : To Explain.

20.9 Review Questions

1. Discuss Of Essay Writing by Hume.
2. Give an analysis of Hume’s life.
3. Write a brief note on Beauty and Taste in Hume’s moral theory.
4. Examine critically Hume’s essay “Of Essay Writing”

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (c)

20.10 Further Readings

1. David Hume, selected Essays Oxford World Classics, Oxford University Press.
Unit 21: Harriet Martineau-On Marriage: Introduction and Detailed Study

Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to
• Discuss Martineau’s Life and Works
• Explain the essay On Marriage.

Introduction
Harriet Martineau was an English social theorist and Whig writer, often cited as the first female sociologist.

Martineau wrote 35 books and a multitude of essays from a sociological, holistic, religious, domestic, and, perhaps most controversial, a feminine perspective; she also translated various works from Auguste Comte. She earned enough to be supported entirely by her writing, a challenging feat for a woman in the Victorian era. Martineau has said of her approach: “when one studies a society, one must focus on all its aspects, including key political, religious, and social institutions”. She believed a thorough societal analysis was necessary to understand woman’s status.

The novelist Margaret Oliphant said “as a born lecturer and politician she (Martineau) was less distinctively affected by her sex than perhaps any other, male or female, of her generation.” While she was commonly described as having a masculine intellect, Martineau introduced feminist sociological perspectives in her writing on otherwise overlooked issues such as marriage, children, domestic and religious life, and race relations.

21.1 Martineau’s Life and Works

The sixth of eight children, Harriet Martineau was born in Norwich, England, where her father was a manufacturer. Her mother was the daughter of a sugar refiner and a grocer. The family was of French Huguenot ancestry and professed Unitarian views. She was closest to her brother, James, who became a clergyman in the tradition of the English Dissenters. According to the writer Diana Postlethwaite, Harriet’s relationship with her mother was strained and lacking affection,
which contributed to views expressed in her later writing. Martineau claimed her mother abandoned her to a wet nurse.

Her ideals on domesticity and the “natural faculty for housewifery” as described in her piece, *Household Education* written in 1848, stemmed from her lack of nurture growing up. Martineau’s mother was the antithesis of the warm and nurturing qualities which Harriet believed to be necessary for girls at an early age. Martineau’s mother urged all her children to be well-read but at the same time, opposed female pedantics “with a sharp eye for feminine propriety and good manners. Her daughters could never be seen in public with a pen in their hand.” Her mother strictly enforced proper feminine behavior, pushing her daughter to “hold a sewing needle” as well as the pen.

Martineau began losing her sense of taste and smell, becoming increasingly deaf at a young age and having to use an ear trumpet. It was the beginning of many health problems in her life. In 1821 she began to write anonymously for the *Monthly Repository*, a Unitarian periodical, and in 1823 she published *Devotional Exercises and Addresses, Prayers and Hymns*. Her father’s business failed in 1829. At 27 years old, Martineau stepped out of feminine propriety in order to earn a living for her family. Along with her needlework, she began selling her articles to the *Monthly Repository*. Her first commissioned volume, *Illustrations of Political Economy*, was published in February 1832 and quickly became successful. Martineau agreed to compose monthly volumes for 24 months, each critiquing various political and economic affairs. She developed the multi-volume work as a fictional tutorial on different political economists such as Malthus, Ricardo, and Bentham for the general public. It was her first piece to receive widespread acclaim. She continued to write for the *Repository*, earning accolades, including three essay prizes from the Unitarian Association. Her work with the *Repository* established her as a successful writer.

In 1832 Martineau moved to London. Among her acquaintances were: Henry Hallam, Harriet Taylor, Alexander Maconochie, Henry Hart Milman, Thomas Malthus, Monckton Milnes, Sydney Smith, John Stuart Mill, George Eliot, Edward George Bulwer-Lytton, Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Charles Lyell, as well as Thomas Carlyle. She met Florence Nightingale and Charlotte Brontë later on in her literary career.

Until 1834 Martineau was occupied with her political economy series as well as a supplemental series of *Illustrations of Taxation*. About the same time, she published four stories expressing support of the Whig Poor Law reforms. These tales (direct, lucid, written without any appearance of effort, and yet practically effective) display the characteristics of their author’s style. Tory paternalists reacted by calling her a Malthusian “who deprecates charity and provision for the poor”, while Radicals opposed her to the same degree. Whig high society fêted her.

In May 1834 Charles Darwin, on his expedition to the Galapagos Islands, received a letter from his sisters saying that Martineau was “now a great Lion in London, much patronized by Ld. Brougham who has set her to write stories on the poor Laws” and recommending *Poor Laws and Paupers Illustrated* in pamphlet-sized parts. They added that their brother Erasmus “knows her & is a very great admirer & every body reads her little books & if you have a dull hour you can, and then throw them overboard, that they may not take up your precious room”.

In 1834, after completing the economic series, Harriet Martineau paid a long visit to the United States. During this time, she visited with James Madison, the former president, at his home of Montpelier. She also met numerous abolitionists in Boston and studied the emerging girls’ schools established for their education. Her support of abolitionism, unpopular in the South, caused controversy. Her publication, soon after her return, of *Society in America* (1837) and *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (1838), added to the controversy. The two books are considered to have led to the founding of modern sociology.
In *Society in America*, the scholar angrily criticized the state of women's education. She wrote, “The intellect of women is confined by an unjustifiable restriction of... education... As women have none of the objects in life for which an enlarged education is considered requisite, the education is not given... The choice is to either be 'ill-educated, passive, and subservient, or well-educated, vigorous, and free only upon sufferance.” Her article “The Martyr Age of the United States” (1839), in the *Westminster Review*, introduced English readers to the struggles of the abolitionists in America several years after Britain had abolished slavery.

In October 1836, soon after returning from the voyage of the *Beagle*, Charles Darwin went to London to stay with his brother Erasmus. He found him spending his days “driving out Miss Martineau”, who had returned from her trip to the United States. Charles wrote to his sister, “Our only protection from so admirable a sister-in-law is in her working him too hard.” He commented, “She already takes him to task about his idleness— She is going some day to explain to him her notions about marriage— Perfect equality of rights is part of her doctrine. I much doubt whether it will be equality in practice.”

The Darwins shared Martineau’s Unitarian background and Whig politics, but their father Robert was concerned that, as a potential daughter-in-law, the writer was too extreme in her politics. Charles noted that his father was upset by a piece read in the *Westminster Review* calling for the radicals to break with the Whigs and give working men the vote “before he knew it was not hers [Martineau’s], and wasted a good deal of indignation, and even now can hardly believe it is not hers.” In early December 1836 Charles Darwin called on Martineau and may have discussed the social and natural worlds she was writing about in her book *Society in America*, including the “grandeur and beauty” of the “process of world making” she had seen at Niagara Falls. He remarked in a letter, “She was very agreeable and managed to talk on a most wonderful number of subjects, considering the limited time. I was astonished to find how little ugly she is, but as it appears to me, she is overwhelmed with her own projects, her own thoughts and own abilities. Erasmus palliated all this, by maintaining one ought not to look at her as a woman.”

In April 1838 Charles wrote to his older sister Susan that “Erasmus has been with her noon, morning, and night: if her character was not as secure, as a mountain in the polar regions she certainly would loose it. Lyell called there the other day and there was a beautiful rose on the table, and she coolly showed it to him and said ‘Erasmus Darwin’ gave me that. How fortunate it is, she is so very plain; otherwise I should be frightened: She is a wonderful woman”.

Martineau wrote *Deerbrook* (1838), a three-volume novel published after her American books. She portrayed a failed love affair between a physician and his sister-in-law. It was considered her most successful novel. She also wrote *The Hour and the Man: An Historical Romance* (1839), a three-volume novel about the Haitian slave leader Toussaint L’Ouverture, who contributed to the island nation’s gaining independence in 1804.

In 1839, during a visit to Continental Europe, Martineau was diagnosed with a uterine tumor. She several times visited her brother-in-law, Thomas Michael Greenhow, who was a celebrated doctor in Newcastle upon Tyne, to try to alleviate her symptoms. On the last occasion she stayed for six months in the Greenhow family house at 28 Eldon Square. Immobile and confined to a couch, she was cared for by her mother until purchasing a house and hiring a nurse to aid her.

She next moved downriver to Tynemouth, where she stayed at Mrs Halliday’s boarding-house, 57 Front Street, for nearly five years from 16 March 1840. The critic Diana Postlethwaite wrote of this period for Martineau:

“Being homebound is a major part of the process of becoming feminine. In this interior setting she (Martineau) is taught the home arts of working, serving, and cleaning, as well as the rehearsals for the role of mothering. She sees her mother... doing these things. They define femininity for her.” Her illness caused her to literally enact the social constraints of her gender during this time.
Martineau wrote at least three books during her illness, and a historical plaque marks this house. In 1844 she published both Crofton Boys, the children’s novel, and Life in the Sickroom: Essays by an Invalid, an autobiographical reflection on invalidism. She wrote Household Education (1848), the handbook on the ‘proper’ way to raise and educate children. Lastly, she began working on her autobiography. Completed much later, it included some hundred pages to this period. Notable visitors included Richard Cobden and Thomas Carlyle and his wife.

Life in the Sickroom is considered to be one of Martineau’s most underrated works. It upset evangelical readers as they “thought it dangerous in ‘its supposition of self-reliance.’ This series of essays embraced traditional womanhood. Martineau dedicated it to Elizabeth Barrett, as it was “an outpouring of feeling to an idealized female alter ego, both professional writer and professional invalid- and utterly unlike the women in her own family.” Written during a kind of public break from her mother, this book was Martineau’s proclamation of independence.

At the same time, Martineau turned the traditional patient/doctor relationship on its head by asserting control over her space even in sickness. The sickroom was her space. Life in the Sickroom explained how to regain control even in illness. Alarmed that a woman was suggesting such a position in the power dynamic, critics suggested that, as she was an invalid, her mind must also be sick and the work was not to be taken seriously. British and Foreign Medical Review dismissed Martineau’s piece on the same basis as the critics: an ill person cannot write a healthy work. They thought it was unheard of for a woman to suggest being in a position of control, especially in sickness. Instead, the Review recommended patients’ follow “unconditional submission” to the advice of doctors. They disagreed with the idea that Martineau might hold any sort of “authority to Britain’s invalids.”

Expecting to remain an invalid for the rest of her life, Martineau delighted in the new freedom of views using her telescope. Across the Tyne was the sandy beach 3 where there are frequent wrecks – too interesting to an invalid... and above the rocks, a spreading heath, where I watch troops of boys flying their kites; lovers and friends taking their breezy walks on Sundays...” She expressed a lyrical view of Tynemouth:

“When I look forth in the morning, the whole land may be sheeted with glistening snow, while the myrtle-green sea tumbles... there is none of the deadness of winter in the landscape; no leafless trees, no locking up with ice; and the air comes in through my open upper sash, but sun-warmed. The robins twitter and hop in my flower-boxes... and at night, what a heaven! What an expanse of stars above, appearing more steadfast, the more the Northern Lights dart and quiver!”

During her illness, she for a second time declined a pension on the civil list, fearing to compromise her political independence. After publication of her letter on the subject, some of her friends raised a small annuity for her soon after.

### 21.2 Mesmerism and Ambleside

In 1844 Martineau underwent a course of mesmerism, returning to health after a few months. There was national interest in mesmerism at this time. Also known as ‘animal magnetism’, it can be defined as a “loosely grouped set of practices in which one person influenced another through a variety of personal actions, or through the direct influence of one mind on another mind. Mesmerism was designed to make invisible forces augment the mental powers of the mesmeric object.” She eventually published an account of her case in sixteen Letters on Mesmerism, which caused much discussion. Her work led to friction with “the natural prejudices of a surgeon and a surgeon’s wife” (her brother-in-law and sister).

In 1845 she left Tynemouth for Ambleside in the Lake District, where she built herself the house called “The Knoll”, where she spent the greater part of her later life. In 1845 she published three volumes of Forest and Game Law Tales. In 1846 she toured Egypt, Palestine and Syria with some
friends, and on her return published *Eastern Life, Present and Past* (1848). This travelogue expressed her concept that, as humanity passed through one after another of the world’s historic religions, the conception of the Deity and of Divine government became at each step more and more abstract and indefinite. She believed the ultimate goal to be philosophic atheism, but did not explicitly say so in the book. She described ancient tombs, “the black pall of oblivion” set against the paschal “puppet show” in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and noted that Christian beliefs in reward and punishment were based on and similar to heathen superstitions. Describing an ancient Egyptian tomb, she wrote, “How like ours were his life and death!... Compare him with a retired naval officer made country gentleman in our day, and in how much less do they differ than agree?” The book’s “infidel tendency” was too much for the publisher John Murray, who rejected it.

Martineau wrote *Household Education* in 1848, lamenting the state of women’s education. She believed women had a natural inclination to motherhood and believed domestic work went hand in hand with academia for a proper, well-rounded education. She stated, “I go further than most persons... in desiring thorough practice in domestic occupations, from an early age, for young girls” She proposed that freedom and rationality, rather than command and obedience, are the most effectual instruments of education.

Her interest in schemes of instruction led her to start a series of lectures, addressed at first to the school children of Ambleside, but afterward extended to their parents, at the request of the adults. The subjects were sanitary principles and practice, the histories of England and North America, and the scenes of her Eastern travels. At the request of the publisher Charles Knight, in 1849 she wrote *The History of the Thirty Years’ Peace, 1816–1846*, an excellent popular history from the point of view of a “philosophical Radical”. Martineau productively spanned a variety of subjects in her writing and did so with more assertiveness than was expected of women at the time. She has been described as having an “essentially masculine nature”. It was commonly thought that a progressive woman, in order to be progressive, was emulating the qualities of a man.

Martineau edited a volume of *Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development*, published in March 1851. Its epistolary form is based on correspondence between her and the self-styled scientist Henry G. Atkinson. She expounded the doctrine of philosophical atheism, which she thought the tendency of human belief. She did not deny a first cause but declared it unknowable. She and Atkinson thought they affirmed man’s moral obligation. Atkinson was a zealous exponent of mesmerism. The prominence given to the topics of mesmerism and clairvoyance heightened the general disapproval of the book. Literary London was outraged by its mesmeric evolutionary atheism, and the book caused a lasting division between Martineau and some of her friends. From 1852 to 1866, she contributed regularly to the *Daily News*, writing sometimes six leaders a week. It also published her *Letters from Ireland*, written during a visit to that country in the summer of 1852. For many years she was a contributor to the *Westminster Review*; in 1854 she was among financial supporters who prevented its closing down.

Martineau believed she was psychosomatic; this medical belief of the times related the uterus to emotions and hysteria. She had symptoms of hysteria in her loss of taste and smell. Her partial deafness throughout life may have contributed to her problems. Various people, including the maid, her brother, and Spencer T. Hall (a notable mesmerist) performed mesmerism on her. Some historians attribute her apparent recovery from symptoms to a shift in the positioning of her tumor so that it no longer obstructed other organs. As the physical improvements were the first signs of healing she had in five years and happened at the same time of her first mesmeric treatment, Martineau confidentially credited mesmerism with her “cure.”

She continued her political activism during the late 1850s and 1860s. She supported the Married Women’s Property Bill and in 1856 signed a petition for it organized by Barbara Bodichon. She also pushed for licensed prostitution and laws that addressed the customers rather than the women. She supported women’s suffrage and signed Bodichon’s petition in its favor in 1866.
In the early part of 1855, Martineau was suffering from heart disease. She began to write her autobiography, as she expected her life to end. Completing the book rapidly in three months, she postponed its publication until after her death, and lived another two decades. Her autobiography was published posthumously in 1877.

When Darwin’s book *The Origin of Species* was published in 1859, his brother Erasmus sent a copy to his old flame Harriet Martineau. At age 58, she was still reviewing from her home in the Lake District. From her “snow landscape”, Martineau sent her thanks, adding that she had previously praised “the quality and conduct of your brother’s mind, but it is an unspeakable satisfaction to see here the full manifestation of its earnestness & simplicity, its sagacity, its industry, and the patient power by which it has collected such a mass of facts, to transmute them by such sagacious treatment into such portentous knowledge. I should much like to know how large a proportion of our scientific men believe he has found a sound road.”

Martineau supported Darwin’s theory because it was not based in theology. Martineau strove for secularism stating, “In the present state of the religious world, Secularism ought to flourish. What an amount of sin and woe might and would then be extinguished.” She wrote to her fellow Malthusian (and atheist) George Holyoake enthusing, “What a book it is! – overthrowing (if true) revealed Religion on the one hand, and Natural (as far as Final Causes and Design are concerned) on the other. The range and mass of knowledge take away one’s breath.” To Fanny Wedgwood she wrote, “I rather regret that C.D. went out of his way two or three times to speak of “The Creator” in the popular sense of the First Cause.... His subject is the “Origin of Species” and not the origin of Organisation; and it seems a needless mischief to have opened the latter speculation at all – There now! I have delivered my mind.”

### 21.3 Economics and Social Sciences

As early as 1831, Martineau wrote on the subject “Political Economy” (as the field of economics was then known). Her goal was to popularise and illustrate the principles of *laissez faire* capitalism, though she made no claim to original theorising.

Martineau’s reflections on *Society in America*, published in 1837, are prime examples of her approach to the area later known as sociological methods. Her ideas in this field were set out in her 1838 book *How to Observe Morals and Manners*. She believed that some very general social laws influence the life of any society, including the principle of progress, the emergence of science as the most advanced product of human intellectual endeavour, and the significance of population dynamics and the natural physical environment.

Auguste Comte coined the name sociology and published a rambling exposition under the title of *Cours de Philosophie Positive* in 1839. Martineau undertook a translation that was published in two volumes in 1853 as *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau). It was a remarkable achievement, but a successful one. Comte recommended her volumes to his students instead of his own. Some writers regard Martineau as “the first woman sociologist”. Her introduction of Comte to the English-speaking world and the elements of sociological perspective in her original writings support her credit as a sociologist.

### Death

Harriet Martineau died at “The Knoll” on 27 June 1876. She left an autobiographical sketch to be published by the *Daily News*, in which she wrote. “Her original power was nothing more than was due to earnestness and intellectual clearness within a certain range. With small imaginative and suggestive powers, and therefore nothing approaching to genius, she could see clearly what she did see, and give a clear expression to what she had to say. In short, she could popularize while she could neither discover nor invent.”
The following year, her autobiography was published. It was rare for a woman to publish such a work, let alone one secular in nature. Her book was regarded as dispassionate, ‘philosophic to the core’ in its perceived masculinity, and a work of necessitarianism. She deeply explored childhood experiences and memories, expressing feelings of having been deprived of her mother’s affection, as well as strong devotion to her brother James Martineau, a theologian.

21.4 Text—On Marriage

The Marriage compact is the most important feature of the domestic state on which the observer can fix his attention. If he be a thinker, he will not be surprised at finding much imperfection in the marriage state wherever he goes. By no arrangements yet attempted have purity of morals, constancy of affection, and domestic peace been secured to any extensive degree in society. Almost every variety of method is still in use, in one part of the world or another. The primitive custom of brothers marrying sisters still subsists in some Eastern regions. Polygamy is very common there, as every one knows. In countries which are too far advanced for this, every restraint of law, all sanction of opinion, has been tried to render that natural method,—the restriction of one husband to one wife,—successful, and therefore universal and permanent. Law and opinion have, however, never availed to anything like complete success. Even in thriving young countries, where no considerations of want, and few of ambition, can interfere with domestic peace,—where the numbers are equal, where love has the promise of a free and even course, and where religious sentiment is directed full upon the sanctity of the marriage state,—it is found to be far from pure. In almost all countries, the corruption of society in this department is so deep and wide-spread, as to vitiate both moral sentiment and practice in an almost hopeless degree. It neutralizes almost all attempts to ameliorate and elevate the condition of the race.—There must be something fearfully wrong where the general result is so unfortunate as this. As in most other cases of social suffering, the wrong will be found to lie less in the methods ordained and put in practice, than in the prevalent sentiment of society, out of which all methods arise.

It is necessary to make mention (however briefly) of the kinds of false sentiment from which the evil of conjugal unhappiness appears to spring.—The sentiment by which courage is made the chief ground of honour in men, and chastity in women, coupled with the inferiority in which women have ever been sunk, was sure to induce profligacy. As long as men were brave nothing more was required to make them honourable in the eyes of society: while the inferior condition of women has ever exposed those of them who were not protected by birth and wealth to the profligacy of men.

Marriage exists everywhere, to be studied by the moral observer. He must watch the character of courtships wherever he goes;—whether the young lady is negotiated for and promised by her guardians, without having seen her intended; like the poor girl who, when she asked her mother to point out her future husband from among a number of gentlemen, was silenced with the rebuke, “What is that to you?”—or whether they are left free to exchange their faith “by flowing stream, through wood, or craggy wild,” as in the United States;—or whether there is a medium between these two extremes, as in England. He must observe how fate is defied by lovers in various countries...Scotch lovers agree to come together after so many years spent in providing the “plenishing.” Irish lovers conclude the business, in case of difficulty, by appearing before the priest the next morning. There is recourse to a balcony and rope-ladder in one country; a steam-boat and back-settlement in another; trust and patience in a third; and intermediate flirtations, to pass the time, in a fourth. He must note the degree of worldly ambition which attends marriages, and which may therefore be supposed to stimulate them, how much space the house with two rooms in humble life, and the country-seat and carriages in higher life, occupy in the mind of bride or bridegroom.—He must observe whether conjugal infidelity excites horror and rage, or whether it is so much a matter of course as that no jealousy interferes to mar the arrangements of
mutual convenience.—He must mark whether women are made absolutely the property of their husbands, in mind and in estate; or whether the wife is treated more or less professedly as an equal party in the agreement.—He must observe whether there is an excluded class, victims to their own superstition or to a false social obligation, wandering about to disturb by their jealousy or licentiousness those whose lot is happier.—He must observe whether there are domestic arrangements for home enjoyments, or whether all is planned on the supposition of pleasure lying abroad; whether the reliance is on books, gardens, and play with children, or on the opera, parties, the ale-house, or dances on the green.—He must mark whether the ladies are occupied with their household cares in the morning, and the society of their husbands in the evening, or with embroidery and looking out of balconies; with receiving company all day, or gadding abroad; with the library or the nursery; with lovers or with children.—In each country, called civilized, he will meet with almost all these varieties: but in each there is such a prevailing character in the aspect of domestic life, that intelligent observation will enable him to decide, without much danger of mistake, as to whether marriage is merely an arrangement of convenience, in accordance with low morals, or a sacred institution, commanding the reverence and affection of a virtuous people. No high degree of this sanctity can be looked for till that moderation is attained which, during the prevalence of asceticism and its opposite, is reached only by a few. That it yet exists nowhere as the characteristic of any society,—that all the blessings of domestic life are not yet open to all, so as to preclude the danger of any one encroaching on his neighbour,—is but too evident to the travelled observer. He can only mark the degree of approximation to this state of high morals wherever he goes. The traveller everywhere finds woman treated as the inferior party in a compact in which both parties have an equal interest. Any agreement thus formed is imperfect, and is liable to disturbance; and the danger is great in proportion to the degradation of the supposed weaker party. The degree of the degradation of woman is as good a test as the moralist can adopt for ascertaining the state of domestic morals in any country.

The Indian squaw carries the household burdens, trudging in the dust, while her husband on horseback paces before her, unencumbered but by his own gay trappings. She carries the wallet with food, the matting for the lodge, the merchandize (if they possess any), and her infant. There is no exemption from labour for the squaw of the most vaunted chief. In other countries the wife may be found drawing the plough, hewing wood and carrying water; the men of the family standing idle to witness her toils. Here the observer may feel pretty sure of his case. From a condition of slavery like this, women are found rising to the highest condition in which they are at present seen, in France, England, and the United States,—where they are less than half-educated, precluded from earning a subsistence, except in a very few ill-paid employments, and prohibited from giving or withholding their assent to laws which they are yet bound by penalties to obey. In France owing to the great destruction of men in the wars of Napoleon, women are engaged, and successfully engaged, in a variety of occupations which have been elsewhere supposed unsuitable to the sex. Yet there remains so large a number who cannot, by the most strenuous labour in feminine employments, command the necessities of life, while its luxuries may be earned by infamy, that the morals of the society are naturally bad. Great attention has of late been given to this subject in France: the social condition of women is matter of thought and discussion to a degree which promises some considerable amelioration. Already, women can do more in France than anywhere else; they can attempt more without ridicule or arbitrary hindrance: and the women of France are probably destined to lead the way in the advance which the sex must hereafter make. At present, society is undergoing a transition from a feudal state to one of mutual government; and women, gaining in some ways, suffer in others during the process. They have, happily for themselves, lost much of the peculiar kind of observance which was the most remarkable feature of the chivalrous age; and it has been impossible to prevent their sharing in the benefits of the improvement and diffusion of knowledge. All cultivation of their powers has secured to them the use of new power; so that their condition is far superior to what it was in any former age. But new difficulties about securing a maintenance have arisen. Marriage is less general; and the husbands
of the greater number of women are not secure of a maintenance from the lords of the soil, any more than women are from being married. The charge of their own maintenance is thrown upon large numbers of women, without the requisite variety of employments having been opened to them, or the needful education imparted. A natural consequence of this is, that women are educated to consider marriage the one object in life, and therefore to be extremely impatient to secure it. The unfavourable influence of these results upon the happiness of domestic life may be seen at a glance.

This may be considered the sum and substance of female education in England; and the case is scarcely better in France, though the independence and practical efficiency of women there are greater than in any other country. The women in the United States are in a lower condition than either, though there is less striving after marriage, from its greater frequency, and little restriction is imposed upon the book-learning which women may obtain. But the old feudal notions about the sex flourish there, while they are going out in the more advanced countries of Europe; and these notions, in reality, regulate the condition of women. American women generally are treated in no degree as equals, but with a kind of superstitious outward observance, which, as they have done nothing to earn it, is false and hurtful. Coexisting with this, there is an extreme difficulty in a woman's obtaining a maintenance, except by the exercise of some rare powers. In a country where women are brought up to be indulged wives, there is no hope, help, or prospect for such as have not money and are not married.

In America, women can earn a maintenance only by teaching, sewing, employment in factories, keeping boarding-houses, and domestic service. Some governesses are tolerably well paid,—comparing their earnings with those of men. Employment in factories, and domestic service, are well paid. Sewing is so wretched an occupation everywhere, that it is to be hoped that machinery will soon supersede the use of human fingers in a labour so unprofitable. In Boston, Massachusetts, a woman is paid nine pence (sixpence English) for making a shirt. In England, besides these occupations, others are opening; and, what is of yet greater consequence, the public mind is awakening to the necessity of enlarging the sphere of female industry. Some of the inferior branches of the fine arts have lately offered profitable employment to many women. The commercial adversity to which the country has been exposed from time to time, has been of service to the sex, by throwing hundreds and thousands of them upon their own resources, and thus compelling them to urge claims and show powers which are more respected every day. In France this is yet more conspicuously the case. There, women are shopkeepers, merchants, professional accountants, editors of newspapers, and employed in many other ways, unexampled elsewhere, but natural and respectable enough on the spot.

Domestic morals are affected in two principal respects by these differences. Where feminine occupations of a profitable nature are few, and therefore overstocked, and therefore yielding a scanty maintenance with difficulty, there is the strongest temptation to prefer luxury with infamy to hardship with unrecognized honour. Hence arises much of the corruption of cities,—less in the United States than in Europe, from the prevalence of marriage,—but awful in extent everywhere. Where vice is made to appear the interest of large classes of women, the observer may be quite sure that domestic morals will be found impure. If he can meet with any society where the objects of life are as various and as freely open to women as to men, there he may be sure of finding the greatest amount of domestic purity and peace; for, if women were not helpless, men would find it far less easy to be vicious.

The other way in which domestic morals are affected by the scope which is allowed to the powers of women, is through the views of marriage which are induced. Marriage is debased by being considered the one worldly object in life,—that on which maintenance, consequence, and power depend. Where the husband marries for connexion, fortune, or an heir to his estate, and the wife for an establishment, for consequence, or influence, there is no foundation for high domestic morals and lasting peace; and in a country where marriage is made the single aim of all women, there is no security against the influence of some of these motives even in the simplest and purest cases of attachment. The sordidness is infused from the earliest years; the taint is in the mind before the attachment begins, before the objects meet; and the evil effects upon the marriage state are incalculable.
All this—the sentiment of society with regard to Woman and to Marriage, the social condition of Woman, and the consequent tendency and aim of her education,—the traveller must carefully observe. Each civilized society claims for itself the superiority in its treatment of woman. In one, she is indulged with religious shows, and with masquerades, or Punch, as an occasional variety. In another, she is left in honourable and undisputed possession of the housekeeping department. In a third, she is allowed to meddle, behind the scenes, with the business which is confided to her husband’s management. In a fourth, she is satisfied in being the cherished domestic companion, unaware of the injury of being doomed to the narrowness of mind which is the portion of those who are always confined to the domestic circle. In a fifth, she is flattered at being guarded and indulged as a being requiring incessant fostering, and too feeble to take care of herself. In a sixth society, there may be found expanding means of independent occupation, of responsible employment for women; and here, other circumstances being equal, is the best promise of domestic fidelity and enjoyment.

It is a matter of course that women who are furnished with but one object,—marriage,—must be as unfit for anything when their aim is accomplished as if they had never had any object at all. They are no more equal to the task of education than to that of governing the state; and, if any unexpected turn of adversity befalls them, they have no resource but a convent, or some other charitable provision. Where, on the other hand, women are brought up capable of maintaining an independent existence, other objects remain where the grand one is accomplished. Their independence of mind places them beyond the reach of the spoiler; and their cultivated faculty of reason renders them worthy guardians of the rational beings whose weal or woe is lodged in their hands. There is yet, as may be seen by a mere glance over society, only a very imperfect provision made anywhere for doing justice to the next generation by qualifying their mothers; but the observer of morals may profit by marking the degrees in which this imperfection approaches to barbarism. Where he finds that girls are committed to convents for education, and have no alternative in life but marriage, in which their will has no share, and a return to their convent, he may safely conclude that there a plurality of lovers is a matter of course, and domestic enjoyments of the highest kind undesired and unknown. He may conclude that as are the parents, so will be the children; and that, for one more generation at least, there will be little or no improvement. But where he finds a variety of occupations open to women; where he perceives them not only pursuing the lighter mechanic arts, dispensing charity and organizing schools for the poor, but occupied in education, and in the study of science and the practice of the fine arts, he may conclude that here resides the highest domestic enjoyment which has yet been attained, and the strongest hope of a further advance.

From observation on these classes of facts,—the Occupation of the people, the respective Characters of the occupied classes, the Health of the population, the state of Marriage and of Women, and the character of Childhood,—the moralist may learn more of the private life of a community than from the conversation of any number of the individuals who compose it.

Self Assessment

1. Fill in the blanks:

   (i) Martineau’s reflections on *Society in America*, published in ........

   (ii) The traveller everywhere finds woman treated as the.......

   (iii) In America, women can earn a maintenance only by teaching, sewing, and employment in .........

   (iv) Auguste Comte coined the name.............


   (vi) In Boston, Massachusetts, a woman is paid...........

21.5 Summary

• The sixth of eight children, Harriet Martineau was born in Norwich, England, where her father was a manufacturer. Her mother was the daughter of a sugar refiner and a grocer. The
family was of French Huguenot ancestry and professed Unitarian views. She was closest to her brother, James, who became a clergyman in the tradition of the English Dissenters.

- Martineau wrote at least three books during her illness, and a historical plaque marks this house. In 1844 she published both *Crofton Boys*, the children’s novel, and *Life in the Sickroom: Essays by an Invalid*, an autobiographical reflection on invalidism. She wrote *Household Education* (1848), the handbook on the ‘proper’ way to raise and educate children. Lastly, she began working on her autobiography. Completed much later, it included some hundred pages to this period. Notable visitors included Richard Cobden and Thomas Carlyle and his wife.

- The Marriage compact is the most important feature of the domestic state on which the observer can fix his attention. If he be a thinker, he will not be surprised at finding much imperfection in the marriage state wherever he goes. By no arrangements yet attempted have purity of morals, constancy of affection, and domestic peace been secured to any extensive degree in society. Almost every variety of method is still in use, in one part of the world or another. The primitive custom of brothers marrying sisters still subsists in some Eastern regions. Polygamy is very common there, as every one knows. In countries which are too far advanced for this, every restraint of law, all sanction of opinion, has been tried to render that natural method,—the restriction of one husband to one wife,—successful, and therefore universal and permanent. Law and opinion have, however, never availed to anything like complete success. Even in thriving young countries, where no considerations of want, and few of ambition, can interfere with domestic peace,—where the numbers are equal, where love has the promise of a free and even course, and where religious sentiment is directed full upon the sanctity of the marriage state,—it is found to be far from pure. In almost all countries, the corruption of society in this department is so deep and wide-spreading, as to vitiate both moral sentiment and practice in an almost hopeless degree. It neutralizes almost all attempts to ameliorate and elevate the condition of the race.—There must be something fearfully wrong where the general result is so unfortunate as this. As in most other cases of social suffering, the wrong will be found to lie less in the methods ordained and put in practice, than in the prevalent sentiment of society, out of which all methods arise.

### 21.6 Key-Words

1. Abolitionist : A person who favors the abolition of a practice or institution, especially capital punishment or formerly slavery.

2. Importunities : A set of circumstances that makes it possible to do something.

### 21.7 Review Questions

1. Write a short note on Harriet’s Life and Works.
2. Briefly describe the essay “On Marriage”.

### Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) 1837 
   (ii) inferior party 
   (iii) factories 
   (iv) sociology 
   (v) March 1851 
   (vi) nine pence

### 21.8 Further Readings

Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Discuss Martineau as an Author
• Analyse Martineau’s views on Marriage

Introduction

Harriet Martineau authored the first systematic methodological treatise in sociology, conducted extended international comparative studies of social institutions, and translated August Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive into English, thus structurally facilitating the introduction of sociology and positivism into the United States. In her youth she was a professional writer who captured the popular English mind by wrapping social scientific instruction in a series of widely read novels. In her maturity she was an astute sociological theorist, methodologist, and analyst of the first order. To the extent that any complex institutional phenomenon such as sociology can have identifiable founders, Alice Rossi justly celebrates Harriet Martineau as ‘the first woman sociologist.’”

Harriet Martineau was the most astute female politician in England through almost four decades of the mid-nineteenth century. She did her work as a writer, an investigative traveler, a correspondent, and an interpreter of a multitude of intellectual trends. In all the vast number of her works and interests she was ever conscious of being female. She knew that being a woman meant that she had to do whatever she did differently from a man. Early in 1832 she wrote in a letter to Francis Place from her native Norwich, “I wish I were in London, . . . I want to be doing something with the pen, since no other means of action in politics are in a woman’s power.”

She was able to move to London within the year, for her monthly series of didactic fictional accounts of the ideas of the new economics, Illustrations of Political Economy, had made her instantly famous, and the income from the series made her self-supporting. She was to earn her living as a writer, her reputation as a radical economic, political, and social commentator, and her historical mark as a social scientist, current historian, and feminist. She is known today by scholars of American society through her keenly analytic work, Society in America, published in 1837 after a
two-year journey in Jacksonian America. She is known by English people as the renowned
progressive journalist and leader writer (editorialist) for the London Daily News, author of a
history of a period through which she lived, The History of England during the Thirty Years’ Peace,
1816-1846, translator into English of Auguste Comte’s Positive Philosophy, and proponent of
positivism and the social scientific method. In England she is even remembered locally as an
amiable resident-householder of Ambleside in the Lake District, the informal educator of local
workers through her winter series of instructive evening lectures and her personal lending library.
In this, as in all her work, she was the progressive, enlightening reformer, perpetually confident
in the rightness of her truth. Her feminism, perhaps because it was part and parcel of the whole
of her political philosophy, is not as well known as her other ideas. Yet she took a stand and
commented on virtually every campaign regarding women in England and America of her day
and addressed some women’s issues that were not identified so clearly as such until the women’s
movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Martineau’s politics included a thoroughgoing attention to women. It was an essential part of her
blend of radicalism, and it had emerged well before her declaration to Place a month before her
thirtieth birthday in 1832 that she must act with her pen, as that was the only access to politics a
woman had. Her feminist politics was to continue strong throughout her life. Sensitive to her own
womanhood and the limitations it imposed on her, the entry to feminism for many a woman
through several feminist generations, Martineau gradually turned this personal sensitivity to
social ends until the rights of women and advocacy of women’s causes became one of her lifelong
major efforts. The first piece she ever published—at age nineteen—was on women: “Female Writers
of Practical Divinity.” In 1869, while an invalid confined to her home The Knoll at Ambleside, as
her last public work she applied her mighty pen in support of the campaign by the Ladies’
National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts. This campaign was an
organized effort by women to get Parliament to repeal a group of laws that they believed
incriminated women indiscriminately. Euphemistically named, the laws purported to control
syphilis and gonorrhea through controlling prostitution, while giving sweeping authority to police
in garrison towns to detain and examine women on mere suspicion of prostitution. Englishwomen
made the repeal of these laws a rallying focus for their first fully organized feminist operation. In
her sixties Harriet Martineau wrote the drafts for their petitions, wrote speeches for the campaign
leader, Josephine Butler, wrote the newspaper letters that launched the effort.

A London female journalist, Sarah Curtis, standing for Parliament in 1974 at the peak of the
contemporary women’s movement in Great Britain, called Harriet Martineau “the woman journalist
of our time, then.” Curtis encapsulated in that statement the reason we need a fresh look at
Martineau’s feminism. I think this can best be accomplished through reading her own words on
the subject, and to that end I present these selections of her works on women.

Harriet Martineau was a complicated female intellectual at a time when often the most a bookish
middle-class woman in need of employment could aspire to was a position as a governess. She
was full of contradictions, at times the advance messenger of a new movement, at times a reflector
of Victorian eccentric views and narrow morality, sometimes farsighted, other times petty,
sometimes mean, other times generous and wise, occasionally brilliant, but often verbose,
repetitious, and tedious. Yet she was surely what we called in the early days of the recent women’s
movement “a role model from history,” a woman of achievement, independence, and autonomy,
whose hard-won gains resulted from her own effort. For Victorian England the magnitude of her
accomplishment is astounding. She wrote without a significant break from early adulthood into
her late sixties, despite health obstacles, supporting herself all her life by writing, and publishing
well over 100 separately printed titles, scores of periodical articles, and some 1,642 newspaper
editorials. The content of all that she wrote was wide-ranging, substantial, and serious.
As we reconsider her influence, we realize that we are not recovering a "lost woman writer" whose few small gems have been lost to the public for many years. Rather, hers is an enormous output. She never revised, and although some of her writing is lively and brilliant, some of it is very dull. She can be credited with neither painstaking attention to craft nor stylistic grace. Some of her vast outpouring has remained in print, and she has continued to hold a small place of historical recognition. Thus, it is neither because of neglect nor because of her virtuosity as a writer that we should again turn our attention to her.

As she was not entirely lost to history, so she was not a typical woman of her time, either. Harriet Martineau cannot be used as a case study of a nineteenth-century woman. She was not inarticulate or limited in public expression as most women were. She was not even a typical woman writer, for there were few women journalists, women writers tending to concentrate more on fiction and poetry. As a single woman, she was not dependent on an individual man for her economic or emotional well-being as the vast majority of women were. No one thing that she did, no one aspect of her life makes her in any way a representative nineteenth-century woman.

On the other hand, even though she more often expressed new trends than typified currents, she was not an original thinker. Her genius lay in her ability to discern new ideas with quick intelligence, to communicate them clearly to the popular mind, and thus to rally, time and again, supporters and advocates of the new viewpoints and causes. Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, James Mill, Joseph Priestley, Jeremy Bentham thought up the doctrines of political economy, necessarian philosophy, and utilitarianism that she taught in the early years of her adulthood. Mrs. Jane Marcet in *Conversations on Political Economy* even invented the format she first used, the simplified lesson in print aimed at educating common people. Martineau took the ideas and perfected the form—the primer textbook in a sophisticated field, the how-to manual—at a time when the desire for general education was highly developed, but the instructional materials for it were not. Similarly, her account of her travels in the United States helped change the shape of the travel book. Although it was in vogue for Europeans to travel in the new republic and write about it, Martineau did more than simply describe her journey. She formulated a comparative method for studying societies and analyzed the new American culture by measuring it against carefully stated principles. Quite possibly, she wrote the first “methodological essay” ever published, *How to Observe Morals and Manners*. Her greatest originality was in her method. Significantly, she translated and abbreviated Comte’s *Positive Philosophy*, the wellspring of social scientific thought, so effectively that it spread the Comtean word far and wide and gave Martineau herself a new systematic framework in positivism. Comte himself believed it was so good that he had it retranslated into French for his French disciples, and her translation and abridgment are still the standard edition of Comte’s work used in English sociology textbooks today.

It was the same with political issues. She did not begin a single campaign, but whether it was British reform politics, American abolitionism, nursing in the Crimean War, or feminism, she was in the forefront, interpreting and fighting for the cause. John Stuart Mill took the first petition for woman’s suffrage to Parliament in 1866, but Harriet Martineau signed it and had long worked for it. American abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was her hero, and no other English writer wrote so much in the cause of American abolition of slavery as she. Florence Nightingale was on the battlefield, organizing and professionalizing nursing in the Crimea, and then back home organizing nursing education and the War Office in England, but Martineau was her champion in the press. It is the cumulative effect of Martineau’s numerous contributions that forms a part of her lasting contribution.

Although in some ways Martineau was very much a woman of her time and a Victorian intellectual, she was also, along with a group of her contemporaries, a true progenitor of the intellectual mode that reigns in Anglo-American liberalism today and provides the dominant informing paradigm of mainstream Western feminism. It is this intellectual influence that constitutes her greatest
contribution. Her radicalism was the consistent strand in all her far-flung efforts. Its tenets were rationalism, progressivism, organizational order, voice for the inarticulate, respect for the individual, and faith in science, all of which determined right thinking. Hers was a singularly principled posture. She held the position that human free will is limited. What free will there is rests on the ability of the human to uncover the immutable laws of nature, physical, economic, and social. This radicalism of the Victorian era became the twentieth century’s liberalism, and liberalism became the idea that did more than any other conceptual nucleus to make room for twentieth-century feminism clear into the 1980s. Harriet Martineau, I think, spelled out a feminist overview in the nineteenth century in terms that were radical then, and did it better, more consistently, and more often than most other feminists. I do not think she knew what she was doing, and I think she was often “wrong.” I find some of her conclusions inadequate and even bigoted for my time and place.

As an English-language feminist intellectual, I think I would recognize her as my forebear and the ancestor of my culture more readily than I would identify my illiterate Irish American great-grandmother who came to America in 1850 to escape the potato famine—or Emma Goldman, the Russian American anarchist feminist whom I would like a great deal, and whose radical twentieth-century ideas I enjoy exploring. But Goldman and our great-grandmothers have had minimal influence on what most American and English women think, and what we socially assume even outside the range of our conscious deliberations, whereas Martineau spelled out a century ahead of us these thoughts and deliberations. Harriet Martineau’s radicalism led her to make a cogent, rational economic argument about conditions in Ireland in 1843 that included specific consideration of the special poverty of women in the same decade that my great-grandmother Graham was preparing for her boat trip to New Orleans to avoid starvation near Dublin. Martineau’s kind of radicalism rattled the whole Anglo-American cognitive universe as well as the political one. Unlike the radicalism of the Emma Goldmans, it set in place the cognitive assumptions the majority of us, whether socialist, radical, or liberal feminists, operate under today, whether fully consciously or vaguely from within our culture’s orientation to the world. These assumptions are the belief in order, the belief that change will bring about betterment, the belief that knowledge is power, the belief that the individual will do good if she or he is taught the good, and, above all, the substitution of a science of society for a theological or speculative base, as the first premise for other individual and collective ideas.

For the contemporary British journalist Sarah Curtis and me, and, I believe, the majority of the world that looks to concepts originating in English, Harriet Martineau articulated the world view that was formative, comprehensible, palatable for our feminism. For Martineau, it was very much a part of a whole, of politics, of economics, of life-style, of philosophy, of a belief system. Being inside the paradigm, she did not know this was so. She gave us our liberal faith in progress, science, and order, a faith that included feminism, what she and her contemporaries called the woman question, which would have as its “natural,” inevitable outcome rights of women corresponding to those of men.

Although in our day challenges to the paradigm, both the undergirding philosophic one and the feminist one, have arisen, making us conscious of the characteristics of that world view and challenges to it, I believe that what Martineau gave us is an explanation of the fundamental intellectual precepts on which most of our feminism is posited. A retrospective look at some of her works on the subject of women and some of her advocacy of women’s causes will help us, I believe, explain to ourselves where we have come from.

22.1 Analysis on Marriage

"Marriage is so unlike everything else. There is something even awful in the nearness it brings. Even if we loved some one else better than—than those we were married to, it would be of no use" —poor Dorothea, in her palpitating anxiety, could only seize her language brokenly—"I
mean, marriage drinks up all our power of giving or getting any blessedness in that sort of love. I know it may be very dear—but it murders our marriage—and then the marriage stays with us like a murder—and everything else is gone. And then our husband—if he loved and trusted us, and we have not helped him, but made a curse in his life—"

If Marian Evans rejected the sanctions which society has imposed on the love of man and woman in the legal forms of marriage, it was not in a wilful and passionate spirit. There are reasons for believing that she was somewhat touched in her youth with the individualistic theories of the time, which made so many men and women of genius reject the restraints imposed by society, as in the case of Goethe, Heine, George Sand, Shelley and many another; yet she does not appear to have been to more than a very limited extent influenced by such considerations in regard to her own marriage. The matter for surprise is, that one who regarded all human traditions, ceremonies and social obligations as sacred, should have consented to act in so individualistic a manner. She makes Rufus Lyon say—and it is her own opinion—that "the right to rebellion is the right to seek a higher rule, and not to wander in mere lawlessness." Her marriage, after the initial act, had in it nothing whatever of lawlessness.

She believed there exists a higher rule than that of Parliament, and to this higher law she submitted. To her this was not a law of self-will and personal inclination, but the law of nature and social obligation. That she was not overcome by the German individualistic and social tendencies may be seen in the article on "Weimar and its Celebrities," in the Westminster Review, where, in writing of Wieland as an educator, she says that the tone of his books was not "immaculate," and that it was "strangely at variance, with that sound and lofty morality which ought to form the basis of every education." She also speaks of the philosophy of that day as "the delusive though plausible theory that no license of tone, or warmth of coloring, could injure any really healthy and high-toned mind." In the article on "Woman in France," she touches on similar theories. As this article was written just at the time of her marriage, one passage in it may have a personal interest, and shows her conception of a marriage such as her own, based on intellectual interest rather than on passionate love. She is speaking of the laxity of opinion and practice with regard to the marriage tie.

Heaven forbid [she adds] that we should enter on a defence of French morals, most of all in relation to marriage! But it is undeniable that unions formed in the maturity of thought and feeling, grounded only on inherent fitness and mutual attraction, tended to bring women into more intelligent sympathy with men, and to heighten and complicate their share in the political drama. The quiescence and security of the conjugal relation are, doubtless, favorable to the manifestation of the highest qualities by persons who have already attained a high standard of culture, but rarely foster a passion sufficient to rouse all the faculties to aid in winning or retaining its beloved object—to convert indolence into activity, indifference into ardent partisanship, dullness into perspicuity.

Her conception of marriage may have been affected by that presented by Feuerbach in his Essence of Christianity. In words translated into English by herself, Feuerbach says, "that alone is a religious marriage which is a true marriage, which corresponds to the essence of marriage—love." Again, he says that marriage is only sacred when it is an inward attraction confirmed by social and personal obligations; "for a marriage the bond of which is merely an external restriction, not the voluntary, contented self-restriction of love—in short, a marriage which is not spontaneously concluded, spontaneously willed, self-sufficing—is not a true marriage, and therefore not a truly moral marriage." As a moral and social obligation, marriage is to be held sacred; its sacredness grows out of its profound human elements of helpfulness, nurture and emotional satisfaction, while its obligation rises from its primary social functions. It does not consist in any legal form, but in compliance with deep moral and social responsibilities. Some such conception of marriage as this she seems to have accepted, which found its obligation in the satisfaction it gives to the
inner nature, and in the fulfilment of social responsibilities. The influence of Compte may also have been felt in the case of both Lewes and Marian Evans; they saw in the marriage form a fulfilment of human, not of legal, requirements.

While there is no doubt they would both gladly have accepted the legal form had that been possible, yet they were sufficiently out of sympathy with the conventionalities of society to cause them to disregard that form when it could not be complied with. They regarded themselves, however, as married, and bound by all the ties and requirements which marriage imposes. They proclaimed themselves to their friends as husband and wife, and they were so accepted by those who knew them. In her letters to literary correspondents she always mentioned Lewes as “my husband.” The laws of most civilized nations recognize these very conditions, and regard the acceptance of the marriage relation before the world as a sufficient form.

Those who have written of this marriage, bear testimony to its devotion and beauty. The author of the account of her life and writings in the Westminster Review, an early and intimate friend, says the “union was from the first regarded by themselves as a true marriage, as an alliance of a sacred kind, having a binding and permanent character. When the fact of the union was first made known to a few intimate friends, it was accompanied with the assurance that its permanence was already irrevocably decreed. The marriage of true hearts for a quarter of a century has demonstrated the sincerity of the intention. ‘The social sanction,’ said Mr. Lewes once in our hearing, ‘is always desirable.’ There are cases in which it is not always to be had. Such a ratification of the sacrament of affection was regarded as a sufficient warrant, under the circumstances of the case, for entrance on the most sacred engagement of life. There was with her no misgiving, no hesitation, no looking back, no regret; but always the unostentatious assertion of quiet, matronly dignity, the most queenly expression and unconscious affirmation of the ‘divine right’ of the wedded wife. We have heard her own oral testimony to the enduring happiness of this union, and can, as privileged witnesses, corroborate it. As a necessary element in this happiness she practically included the enjoyment inseparable from the spontaneous reciprocation of home affection, meeting with an almost maternal love the filial devotion of Mr. Lewes’s sons, proffering all tender service in illness, giving and receiving all friendly confidence in her own hour of sorrowful bereavement, and crowning with a final act of generous love and forethought the acceptance of parental responsibilities in the affectionate distribution of property, the visible result of years of the intellectual toil whose invisible issues are endless.”

Their marriage helped both to a more perfect work and to a truer life. She gave poise and purpose to the “versatile, high-strung, somewhat wayward nature” of her husband, and she “restrained, raised, ennobled, and purified” his life and thought. He stimulated and directed her genius life into its true channel, cared for her business interests with untiring faithfulness, made it possible for her to pursue her work without burdens and distractions, and gave her the inspiration of a noble affection and a cheerful home. Miss Edith Simcox speaks of “the perfect union between these two,” which, she says, “lent half its charm to all the worship paid at the shrine of George Eliot.” She herself, Miss Simcox proceeds to say, “has spoken somewhere of the element of almost natural tenderness in a man’s protecting love: this patient, unwearying care for which no trifles are too small, watched over her own life; he stood between her and the world, her relieved her from all those minor cares which chafe and fret the artist’s soul; he wrote her letters; in a word, he so smoothed the course of her outer life as to leave all her powers free to do what she alone could do for the world and for the many who looked to her for help and guidance. No doubt this devotion brought its own reward; but we are exacting for our idols and do not care to have even a generous error to condone, and therefore we are glad to know that, great as his reward was, it was no greater than was merited by the most perfect love that ever crowned a woman’s life.” Mr. Kegan Paul also writes of the mutual helpfulness and harmony of purpose which grew out of this marriage. “Mr. Lewes’s character attained a stability and pose in which it had been somewhat
lacking, and the quiet of an orderly and beautiful home enabled him to concentrate himself more and more on works demanding sustained intellectual effort, while Mrs. Lewes's intensely feminine nature found the strong man on whom to lean in the daily business of life, for which she was physically and intellectually unfitted. Her own somewhat sombre cast of thought was cheered, enlivened and diversified by the vivacity and versatility which characterized Mr. Lewes, and made him seem less like an Englishman than a very agreeable foreigner."

This marriage presents one of the curious ethical problems of literature. In this case approval and condemnation are alike difficult. Her own teaching condemns it; her own life approves it. We could wish it had not been, for the sake of what is purest and best; and yet it is not difficult to see that its effects were in many ways beneficial to her. That it was ethically wrong there is no doubt. That it was condemned by her own teaching is so plain as to cause doubt about how she could herself approve it.

Lewes had a brilliant and versatile mind. He was not a profound thinker, but he had keen literary tastes, a vigorous interest in science, and a remarkable alertness of intellect. His gifts were varied rather than deep; literary rather than philosophical. As a companion, he had a wonderful charm and magnetism; he was a graceful talker, a marvellous story-teller, and a wit seldom rivalled. His intimate friend, Anthony Trollope, says, "There was never a man so pleasant as he with whom to sit and talk vague literary gossip over a cup of coffee and a cigar." By the same friend we are told that no man related a story as he did. "No one could say that he was handsome. The long bushy hair, and the thin cheeks, and the heavy mustache, joined as they were, alas! almost always to a look of sickness, were not attributes of beauty. But there was a brilliancy in his eye which was not to be tamed by any sickness, by any suffering, which overcame all other feeling on looking at him."

22.2 Views on Women

• "If a test of civilization be sought, none can be so sure as the condition of that half of society over which the other half has power." The "test of civilization" refers to how well that civilization protects minorities. She is saying that the acid test is how do those who are in power treat those who are not? A wicked society oppresses them, and a moral society respects them.

• "There is no country in the world where there is so much boasting of the 'chivalrous' treatment she enjoys....In short, indulgence is given her as a substitute for justice." There is a saying about people who live in a gilded cage; they are given luxury but they are imprisoned.

• Compared supposed morals to actual behavior. The Declaration of Independence express the idea of equality, but both slavery and the treatment of women show a shortcoming of the expressed morals. 'Is it to be understood that the principles of the Declaration of Independence bear no relation to half of the human race? If so, what is the ground of the limitation? If not so, how is the restricted and dependent state of women to be reconciled with the proclamation that "all are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?"

• Said that women are made to believe that marriage is the only thing of real importance in a woman's life-and that they are taught to pretend they don't think so.

• Said that the morals of women are crushed. Said that in America, 'the whole apparatus of public opinion is brought to bear offensively upon individuals among women who exercise freedom of mind in deciding upon what duty is, and the methods by which it is to be pursued'. Basically she says that women are denied ethical independence (form their own ethical judgments); they can hold opinions, but are not allowed to act on them.

Marriage

• Says marriage in America seems like it is more fair and less worrisome than it is in other countries. Marriage can never be fully successful "while the one sex overbears the other."
Marriage is better than it is in Europe, but it will remain imperfect so long as women continue to be "ill-educated, passive, and subservient".

- Marriage is different throughout various parts of the U.S. Women in America have the right to hold property, especially in the south, where the husband and wife get half of the property each. (Marriage is seen as the fundamental unit of productive work; the income belongs to both of them.)
- The rules in the south copy the old Saxon law that gives a wife half her husband's earnings. Spain, France, Italy and Germany give the same rights and it is English laws fail to honor the rights of the woman. The faults of that English law are copied by Massachusetts.
- Divorce in England is so difficult for women that people use it as a means to defraud others, and it drives them to unfaithfulness to their spouse. Because it is so difficult, only the rich can afford it in England. In the U.S., it is much more easy to obtain.
- Divorce in some states is almost as rigid as it is in England; in other states, cruelty, which is grounds for divorce in any state, is so broad a term that almost anyone can get a divorce with relative ease. Because "cruelty" is so broad a term, it is almost never cited as the reason for a divorce. (A more modern term to explain broadly defined cruelty is "irreconcilable differences" or "we grew apart.") Broadened more so that many states have "no-fault divorce."
- The only proper role which legislation has in relation to marriage is in relation to property and its equitable distribution between the husband and wife and the children. It has no value in attempting to regulate morality.
- One would hope that marriage in America is more a marriage of equality in love, but it is beginning to take on some of the corruption of Europe, in that it is becoming a means of ensuring financial safety.
- "The unavoidable consequence of such a mode of marrying is, that the sanctity of marriage is impaired, and that vice succeeds. Any one must see at a glance that if men and women marry those whom they do not love, they must love those whom they do not marry." (154) Saying that if you marry for money you have almost certainly set yourself up for infidelity.
- "Laws and customs may be creative of vice; and should be therefore perpetually under process of observation and correction: but laws and customs cannot be creative of virtue: they may encouraged and help to preserve it; but they cannot originate it." Means that laws created with vice are made to take advantage of others. Laws can't create virtue because they can't stop a person from wanting to take advantage of others, but they can be created either to take advantage of others or to restrain those who would.
- "Women, especially, should be allowed the use and benefit of whatever native strength their Maker has seen fit to give them. It is essential to the virtue of society that they should be allowed the freest moral action, unfettered by ignorance, and unintimidated by authority: for it is unquestioned and unquestionable that if women were not weak, men could not be wicked: that if women were bravely pure, there must be an end to the dastardly tyranny of licentiousness." Saying that her basic principle is that if people are better educated and less imprisoned, they'll make better decisions and are less likely to get into trouble.

22.3 The Successful Author

As her success and recognition grew, Martineau travelled widely in England, Europe, America, and the Middle East. These travels produced a number of travel guides to specific regions, books that were much more than the usual travelogues popular at the time. In addition to descriptions of scenery and places of interest, she described and analyzed the social, political, class, and religious structures of the various countries. In particular, Society in America ([1837]) 1994) and How to Observe Manners and Morals ([1838] 1989) are important precursors to what would eventually become the discipline of sociology.
Notes

*Society in America* [(1837)] 1994) demonstrates the beginnings of a comprehensive, empirical-sociological analysis. Martineau organized social interactions by classifying them according to the institution in which they take place. The role of religion, government, economy, slavery, and the position of women were looked at in relation to the discrepancies between the actual conditions in the United States and its professed adherence to democracy. Unlike her contemporary, Comte, Martineau’s analysis was grounded in the real world rather than in abstract theories of society and history.


After the publications of *Society in America* and *How to Observe Morals and Manners*, Martineau was ill with gynecologic problems, which produced severe back pain and a general loss of physical strength. This resulted in confinement to her home for almost six years (Hoecker-Drysdale 1992). During their period, she continued to write, even writing about her own illness. *Life in the Sickroom*, originally published anonymously in 1844, was a study of illness that focused on the patient and those who attended the patient. When she did not show any improvement, and fearing she would be a lifelong invalid, Martineau turned to the controversial treatment of mesmerism, a treatment based on the belief that magnetic fluid was present in the body and could be regulated by principles of electricity and magnetism.

Martineau’s recovery was almost immediate and her pain decreased. This in turn, allowed her to give up opiates, upon which she had become increasingly dependent. Although, her brother-in-law, Dr. Thomas Greenhow, who had been in charge of her medical care, claimed she had been making progress all along, Martineau was convinced that mesmerism was responsible for her recovery and wrote a book about the experience, *Letters on Mesmerism*, published in 1845. The publication of the book engendered a great deal of controversy with the general public and within Martineau’s own family.

Mesmerism was an extremely controversial procedure and presented a real challenge to traditional medicine. The medical establishment was harsh in its criticism of Martineau’s account of her recovery. Closer to home, Greenhow, attempting to preserve his medical reputation, published a case study of Martineau’s illness, discrediting the mesmerism treatments. (Martineau had originally given him permission to publish the case in medical journal, but he instead published it in a popular form). The result was a rancorous split in the family, with Martineau’s mother and sister taking the side of Dr. Greenhow (Hoecker-Drysdale 1992).

### 22.4 Religion and Women’s Issues

After this episode, Martineau returned to writing on the theme of religion, which she had written about when younger. Now, however, she had changed her views, moving from the piety of her youth of being a critic of religion. *Eastern Life: Past and Present* (1848), which came out of her travels to the Middle East two years earlier, advocated the position that religion was like any other social institution– it was influenced by change in the society in which it was found. Using Saint-Simon’s and Comte’s “Law of Three Stages” as the basis of her analysis, Martineau saw religion as evolutionary, moving from magic and superstition to polytheism, and then to monotheism.

Martineau’s next important work, from a sociological perspective, was a collection of short previously published articles dealing with the socialization of children. The articles were brought together in *Household Education* (1849). Two years later, *The letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development*, coauthored with Henry George Atkinson (1851), publicly announced her movement from being a Unitarian theist to an agnostic and a naturalist. The book generated even more
controversy that had her views on mesmerism. Conceived of as a work that would expound on the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte (in which she had become very interested), the reading public and her critics instead chose to focus on her agnosticism. After the controversy over mesmerism and her religious views, Martineau began a translation of Comte’s *The Positive Philosophy*, which was then a great influence on her thought. Coming from a French Huguenot background, and having studied French as a child, she was quite conversant in the language. Martineau’s translation, published in 1853, was success, and not only introduced Comte to the English-speaking world, but, when it was translated back into French, it substantially increased Comte’s popularity.

After the Comte translation, Martineau turned again to the social problems of England—focusing primarily on women’s issues. Using various publication outlets, such as newspaper editorials, popular journal articles, and book reviews, she argued for specific policies that would help women. One such policy was the Married Women’s Property Bill, which was passed by Parliament in 1857, and which changed the divorce laws under which women had little, if any, rights. Another endeavor concerned attempts to repeal the Contagious Disease Acts of 1866 and 1869, which on the surface had been passed to control prostitution, but in actuality “gave indiscriminate power to the police to arrest and humiliate women.”

When Martineau was in her early fifties, illness began to progressively limit her activities. She was incapacitated again, and this time was confined to her home for five years. Her doctors told her she not have long to live, so she hurried to finish her autobiography, leaving strict instruction that it not be published until after her death. She outlasted the medical predictions by over twenty years, reaching the age of seventy-three, and she continued to write prolifically, even writing her own obituary two weeks before her death on June 25, 1876.

**Self Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Sarah Curtis was a
   (a) Warter  (b) Novelist  (c) Journalist  (d) None of these

   (ii) John Stuart Mill took the first petition for woman’s suffrage to Parliament in
   (a) 1850  (b) 1866  (c) 1860  (d) 1870

   (iii) Martineau was very much a woman of her time of a
   (a) Romantic period  (b) Victorian Period
   (c) Classical Period  (d) None of these

   (iv) Society in America published in
   (a) 1837  (b) 1845  (c) 1825  (d) 1840

**22.5 Summary**

- Harriet Martineau authored the first systematic methodological treatise in sociology, conducted extended international comparative studies of social institutions, and translated August Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive* into English, thus structurally facilitating the introduction of sociology and positivism into the United States. In her youth she was a professional writer who captured the popular English mind by wrapping social scientific instruction in a series of widely read novels.

- Harriet Martineau was the most astute female politician in England through almost four decades of the mid-nineteenth century. She did her work as a writer, an investigative traveler, a correspondent, and an interpreter of a multitude of intellectual trends. In all the vast number of her works and interests she was ever conscious of being female. She knew that being a woman meant that she had to do whatever she did differently from a man. Early in
1832 she wrote in a letter to Francis Place from her native Norwich, “I wish I were in London, . . . I want to be doing something with the pen, since no other means of action in politics are in a woman’s power.”

- Martineau’s politics included a thoroughgoing attention to women. It was an essential part of her blend of radicalism, and it had emerged well before her declaration to Place a month before her thirtieth birthday in 1832 that she must act with her pen, as that was the only access to politics a woman had. Her feminist politics was to continue strong throughout her life. Sensitive to her own womanhood and the limitations it imposed on her, the entry to feminism for many a woman through several feminist generations, Martineau gradually turned this personal sensitivity to social ends until the rights of women and advocacy of women’s causes became one of her lifelong major efforts. The first piece she ever published—at age nineteen—was on women: “Female Writers of Practical Divinity.”

- “Marriage is so unlike everything else. There is something even awful in the nearness it brings. Even if we loved some one else better than—than those we were married to, it would be of no use”—poor Dorothea, in her palpitating anxiety, could only seize her language brokenly—“I mean, marriage drinks up all our power of giving or getting any blessedness in that sort of love. I know it may be very dear—but it murders our marriage—and then the marriage stays with us like a murder—and everything else is gone. And then our husband—if he loved and trusted us, and we have not helped him, but made a curse in his life—”

- Her conception of marriage may have been affected by that presented by Feuerbach in his Essence of Christianity. In words translated into English by herself, Feuerbach says, “that alone is a religious marriage which is a true marriage, which corresponds to the essence of marriage—love.”

- This marriage presents one of the curious ethical problems of literature. In this case approval and condemnation are alike difficult. Her own teaching condemns it; her own life approves it. We could wish it had not been, for the sake of what is purest and best; and yet it is not difficult to see that its effects were in many ways beneficial to her. That it was ethically wrong there is no doubt. That it was condemned by her own teaching is so plain as to cause doubt about how she could herself approve it.

### 22.6 Key-Words

1. Didactic fictional : Inclined to teach or moralise excessively.
2. Euphemistically : Affected, metaphorical, mild.

### 22.7 Review Questions

1. Briefly examine the life of Martineau
2. Discuss the views of Martineau on Marriage

**Answers: Self-Assessment**

1. (i) (c)  (ii) (b)  (iii) (b)  (iv) (a)

### 22.8 Further Readings

Unit 23: Harriet Martineau-On Women: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about Harriet Martineau’s Views on Women.
• Discuss Writings of Martineau

Introduction
Called by William Davenport “the first of the notable women of the nineteenth century,” Harriet Martineau was born in Norwich on June 12th, 1802, the fifth child of Thomas Martineau and Elizabeth Rankin Martineau. Of French Huguenot origin, the extensive family boasted a long line of surgeons but Thomas Martineau was a bombazine manufacturer. Martineau’s childhood, according to her Autobiography, was not a particularly happy one for she was a nervous, fearful child, often ill, and often imagining herself singled out by her mother and siblings for criticism. She was, however, fortunate in her education. After being taught Latin, writing, arithmetic, and French at home by her older brothers and sister, she and her sister Rachel attended Rev. Isaac Perry’s school for two years where she received the same education as the boys. At about the age of 12, she first became troubled by the deafness that was to be with her for life, to a greater or lesser extent. As an unhappy teenager, she was sent to stay with her aunt in Bristol where she was inspired by the intellectual zeal of the family and influenced by the teachings of the prominent Unitarian minister, Dr. Lant Carpenter. In 1826 her father died, and three years later the family business failed. Martineau and her two sisters were thus forced to earn their own living, a circumstance which she felt was far better than living in genteel poverty. By then, however, Martineau had already embarked on a literary career, her first article appearing in the Unitarian periodical, The Monthly Repository, about 1821.

“Harriet Martineau authored the first systematic methodological treatise in sociology, conducted extended international comparative studies of social institutions, and translated August Comte’s Cours de philosophi positive into English, thus structurally facilitating the introduction of sociology and positivism into the United States. In her youth she was a professional writer who captured the
popular English mind by wrapping social scientific instruction in a series of widely read novels. In her maturity she was an astute sociological theorist, methodologist, and analyst of the first order. To the extent that any complex institutional phenomenon such as sociology can have identifiable founders, Alice Rossi (1973, 118-124) justly celebrates Harriet Martineau as 'the first woman sociologist.'”

23.1 Martineau’s Childhood

Harriet Martineau was born in 1802, the sixth of eight children in an upper middle class English family. Her parents were Thomas and Elizabeth (Rankin) Martineau. Thomas was a manufacturer of textiles and an importer of wine in the old cathedral city of Norwich. Norwich was once a distinguished cultural and manufacturing center, but became a casualty of the industrial revolution later in Harriet’s life. Thomas’s family was considered one of the first families of Norwich, he belonged to an elite literary circle that included Mrs. Barbauld and Amelia Opie. Thomas was a devout Unitarian, a trait that he passed onto his daughter Harriet.

Harriet’s mother, Elizabeth was a literate and intelligent woman but had little formal education, making her feel out of place among the cultural elite of Norwich. Harriet described her mother as a domestic tyrant and believed that her tyrannies stemmed from her perceived social inadequacies. But at the same time, it is true that the frugal efficiency and impersonal nature with which she ran her house was characteristic of the 19th century matriarch. Elizabeth enforced in Harriet a fearfulness and feelings of self doubt that would take her years to work out.

Harriet described childhood overall as a “burdensome experience” written in Household Education (1849)

No creature is so intensely reserved as a proud and timid child: and the cases are few in which the parents know anything of the agonies of its little heart...It hides its miseries under an appearance of indifference or obstinacy, till its habitual terror impairs its health, or drives it into a temper of defiance or recklessness. I can speak with some certainty of this, from my own experience. I was as timid a child as ever was born.

And though Harriet became deaf later in her life she claimed she had no sense of smell or taste, which some have linked to a traumatic event that blocked it out psychologically. Harriet’s mother had turned her over to a wet nurse soon after she was born, which was custom at the time. “The wet nurse hired to suckle the child had concealed from Mrs. Martineau that she had all but ceased lactation”. To make up for this neglect, Elizabeth made milk the staple of Harriet’s diet, and though she hated it, could not bring herself to complain, ....and so went for years having the feeling of a heavy lump in her throat for the whole of every morning - sometimes choking with it, and sometimes stealing out into the yard to vomit; and worse than the lump in her throat she had depression of the spirits for the first half of every day, which much injured the action of her mind at lessons and was too much for her temper (Martineau in Household Education p.185)

Though most of her childhood was miserable, Harriet’s two sources of joy came from her maternal instinct for her younger brother James and her youngest sister, Ellen. When Ellen was born, Harriet said she would “like to observe the growth of a human mind from the very beginning”. Harriet’s education was largely at home through self study. She had early exposure to subjects routinely taught only to males. University study was barred to women at the time, but Harriet maintained a regime of intense, self directed investigation throughout her life. When Harriet was about 15 years of age, and her deafness worsening, she was sent by her parents to stay with her aunt and uncle. It was through her uncle that she was introduced to the writings of Locke, Hartley and the principle of sensation. Her uncle was also a minister and reinforced her religious views as a devout Unitarian.
23.2 Adulthood

During the 1820's, the Martineau family went into economic decline when Thomas died. Despite the imposing threat of poverty, Harriet felt a sense of freedom in facing the reality of earning her own living. She was able to escape the confines of a middle class Victorian marriage when her fiancé, John Hugh Worthington, had a mental and physical collapse. She had no relationship after this - stating later that “there is a power of attachment in me that has never been touched.” She remained single and independent the rest of her life.

Harriet “successfully supported herself as an author in various forms, including essays, tracts, reviews, novels, journal articles, travelogues, biographies, how-to manuals, newspaper columns, histories, children’s stories and sociologically informed non-fiction”. By 1829 she had decided that decided to commit herself to the profession, writing:

I have determined that my chief subordinate object in life shall henceforth be the cultivation of my intellectual powers, with a view to the instruction of others by my writings. On this determination I pray for the blessing of God...I believe myself possessed of no uncommon talents, and of not an atom of genius; but as various circumstances have allowed me to think more accurately than some women, I believe that I may so write on subjects of universal concern as to inform some minds and stir up others...of posthumous fame I have not the slightest expectation or desire. To be useful in my day and generation is enough for me.

Harriet’s first literary efforts were reverently religious due to her devout Unitarianism. The adoption of Necessitarianism by Harriet, however, provided her with the intellectual bridge to a social scientific perspective. In Economy Political of (1832-1834) she abandoned her ecclesiastical dogma and began a relationship with social theory. In this book she used fiction to explicate the principles of the new science of political economy. She lived in London during these years and became part of a very influential and advanced literary circle. The circle included: Charles Babbage, Thomas Carlyle, George Eliot, Florence Nightingale, Charles Dickens, Thomas Malthaus, William Wodsworth, Charlotte Bronte, and Charles Darwin.

23.3 Martineau’s Writings

In 1834 Harriet began a two year study and visit of the United States. She reported her findings in Society in America (1837) and Retrospect of Western Travel (1838). These empirical studies emerged at the same time as her foundational treatise on sociological data collection, How to Observe Morals and Manners (1838). This book articulated the principles and methods of empirical social research.

Society in America is her most widely known work to sociologists in the U.S., addressing the issues of methodological strategy confronted with ethnocentrism. In this work she compared valued moral principles and observable social patterns, illustrating insightfully the distinctions between rhetoric and reality. Her writings in How to Observe Morals and Manners offered a positivist solution to the correspondence problem between inter subjectivity, verifiable observables, and unobservable theoretical issues.

Before Marx, Engels or Weber, Martineau examined social class, religion, suicide, national character, domestic relations, women’s status, criminology, and interrelations between institutions and individuals. In 1848, after her trip to the Mid-East and the publication of her work: Eastern Life Past and Present, Harriet openly embraced atheism. She lost much of the support in her family, especially her younger brother James, a known cleric at the time. She also received a cold reception in the populous but was supported by her circle of literary friends. William Lloyd Garrison wrote in her support: I know what you have dared to be brave, what you have suffered, by the frank avowal of what a hireling priesthood and a corrupt church have branded atheistical sentiments. Though my belief in immortality is without peradventure, I desire to tell you that you skepticism, in lack of evidence, on that point, has never altered my confidence in the goodness of your heart and the
noleness of your character...I respect and admire conscientious dissent and doubt...Heresy is the only thing that will redeem mankind. (Pichanick, 191) In 1851 Harriet translated Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive* into English, facilitating the introduction of positivism into American thought.

**Later Life**

Harriet Martineau spent her later years away from the bustling streets of London, moving to the serene Lake District. This was a welcome contrast to the years of constant trial and controversy that was characteristic of most of her life. There is no thorough bibliography of Martineau’s reviews and journal articles. During her life, she wrote over 1500 columns, undertook pioneering methodological studies in what is now called sociology. She was forgotten, in sociology, literature, history, and journalism due to the male academic system. She died after years of illness in 1876, but, in her usual fashion, had already written her obituary, nearly twenty years before:

Her original power was nothing more than was due to earnestness and intellectual clearness within a certain range. With small imaginative and suggestive powers, and therefore nothing approaching genius, she could see clearly what she did see, and give a clear expression to what she had to say. In short, she could popularize, while she could neither discover nor invent. She could sympathize in other people’s views and was too facile in doing so; and she could obtain and keep a firm grasp of her own, and, moreover, she could make them understood. The function of her life was to do this, and, insofar as it was done diligently and honestly, her life was of use, however far its achievements may have fallen short of expectations less moderate than her own. Her duties and her business were sufficient for the peace and the desires of her mind. She saw the human race, as she believed, advancing under the law of progress; she enjoyed her share of the experience, and had no ambition for a larger endowment, or reluctance or anxiety about leaving the enjoyment of such as she had. (Pichanick, 239).

23.4 On Women’s Education

A central doctrine of Martineau’s feminist thought from the very start of her writing career was the importance of education for women. Excerpts from her second *Monthly Repository* article, “On Female Education,” written in 1822, open this section. In that piece, written when she was barely twenty years old, Martineau made the claim, amazing for her youth and period, that women’s intellectual inferiority to men is based on women’s lack of mental training, others’ expectations of women, and women’s circumstances rather than women’s ability. She cleverly side stepped the issue of whether women can be men’s equals, saying instead she was looking “to show the expediency of giving properscope and employment to the powers which they [women] do possess.”

Similarly, she avoided the nature versus nurture argument of whether educational potential is dependent on “the structure of the body” or “bodily frame.” Although in this youthful argument, published in the organ of Unitarian Christianity to which she was then faithful, she allowed that women should be educated to enhance their relationships to men and make them better mothers and held that the greatest value of education is to give women a better understanding of Christianity, she nevertheless had a very clear-sighted perception of the dreariness and degradation, the retrogression that lack of education means in women’s lives. In later life, Martineau was to abandon and even to repudiate the religion that this early essay relied upon, but she was always to believe in the great importance of education for women.

Forty years later she was of a different mind on the purpose but not on the benefit of women’s education. Writing in *Once a Week* in 1861, she deplored the justification of “good intellectual training as fitting women to be ‘mothers of heroes,’ ‘companions to men,’ and so on. . . . Till it is proposed, in educating girls, to make them, in themselves and for their own sakes, as good specimens of the human being as the conditions of the case allow, very little will be effected by any expenditure of pains, time, and money.” Included here are pieces on basic education for
women, including a section from her 1848 book, *Household Education*, which was a kind of popular manual for the moral and practical instruction of a household, and a long article from *Cornhill Magazine* (1864) entitled “Middle-Class Education in England: Girls.” In both of these she held that education should be for the sake of improving the person. She insisted that girls should study the same subjects as boys, that both should have time in school for both study and play, mental exercise and physical exercise, but that girls should study the domestic arts as well.

Never did she question that women should become skillful at housekeeping; rather she claimed that education would make them better at it. This is drawn from her own life, for she prided herself on her needle work, her household management, and the sensible way in which she entertained. She argues in several contexts that not all Englishwomen are cared for by a man and that women need to be educated for an occupation so that they can earn their own way. These ideas came out of Martineau’s own middle-class experience of having been left with a small legacy poorly invested. It did not occur to her to argue for universal education. She did, however, favor higher education for qualified women early on and enthusiastically supported the establishment in London of Queen’s College in Hartley Street and the Ladies’ College in Bedford Square (now Bedford College). An article on higher education, “What Women are Educated For,” forms the third selection in this section.

### 23.5 On Female Education

In discussing the subject of Female Education, it is not so much my object to inquire whether the natural powers of women be equal to those of men, as to shew the expediency of giving proper scope and employment to the powers which they do possess. It may be as well, notwithstanding, to inquire whether the difference be as great as is generally supposed between the mental structure of men and of women.

Doubtless the formation of the mind must depend in a great degree on the structure of the body. From this cause the strength of mind observable in men is supposed to arise; and the delicacy of the female mind is thought to be in agreement with the bodily frame. But it is impossible to ascertain how much may depend on early education; nor can we solve our doubts on this head by turning our view to savage countries, where, if the bodily strength be nearly equal in the two sexes, their minds are alike sunk in ignorance and darkness. In our own country, we find that as long as the studies of children of both sexes continue the same, the progress they make is equal. After the rudiments of knowledge have been obtained, in the cultivated ranks of society, (of which alone I mean to speak,) the boy goes on continually increasing his stock of information, it being his only employment to store and exercise his mind for future years; while the girl is probably confined to low pursuits, her a spirings after knowledge are subdued, she is taught to believe that solid information is unbecoming her sex, almost her whole time is expended on light accomplishments, and thus before she is sensible of her powers, they are checked in their growth; chained down to mean objects, to rise no more; and when the natural consequences of this mode of treatment arise, all mankind agree that the abilities of women are far inferior to those of men. But in the few instances where a contrary mode of treatment has been pursued, where fair play has been given to the faculties, even without much assistance, what has almost invariably been the result? Has it not been evident that the female mind, though in many respects differently constituted from that of man, may be well brought into comparison with his? If she wants his enterprising spirit, the deficiency is made up by perseverance in what she does undertake; for his ambition, she has a thirst for knowledge; and for his ready perception, she has unwearied application. It is proof sufficient to my mind, that there is no natural deficiency of power, that, unless proper objects are supplied to women to employ their faculties, their energies are exerted improperly. Some aim they must have, and if no good one is presented to them, they must seek for a bad one. We may find evidence in abundance of this truth in the condition of women before the introduction of Christianity. Before the revelation of this blessed religion, (doubly blessed to the female sex,) what
was their situation? They were either sunk almost to the level of the brutes in mental darkness, buried in their own homes, the slaves instead of the companions of their husbands, only to be preserved from vice by being excluded from the world, or, not being able to endure these restraints, employing their restless powers and turbulent passions in the pursuit of vicious pleasures and sensual gratifications. And we cannot wonder that this was the case, when they were gifted with faculties which they were not permitted to exercise, and were compelled to vegetate from year to year, with no object in life and no hope in death. Observe what an immediate change was wrought by the introduction of Christianity. Mark the zeal, directed by knowledge, of the female converts, of so many of whom St. Paul makes honorable mention as his friends, on account of their exertions in the great cause. An object was held out for them to obtain, and their powers were bent to the attainment of it, instead of being engaged in vice and folly. The female character has been observed to improve since that time, in proportion as the treasures of useful knowledge have been placed within the reach of the sex.

I wish to imply by what I have said, not that great stores of information are as necessary to women as to men, but that as much care should be taken of the formation of their minds. Their attainments cannot in general be so great, because they have their own appropriate duties and peculiar employments, the neglect of which nothing can excuse; but I contend that these duties will be better performed if the powers be rationally employed. If the whole mind be exercised and strengthened, it will bring more vigour to the performance of its duties in any particular province.

The first great objection which is made to enlightening the female mind is, that if engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, women neglect their appropriate duties and peculiar employments. Second That the greatest advances that the female mind can make in knowledge, must still fall far short of the attainments of the other sex. Third That the vanity so universally ascribed to the sex is apt to be inflated by any degree of proficiency in knowledge, and that women therefore become forgetful of the subordinate station assigned them by law, natural and divine.

To the first objection I answer, that such a pursuit of knowledge as shall lead women to neglect their peculiar duties, is not that cultivation of mind for the utility of which I am contending. But these duties may be well performed without engaging the whole time and attention. If “great thoughts constitute great minds,” what can be expected from a woman whose whole intellect is employed on the trifling cares and comparatively mean occupations, to which the advocates for female ignorance would condemn her? These cares and these occupations were allotted to women to enable them to smooth our way through life; they were designed as a means to this end, and should never be pursued as the end itself. The knowledge of these necessary acts is so easily acquired, and they are so easily performed, that an active mind will feel a dismal vacuity, a craving after something nobler and better to employ the thoughts in the intervals of idleness which must occur when these calls of duty are answered, and if nothing nobler and better is presented to it, it will waste its energies in the pursuit of folly, if not of vice, and thus continually perpetuate the faults of the sex. . . .

It must be allowed by all, that one of woman’s first duties is to qualify herself for being a companion to her husband, or to those with whom her lot in life is cast. She was formed to be a domestic companion, and such an one as shall give to home its charms, as shall furnish such entertainment that her husband need not be driven abroad for amusement. This is one of the first duties required from a woman, and no time can be misemployed which is applied to the purpose of making her such a companion, and I contend that a friend like this cannot be found among women of uncultivated minds. If their thoughts are continually occupied by the vanities of the world, if that time which is not required for the fulfilment of household duties, is spent in folly, or even in
harmless trifles in which the husband has no interest, how are the powers of pleasing to be perpetuated, how is she to find interesting subjects for social converse? If we consider woman as the guardian and instructress of infancy, her claims to cultivation of mind become doubly urgent. It is evident that if the soul of the teacher is narrow and contracted, that of the pupil cannot be enlarged. With respect to the second objection, viz., That the greatest advances which the female mind can make in knowledge must fall far short of the attainments of the other sex,—I allow that the acquirements of women can seldom equal those of men, and it is not desirable that they should. I do not wish to excite a spirit of rivalry between the sexes; I do not desire that many females should seek for fame as authors. I only wish that their powers should be so employed that they should not be obliged to seek amusements beneath them, and injurious to them. I wish them to be companions to men, instead of playthings or servants, one of which an ignorant woman must commonly be. If they are called to be wives, a sensible mind is an essential qualification for the domestic character; if they remain single, liberal pursuits are absolutely necessary to preserve them from the faults so generally attributed to that state, and so justly and inevitably, while the mind is buried in darkness.

If it be asked what kind and degree of knowledge is necessary to preserve women from the evils mentioned as following in the train of ignorance, I answer that much must depend on natural talent, fortune and station; but no English woman, above the lower ranks of life, ought to be ignorant of the Evidences and Principles of her religious belief, of Sacred History, of the outline of General History, of the Elements of the Philosophy of Nature, and of the Human Mind; and to these should be added the knowledge of such living languages, and the acquirement of such accomplishments, as situation and circumstances may direct.

With respect to the third objection, viz., that the vanity so universally ascribed to the sex is apt to be inflated by any degree of proficiency in knowledge, and that women, therefore, become forgetful of the subordinate station assigned them by law, natural and divine: the most important part of education, the implanting of religious principles must be in part neglected, if the share of knowledge which women may appropriate, should be suffered to inflate their vanity, or excite feelings of pride. Christian humility should be one of the first requisites in female education, and till it is attained every acquirement of every kind will become a cause of self-exaltation, and those accomplishments which are the most rare, will of course be looked upon with the most self-complacency. But if the taste for knowledge were more generally infused, and if proficiency in the attainments I have mentioned were more common, there would be much less pedantry than there is at present; for when acquirements of this kind are no longer remarkable, they cease to afford a subject for pride. Let woman then be taught that her powers of mind were given her to be improved. Let her be taught that she is to be a rational companion to those of the other sex among whom her lot in life is cast, that her proper sphere is home— that there she is to provide, not only for the bodily comfort of the man, but that she is to enter also into community of mind with him; As she finds nobler objects presented to her grasp, and that her rank in the scale of being is elevated, she will engraft the vigorous qualities of the mind of man on her own blooming virtues, and insinuate into his mind those softer graces and milder beauties, which will smooth the ruggedness of his character:

**Classical Feminist Theory**

The contributions of female thinkers to classical sociological theory have generally been overlooked throughout the years, even though they systematically developed understandings of society similar to those of their male counterparts. However, the theories of these female thinkers are distinctive because they incorporate the standpoint of gender, focus on the lives and work of women, critically
engage the problem of social inequality, and offer solutions to ameliorate social problems. This chapter discusses the work of several women theorists, activists, and social reformers, and it presents the case for why it should be included in the canon of classical sociological theory.

**Self Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:
   - (i) Martineau was born in
     - (a) 1802
     - (b) 1805
     - (c) 1810
     - (d) 1819
   - (ii) Harriet described childhood as
     - (a) Burdensome
     - (b) Joyful
     - (c) Most pleased
     - (d) Golden
   - (iii) ‘The book’ How to observe morals and manners’ published in
     - (a) 1836
     - (b) 1838
     - (c) 1850
     - (d) 1831
   - (iv) “On Female Education” was written in
     - (a) 1822
     - (b) 1820
     - (c) 1815
     - (d) 1825

**23.6 Summary**

- Martineau has come to be known as the “founding mother” of sociology for both her theoretical and empirical work. A prolific writer, Martineau published twenty-five didactic novels in a series called Illustrations of Political Economy; the first sociological research text, How to Observe Morals and Manners; three volumes on her field work in the United States, Society in America; and a book on her research in the Middle East, Eastern Life: Present and Past. She also translated and edited Comte’s Positive Philosophy, a volume that was so highly acclaimed that Comte translated her rendition of his book back into French.

- Martineau viewed the central concern of sociology to be what she called “social life in society,” the patterns, causes, consequences, and problems of the social world. Like Comte and Spencer, she was a positivist who believed in social laws and the progressive evolution of society. According to Martineau, the most important law of social life is human happiness, and much of her work sought to understand the extent to which individuals developed “morals and manners” to achieve this end.

- Martineau used a comparative methodological approach to study the moral principles in different societies and to uncover the degrees to which these societies had progressed. She devised three measures to study progress, including the condition of the less powerful groups in society, the cultural attitudes towards authority and autonomy, and the extent to which all individuals were provided the tools to realize autonomous moral action.

- Unlike Spencer, Martineau was overwhelmingly concerned with gender, racial, and class inequality. For example, when researching the moral condition of America, Martineau focused on marriage patterns and slavery. She also studied the conditions of wage-earning women in Great Britain and the lives of the poor in her field work in the Middle East.

**23.7 Key-Words**

1. Positivism : It is a philosophy of science based on the view that in the social as well as natural science.
2. Perseverance : Steadfastness in doing something despite difficulty or delay in achieving.
23.8 Review Questions

1. Write briefly about Martineau’s Childhood.
2. Explain the views of Harriet on Female Education.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (b) (iv) (a)

23.9 Further Readings

Unit 24: Harriet Martineau-On Women: Critical Appreciation cum Analysis

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Discuss the biographical information with the critical reception
• Examine Harriet Martineau’s feminism

Introduction

Martineau was a writer of exceptional breadth and vitality, earning her reputation by unflinchingly inserting herself into the great debates of the day, including women’s rights and slavery. She moved from genre to genre and from subject to subject with ease, writing children’s stories and political commentary, travelogues and short stories, historical studies and translations of philosophy. Martineau’s career spanned fifty-five years and despite tremendous physical and cultural obstacles she established a prominent position in the intellectual life of Victorian culture.

24.1 Biographical Information

Martineau was the sixth of eight children, born June 12, 1802 to Thomas and Elizabeth Martineau. Her childhood was marked by chronic digestive and nervous system ailments, and she was born without a sense of smell or taste. A voracious reader, the young Martineau committed large portions of Paradise Lost to memory, reciting verses to help her fall asleep. Raised within the Unitarian church, Martineau strongly believed in the doctrine that every effect has a cause which neither divine nor human will can change. Belief in this doctrine proved to be a stabilizing force throughout her life. In addition, Martineau’s first writings appeared in the Unitarian periodical Monthly Repository in 1822. However, Martineau’s religious beliefs began to depart from Unitarianism in the 1830s, and she began to identify the worship of God with the service of humanity.

In the years 1832-34, Martineau published a collection of stories entitled Illustrations of Political Economy, intended to inform the general reader about economic matters through the use of fiction.
The work was highly successful, and provided her with enough money to fund an extensive tour of the United States. Her experiences in America formed the basis of two books, Society in America (1837) and Retrospect of Western Travel (1838). From 1839 to 1844, a uterine tumor left Martineau bedridden. In search of a cure for her condition, she allowed herself to be hypnotized, after which her pain vanished. In 1846, she traveled again, this time to the Middle East, where she studied ancient Egyptian religion and visited biblical sites. During the course of these studies, Martineau ceased to believe in Christian doctrines, including the afterlife. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, Martineau became a prolific contributor to the London Daily News and other liberal periodicals, writing several articles per week. Despite a recurrence of her illness in 1854, Martineau continued to write, and over the course of her career she wrote more than 1,600 articles for the Daily News. Her illness forced Martineau to retire in 1866, and she died from bronchitis in 1876.

24.2 Major Works

Martineau worked in many genres and discussed many social, religious and political issues during her prolific career. Several of her first articles argued that the apparent differences in intellect between men and women were the product of educational discrimination. Her focus on education continued in Household Education (1849), which was based on personal experience. In this work, Martineau condemned the Christian practice of teaching a child that his or her nature is inherently evil and emphasized parental love as vital to the development of an individual’s self-esteem. Her American travel experiences provided the material for Society in America, in which Martineau expressed a generally favorable impression of democracy. However, she also commented on several shortcomings she found in democratic society, including the fact that the free enterprise system allowed the greed of a few people to trample the rights of the many. Martineau also noted that women seemed more restricted in their lives than what she had anticipated after reading the Declaration of Independence. Her long illness prompted the writing of Life in the Sick-Room, in which she counseled readers on how to live with illness as well as how to behave when visiting those who are sick. Martineau’s trip to the Middle East yielded Eastern Life, Present and Past (1848) in which she explained the reasons for her religious conversion. Her Autobiography, written in 1854 and 1855, but published posthumously in 1877, raised a furor due to its atypically secular focus as well as the perceived lack of decorum with which she described the inadequacies of her family.

24.3 Critical Reception

While she was admired and respected by many during her lifetime—Auguste Comte reportedly stated that he preferred her translation of his Positive Philosophy to his text—Martineau was also vehemently criticized for her writing on behalf of social causes. While Martineau was largely ignored by critics after her death, in recent years there has been a renewed interest in her political, social, and economic writings. Many of Martineau’s social and philosophical beliefs, in the view of Mitzi Myers, were shaped by the author’s early home life. Myers claims that the “key details in Harriet’s early domestic history were fear, emotional deprivation, remorse, and lack of self-respect.” Gillian Thomas has observed that in writing Illustrations of Political Economy, Martineau’s aim was to “reach working-class readers” by rendering information on a complex subject in the style of a work of a fiction rather than that of an academic treatise. Valerie Sanders has expressed her agreement with this assessment, stating that “[Martineau’s] Illustrations teem with teacher-figures, mostly clergymen and manufacturers, who try to enlighten the poorer members of their local community.” Many critics believe that Society in America is Martineau’s most enduring work because of its astute observations on early American society and how that society was living up to the goals set forth in the Declaration of Independence. It has often been compared to Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic work Democracy in America. According to Shelagh Hunter, Martineau’s study
“lacks both the detachment and the structural clarity of Democracy in America, but its thorough personal engagement is its peculiar strength.” As Deborah Logan has asserted, Martineau’s chief desire as a writer was to “eradicate slavery in its various forms: racial slavery, seen in the abolition-themed writings; sexual slavery, illustrated by her focus on world-wide oppressions of women; and social slavery, demonstrated by her aim to educate the working classes about the forces creating and perpetuating their economic exploitation.”

24.4 On Women

Harriet Martineau was a life long feminist, and she became one early and on her own. “The woman question” was what she and other like-minded nineteenth-century thinkers and activists called what we call feminism. In addition to giving her individual attention to women and women’s concerns Martineau participated in groups in both England and the United States that were fertile environments for deliberate efforts on women’s behalf. Probably not too much should be made of the fact that she wrote admiringly of women writers in her first published piece (“Female Writers of Practical Divinity”) or that she went to some length to establish the fact that the form she used for her political economy tales was derived from a woman. Still, these attributions acknowledged influences from women that she valued from the first. Her first intellectual groups, the Norwich and then the London Unitarians and Utilitarians, were probably far more important in her development, since a component of the thought of both Unitarian religion and Utilitarian philosophy was favorable to women having a larger place in intellectual and public pursuits. Although the first of Martineau’s several breaches with people she had once favored came with W. J Fox, the Unitarian editor, because of his setting up a household with Eliza Flowers without marriage, Martineau was surely influenced by Fox’s liberality toward talented women and the intellectual role such women as Flowers played in Fox’s editorship. Her scruples about sexual liaisons were more stereotypically Victorian than the views and practices of many of her associates. Yet sexuality per se was not a feminist issue in the nineteenth century. To consider it an obstacle to the realization of feminist goals is to interpret nineteenth-century views in light of twentieth-century feminism which has made the link between sexuality and gender role assignment. It is ironic from a contemporary feminist stance, if not from her own, that she regenerated or kept up correspondence or a working relationship with the men in such affairs, but not the women. The American group with whom Martineau found the greatest affinity during her 1834-1836 travels, the Garrisonian abolitionists, like the British Unitarians and Utilitarians, valued the activity and importance of women and was markedly more advanced on the question than many other groups. Anti-slavery women’s groups in America were to provide leaders and formative ideas in its early years for the movement for women’s rights per se, a movement for women as well as a movement of and by women on behalf of slaves. The five pieces that follow are ones in which Martineau addressed feminism in some general way. In the opening selection she questions the advisability of marriage for everyone, a position that required considerable bravery in 1838. She raised the question as a means of making judgments about the character of a society, but whatever its intent, it was a courageous question to ask and one that anticipates such contrasting variations of the theme in the 1970s as Kate Millett’s “sexual politics” and Jessie Bernard’s study of “his” and “hers” marriages that yield greater benefits to men and lesser benefits to women. Martineau was shrewd and discerning to pick the place of women and the treatment of women in marriage as indices of a society’s distinctiveness. In How to Observe Morals and Manners she set up criteria for analyzing a society. Published after her books on the United States, Society in America and Retrospect of Western Travel, it reflects the method of comparative study of societies used in those books. She set down what she believed to be an appropriate set of principles, laws of right and wrong, if you will, and then gauged the society by how well she thought it met the principles. As the title suggests, these principles had to do with “morals,” deep values held and acted upon, and “manners,” assumptions and practices of courtesy, kindness, politeness, or the absence thereof, the surface manifestations of moral depth.
This work was indeed an early sociological work on method, as Alice Rossi has claimed. Martineau goes halfway toward what early anthropologists and sociologists several decades later hoped to achieve. That is, her methodological approach involved the attempt to evolve some detached criteria for objectivity. That far, she succeeds in being a primitive scientist. But the other half of her approach provides her limitation. She inserts her own values, quite assuredly and dogmatically, as the appropriate criteria. This was, however, four years before Comte’s Positive Philosophy was published and at least thirteen years before she read it. She was herself to criticize this phase of her thinking as “metaphysical” at a later time.

Her feminism and her social science may be in conflict in this article. To raise such questions about women and marriage was important on women’s behalf however she did it, but to do it dogmatically is not good enough. Calling monogamy of the English variety “the natural method” for all coupling is application of an unexamined value system. Calling for removal of inferior treatment of women is suggesting a new one.

The second selection, “Criticism on Women,” published in 1839, is ostensibly a review essay of three items, but is in fact an essay on the abuse of women and the right of women to be respected and honored or to be criticized according to standards of honesty and fairness to all people. One of the persons she defends so splendidly in this piece is the young Queen Victoria, just come to the throne in 1837. Another (this review is anonymous) is herself, attacked ad hominem for her deafness and her womanhood after daring to write on population. She had received vicious treatment in the reviews of “Wealand Woe in Garveloch.” Writing under the editorship of John Gibson Lockhart in the Quarterly Review, John Wilson Croker was the first to damn her. He wrote, “and most of all it is quite impossible not to be shocked, nay, disgusted, with many of the unfeminine and mischievous doctrines on the principles of social welfare. . . . A woman who thinks child-bearing a crime against society! An unmarried woman who declaims against marriage! A young woman who deprecates charity and provision for the poor!!!” The attack was patently unfair, not only for its rejection of the mild story favoring birth control, but also for its sexist strebuke of Martineau personally as a woman who would dare to write on such a subject. In “Criticism on Women,” she coins the word “Crokerism” to identify this particular kind of reputation smearing. The very year (1832) of Croker’s article, in fact, she was still allowing for the possibility that she might marry and, hence, bear children herself. Writing to her mother in anticipation of her mother’s coming to live with her in London, she laid out, along with her claim to professional independence as a woman, her right to marry: “There is another chance, dear mother, and that is, of my marrying. I have no thoughts of it. I see a thousand reasons against it. But I could not positively answer for always continuing in the same mind. . . . I mean no more than I say, I assure you; but, strong as my convictions are against marrying, I will not positively promise.” The third piece is a marvelous letter written, no doubt, to Maria Weston Chapman and read at an American women’s rights convention at Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1851. In the letter, Martineau repeats her themes of the necessity of equal treatment of all humans, of the importance of education to enable women to flourish, of the need for the object of education to be occupation, and of the silliness of the old controversy of influence versus office. However, it is significant here that she couched her persuasive arguments in terms of the need to do a scientific experiment. Although her writing had always been analytical, this letter was written in the year she was first reading Comte’s Positive Philosophy, and it is clear that she has a new faith that social experiment will yield proof of women’s ability. This letter from 1851 is an early example of her work after she had found clarity in science and provides a good exhibit of her utter confidence in the outcome of an experiment not yet conducted. Only to those of us with post-Darwinian, post-Freudian, post-Einsteinian mentalities is such assurance unwarranted. It was entirely earnest and even revolutionary in Martineau.

If the personal is the political is the intellectual, we may have the key to Martineau’s vast outpouring
of work about women. One element in the shaping of her young life was the insanity and apparent suicide of the one man to whom she ever seemed to have had a romantic attachment, her fiance John Worthington, a college friend of her brother James. I do not think it is the whole story. I do not think it is even a great part of the story. Yet, I take at her word the account she gives in the fourth selection of her singleness being the great benefit to her work, in effect her work being her love. In so doing, I differ with her recent biographers who have speculated about her lesbianism or absence of it, her sexuality, latent or active. R. K. Webb concludes that she was a “latent lesbian.” Pichanick disagrees with him, arguing that although Martineau had important “affectionate female friendships,” there is no evidence for her being alesbian. I believe she was probably behaviorally a sexual and emotionally sexually naive, and I think she means what she says in her Autobiography: that Worthington’s death liberated her to be alone and like it. The fifth selection, on Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, and the woman question, occurs in the context of a description of William Godwin as one of her morning visitors in London in the early days of her fame in 1833. She delighted in Godwin and greatly enjoyed his company, and, seeing no conflict of ideology loyalties, Martineau expressly denied that her interest in him arose because of his connection with Mary Wollstonecraft. Instead, she said, the opposite was true. She had no use for Wollstonecraft, while honoring Godwin. She claimed Wollstonecraft did the cause of woman a disservice, proclaiming Wollstonecraft “a poorvictim of passion, with no control over her own peace, and no calmness or content except when the needs of her individual nature were satisfied.” All that, while extolling the pleasure of visiting with the man who loved Wollstonecraft—presumably with a passion of his own—and who had done everything he could to keep her memory alive! The passion she means, of course, is not merely sexual extravagance but the exaggerated romantic flamboyance of a personality like Wollstonecraft’s. Following that judgment of Wollstonecraft, however, her comments on the woman question sound uncharacteristically self-righteous. Her tone is hostile toward some women, but her message is still consistently that of the rational moralist. She writes calmly of her expectation that women will achieve the right to vote.

24.5 Analysis

If I could be providence to the world for a time, for the express purpose of raising the condition of women, I should come to you to know the means—the purpose would be to remove all interference with affection, or with any thing which is, or which even might be supposed to be, demonstrative of affection—In the present state of women minds, perfectly uneducated, and with whatever of timidity and dependance is natural to them increased a thousand fold by their habits of utter dependance, it would probably be mischievous to remove at once all restraints, they would buy themselves protectors at a dearer cost than even at present—but without raising their natures at all, it seems to me, that once give women the desire to raise their social condition, and they have a power which in the present state of civilization and of mens characters, might be made of tremendous effect. Whether nature made a difference in the nature of men and women or not, it seems now that all men, with the exception of a few lofty minded, are sensualists more or less—Women on the contrary are quite exempt from this trait, however it may appear otherwise in the cases of some—It seems strange that it should be so, unless it was meant to be a source of power in demi-civilized states such as the present—or it may not be so—it may be only that the habits of freedom and low indulgence in which boys grow up and the contrary notion of what is called purity in girls may have produced the appearance of different natures in the two sexes—As certain it is that there is equality in nothing, now—all the pleasures such as there are being mens, and all the disagreables and pains being womens, as that every pleasure would be infinitely heightened both in kind and degree by the perfect equality of the sexes. Women are educated for one single object, to gain their living by marrying—(some poor souls get it without the churchgoing
in the same way—they do not seem to me a bit worse than their honoured sisters)—To be married is the object of their existence and that object being gained they do really cease to exist as to anything worth calling life or any useful purpose. One observes very few marriages where there is any real sympathy or enjoyment of companionship between the parties—The woman knows what her power is, and gains by it what she has been taught to consider “proper” to her state—The woman who would gain power by such means is unfit for power, still they do use this power for paltry advantages and I am astonished it has never occurred to them to gain some large purpose: but their minds are degenerated by habits of dependance—I should think that 500 years hence none of the follies of their ancestors will so excite wonder and contempt as the fact of legislative restraint as to matters of feeling—or rather in the expressions of feeling. When once the law undertakes to say which demonstration of feeling shall be given to which, it seems quite inconsistent not to legislate for all, and say how many shall be seen, how many heard, and what kind and degree of feeling allows of shaking hands—The Turks is the only consistent mode.

I have no doubt that when the whole community is really educated, tho’ the present laws of marriage were to continue they would be perfectly disregarded, because no one would marry—The widest and perhaps the quickest means to do away with its evils is to be found in promoting education—as it is the means of all good—but meanwhile it is hard that those who suffer most from its evils and who are always the best people, should be left without remedy. Would not the best plan be divorce which could be attained by any, without any reason assigned, and at small expence, but which could only be finally pronounced after a long period? not less time than two years should elapse between suing for divorce and permission to contract again—but what the decision will be must be certain at the moment of asking for it—unless during that time the suit should be withdrawn—(I feel like a lawyer in talking of it only! O how absurd and little it all is!)—In the present system of habits and opinions, girls enter into what is called a contract perfectly ignorant of the conditions of it, and that they should be so is considered absolutely essential to their fitness for it!—But after all the one argument of the matter which I think might be said so as to strike both high and low natures is—Who would wish to have the person without the inclination? Whoever would take the benefit of a law of divorce must be those whose inclination is to separate and who on earth would wish another to remain with them against their inclination? I should think no one—people sophisticate about the matter now and will not believe that one “really would wish to go.” Suppose instead of calling it a “law of divorce” it were to be called “Proof of affection” —They would like it better then—At this present time, in this state of civilization, what evil would be caused by, first placing women on the most entire equality with men, as to all rights and privileges, civil and political, and then doing away with all laws whatever relating to marriage? Then if a woman had children she must take the charge of them, women would not then have children without considering how to maintain them. Women would have no more reason to barter person for bread, or for any thing else, than men have—public offices being open to them alike, all occupations would be divided between the sexes in their natural arrangement. Fathers would provide for their daughters in the same manner as for their sons.

All the difficulties about divorce seem to be in the consideration for the children—but on this plan it would be the women’s interest not to have children—now it is thought to be the womans interest to have children as so many ties to the man who feeds her. Sex in its true and finest meaning, seems to be the way in which is manifested all that is highest best and beautiful in the nature of human beings—none but poets have approached to the perception of the beauty of the material world—still less of the spiritual—and there never yet existed a poet, except by the inspiration of that feeling which is the perception of beauty in all forms and by all the means which are given us, as well as by sight. Are we not born with the five senses, merely as a foundation for others which we may make by them—and who extends and refines those material senses to the highest—into infinity—best fulfils the end of creation—That is only saying—Who enjoys most, is most virtuous—
Prose

Notes

It is for you—the most worthy to be the apostle of all loftiest virtue—to teach, such as may be taught, that the higher the kind of enjoyment, the greater the degree—perhaps there is but one class to whom this can be taught—the poetic nature struggling with superstition: you are fitted to be the saviour of such—If you've spent any time in Victorian England, you’ve undoubtedly run into Harriet Martineau. She’s one of those persons who shows up everywhere there seems to be something important happening. There she is in the summer of 1830 at the dinner party where John Stuart Mill meets Mrs. Harriet Taylor. Two years later she can be spotted at Charles Babbage’s home for a demonstration of a working component of his unfinished Calculating Engine. “All were eager to go to his glorious soirées;” she later wrote in her autobiography, “and I always thought he appeared to great advantage as a host. His patience in explaining his machine in those days was really exemplary. I felt it so, the first time I saw the miracle, as it appeared to me...” While Charles Darwin is sailing around the world aboard the Beagle, his older brother Erasmus is making the acquaintance of Harriet Martineau, who later spends much time with the Darwins and Wedgwoods, inspiring them with her strong anti-slavery politics. Some even think that marriage might be in the future for Erasmus Darwin and Harriet. (Harriet Martineau never married.)

When the controversial pseudo-scientific Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation is published anonymously in 1844, Harriet Martineau is suspected of being the author. (So is Charles Babbage, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Lyell, Charles Darwin, Lady Lovelace, and many others.) In 1845 Harriet Martineau meets the 25-year old Mary Ann Evans, and inspires the younger woman to become a professional writer and move to London, which she does to achieve great success under the pseudonym George Eliot. All this time, Harriet Martineau is writing dozens of novels and stories, and thousands of articles for periodicals, becoming the most famous female English journalist of the 19th century.

Harriet Martineau was born in 1802 to a Unitarian household. At the age of 20 she contracted otosclerosis, and as she aged she became increasingly deaf — requiring her to use an ear trumpet for most of her life — with no sense of smell and a defective sense of taste. Her father’s business collapsed in the financial crisis of 1825–26, leaving the family poor and Harriet in the position of needing to earn an income. As a deaf woman, she couldn’t teach and she had already been writing, so she began writing more, with fame and notoriety soon to follow. Her Illustrations of Political Economy (1832—35) consisted of nine volumes of stories that explored various concepts of economics of the sort preferred by free-trade Whigs. She traveled to America and was threatened with lynching after speaking out against slavery, writing about her experiences in the three-volume Society in America (1837) followed by the three-volume Retrospect of Western Travel (1838). She wrote books on education, mesmerism, and history, became a follower of Comte, and published The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Freely Translated & Condensed by Harriet Martineau (1853), which was then translated back into French because her condensation and elimination of repetition managed to improve on the original.

In 1858, Harriet Martineau began writing for The Edinburgh Review — standard reading for politically progressive households of the period, and one of several periodicals of the era that featured what seemed to be book reviews, but were actually long, often unsigned, essays. For the October 1858 issue, Harriet. Martineau contributed “The Slave Trade in 1858”, one of her many articles about slavery.

Harriet Martineau’s major contribution to the literature of 1859 was an April 1859 article for The Edinburgh Review focusing on another subject she was passionate about — the political and economic mistreatment of women in “Female Industry”.

“Female Industry” is a fascinating artifact, mostly for the vision it gives us of the wide scope of jobs women performed in England 150 years ago. As Harriet Martineau indicates, English law of the period assumed that “every woman is supported ... by her father, her brother, or her husband.” But this was no longer the case. With the rise of the middle class, many women were working...
outside the home for their own subsistence, unfortunately for wages that would not allow them any type of retirement. How many women are we talking about? Using census figures and other data, Harriet Martineau comes to a conclusion towards the end of her article that I find astonishing:

Out of six millions of women above twenty years of age, in Great Britian, exclusive of Ireland, and of course of the Colonies, no less than half are industrial in their mode of life. More than a third, more than two millions, are independent in their industry, are self-supporting, like men."

Apparently English men and women of the time were also astonished, following court cases that resulted from a new limited ability for women to obtain divorces that had only been in effect in England following the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.

The proceedings in the new Divorce Court, and in matrimonial cases before the police-magistrates, have caused a wide-spread astonishment at the amount of female industry they have disclosed. Almost every aggrieved wife who has sought protection, has proved that she has supported her household, and has acquired property by her effective exertions.

Toward the beginning of the article, Harriet Martineau makes it clear that for working women, “their work should be paid for by its quality, and its place in the market, irrespective of the status of the worker.” She then methodically analyzes industry by industry, examining the work that women do in that industry, indicating its difficulty, and at times (when she has the data available) showing a wide discrepancy in wages between male and female workers.

The professional dairy woman ... has been about the cows since she was tall enough to learn to milk, and her days are so filled up, that it is all she can do to keep her clothes in decent order. She drops asleep over the last stage of her work; and grows up ignorant of all other knowledge, and unskilled in all other arts. Such work as this ought at least to be paid as well as the equivalent work of men; indeed, in the dairy farms of the West of England the same labour of milking the kine is now very generally performed by men, and the Dorset milkmaid, tripping along with her pail, is, we fear, becoming a myth. But even in Cheshire the dairymaids receive, it appears, only from 8l. to 10l. a-year, with board and lodging. The superintendent of a large dairy is a salaried personage of some dignity, with two rooms, partial or entire diet, coal and candle, and wherewithal to keep a servant — 50l. a year or more. But of the 64,000 dairy women of Great Britain, scarcely any can secure a provision for the time when they can no longer lean over the cheese tub, or churn, or carry heavy weights. For anyone who believes that “equal pay for equal work” was a concept developed by feminists in the 1970s, Harriet Martineau’s article reveals just how long this concept was successfully resisted and suppressed. Low-paid work takes an enormous toll on the women, and Martineau finds that maids of all work are particularly susceptible to medical and financial problems:

The physician says that, on the female side of lunatic asylums, the largest class, but one, of the insane are maids of all work (the other being governesses). The causes are obvious enough: want of sufficient sleep from late and early hour, unremitting fatigue and hurry, and, even more than these, anxiety about the future from the smallness of the wages.... Too often we find that the most imbecile old nurses, the most infirm old charwomen, are the wrecks and ruins of the rosy cooks and tidy housemaids of the last generation. This ought not to be.

“Female Industry” was published without a byline (as many articles of that era were published), and the anonymous author of the article at times speaks from a male perspective — perhaps to sound a little more objective about the subject. (At one point the article even mentions “a letter from Harriet Martineau”!) Yet, the article does not look disapprovingly on working women. Martineau clearly feels that female industry is inevitable with the rise of the middle class. She seems to enjoy seeing women work outside the home, and argues that they be allowed to engage even in those occupations jealously guarded by the men. From our youth up, some of us have known how certain of the wisest and most appreciated of physicians have insisted that the health
of women and their children will never be guarded as it ought to be till it is put under the charge
of physicians of their own sex. The moral and emotional considerations involved in this matter
need no discussion. Given that millions of English women were already supporting themselves by
their work, it would be useless to try to stop the trend. Instead, female industry must be nurtured
with education and opportunities. She concludes: With this new condition of affairs, new duties
and new views must be accepted. Old obstructions must be removed; and the aim must be sent
before us, as a nation as well as in private life, to provide for the free development and full use of
the powers of every member of the community. In other words, we must improve and extend
education to the utmost; and then open a fair field to the powers and energies we have educed.
This will secure our welfare, nationally and in our homes, to which few elements can contribute
more vitally and more richly than the independent industry of our country women.

Harriet Martineau was a woman of strong opinions, not only about political and economic issues
but about religious ones. From the beginnings of her Unitarian background, her religious beliefs
gradually fell away, until an outright atheism was revealed in Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature
and Development (1851), co-authored with Henry G. Atkinson, a book that one wit summed up as
“The doctrine seems to be this: There is no God, and Harriet is his prophet.” She was very ready
for Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, published later in 1859. In one letter she wrote, What a book
it is! — overthrowing (if true) revealed Religion on the one hand, & Natural (as far as Final Causes
& Design are concerned) on the other. The range & mass of knowledge take away one’s breath.
(quoted in Adrian Desmond & James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist, p. 486) To
Darwin’s cousin Fanny Wedgwood, Harriet Martineau wrote,

One might say “thank you” all one’s life without giving any idea of one’s sense of obligation.... we
must all be glad that he has set the world on this great new track. (quoted in Janet Browne, Charles
Darwin: The Power of Place, p. 92) The only problem that Martineau found with the book was the
religious terminology that Darwin seemed to use too much! As she continued in her letter to
Fanny, I rather regret that C.D. went out of his way two or three times ... to speak of “the Creator”
in the popular sense of the First Cause ... It is curious to see how those who would otherwise agree
with him turn away because his view is “derived from” or “based on” “Theology” ... It seems to
me that having carried us up to the earliest group of forms, or to the single primitive one, he & his
have nothing to do with how those few forms, or that one, come here. His subject is the “Origin of
Species,” and not the origin of Organisation; & it seems a needless mischief to have opened the
latter speculation at all. — There now! I have delivered my mind. (Desmond & Moore, p. 486-7)

**24.6 Harriet Martineau’s Feminism**

It is tempting to follow Martineau’s own method and measure her feminism against specific
principles. For historical fairness, they should be principles that she herself endorsed. Yet that
would not yield a full enough picture, for it is my intent to show her contribution to later feminism,
including that of our time, as well as to the efforts of her time. Thus, the criteria must be both her
own and ones that we still consider important today, though we must be aware of the difference
between those ideas that were deliberately feminist on her part and the ones to which we in a later
age have assigned feminist significance. Martineau, herself a model of women’s accomplishment
for later feminists, was often a genuine promoter of other women. She was sensitive and conscious
of efforts made by women on women’s behalf, even though her tongue could sometimes be acid
in gossip about some women. Contemporary feminist scholars can note with appreciation that in
her Illustrations of Political Economy she repeatedly gave Mrs. Jane Marcet credit for the idea of her
own work. Though she raised her eyebrows at Mary Wollstonecraft’s personal sexual behavior
and what she regarded as her romantic excesses, she fully acknowledged Wollstonecraft as the
first English public advocate of women’s rights. Present at the dinner at which John Stuart Mill
and Harriet Taylor met, she is reputed to have been one of the worst gossips about the long,
devoted relationship Taylor and Mill maintained while Taylor was married to someone else. Yet
she was supportive of their feminism. Although she was not very tolerant of or informed about sexuality and unorthodox relationships, she was very supportive of work, education, political rights, and personal dignity for women; and she went a long way in supporting all manner of their manifestations. She came to be able to do this by objectifying the actual women involved as she led their causes.

In a leader in the London Daily News published June 28, 1854, Harriet Martineau wrote that “the wife-beating which has excited so much attention for the last two or three years, and which we have endeavored to meet by express legislation, has revealed to alarmed thousands of us that the mistresses of tyrannical men have a great advantage over the wives in being able to free themselves from their tyrant when they please. They can tell the truth in court about the treatment they have undergone; for they have nothing to fear from the vindictiveness of the brute when he comes out of gaol again.” This observation came in response to a report of a parliamentary Commission on Divorce. A Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act was to pass in 1857, and Martineau’s support of it in the newspaper and her expression of that support in terms of the easing of brutality against poor women are indications of her surprisingly foresighted feminist outlook. The new law only established a single court where there had previously been three different jurisdictions to handle divorce cases and did not actually give women much relief, but Martineau’s argument is immensely important as an early feminist framework for later criticism and campaigns. Long before the coining of the word “feminist” and thirty years before the beginning of an organized women’s rights campaign in England, Harriet Martineau was a wide-ranging, progressive, and thorough-going feminist in nearly every sense in which that word is used today. Embracing practically every cause clearly in favor of women’s advancement in her lifetime and taking up certain issues that were not sodefinitely identified as parts of the feminist fabric until the 1960s and 1970s, Martineau was a giant among early feminists. An overview of Martineau’s writings and the issues and campaigns she fought for with her pen gives a contemporary reader both a profile of the emergence of feminism in nineteenth-century England and America and a theoretical foundation for the feminist social philosophy still dominant today. She was the first Englishwoman to make the analogy between the American woman’s lot and the slave’s. Publishing that claim in Society in America in the context of a full analysis of the situation of American women, she and her book received far more attention, both positive and negative, for her abolitionist views than for her feminism. Yet the book included a very astute chapter entitled “The Political Non-Existence of Women,” in which she claimed that the democratic principle was violated by the denial of political participation to women. It was from women that she had learned much that she knew about the United States, and she gave credit to these women for their achievements and talents. At the same time she criticized the lack of authority and choice for American women and the resulting servitude for many of them. Martineau’s position as a model for today’s feminists or as an inspiration for female achievers is important. Alice S. Rossi’s inclusion of Martineau’s chapter on women from Society in America in her selection of classic feminist statements, The Feminist Papers (1973), indicates the current value of Martineau’s thought. In presenting her chapter from Martineau, Rossi especially represents Martineau as a forerunner of the discipline of sociology.

Others could make such a claim for her relation to economics, though Martineau was a popularizer in that field, not an original thinker. Although it would be much too extravagant to claim a significant place for her as a fiction writer—her didactic tales, children’s stories, and novel Deer brook having small current readership—it is, nevertheless, important to note that she wrote a considerable amount of fiction. The most comprehensive “first” that Martineau accomplished as a woman was as a journalist, for besides earning her living from her early thirties by writing numerous popular books and many articles for major journals, she contributed, as mentioned, over 1,600 editorials to the London Daily News on an enormous range of political and social topics during the 1850s and 1860s.
The historian Janet Courtney, writing in the 1930s about the British women’s movement in the 1830s, believed Harriet Martineau to be the leading feminist of the period. Courtney wrote, “And when I found Harriet Martineau, the ablest of them all, announcing that the best advocates of women’s rights would be the successful professional women and the ‘substantially successful authoresses,’ I recognized that she had put in a nutshell the whole truth about the women’s movement.”

Courtney believed that in the 1830s women and women’s rights made great advances only to fall back under the influence of Queen Victoria and the Victorians. Though Martineau did not write the passage Courtney selected until she wrote her Autobiography in 1855, faith in individual women’s accomplishments was a central point of Martineau’s feminism from the beginning. The female role model idea is significant in Martineau’s first published piece, “Female Writers of Practical Divinity,” published in the Unitarian journal Monthly Repository in 1822. The article opens, I do not know whether it has been remarked by others as well as myself, that some of the finest and most useful English work son the subject of Practical Divinity are by female authors. I suppose it is owing to the peculiar susceptibility of the female mind, and its consequent warmth of feeling, that its productions, when they are really valuable, find a more ready way to the heart than those of the other sex; and it gives me great pleasure to see women gifted with superior talents, applying those talents to promote the cause of religion and virtue. In contradiction to her theme, however, she signed the article, “Discipulus,” implying a male author, a practice she followed in pseudonym or textual voice off and on throughout her career in spite of the fame she gained in the 1830s writing in her own name.

She was to echo her first printed sentiment about women achievers as models in a piece written as an obituary for Florence Nightingale when Nightingale was believed to be dying after the Crime an War, but not published until 1910 when Nightingale actually died. Florence Nightingale was the woman of her time whom Martineau perhaps most greatly admired, and she wrote, Florence Nightingale encountered opposition—from her own sex as much as the other; and she achieved, as the most natural thing in the world, and without the smallest sacrifice of her womanly quality, what would beforehand have been declared a deed for a future age.

She was no declaimer, but a housewifely woman; she talked little, and did great things. When other women see that there are things for them to do, and train themselves to the work, they will get it done easily enough. There can never be a more unthought-of and marvellous career before any working woman than Florence Nightingale has achieved; and her success has opened a way to all others easier than anyone had prepared for her.

Education for women was another theme Martineau pursued all her life. Her second published piece was on that topic. She was well aware early that intellectual occupation was not considered fitting for a girl, writing that “when I was young, it was not thought proper for young ladies to study very conspicuously; and especially with pen in hand. . . . and thus my first studies in philosophy were carried on with great care and reserve.” Martineau’s youthful writings suggested that women should be educated in order to enhance their companionship with men and improve their teaching of their own children, although she alway sadvocated a rigorous course of study for girls, physical exercise for girls as well as boys, and domestic arts for women in addition to the program followed by males. Her feminist consciousness grew, and in later life, she encouraged the idea of education of women for its own sake and recommended a full program of advanced subjects. As a public figure and in the press, she supported the establishment of the colleges for women in London, Queens College in Harley Street and the Ladies College in Bed ford Square, of the first professional school of nursing at St. Thomas’ Hospital in London, and of women’s medical education.

Work for women was also a frequent theme. Martineau made a strong argument—amazing for the time—in favor of equal pay for equal work. Hers was not the literal argument still heard today
that women should be paid the same amount of money for exactly the same jobs as men but was
much stronger, insisting that equivalent labor deserves equal pay. She made it most forcefully, in
fact, on behalf of the dairy-maids whose job of milking the cows twice daily, straining the milk,
preparing cheese, and churning but therhad formerly been exclusively a female occupation. She
wrote that “such work as this ought at least to be paid as well as the equivalent work of men;
indeed, in the dairy farms of the west of England the same labour of milking the kine is now very
generally performed by men, and the Dorset milkmaid, tripping along with her pail, is, we fear,
becoming a myth.”

In her writings on women’s work Martineau repeatedly expressed a concern for health as well as
pay. She wrote in several pieces of the degeneration of stamina and mental well-being experienced
by governesses and servant women because of the crushing demands of their employers: “The
physician says that, on the female side of the lunatic asylums, the largest class, but one, of the in
sane are maids of all work (the other being governesses). The causes are obvious enough: want of
sufficient sleep from late and early hours, unremitting fatigue and hurry, and, even more than
these, anxiety about the future from the smallness of the wages.” If not the insane asylum, then
the workhouse followed for many of these women, for they did not earn enough to save for their
old age. But it was better wages and the obligation of good advice from their employers on
savings pensions for themselves that Martineau advocated. Ever the laissez-faire economist, she
did not envision a social scheme for retirement benefits.

For middle-class married women, Martineau advocated improved household man agement skills
exemplified in learning expert cookery. The teaching of such skills as cookery could also become
an occupation. These women need not be house bound, though, for many of them were already
engaged alongside their husbands, brothers, and father sin shop keeping, crafts, small
manufacturing, and the desk work, especially accounting, that went with such employment.
Martineau believed that such women should be encouraged to be more active in these pursuits,
but that they would be much more useful if they were taught sufficient arithmetic to manage sales
and accounting effectively. Though she did not propose wide-scale female ownership of businesses
in preference to men and typically discussed female shopkeeping as though husbands were in
charge, she did encourage single women to learn business skills and widows to learn to manage
their inherited shops to avoid having to remarry so quickly. She spoke of nursing and medicine as
newly opened occupations that should be attractive to middle-class women and predicted that
scientists, artists, and writers would emerge from among educated women.

When Harriet Martineau was fifty-two, she wrote to all her correspondents asking them to address
her henceforth as “Mrs.,” buther request had nothing to do with marriage. It was an
acknowledgment that greater respect was carried by the title “Mrs.” than “Miss” and an assertion
that she was entitled to such respect. This was resonant with the original meaning of the word
“mistress,” of which “Mrs.” was firstan abbreviation, a word that meant female authority in the
household and had nothing to do with marital status. That meaning was largely gone by the end
of the eighteenth century, but a few distinguished nineteenth-century single women like Martineau
attempted to renewit, showing a sensitivity to the dignity conveyed by a title. Their attempts came
from the same impulse that pressed feminists of the 1970s to introduce “Ms.” as a general title by
which a woman might be addressed whatever her marital status. Martineau was outspoken about
the degradation and limits imposed on women by marriage, but she was understandably ambivalent
in some of her statements and contradictory in some of her behavior having to do with marriage.
In her time and place where marriage was so definitively normative for women, the wonder is
that she was at times so piercingly critical of marriage in general, not that most of the time she
fostered and approved of specific marriages between people she knew. This too is more consistent
with contemporary feminists’ views of the disabilities of marriage than with those of Martineau’s
own time.
This contradiction is vividly seen in two illustrations. In the “Memorials,” Maria Weston Chapman reports the memory one of Harriet Martineau’s oldest friends had of Martineau’s deep regret at the marriage of a young lady friend. She related that Martineau said that marriage “would deprive her of larger opportunities of usefulness to the world.” Yet in 1854 she was apparently very happy to sponsor the wedding for her maid from her house at Amble side. She wrote, refusing an invitation received from a Mrs. Barkworth: “Many thanks for your invitation; but the intended bridegroom will be here on Sunday, and I am engaged every day till after the wedding. My house, hands, heart and time will be very full till it is over.”

More enigmatic is her approval of Margaret Fuller’s marriage to Count Ossoli during the last years of Fuller’s life. Given her opinion that marriage would “deprive [one young woman] of larger opportunities of usefulness,” it is striking to find Martineau writing of “that remarkable regeneration which transformed her [Fuller] from the dreaming and haughty pedant into the true woman. In a few months more she had loved and married; and how interesting and beautiful was the closing period of her life, when husband and child concentrated the power and affections which had so long run to waste in intellectual and moral eccentricity.” This is a rather severe judgment of Fuller, for although Martineau claims to have been her friend, twice in the Autobiography she sharply criticizes the American woman. She is resentful that Fuller negatively criticized Society in America for its emphasis on the abolition of American slavery. She was also stung by a report from London that Fuller had called her “commonplace” after a visit as her house guest at The Knoll. Though near in age and occupation, and even in high-strung temperament, Martineau and Fuller were opposites philosophically, Martineau the positivist, Fuller the transcendentalist. It is no wonder that they finally did not get along with each other. This evidence makes me wonder if Martineau was not being spiteful rather than truthful about the value of marriage for Margaret Fuller.

On marriage in theory, Martineau wrote in How to Observe Morals and Manners: “The traveller everywhere finds women treated as the inferior party in a compact in which both parties have an equal interest. Any agreement thus formed is imperfect, and is liable to disturbance; and the danger is great in proportion to the degradation of the supposed weaker party. The degree of the degradation of woman is as good a test as the moralist can adopt for ascertaining the state of domestic morals in any country.” And “It is a matter of course that women who are furnished with but one object,—marriage—must be as unfit for anything when their aim is accomplished as if they had never any object at all. They are no more equal to the task of education than to that of governing the state; and, if any unexpected turn of adversity befals them, they have no resource but a convent, or some other charitable provision.” Her observations of marriage were confirmed by letters she received from English women describing the “intolerable oppression” of women under law and custom in England.

Martineau published theoretical considerations of political equality for women several times between 1837 and 1851. All were about women in American society; and all were very positive. But only once, in a passage in her Autobiography, did she address at its most abstract level what was typically called in her day the woman question, and on that occasion she is atypically negative. The tone of that piece suggests that women will come to have political rights if women will be worthy of them. Most other times she was far more willing to indict the political system for excluding women.

The woman’s suffrage campaign did not really get under way until the late 1860s when Martineau’s health was failing. However, she had written in 1855, “I have no vote at elections, though I am a tax-paying housekeeper and responsible citizen; and I regard the disability as an absurdity, seeing that I have for a long course of years influenced public affairs to an extent not professed or attempted by many men.”

She went on in that passage, however, to disclaim any intention of agitating over suffrage, believing that women would have a vote in time. The vote was clearly simply one among many women’s
issues for her, not the central, singular driving focus for women’s rights that it came to be in both England and America after her death. Nevertheless, she readily signed the petition for women’s suffrage that John Stuart Mill presented to Parliament in 1866. She admired Mill and believed him to be an effective supporter of women’s rights, but adding her name to those of the 1,498 other women on the petition was not a strong gesture. Her conviction of the rightness of the principle of the vote for women, incidentally, was not shared by the ruling Queen Victoria, still mourning deeply for her husband, then dead for five years, nor by the most admired woman in England at the time and Martineau’s friend, Florence Nightingale.

Martineau’s final act of political activism in her old age was on behalf of women and again in the service of a campaign led by another, the campaign of the Ladies’ National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts led by Josephine Butler. This time a thoroughly feminist organization was launched. It was liberal and even patronizing in the sense that it consisted of “respectable” women working for “fallen” women. Nevertheless, this movement was radical in the sense that the women involved realized that all women were potentially incriminated by laws that identified prostitutes too vaguely and punished women but not men for acts of prostitution. Martineau was invigorated by writing publicly for this campaign, which provided an appropriate finale for a distinguished career as journalist, thinker, and feminist.

**Self Assessment**

1. Choose the correct options:
   
   (i) Martineau’s first writings appeared in unitarian periodical published in
   
   (a) 1822  
   (b) 1825  
   (c) 1830  
   (d) 1828

   (ii) The first writing written by Harriet was
   
   (a) Illustration of Political Economy  
   (b) Monthly Depository  
   (c) Retrospect of Western Travel  
   (d) None of these

   (iii) Martineau’s Antobiography was written in
   
   (a) 1854 – 85  
   (b) 1865 – 66  
   (c) 1850 -51  
   (d) 1853- 54

   (iv) The Feminist Papers indicates the ...... of Martineau’s thought
   
   (a) Current value  
   (b) Past Value  
   (c) Future value  
   (d) None of these

**24.7 Summary**

- The selections in this book were chosen to give a full view of the ways in which Harriet Martineau wrote about women and about those feminist issues, both historical and contemporary, that she addressed. Often she wrote several pieces on the same topic, and I usually picked the shortest one if it gave the complete scope of her argument. To choose from her many biographical works on women, I used two criteria: that a particularly feminist point was made and that the biographee as herself notable. To my knowledge, the pieces on American women, Irish women, and the women in the harems in Cairo and Damascus are the only ones she wrote in a deliberately social mode about women in groups. I wanted to show how she attended to feminist material and developed feminist theory throughout her lifetime, so I chose material from different periods of her writing. Since my purpose was solely to develop the idea that over forty years Martineau fostered feminist causes and structured feminist theory in a great many works, Excluded from the selections printed here passages that were not directly about women. I have left nearly all of Martineau’s spelling, punctuation, and phrasing as they were in the original source, even though occasionally one looks like a printer’s error or a grammatical oversight. I have assumed that the reader’s interest will be primarily on the topic of women, so I have kept to a minimum, interesting
Notes

though it is, commentary or notes on the surrounding historical background or incidental figures in Martineau’s texts.

• All women should inform themselves of the condition of their sex and of their own position. It must necessarily follow that the noblest of them will, sooner or later, put forth a moral power which shall prostrate cant, and burst asunder the bonds (silken to some but cold iron to others) of feudal prejudice and usages. In the meantime is it to be understood that the principles of the Declaration of Independence bear no relation to half of the human race? If so, what is the ground of this limitation? There is no country in the world where there is so much boasting of the ‘chivalrous’ treatment she enjoys . . . . In short, indulgence is given her as a substitute for justice.

• What office is there which involves more responsibility, which requires more qualifications, and which ought, therefore, to be more honourable, than that of teaching? Teaching and training children is to a few, a very few, a delightful employment notwithstanding its toils and cares. Except to these few it is irksome: and when accompanied with poverty and mortification intolerable.

• A soul occupied with great ideas performs small duties. Religion is a temper, not a pursuit. I am in truth very thankful for not having married at all. The older I have grown, the more serious and irremediable have seemed to me the evils and disadvantages of married life as it exists among us at this time. I have no sympathy for those who, under any pressure of circumstances, sacrifice their heart’s-love for legal prostitution. [on a visit to the United States:] The instruction furnished is not good enough for the youth of such a country . . . . There is not even any systematic instruction given on political morals: an enormous deficiency in a republic.

24.8 Key-Words

1. Unflinchingly  : Showing neither fear nor indecision.
2. Feminism  : Advocacy of Women’s rights on the grounds of political, social and economic equality to men.

24.9 Review Questions

1. Martineau was a writer of exceptional breadth and vitality. Discuss.
2. What are the major works of Martineau?
3. Briefly analyse Martineau’s view on women.
4. Describe Harriet’s Feminism.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a)  (ii) (b)  (iii) (a)  (iv) (a)

24.10 Further Readings

Unit 25: Swift–Hints Towards an Essay on Conversation: Introduction and Detailed Study

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25.1 Introduction to Hints Towards An Essay On Conversation
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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to
• Discuss Swift's Life and Works
• Introduce Hints Towards An Essay on Conversation

Introduction
Irish author and journalist, dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral (Dublin) from 1713, the foremost prose satirist in English language. Swift became insane in his last years, but until his death he was known as Dublin’s foremost citizen. Swift’s most famous works is *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726), where the stories of Gulliver’s experiences among dwarfs and giants are best known. Swift gave to these journeys an air of authenticity and realism and many contemporary readers believed them to be true.

“They look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and therefore seldom fail to punish it with death; for they alledge, that care and vigilante, with a very common understanding, may preserve a man’s goods from thieves; but honesty hat no fence against superior cunning: and since it is necessary that there should be a perpetual intercourse of buying and selling, and dealing upon credit; where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no Law to punish it, the honest dealer is always undone and the knave gets the advantage.” (from *Gulliver’s Travels: A Voyage to Lilliput*)

Jonathan Swift was born in Dublin. His father, Jonathan Swift Sr., a lawyer and an English civil servant, died seven month’s before his son was born. Abigail Erick, Swift’s mother, was left without private income to support her family. Swift was taken or “stolen” to England by his nurse, and at the age of four he was sent back to Ireland. Swift’s mother returned to England, and she left her son to her wealthy brother-in-law, Uncle Godwin.

Swift studied at Kilkenny Grammar School (1674-82), Trinity College in Dublin (1682-89), receiving his B.A. in 1686 and M.A. in 1692. At school Swift was not a very good good student and his teachers noted his headstrong behavior. When the anti-Catholic Revolution of the year 1688 aroused reaction in Ireland, Swift moved to England to the household of Sir William Temple at Moor Park, Surrey - Lady Temple was a relative of Swift’s mother. He worked there as a secretary (1689-95, 1696-99), but did not like his position as a servant in the household.

In 1695 Swift was ordained in the Church of Ireland (Anglican), Dublin. While in staying in Moor Park, Swift also was the teacher of a young girl, Esther Johnson, whom he called Stella. When she


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grew up she become an important person in his life. Stella moved to Ireland to live near him and followed him on his travels to London. Their relationship was a constant source of gossips. According to some speculations, they were married in 1716. Stella died in 1728 and Swift kept a lock of her hair among his papers for the rest of his life.

“As the common forms of good manners were intended for regulating the conduct of those who have weak understandings; so they have been corrupted by the persons for whose use they were contrived. For these people have fallen into a needless and endless way of multiplying ceremonies, which have been extremely troublesome to those who practice them, and insupportable to everyone else: insomuch that wise men are often more uneasy at the over civility of these refiners, than they could possibly be in the conversations of peasants or mechanics.” (from ‘A Treatise on Good Manners and Good Breeding’, 1754)

After William Temple’s death in 1699, Swift returned to Ireland. He made several trips to London and gained fame with his essays. Throughout the reign of Queen Anne (1702-14), Swift was one of the central characters in the literary and political life of London. From 1695 to 1696 Swift was the vicar of Kilroot. There he met Jane Waring, with whom he had an affair. For Swift’s disappointment, she did not consider him a suitable marriage partner. Between the years 1707 and 1709 Swift was an emissary for the Irish clergy in London. Swift contributed to the ‘Bickerstaff Papers’ and to the Tattler in 1708-09. He was a cofounder of the Scriblerus Club, which included such member as Pope, Gay, Congreve, and Robert Harley, 1st Earl of Oxford.

In 1710 Swift tried to open a political career among Whigs but changed his party and took over the Tory journal The Examiner. With the accession of George I, the Tories lost political power. Swift withdrew to Ireland. Hester Vanhomrigh, whom Swift had met in 1708, and whom he had tutored, followed him to Ireland after her mother had died. She was 22 years younger than Swift, who nicknamed her Vanessa. In the poem ‘Cadenus and Vanessa’ from 1713 Swift wrote about the affair: “Each girl, when pleased with what is taught, / Will have the teacher in her thought.” In 1723 Swift broke off the relationship; she never recovered form his rejection.

From 1713 to 1742 Swift was the dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral. It is thought that Swift suffered from Ménère’s disease or Alzheimer’s disease. Many considered him insane - however, from the beginning of his twentieth year he had suffered from deafness. Swift had predicted his mental decay when he was about 50 and had remarked to the poet Edward Young when they were gazing at the withered crown of a tree: “I shall be like that tree, I shall die from the top.”

25.1 Introduction to Hints Towards An Essay on Conversation

In this essay, the great Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift (author of Gulliver’s Travels and “A Modest Proposal”) enumerates “the faults and errors” of those who lack the ability to participate in an agreeable conversation.


Hints Toward an Essay on Conversation (1713)

I have observed few obvious subjects to have been so seldom, or, at least, so slightly handled as this; and, indeed, I know few so difficult to be treated as it ought, nor yet upon which there seemeth so much to be said.

Most things, pursued by men for the happiness of public or private life, our wit or folly have so refined, that they seldom subsist but in idea; a true friend, a good marriage, a perfect form of government, with some others, require so many ingredients, so good in their several kinds, and so much niceness in mixing them, that for some thousands of years men have despaired of reducing
their schemes to perfection. But, in conversation, it is, or might be otherwise; for here we are only to avoid a multitude of errors, which, although a matter of some difficulty, may be in every man’s power, for want of which it remaineth as mere an idea as the other. Therefore it seemeth to me, that the truest way to understand conversation, is to know the faults and errors to which it is subject, and from thence every man to form maxims to himself whereby it may be regulated, because it requireth few talents to which most men are not born, or at least may not acquire without any great genius or study. For nature hath left every man a capacity of being agreeable, though not of shining in company; and there are an hundred men sufficiently qualified for both, who, by a very few faults, that they might correct in half an hour, are not so much as tolerable.

I was prompted to write my thoughts upon this subject by mere indignation, to reflect that so useful and innocent a pleasure, so fitted for every period and condition of life, and so much in all men’s power, should be so much neglected and abused.

And in this discourse it will be necessary to note those errors that are obvious, as well as others which are seldom observed, since there are few so obvious, or acknowledged, into which most men, some time or other, are not apt to run.

The Folly of Talking Too Much

For instance: Nothing is more generally exploded than the folly of talking too much; yet I rarely remember to have seen five people together, where some one among them hath not been predominant in that kind, to the great constraint and disgust of all the rest. But among such as deal in multitudes of words, none are comparable to the sober deliberate talker, who proceedeth with much thought and caution, maketh his preface, brancheth out into several digressions, findeth a hint that putteth him in mind of another story, which he promiseth to tell you when this is done; cometh back regularly to his subject, cannot readily call to mind some person’s name, holding his head, complaineth of his memory; the whole company all this while in suspense; at length says, it is no matter, and so goes on. And, to crown the business, it perhaps proveth at last a story the company hath heard fifty times before; or, at best, some insipid adventure of the relater.

Another general fault in conversation is, that of those who affect to talk of themselves: Some, without any ceremony, will run over the history of their lives; will relate the annals of their diseases, with the several symptoms and circumstances of them; will enumerate the hardships and injustice they have suffered in court, in parliament, in love, or in law. Others are more dexterous, and with great art will lie on the watch to hook in their own praise: They will call a witness to remember they always foretold what would happen in such a case, but none would believe them; they advised such a man from the beginning, and told him the consequences, just as they happened; but he would have his own way. Others make a vanity of telling their faults; they are the strangest men in the world; they cannot dissemble; they own it is a folly; they have lost abundance of advantages by it; but, if you would give them the world, they cannot help it; there is something in their nature that abhors insincerity and constraint; with many other insufferable topics of the same altitude.

Of such mighty importance every man is to himself, and ready to think he is so to others; without once making this easy and obvious reflection, that his affairs can have no more weight with other men, than theirs have with him; and how little that is, he is sensible enough.

Where company hath met, I often have observed two persons discover, by some accident, that they were bred together at the same school or university, after which the rest are condemned to silence, and to listen while these two are refreshing each other’s memory with the arch tricks and passages of themselves and their comrades.

I know a great officer of the army, who will sit for some time with a supercilious and impatient silence, full of anger and contempt for those who are talking; at length of a sudden demand audience, decide the matter in a short dogmatical way; then withdraw within himself again, and vouchsafe to talk no more, until his spirits circulate again to the same point.
Men of Wit

There are some faults in conversation, which none are so subject to as the men of wit, nor ever so much as when they are with each other. If they have opened their mouths, without endeavouring to say a witty thing, they think it is so many words lost: It is a torment to the hearers, as much as to themselves, to see them upon the rack for invention, and in perpetual constraint, with so little success. They must do something extraordinary, in order to acquit themselves, and answer their character, else the standers-by may be disappointed and be apt to think them only like the rest of mortals. I have known two men of wit industriously brought together, in order to entertain the company, where they have made a very ridiculous figure, and provided all the mirth at their own expense.

I know a man of wit, who is never easy but where he can be allowed to dictate and preside: he neither expecteth to be informed or entertained, but to display his own talents. His business is to be good company, and not good conversation; and therefore, he chooseth to frequent those who are content to listen, and profess themselves his admirers. And, indeed, the worst conversation I ever remember to have heard in my life, was that at Will’s coffeehouse, where the wits (as they were called) used formerly to assemble; that is to say, five or six men, who had writ plays, or at least prologues, or had share in a miscellany, came thither, and entertained one another with their trifling composures, in so important an air, as if they had been the noblest efforts of human nature, or that the fate of kingdoms depended on them; and they were usually attended with an humble audience of young students from the inns of court, or the universities, who, at due distance, listened to these oracles, and returned home with great contempt for their law and philosophy, their heads filled with trash, under the name of politeness, criticism and belles letters.

Pedantry

By these means the poets, for many years past, were all overrun with pedantry. For, as I take it, the word is not properly used; because pedantry is the too frequent or unseasonable obtruding our own knowledge in common discourse, and placing too great a value upon it; by which definition, men of the court or the army may be as guilty of pedantry as a philosopher or a divine; and, it is the same vice in women, when they are over copious upon the subject of their petticoats, or their fans, or their china. For which reason, although it be a piece of prudence, as well as good manners, to put men upon talking on subjects they are best versed in, yet that is a liberty a wise man could hardly take; because, beside the imputation of pedantry, it is what he would never improve by. The great town is usually provided with some player, mimic or buffoon, who hath a general reception at the good tables; familiar and domestic with persons of the first quality, and usually sent for at every meeting to divert the company; against which I have no objection. You go there as to a farce or a puppet show; your business is only to laugh in season, either out of inclination or civility, while this merry companion is acting his part. It is a business he hath undertaken, and we are to suppose he is paid for his day’s work. I only quarrel, when in select and private meetings, where men of wit and learning are invited to pass an evening, this jester should be admitted to run over his circle of tricks, and make the whole company unfit for any other conversation, besides the indignity of confounding men’s talents at so shameful a rate.

Raillery

Raillery is the finest part of conversation; but, as it is our usual custom to counterfeit and adulterate whatever is too dear for us, so we have done with this, and turned it all into what is generally called repartee, or being smart; just as when an expensive fashion cometh up, those who are not able to reach it, content themselves with some paltry imitation. It now passeth for raillery to run a man down in discourse, to put him out of countenance, and make him ridiculous, sometimes to expose the defects of his person or understanding; on all which occasions he is obliged not to be angry, to avoid the imputation of not being able to take a jest. It is admirable to observe one who
is dexterous at this art, singling out a weak adversary, getting the laugh on his side, and then carrying all before him. The French, from whence we borrow the word, have a quite different idea of the thing, and so had we in the politer age of our fathers. Raillery was to say something that at first appeared a reproach or reflection; but, by some turn of wit unexpected and surprising, ended always in a compliment, and to the advantage of the person it was addressed to. And surely one of the best rules in conversation is, never to say a thing which any of the company can reasonably wish we had rather left unsaid; nor can there anything be well more contrary to the ends for which people meet together, than to part unsatisfied with each other or themselves.

**Interruptions**

There are two faults in conversation, which appear very different, yet arise from the same root, and are equally blameable; I mean, an impatience to interrupt others, and the uneasiness of being interrupted ourselves. The two chief ends of conversation are to entertain and improve those we are among, or to receive those benefits ourselves; which whoever will consider, cannot easily run into either of those two errors; because when any man speaketh in company, it is to be supposed he doth it for his hearers' sake, and not his own; so that common discretion will teach us not to force their attention, if they are not willing to lend it; nor on the other side, to interrupt him who is in possession, because that is in the grossest manner to give the preference to our own good sense.

There are some people, whose good manners will not suffer them to interrupt you; but, what is almost as bad, will discover abundance of impatience, and lie upon the watch until you have done, because they have started something in their own thoughts which they long to be delivered of. Meantime, they are so far from regarding what passes, that their imaginations are wholly turned upon what they have in reserve, for fear it should slip out of their memory; and thus they confine their invention, which might otherwise range over a hundred things full as good, and that might be much more naturally introduced.

There is a sort of rude familiarity, which some people, by practising among their intimates, have introduced into their general conversation, and would have it pass for innocent freedom or humour, which is a dangerous experiment in our northern climate, where all the little decorum and politeness we have are purely forced by art, and are so ready to lapse into barbarity. This, among the Romans, was the raillery of slaves, of which we have many instances in Plautus. It seemeth to have been introduced among us by Cromwell, who, by preferring the scum of the people, made it a court entertainment, of which I have heard many particulars; and, considering all things were turned upside down, it was reasonable and judicious: Although it was a piece of policy found out to ridicule a point of honour in the other extreme, when the smallest word misplaced among gentlemen ended in a duel.

There are some men excellent at telling a story, and provided with a plentiful stock of them, which they can draw out upon occasion in all companies; and, considering how low conversation runs now among us, it is not altogether a contemptible talent; however, it is subject to two unavoidable defects; frequent repetition, and being soon exhausted; so that whoever valueth this gift in himself, hath need of a good memory, and ought frequently to shift his company, that he may not discover the weakness of his fund; for those who are thus endowed, have seldom any other revenue, but live upon the main stock.

**Elocution**

Great speakers in public, are seldom agreeable in private conversation, whether their faculty be natural, or acquired by practice, and often venturing. Natural elocution, although it may seem a paradox, usually springeth from a barrenness of invention and of words, by which men who have only one stock of notions upon every subject, and one set of phrases to express them in, they swim upon the superficies, and offer themselves on every occasion; therefore, men of much learning, and
who know the compass of a language, are generally the worst talkers on a sudden, until much practice hath inured and emboldened them, because they are confounded with plenty of matter, variety of notions, and of words, which they cannot readily choose, but are perplexed and entangled by too great a choice; which is no disadvantage in private conversation; where, on the other side, the talent of haranguing is, of all others, most insupportable.

Nothing hath spoiled men more for conversation, than the character of being wits, to support which, they never fail of encouraging a number of followers and admirers, who list themselves in their service, wherein they find their accounts on both sides, by pleasing their mutual vanity. This hath given the former such an air of superiority, and made the latter so pragmatical, that neither of them are well to be endured. I say nothing here of the itch of dispute and contradiction, telling of lies, or of those who are troubled with the disease called the wandering of the thoughts, that they are never present in mind at what passeth in discourse; for whoever labours under any of these possessions, is as unfit for conversation as a madman in Bedlam.

I think I have gone over most of the errors in conversation, that have fallen under my notice or memory, except some that are merely personal, and others too gross to need exploding; such as lewd or profane talk; but I pretend only to treat the errors of conversation in general, and not the several subjects of discourse, which would be infinite. Thus we see how human nature is most debased, by the abuse of that faculty, which is held the great distinction between men and brutes; and how little advantage we make of that which might be the greatest, the most lasting, and the most innocent, as well as useful pleasure of life. In default of which, we are forced to take up with those poor amusements of dress and visiting, or the more pernicious ones of play, drink, and vicious amours, whereby the nobility and gentry of both sexes are entirely corrupted both in body and mind, and have lost all notions of love, honour, friendship, generosity; which, under the name of fopperies, have been for some time laughed out of doors.

The Exclusion of Women

This degeneracy of conversation, with the pernicious consequences thereof upon our humours and dispositions, hath been owing, among other causes, to the custom arisen, for sometime past, of excluding women from any share in our society, further than in parties at play, or dancing, or in the pursuit of an amour. I take the highest period of politeness in England (and it is of the same date in France) to have been the peaceable part of King Charles the First’s reign; and from what we read of those times, as well as from the accounts I have formerly met with from some who lived in that court, the methods then used for raising and cultivating conversation, were altogether different from ours. Several ladies, whom, we find celebrated by the poets of that age, had assemblies at their houses, where persons of the best understanding, and of both sexes, met to pass the evenings in discoursing upon whatever agreeable subjects were occasionally started; and although we are apt to ridicule the sublime platonic notions they had, or personated in love and friendship, I conceive their refinements were grounded upon reason, and that a little grain of the romance is no ill ingredient to preserve and exalt the dignity of human nature, without which it is apt to degenerate into everything that is sordid, vicious and low. If there were no other use in the conversation of ladies, it is sufficient that it would lay a restraint upon those odious topics of immodesty and indecencies, into which the rudeness of our northern genius is so apt to fall. And, therefore, it is observable in those sprightly gentlemen about the town, who are so very dexterous at entertaining a vizard mask in the park or the playhouse, that, in the company of ladies of virtue and honour, they are silent and disconcerted, and out of their element.

There are some people who think they sufficiently acquit themselves and entertain their company with relating of facts of no consequence, nor at all out of the road of such common incidents as happen every day; and this I have observed more frequently among the Scots than any other nation, who are very careful not to omit the minutest circumstances of time or place; which kind
of discourse, if it were not a little relieved by the uncouth terms and phrases, as well as accent and
gesture, peculiar to that country, would be hardly tolerable. It is not a fault in company to talk
much; but to continue it long is certainly one; for, if the majority of those who are got together be
naturally silent or cautious, the conversation will flag, unless it be often renewed by one among
them, who can start new subjects, provided he doth not dwell upon them, but leaveth room for
answers and replies.

Self Assessment

1. Fill in the blanks:

(i) ................... Swift tried to open a political career among Whigs but changed his party and
took over the Tory journal The Examiner.

   (a) 1710              (b) 1715
   (c) 1718              (d) 1719

(ii) There are ............... faults in conversation

   (a) Three              (b) Two
   (c) Four               (d) Five

(iii) ............... “Of Conversation: An Apology.” was written by

   (a) Bacon              (b) H.G. Wells
   (c) Swift              (d) Addissen

25.2 Summary

• Irish author and journalist, dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral (Dublin) from 1713, the foremost
prose satirist in English language. Swift became insane in his last years, but until his death
he was known as Dublin’s foremost citizen. Swift’s most famous works is Gulliver’s Travels
(1726), where the stories of Gulliver’s experiences among dwarfs and giants are best known.
Swift gave to these journeys an air of authenticity and realism and many contemporary
readers believed them to be true.

• Jonathan Swift was born in Dublin. His father, Jonathan Swift Sr., a lawyer and an English
civil servant, died seven month’s before his son was born. Abigail Erick, Swift’s mother, was
left without private income to support her family. Swift was taken or “stolen” to England by
his nurse, and at the age of four he was sent back to Ireland. Swift’s mother returned to
England, and she left her son to her wealthy brother-in-law, Uncle Godwin.

• In 1695 Swift was ordained in the Church of Ireland (Anglican), Dublin. While in staying in
Moor Park, Swift also was the teacher of a young girl, Esther Johnson, whom he called Stella.

• In 1710 Swift tried to open a political career among Whigs but changed his party and took
over the Tory journal The Examiner. With the accession of George I, the Tories lost political
power. Swift withdrew to Ireland. Hester Vanhomrigh, whom Swift had met in 1708, and
whom he had tutored, followed him to Ireland after her mother had died. She was 22 years
younger than Swift, who nicknamed her Vanessa. In the poem ‘Cadenus and Vanessa’ from
1713 Swift wrote about the affair: “Each girl, when pleased with what is taught, / Will have
the teacher in her thought.” In 1723 Swift broke off the relationship; she never recovered
form his rejection.

• In this essay, the great Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift (author of Gulliver’s Travels and
“A Modest Proposal”) enumerates “the faults and errors” of those who lack the ability to
participate in an agreeable conversation.

25.3 Key-Words

1. Elocution : Elocution is the study of formal speaking in pronunciation, grammar, style, and tone
2. Vizard mask : a mask for hiding the face

25.4 Review Questions

1. Write a short note on Swift’s Life and Works.
2. Briefly describe the essay “Hints Toward an Essay on Conversation”.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (b) (iii) (b)

25.5 Further Readings

Unit 26: Swift–Hints Towards An Essay on Conversation: Critical Appreciation cum Analysis

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Objectives
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26.4 Review Questions
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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to
• Discuss about Swift
• Critically examine the Hints Towards An Essay on Conversation

Introduction
Jonathan Swift was an author, journalist, and political activist best known for his satirical novel Gulliver’s Travels and for his satirical essay on the Irish famine, “A Modest Proposal.”

Born of English parents in Dublin, Ireland, Swift studied at Kilkenny Grammar School and at Trinity College in Dublin. The abdication of King James II drove him to England. During his time in England, Swift realized his great talent for satire and wrote A Tale of a Tub and “The Battle of the Books,” published in 1704. Swift also decided upon a career in the clergy. When he returned to Ireland, Swift became a member of the Anglican clergy, ordained in the Church of Ireland.

During the reign of Queen Anne (1702-14), Swift visited London several times, making a name for himself as a talented essayist. He began his political career as a part of the Whig political party but in 1710 switched sides, becoming a Tory and taking over the Tory journal The Examiner. Swift was disgusted by the Whigs’ aversion to the Anglican Church and could not stand for the party’s desire to do away with the Test Act, which kept many non-Anglicans from holding offices in government. Swift focused his time as a Tory on supporting their cause by writing lengthy pamphlets and essays on religion and politics, continuing to satirize those with different views. In 1713 Swift was offered the deanship of St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin. When Queen Anne died in 1714, the Tories came under fire, so Swift lost favor in London and greater England. He begrudgingly resigned himself to living full-time in Ireland.

In 1724 Swift led the Irish people in their resistance against the English, who continued to oppress them. He wrote many public letters and political pieces with the purpose of rallying the people. One of his most famous essays, “A Modest Proposal,” satirically suggests that the Irish solve their problems of starvation and overpopulation by eating their young. Swift also engaged in extensive commentary on religion, though these works are not much read today. Even though Swift’s identity was widely known by the citizens of Dublin, no one came forward to report him when a 300-pound reward was offered for his arrest.
Swift is also known for *Gulliver’s Travels*, a book of fantasy, satire, and political allegory, much like his other, shorter works. He wrote *Gulliver’s Travels* in 1725, and it was published in 1726. The book was a great success throughout the British Empire, and it contributed to Swift’s fame and legitimacy as a writer and social commentator.

For the majority of his life, Swift was a victim of Meniere’s disease, which affects balance and hearing and causes nausea and dizziness. When Swift was about 72 years old, his disease began to keep him from his duties and social life. He became withdrawn and deeply depressed. Swift died in October 1745. He was buried in St. Patrick’s Cathedral, where he had worked as dean. Swift was a great friend of Alexander Pope, a fellow satirist best known for “Rape of the Lock.” In a letter to Pope, Swift once called himself a misanthrope, but it seems more likely that he was simply frustrated by people who chose not to use the logic and reason they possessed.

### 26.1 Critical Appreciation

The full-text of “Hints Toward an Essay on Conversation,” an essay by Jonathan Swift on the use of language. This plain text version was taken from *Gulliver’s Travels and Other Works* by Jonathan Swift.

In the spring of 2002, I read Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* for the first time as an adult. Soon after, while following a brief electronic discussion on the CORPORA mailing list about the historical background of corpus linguistics, I realized that Swift could arguably be proposed as an illustrious forerunner of this new way of studying language. The main justification for my proposal is that Swift’s writings abound in allusions to a dimension of language which makes the corpus linguistics enterprise possible. Swift, centuries before the advent of the mainframe and personal computer, shows in his only novel, and indeed throughout his work, an awareness of the physical dimension of language and an appreciation of language as phonic or graphic substance. In this paper I would therefore like to nominate Jonathan Swift as a major precursor of corpus linguistics. Indeed, had he not been such a devoted anti-papist, I might suggest he be canonized as patron saint of all those students of language who compile corpora to further their study.

### Background

By the spring of 2002, the field of corpus linguistics, after some years of struggle to establish itself as a legitimate way of doing linguistics followed by a period of demarcation and self-vindication, had attained a degree of self-confidence within the language sciences. Some corpus linguists (Francis, 1992) had earlier begun to take stock and to examine the historical background of this sub-discipline.

A discussion began on its longest-standing and most prestigious mailing list, CORPORA, held at Bergen University in Norway, and various proposals were made for key texts, seminal works and landmarks in the intellectual pre-history of this suddenly fashionable school of linguistics. Rightly enough, key texts from the 1970s (McH Sinclair, 1970) were proposed as being seminal or formative. Pre-computer-age marvels of calculation and generalization were cited, most notably Markov (1912) and Zipf (1936), who, with their laborious ‘manual’ computations, paved the way for present-day researchers in Language Engineering who still extract Zipf distributions and Markov models from corpora. Herculean feats of manual concordancing were mentioned - for example, Cruden’s *Complete Concordance to the Old and New Testaments* (1796).

I promptly posted a proposal of Jonathan Swift as precursor of corpus linguistics and then the thread came to an end. This may have been due to the divagation inherent in my mailing or because I arrived when attention was already shifting to other issues: that particular conversation had run its course. Indeed many practitioners of corpus linguistics perhaps thought it was time to return to more pressing workaday matters and leave the history for another time. In the rest of this paper, I would like to develop the idea I posted to the CORPORA debate.
Textual Bases for my Claim

The realization that Swift had been aware of aspects of language which linguists have only come to grapple with recently first came to me when reading *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726) (henceforth *Gulliver*), especially Part III, Ch 5, where the author describes a machine which generates books of “philosophy, poetry, politics, law, mathematics and theology without the least assistance from genius or study”. Gulliver gullibly observes that “everyone knew how laborious the usual method is of attaining to arts and sciences”. The professor of the Academy of Lagado who invented this engine (worked by 40 pupils who cranked handles and transcribed the output) told Gulliver that he had emptied the whole vocabulary into the frame and made the strictest computation of the general proportion there is in books between the number of particles, nouns, and verbs, and other parts of speech. Chalker, in his endnotes to the 1967 Penguin Classic Edition of *Gulliver*, suggests that this Professor might be based on John Peters, who published a pamphlet, *Artificial Versifying: A New Way to Make Latin Verses* (1678), which was lampooned by Steele in *The Spectator* No 220:

This virtuoso, being a mathematician, has according to his taste, thrown the art of poetry into a short problem, and contrived tables by which anyone without knowing a word of grammar or sense may, to his great comfort, be able to compose, or rather to erect, Latin verses.

Swift may also have been thinking of the work on artificial languages done by George Dalgarno (1661) in *Ars Signorum* and Bishop John Wilkins (1668) in his *An Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*. If he was poking fun at Dalgarno’s and Wilkins’s ill-fated schemes to generate knowledge by inventing a new universal language of science, Swift showed himself to be aware of the mechanics of such knowledge-generation through the patterns of language. As in much of Swift’s satire, it is often difficult to situate where Swift himself stands on the issue he is subjecting to irony, parody and other literary devices. The insouciance of Gulliver when faced with the marvellous scientific riches of Lagado might lead the unsuspecting reader to think that Swift, as author, was against the new science. His subtle deployment of the dual standpoints of author and narrator creates a hall of mirrors to puzzle readers.

There are a number of examples in Swift’s other works where he seems almost to savour the bodily or physical aspect of words and language. For example, in the introduction to Section One of *Tale of a Tub* (1704), he characterizes words as Bodies of much weight and gravity, as is manifest from those deep impressions they make and leave upon us; and therefore must be delivered from a due altitude, or else they will neither carry a good aim, nor fall with sufficient force.

Swift, in the same section, then dwells on books as substantial entities or indeed as living beings to be marshalled in a battle between three institutions, Grub Street (representing the journalists), Gresham (the Royal Society) and Will’s Café (the poets):

I am informed, our two rivals have lately made an offer of to enter into the lists with united forces, and challenge us to a comparison of books, both as to weight and number … Where can they find scales of capacity enough for the first; or an arithmetician of capacity enough for the second? Allowing the word and the book to become flesh comes through often in his work:

When I am reading a book, whether wise or silly, it see meth to me to be alive and talking to me (“Thoughts on various subjects”). Hammond (1999) observes how Swiftian irony works by “materializing the abstract or by literalizing the figurative” often through the use of pun.

In the first page of his brief *A Critical essay upon the faculties of the human mind* (1708), where Swift apes a serious essay, we find a *reductio ad absurdum* of Epicurus’s cosmogony:

How can the Epicurean’s opinion be true, that the universe was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms: which I will no more believe, than that the accidental jumbling of the letters of the alphabet, could fall by chance into a most ingenious and learned treatise of philosophy.

It is the rhetorical aside about the stochastic generation of text which is interesting here in the way it presages the professors in the School of Languages at the Academy of Lagado. Swift is laughing
at such an idea, but as in Gulliver and all his best writing, he allows the reader the pleasure (sometimes the horror) of imagining “yes, but what if … ?”. He is perhaps the greatest virtuoso of thought experiments, the kind beloved of philosophers.

**Rationale for this Conversation between the Centuries, or a Voyage to Glubbdubdrib**

Swift himself would no doubt have smiled at his name being cited in a discussion of the pre-history of a new approach to a human science and my contribution to the debate. Bringing a writer from the eighteenth century face-to-face with a new way of doing linguistics in the twentieth and twenty-first century might seem odd, but some examples from recent intellectual history might help show that Swift’s ideas continue to have an impact on moral, political and philosophical issues long after his death.

It seems somehow appropriate that his satire on the political wranglings of his own day, the war between the Lilliputians and the Blefuscans should be immortalized in the world of computer architecture. Swift’s distinctions and terms in Book I of Gulliver came to be used in informatics to characterize the distinct approaches of little-endians and big-endians. Danny Cohen (1980), in his pivotal paper “On Holy Wars and a Plea for Peace”, uses the Lilliput-Blefuscu controversy as a template to analyse, and seek a solution for, a major ideological confrontation within software engineering.

Another justification for my introduction of Swift into the intellectual genealogy of corpus linguistics can be found in present-day Swiftian scholarship. In his work God, Gulliver and Genocide, Rawson (2001) attempts to show the relevance of ideas expressed in Book IV of Gulliver to the great moral quandary of recent history, genocide and, most notably, the Holocaust. Swift’s Houyhnhnms’ apologia for wiping the Yahoos off the face of the earth prefigured uncannily the Nazi rationale for their “final solution”. Rawson affirms that Swift betrays a harsh proleptic awareness of the later scenarios of oppression with their complacencies and self-deception as well as outright lying … A volatile combination of ‘meaning it, not meaning it, and not not meaning it’ enters into play, which varies with every example, may not ever be fully definable, and flirts elusively with its own literal content.

This analysis uncovers for us some of the layers of complexity lying in this innocuous tale of rational horses and lascivious Yahoos and the jury of critics is still out on whether Swift favoured one more than the other, or repudiated both. On such a multilayered reading, it is easier to sympathise with T.S. Eliot’s (1923) affirmation, in an essay on Joyce’s Ulysses, that Swift’s vision of the country of the Houyhnhnms was “one of the greatest triumphs that the human soul has ever achieved”.

One final argument for bringing Swift into dialogue with modern linguistics derives from Swift himself and that haunting section of Book III of Gulliver where the hero, after his voyage to Glubbdubdrib, has the chance to dialogue with long-deceased thinkers such as Aristotle and Descartes. Perhaps we might emulate Gulliver and ask to commune for twenty-four hours with Swift himself.

**Corpus Linguistics and What the Dean Might Supply**

Corpus linguistics has been practised for longer than the short lifetime of the computer. In the earlier part of the twentieth century, an urgent task for American linguists was the creation of corpora of Amerindian languages threatened with extinction (Boas, 1911) and workers in the empiricist/behaviourist tradition insisted that a scientific theory of language should reject all data that are not directly observable or physically measurable (Bloomfield, 1935: 33). For these scholars, the corpus was the *sine qua non* of scientific description (Leech, 1991: 73).

The temporary fall from grace of behaviourist linguistics was the result of a paradigm shift within linguistics heralded by the publication of Chomsky’s *Syntactic Structures* in 1957. One of the
criticisms which Chomsky made of a corpus-based approach was that it modelled the wrong aspect of language - performance instead of competence. Spoken or written language as observed and captured in corpora is always imperfect due to tiredness, laziness, absentmindedness, carelessness and so on. The object of study of Chomsky’s programme was the knowledge or competence underlying such performance data. What must the brain be like to account for the learning and production of language? This critique of empirical data is intimately linked to the theory which undergirds the whole Chomskian programme: namely, his modern version of Cartesianism. Chomsky, having stressed the creativity of language production in his overthrow of behaviourism, averred that no corpus could be a representative sample of the innumerable sentences of a language: the corpus would always be skewed. Even in the 1960s, a rearguard of linguists worked unashamedly with computer corpus collections of attested naturally-occurring language data, i.e., performance data (Kucera & Francis, 1967). This was flagrant empiricism against the prevalent rationalist tide and so we are right back in the Glubbdubdribrian world of Locke, Berkeley, and Hobbes pitted against Descartes and Spinoza, all of whose major works sat in Swift’s study (Lefanu, 1988).

The mainframe and personal computer can be viewed as observation instruments which might revolutionize the science of linguistics as the telescope and the microscope revolutionized astronomy and medicine (Stubbs, 1996: 231). Swift’s fascination with astronomical speculations is well-documented (Nicholson and Mohler, 1968) and is playfully depicted in the Laputans’ fear of comets (Gulliver Book 3). In the Laputans, he did after all predict, although perhaps fortuitously, the second moon of Mars more than 150 years before its discovery in 1877.

Two leading corpus linguists, Sinclair and Renouf (1988), point out the relentless efficiency of the computer when used to observe language:

retrieval systems, unlike human beings, miss nothing if properly instructed - no usage can be overlooked because it is too ordinary or too familiar … The human mind, contrary to popular belief, is not well organized for isolating consciously what is central and typical in the language; anything unusual is sharply perceived, but the humdrum everyday events are appreciated subliminally. (Sinclair & Renouf, 1988: 151)

In the final section of this paper, I would like to give the reader a glimpse of what the computer can tell us about Swift’s language as revealed in the work of Milic (1967).

We have inherited a set of dualisms from our forebears - for instance, mind/body, langue/parole and competence/performance. A novel attempt to sit on the fence over one of these dichotomies is provided by Partington (1998: 145) when he suggests that a corpus is neither performance nor competence but supplants the differentiation between the two concepts. The concept of competence, the ideal speaker’s knowledge of the language, raises certain philosophical problems because claims about ‘ideal knowledge’ are not falsifiable by any evidence. The individuality of performance needs to be transcended:

information about particular communicative events by itself is of limited, we might even say purely anecdotal value. By and large, we are not methodologically justified in interpreting the significance of a particular linguistic event unless we can compare it with other similar events. The corpus can provide “background information” against which particular events can be seen. (Partington, 1998: 146)

Swift showed awareness of this force towards dichotomization when he described the language professors at the Academy of Lagado (Gulliver Book III) who sought to abolish words and replace them with things. This passage and others (for instance, the Houyhnhnms’ having no need to write) have led some critics to impute grammaphobia or a deep distrust of the written word to Swift (Castle, 1999: 239). Edward Said paints a more complex picture when he suggests rather that
Swift seems to have been very sensitive to the differences between writing and speaking ... Each activity can take two forms, which we may call correct on the one hand and debased on the other (Said, 1999: 32).

**Satire and Thought Experiments**

The power and vehemence of Swift’s irony is world-renowned. In the voyage to Laputa in Book III of *Gulliver*, he excoriates the more extravagant antics of the scientists of his day as reported in the *Transactions of the Royal Society*. Most of the incredible schemes ridiculed in the Grand Academy of Lagado visited by Gulliver in his voyage to Laputa have been traced to real experiments carried out by members of the Royal Society, whose premises, at Gresham College, Swift himself had visited in 1710. One of the features of Swift’s deployment of irony to achieve his satire, which certain critics have remarked (e.g., Leavis, 1952), is that while his target suffers so also does the positive side he wishes to defend. In perhaps his most celebrated satire, *A Modest Proposal*, the English are depicted as cannibalising the Irish, but the Irish peasantry are not spared and come across as cannibals themselves and somehow complicitous in their own indigence. As Leavis (1952: 73-87) expresses it:

The continuous and unpredictable movement of the attack, which turns this way and that ... inexhaustibly surprising-making again an odd contrast with the sustained and level gravity of the tone. If Swift does for a moment appear to settle down to a formula it is only in order to betray; to induce a trust in the solid ground before opening the pitfall.

Another feature of such a balancing act is that to be effective the ironic praise he heaps on his quarry must be convincing. Swift was able to ‘get inside’ his adversary. In the passage about the machine to generate philosophy, poetry, politics, law, mathematics and theology, discussed in Section 3 above, Swift shows that he had thought through the construction of word frequency counts and the analysis of language according to the proportion of nouns, verbs and other parts of speech. It is only in recent years that linguists have been able to discuss the relative frequency of parts of speech with much degree of certainty and the recent literature of corpus linguistics (e.g., Biber, 1999) discusses the proportion of verbs to nouns in different registers, viz. conversation, news reportage, academic writing and fiction.

Even Swift’s closest friends (Pope, Steele and Arbuthnot, the latter himself a scientist) were surprised by the viciousness of his attack on the scientists of his day. Perhaps as in all his celebrated satires the author’s position lies somewhere in the middle (or nowhere?) and he merely covers his tracks by his scatter-gun use of irony, well described by Leavis above. In modern parlance, might Swift be described as the first linguistic terrorist?

Regardless of how this last question is answered, there is little doubt that Swift deliberately hid himself in many of his famous satires so that, for instance, we are still not sure if he thought all men or only the Irish were Yahoos, or whether he thought we should strive to become Houyhnhnmns (rational animals), or whether he saw both Yahoo and Houyhnhnm as undesirable and lamentable states of being. This technique, by a stretch of the imagination, could be compared to the philosophical dialogues beloved of his friend George Berkeley, or of Plato. The use to which Danny Cohen (1980), as discussed above, put the Lilliputian and Blefuscan satire from Book I of *Gulliver* shows the power which such thought experiments can generate. The difference between Swift’s satires and Berkeley’s and Plato’s dialogues is that they enable Swift to efface himself completely from the debate.

**Swift’s One Published and Signed Work on Language**

Contradiction is not far away in the work of Swift. When we come to examine the work which most openly presents Swift’s view of language, *Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue* (1712), we find him advocating the appointment of a society, along the lines of
the French Academy, charged with discovering “some method … for ascertaining and fixing our language for ever”. Swift thought highly of his proposal and it is one of the very few works that he signed. He laments the degeneration of the English language from the period when it “received most improvement”, i.e., the Elizabethan-Jacobean era:

The persons who are to undertake this work … Beside the grammar part wherein we are allowed to be very defective they will observe many gross improprieties, which, however authorized by practice, and grown familiar, ought to be discarded. They will find many words that deserve to be utterly thrown out of our language, many more to be corrected, and perhaps not a few long since antiquated which ought to be restored on account of their energy and sound. (Swift, 1712: 14-15)

Once again we see Swift dwelling on words as physical entities or at any rate, as events, but his naiveté about language change is surprising and might seem to undermine my attempt to have him promoted to the position of Dean of corpus linguistics. He is propounding a reductionist theory of language. He appears to think it possible to freeze language and prevent it changing or evolving. When we see Swift lamenting the degradation of the English language since the time when it had flourished most (Elizabethan times), and when he talks of the barbarisms and affectations, he is looking at the wordstock, the language as a whole. There is a sense in which he sees words and language in all their physicality and substantiality. He uses core words in an almost physical way.

Johnson’s rejoinder to Swift’s wild Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue is typically harsh and grudging to his forebear but would still find much sympathy today:

When we see men grow old and die at a certain time one after another, we laugh at the elixir that promises to prolong life to a thousand years; and with equal justice may the lexicographer be derided … [who] shall imagine that his dictionary can embalm his language, and secure it from corruption and decay.

Simplistic as Swift’s call for an English Academy might seem, this Proposal has other facets: it is Swift’s aesthetic/artistic manifesto. He was not just being a “Tory anarchist”, as Orwell (1968) suggests. He was, as Wordsworth would do later in the Prelude, limiting his lexicon and phrasicon to the core vocabulary of the language. Swift’s Dublin publisher, Faulkner, recounts, in the preface of the first edition of his Works (1735), how Swift asked him to read aloud, in the presence of two men-servants, his proofs “which, if they did not comprehend, he would alter and amend, until they understood it perfectly well”. We can understand from this that Swift had a firm grasp of the concept of core vocabulary as posited by Carter (1986) and was fully aware that non-possession of Graeco-Roman lexis might exclude those unfortunate enough not to have had a classical education (Corson, 1985) from understanding written texts. I surmise that he might have even viewed Ogden’s Basic English (1930) as a blueprint for the implementation of his Proposal. His intentions were aesthetic, political, and moral and, although he might have been placing difficult restrictions on himself, the resulting prose and poetry bears an unmistakable stamp. Indeed, Sykes Davies underlines the importance of core vocabulary in achieving irony:

Flatness of language, commonplaceness, can itself serve as a key of de-coding of ironic messages, especially when it is brought into vivid contrast with the opposing qualities of violence and outrageousness of expression.

Milic (1967) maintains that Swift the writer and Swift the rhetorician were two different persons. His recommendations about usage were never fully implemented in his own work.

**The Dean and Corpora**

Said (1999), as discussed above, mentioned Swift’s two models of conversation, correct as described in Hints towards an Essay on conversation (1710-1712) and debased as in A Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation according to the most polite mode and method now used at Court and in the best companies of England (henceforth, Polite Conversation (1738)). The first of these two works would
seem to pave the way for a great deal of twentieth-century work on speech act theory, ethno methodology and conversation analysis.

I consulted both works when I began to research prefabricated language (prefabs) in the teaching of English for Specific Purposes for my Ph.D, hoping to find intellectual precedents for my work. The layers of irony became more apparent to me as I saw that the latter work could be a primer for, or a wry comment on, the Lexical Approach to language teaching (Lewis, 1993).

Swift had already drawn attention, through the professor of Lagado Academy, to the importance of prefabs in building or reconstituting text. He takes up prefabs again in Polite Conversation, this playful work which was the result of a lifetime of cataloguing examples of linguistic abuse. As such, it can therefore be viewed as a continuation of the project outlined in Proposal to correct the English Tongue. He was collecting clichés in order to extirpate them. He describes how he built up a collection of fashionable sayings over 12 years of field work:

I determined to spend 5 mornings, to dine 4 times, pass three afternoons, and six evenings every week in the houses of the most polite families ... I always kept a large table-book in my pocket; and as soon as I left the company I immediately entered the choicest expressions.

He then spent a further 16 years “digesting it into a method”.

Having worked as a corpus linguist, I found Swift’s jovial account of how he accumulated his data startlingly like the way a corpus is built, discounting his hyperbole in the number of years he allocated to the research. He talks of the need for a further sixteen years’ investigation. Finally he sat on his work for a further six or seven years, observing: I have not been able to add above nine valuable sentences to enrich my collection; from whence I conclude that what remains will amount only to a trifle.

Nowadays, Swift’s collection of smart chat might contain in the blurb that it was based on the author’s own corpus which was more than 30 years in the making. There is little doubt that Swift’s observation that the more observations he made, the fewer new phrases he uncovered will strike a chord with modern lexicographers using computer corpora or indeed the World Wide Web as their corpus to uncover neologisms. The author of Polite Conversation, chortling behind one of his many heteronyms, Simon Wagstaff Esq., may have been imaginatively prefiguring work done more than 250 years after his death by applied linguists such as Nattinger and DeCarrico (1992), Lewis (1993), and Willis and Willis (1988, 1998), who recommend using chunks of language rather than words as the curricular basis of language teaching.

The Spider Gets Webbed

In the final section of my paper I would like to give a brief report on corpus linguistic findings applied to Swift’s own work. It is only appropriate that this eminent precursor should have been one of the first authors to be subjected to a major computer corpus study, and Milic (1967: 15), in one of the earliest book-length computerised analyses of a single writer’s style, claims to have been impressed by the Professor of Lagado (Gulliver Book III);[the] language frame (so reminiscent of a computer programmed to ‘generate’ English sentences) struck me as the perception of a man to whom the mysterious relation between symbol and thing was intuitively clear.

Milic (1990) created a special reference corpus or historical corpus called “The Century of Prose Corpus” or the Augustan Corpus. Part A consists of samples from the work of twenty major prose writers of the period. Part B incorporates samples of prose compositions written between 1680 and 1780. This represents the journalists, scholars, men of letters, popular fiction writers, educationalists and others who produced the typical works against which the noteworthy authors of the period can be compared. Swift’s use of sentence-initial connectives proved to be one of the most distinctive features of his prose. I include this table in order to give the reader a taste of the riches of Milic (1967) and hope I will not be accused of virtuoso sleight of hand or the spurious wiles of a projector.
In the Swift 2,000-word sample, 678 begin with a connective and 354 of these are with and, but or for (but is his favourite). Milic observes that Swift does not use and, but, or or in the customary way to impart the logical connection between sentences, but rather as a neutral connective, that is a word which shows a connection without specifying the nature of that connection. Milic points out that in English if a sentence does not begin with the subject (a noun or nominal) but begins with a connective, it is safe to assume that the next word will be a nominal or determiner. Not so in Swift. Almost a third of the times, Swift defers the subject to interject a further connective or transitional word (e.g., But although, And first, but then, but at present). According to Milic, two effects of this idiolectal use of connectives by Swift is to involve the reader more in the text and to create the illusion of greater clarity and simplicity (Milic, 1967: 136).

Sadly, space does not permit us to follow this analysis which takes us to the King James version of the Bible among other places. Milic discovers and attempts to explain many other interesting features of Swift's style (e.g., his lists), testing and often proving vacuous many of the claims made about Swift's style in the centuries since his death.

Self-Assessment
1. Choose the correct options:
   (i) ............... Swift led the Irish people in their resistance against the English, who continued to oppress them.
      (a) 1724          (b) 1725
      (c) 1730          (d) 1710
   (ii) ............... Gulliver's Travels in 1725, and it was published in 1726 by
      (a) Swift          (b) Bacon
      (c) Addisson       (d) Steele
   (iii) ............... observes how Swiftian irony works by “materializing the abstract or by literalizing the figurative” often through the use of pun.
      (a) Bacon          (b) Steele
      (c) Addisson       (d) Hammond
   (iv) ............... Swift was offered the deanship of St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin.
      (a) 1715          (b) 1714
      (c) 1713          (d) 1720

26.2 Summary
• In this Unit, I have looked at some of the ideas of Jonathan Swift and their possible implications for the historical background of corpus linguistics. Although Swift is always playful and elusive, I think he shows a genuine fascination with the physical and quantificational side of language. In my own work on phraseology, I continue to learn from his works, especially his Hints towards an Essay on conversation (1710-1712) and Polite Conversation (1738) - but above all from Gulliver, that compendious treatise on human nature. I suggest he be posthumously consecrated as the Bishop of Balnibarbi and Grammarian-in-chief of Glubbdubrib. Or have I been taken in by one of the greatest hoaxers of all time?

26.3 Key-Words
1. Genuine fascination : The act of taking on or displaying an attitude or mode of behavior not natural to oneself or not genuinely felt.
2. Virtuoso : an experimenter or investigator especially in the arts and sciences, one skilled in or having a taste for the fine arts.
26.4 Review Questions

1. Discuss the satire Swift used in his works.
2. Critically examine ‘Hints towards an Essay on Conversation’.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (a) (ii) (a) (iii) (d) (iv) (c)

26.5 Further Readings

7. Cruden A. (1796) Complete Concordance to the Old and New Testaments
Unit 27: Swift: Thoughts on Various Subjects: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to

- Discuss Swift’s Major Works
- Explain Swift's views on Thoughts on various Subjects

Introduction

Jonathan Swift was an Anglo-Irish satirist, essayist, political pamphleteer (first for the Whigs, then for the Tories), poet and cleric who became Dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Dublin. He is remembered for works such as Gulliver’s Travels, A Modest Proposal, A Journal to Stella, Draper’s Letters, The Battle of the Books, An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, and A Tale of a Tub. Swift is probably the foremost prose satirist in the English language, and is less well known for his poetry. Swift originally published all of his works under pseudonyms—such as Lemuel Gulliver, Isaac Bickerstaff, M.B. Drapier—or anonymously. He is also known for being a master of two styles of satire: the Horatian and Juvenalian styles.

Biography

Jonathan Swift was born in Dublin, Ireland. He was the second child and only son of Jonathan Swift (1640-1667) and his wife Abigail Erick (or Herrick), of Frisby-on-the-Wreake. His father, a native of Goodrich, Herefordshire, accompanied his brothers to Ireland to seek their fortunes in law after their Royalist father’s estate was brought to ruin during the English Civil War. Swift’s father died at Dublin before he was born, and his mother returned to England. He was left in the care of his influential uncle, Godwin, a close friend and confidante of Sir John Temple, whose son later employed Swift as his secretary.

Swift’s family had several interesting literary connections: His grandmother, Elizabeth (Dryden) Swift, was the niece of Sir Erasmus Dryden, grandfather of the poet John Dryden. The same grandmother’s aunt, Katherine (Throckmorton) Dryden, was a first cousin of the wife of Sir Walter Raleigh. His great-great grandmother, Margaret (Godwin) Swift, was the sister of Francis Godwin, author of The Man in the Moone which influenced parts of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. His uncle, Thomas Swift, married a daughter of the poet and playwright Sir William Davenant, a godson of William Shakespeare.
His uncle Godwin Swift (1628-1695) a benefactor, he took primary responsibility for the young Jonathan, sending him with one of his cousins to Kilkenny College (also attended by the philosopher George Berkeley). In 1682 he attended Dublin University (Trinity College, Dublin), financed by Godwin’s son, Willoughby, from where he received his B.A. in 1686, and developed his friendship with William Congreve. Swift was studying for his Master’s degree when political troubles in Ireland surrounding the Glorious Revolution forced him to leave for England in 1688, where his mother helped him get a position as secretary and personal assistant of Sir William Temple at Moor Park, Farnham. Temple was an English diplomat who, having arranged the Triple Alliance of 1668, retired from public service to his country estate to tend his gardens and write his memoirs. Gaining the confidence of his employer, Swift “was often trusted with matters of great importance.” Within three years of their acquaintance, Temple had introduced his secretary to William III, and sent him to London to urge the King to consent to a bill for triennial Parliaments. When Swift took up his residence at Moor Park, he met Esther Johnson, then eight years old, the fatherless daughter of one of the household servants. Swift acted as her tutor and mentor, giving her the nickname “Stella”, and the two maintained a close but ambiguous relationship for the rest of Esther’s life.

Swift left Temple in 1690 for Ireland because of his health, but returned to Moor Park the following year. The illness, fits of vertigo or giddiness—now known to be Ménière’s disease—would continue to plague Swift throughout his life. During this second stay with Temple, Swift received his M.A. from Hart Hall, Oxford in 1692. Then, apparently despairing of gaining a better position through Temple’s patronage, Swift left Moor Park to become an ordained priest in the Established Church of Ireland and in 1694 he was appointed to the prebend of Kilroot in the Diocese of Connor, with his parish located at Kilroot, near Carrickfergus in County Antrim.

Swift appears to have been miserable in his new position, being isolated in a small, remote community far from the centres of power and influence. While at Kilroot, however, Swift may well have become romantically involved with Jane Waring. A letter from him survives, offering to remain if she would marry him and promising to leave and never return to Ireland if she refused. She presumably refused, because Swift left his post and returned to England and Temple’s service at Moor Park in 1696, and he remained there until Temple’s death. There he was employed in helping to prepare Temple’s memoirs and correspondence for publication. During this time Swift wrote The Battle of the Books, a satire responding to critics of Temple’s Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1690). Battle was however not published until 1704.

On 27 January 1699 Temple died. Swift stayed on briefly in England to complete the editing of Temple’s memoirs, and perhaps in the hope that recognition of his work might earn him a suitable position in England. However, Swift’s work made enemies of some of Temple’s family and friends who objected to indiscretions included in the memoirs. His next move was to approach King William directly, based on his imagined connection through Temple and a belief that he had been promised a position. This failed so miserably that he accepted the lesser post of secretary and chaplain to the Earl of Berkeley, one of the Lords Justices of Ireland. However, when he reached Ireland he found that the secretoryship had already been given to another. But he soon obtained the living of Laracor, Agher, and Rathbeggan, and the prebend of Dunlavin in St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Dublin.

At Laracor, a mile or two from Trim, County Meath, and twenty miles (32 km) from Dublin, Swift ministered to a congregation of about fifteen people, and had abundant leisure for cultivating his garden, making a canal (after the Dutch fashion of Moor Park), planting willows, and rebuilding the vicarage. As chaplain to Lord Berkeley, he spent much of his time in Dublin and traveled to London frequently over the next ten years. In 1701, Swift published, anonymously, a political pamphlet, A Discourse on the Contests and Dissentions in Athens and Rome.
Writer
In February 1702, Swift received his Doctor of Divinity degree from Trinity College, Dublin. That spring he traveled to England and returned to Ireland in October, accompanied by Esther Johnson—now twenty years old—and his friend Rebecca Dingley, another member of William Temple’s household. There is a great mystery and controversy over Swift’s relationship with Esther Johnson nicknamed “Stella”. Many hold that they were secretly married in 1716.

During his visits to England in these years Swift published A Tale of a Tub and The Battle of the Books (1704) and began to gain a reputation as a writer. This led to close, lifelong friendships with Pope, John Gay, and John Arbuthnot, forming the core of the Martinus Scriblerus Club (founded in 1713).

Swift became increasingly active politically in these years. From 1707 to 1709 and again in 1710, Swift was in London, unsuccessfully urging upon the Whig administration of Lord Godolphin the claims of the Irish clergy to the First-Fruits and Twentieths (“Queen Anne’s Bounty”), which brought in about £2,500 a year, already granted to their brethren in England. He found the opposition Tory leadership more sympathetic to his cause and Swift was recruited to support their cause as editor of the Examiner when they came to power in 1710. In 1711, Swift published the political pamphlet “The Conduct of the Allies,” attacking the Whig government for its inability to end the prolonged war with France. The incoming Tory government conducted secret (and illegal) negotiations with France, resulting in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) ending the War of the Spanish Succession.

Swift was part of the inner circle of the Tory government, and often acted as mediator between Henry St. John (Viscount Bolingbroke) the secretary of state for foreign affairs (1710–15) and Robert Harley (Earl of Oxford) lord treasurer and prime minister (1711–1714). Swift recorded his experiences and thoughts during this difficult time in a long series of letters to Esther Johnson, later collected and published as The Journal to Stella. The animosity between the two Tory leaders eventually led to the dismissal of Harley in 1714. With the death of Queen Anne and accession of George I that year, the Whigs returned to power and the Tory leaders were tried for treason for conducting secret negotiations with France.

Also during these years in London, Swift became acquainted with the Vanhomrigh family and became involved with one of the daughters, Esther, yet another fatherless young woman and another ambiguous relationship to confuse Swift’s biographers. Swift furnished Esther with the nickname “Vanessa” and she features as one of the main characters in his poem Cadenus and Vanessa. The poem and their correspondence suggests that Esther was infatuated with Swift, and that he may have reciprocated her affections, only to regret this and then try to break off the relationship. Esther followed Swift to Ireland in 1714, where there appears to have been a confrontation, possibly involving Esther Johnson. Esther Vanhomrigh died in 1723 at the age of 35. Another lady with whom he had a close but less intense relationship was Anne Long, a toast of the Kit-Cat Club.

Maturity
Before the fall of the Tory government, Swift hoped that his services would be rewarded with a church appointment in England. However, Queen Anne appeared to have taken a dislike to Swift and thwarted these efforts. The best position his friends could secure for him was the Deanery of St. Patrick’s, Dublin. With the return of the Whigs, Swift’s best move was to leave England and he returned to Ireland in disappointment, a virtual exile, to live “like a rat in a hole”.

Once in Ireland, however, Swift began to turn his pamphleteering skills in support of Irish causes, producing some of his most memorable works: Proposal for Universal Use of Irish Manufacture (1720), Drapier’s Letters (1724), and A Modest Proposal (1729), earning him the status of an Irish patriot. Also during these years, he began writing his masterpiece, Travels into Several Remote
Nations of the World, in Four Parts, by Lemuel Gulliver, first a surgeon, and then a captain of several ships, better known as Gulliver’s Travels. Much of the material reflects his political experiences of the preceding decade. For instance, the episode in which the giant Gulliver puts out the Lilliputian palace fire by urinating on it can be seen as a metaphor for the Tories’ illegal peace treaty; having done a good thing in an unfortunate manner. In 1726 he paid a long-deferred visit to London, taking with him the manuscript of Gulliver’s Travels. During his visit he stayed with his old friends Alexander Pope, John Arbuthnot and John Gay, who helped him arrange for the anonymous publication of his book. First published in November 1726, it was an immediate hit, with a total of three printings that year and another in early 1727. French, German, and Dutch translations appeared in 1727, and pirated copies were printed in Ireland.

Swift returned to England one more time in 1727 and stayed with Alexander Pope once again. The visit was cut short when Swift received word that Esther Johnson was dying and rushed back home to be with her. On 28 January 1728, Esther Johnson died; Swift had prayed at her bedside, even composing prayers for her comfort. Swift could not bear to be present at the end, but on the night of her death he began to write his The Death of Mrs. Johnson. He was too ill to attend the funeral at St. Patrick’s. Many years later, a lock of hair, assumed to be Esther Johnson’s, was found in his desk, wrapped in a paper bearing the words, “Only a woman’s hair.”

Death became a frequent feature in Swift’s life from this point. In 1731 he wrote Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift, his own obituary published in 1739. In 1732, his good friend and collaborator John Gay died. In 1735, John Arbuthnot, another friend from his days in London, died. In 1738 Swift began to show signs of illness, and in 1742 he appears to have suffered a stroke, losing the ability to speak and realizing his worst fears of becoming mentally disabled. (“I shall be like that tree,” he once said, “I shall die at the top.”) To protect him from unscrupulous hangers on, who had begun to prey on the great man, his closest companions had him declared of “unsound mind and memory.” However, it was long believed by many that Swift was really insane at this point.

In his book Literature and Western Man, author J.B. Priestley even cites the final chapters of Gulliver’s Travels as proof of Swift’s approaching “insanity”.

In part VIII of his series, The Story of Civilization, Will Durant describes the final years of Swift’s life as such: “Definite symptoms of madness appeared in 1738. In 1741 guardians were appointed to take care of his affairs and watch lest in his outbursts of violence he should do himself harm. In 1742 he suffered great pain from the inflammation of his left eye, which swelled to the size of an egg; five attendants had to restrain him from tearing out his eye. He went a whole year without uttering a word.”

In 1744, Alexander Pope died. On October 19 1745, Swift also died. After being laid out in public view for the people of Dublin to pay their last respects, he was buried in his own cathedral by Esther Johnson’s side, in accordance with his wishes. The bulk of his fortune (twelve thousand pounds) was left to found a hospital for the mentally ill, originally known as St. Patrick’s Hospital for Imbeciles, which opened in 1757, and which still exists as a psychiatric hospital.

**Major Prose Works**

Swift’s first major prose work, A Tale of a Tub, demonstrates many of the themes and stylistic techniques he would employ in his later work. It is at once wildly playful and funny while being pointed and harshly critical of its targets. In its main thread, the Tale recounts the exploits of three sons, representing the main threads of Christianity, who receive a bequest from their father of a coat each, with the added instructions to make no alterations whatsoever. However, the sons soon find that their coats have fallen out of current fashion, and begin to look for loopholes in their father’s will that will let them make the needed alterations. As each finds his own means of getting around their father’s admonition, they struggle with each other for power and dominance. Inserted into this story, in alternating chapters, the narrator includes a series of whimsical “digressions” on various subjects.
In 1690, Sir William Temple, Swift’s patron, published An Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning, a defense of classical writing (see Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns) holding up the Epistles of Phalaris as an example. William Wotton responded to Temple with Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694) showing that the Epistles were a later forgery. A response by the supporters of the Ancients was then made by Charles Boyle (later the 4th Earl of Orrery and father of Swift’s first biographer). A further retort on the Modern side came from Richard Bentley, one of the pre-eminent scholars of the day, in his essay Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris (1699). However, the final words on the topic belong to Swift in his Battle of the Books (1697, published 1704) in which he makes a humorous defense on behalf of Temple and the cause of the Ancients.

In 1708, a cobbler named John Partridge published a popular almanac of astrological predictions. Because Partridge falsely determined the deaths of several church officials, Swift attacked Partridge in Predictions For The Ensuing Year by Isaac Bickerstaff, a parody predicting that Partridge would die on March 29. Swift followed up with a pamphlet issued on March 30 claiming that Partridge had in fact died, which was widely believed despite Partridge’s statements to the contrary. According to other sources, Richard Steele uses the personae of Isaac Bickerstaff and was the one who wrote about the “death” of John Partridge and published it in The Spectator, not Jonathan Swift.

Drapier’s Letters (1724) was a series of pamphlets against the monopoly granted by the English government to William Wood to provide the Irish with copper coinage. It was widely believed that Wood would need to flood Ireland with debased coinage in order to make a profit. In these “letters” Swift posed as a shop-keeper—a draper—in order to criticize the plan. Swift’s writing was so effective in undermining opinion in the project that a reward was offered by the government to anyone disclosing the true identity of the author. Though hardly a secret (on returning to Dublin after one of his trips to England, Swift was greeted with a banner, “Welcome Home, Drapier”) no one turned Swift in. The government eventually resorted to hiring none other than Sir Isaac Newton to certify the soundness of Wood’s coinage to counter Swift’s accusations. In “Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift” (1739) Swift recalled this as one of his best achievements.

Gulliver’s Travels, a large portion of which Swift wrote at Woodbrook House in County Laois, was published in 1726. It is regarded as his masterpiece. As with his other writings, the Travels was published under a pseudonym, the fictional Lemuel Gulliver, a ship’s surgeon and later a sea captain. Some of the correspondence between printer Benj. Motte and Gulliver’s also-fictional cousin negotiating the book’s publication has survived. Though it has often been mistakenly thought of and published in bowdlerized form as a children’s book, it is a great and sophisticated satire of human nature based on Swift’s experience of his times. Gulliver’s Travels is an anatomy of human nature, a sardonic looking-glass, often criticized for its apparent misanthropy. It asks its readers to refute it, to deny that it has adequately characterized human nature and society. Each of the four books—recounting four voyages to mostly-fictional exotic lands—has a different theme, but all are attempts to deflate human pride. Critics hail the work as a satiric reflection on the shortcomings of Enlightenment thought.

In 1729, Swift published A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland Being a Burden on Their Parents or Country, and for Making Them Beneficial to the Publick, a satire in which the narrator, with intentionally grotesque arguments, recommends that Ireland’s poor escape their poverty by selling their children as food to the rich: “I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious nourishing and wholesome food...” Following the satirical form, he introduces the reforms he is actually suggesting by deriding them:

Therefore let no man talk to me of other expedients...taxing our absentees...using [nothing] except what is of our own growth and manufacture...rejecting...foreign luxury...introducing a vein of
parsimony, prudence and temperance...learning to love our country...quitting our animosities and factions...teaching landlords to have at least one degree of mercy towards their tenants...Therefore I repeat, let no man talk to me of these and the like expedients, 'till he hath at least some glimpse of hope, that there will ever be some hearty and sincere attempt to put them into practice.

Legacy

John Ruskin named him as one of the three people in history who were the most influential for him. Swift crater, a crater on Mars’s moon Deimos, is named after Jonathan Swift, who predicted the existence of the moons of Mars.

27.1 Textual Introduction

Having first appeared in *Miscellanies in Prose and Verse* of 1711, here numbered [1] to [46], *Various Thoughts* was reprinted, with the addition of [47] to [97] and the variant title *Thoughts on Various Subjects*, in *Miscellanies in Prose and Verse: The First Volume* in 1727. Swift had offered to send this incremental installment to Pope in December 1726: “I have some few of those things I call thoughts moral and diverting; if you please I will send the best I can pick from them, to add to the new volume.”1 Pope’s response must have been encouraging, and the augmented *Various Thoughts* duly appeared in the first volume of the Pope-Swift *Miscellanies* published on 24 June in the following year.2 Both installments were reprinted in Faulkner’s *Works* of 1735. Finally, *Further Thoughts on Various Subjects* were added in 1745. For the Historical Introduction, readers are referred to *Various Thoughts, Moral and Diverting*.

27.2 Thoughts on Various Subjects

We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another. Reflect on things past as wars, negotiations, factions, etc. We enter so little into those interests, that we wonder how men could possibly be so busy and concerned for things so transitory; look on the present times, we find the same humour, yet wonder not at all.

A wise man endeavours, by considering all circumstances, to make conjectures and form conclusions; but the smallest accident intervening (and in the course of affairs it is impossible to foresee all) does often produce such turns and changes, that at last he is just as much in doubt of events as the most ignorant and inexperienced person.

Positiveness is a good quality for preachers and orators, because he that would obtrude his thoughts and reasons upon a multitude, will convince others the more, as he appears convinced himself. How is it possible to expect that mankind will take advice, when they will not so much as take warning?

I forget whether Advice be among the lost things which Aristo says are to be found in the moon; that and Time ought to have been there. No preacher is listened to but Time, which gives us the same train and turn of thought that older people have tried in vain to put into our heads before.

When we desire or solicit anything, our minds run wholly on the good side or circumstances of it; when it is obtained, our minds run wholly on the bad ones. In a glass-house the workmen often fling in a small quantity of fresh coals, which seems to disturb the fire, but very much enlivens it. This seems to allude to a gentle stirring of the passions, that the mind may not languish.

Religion seems to have grown an infant with age, and requires miracles to nurse it, as it had in its infancy. All fits of pleasure are balanced by an equal degree of pain or languor; it is like spending this year part of the next year’s revenue.

The latter part of a wise man’s life is taken up in curing the follies, prejudices, and false opinions he had contracted in the former.
Would a writer know how to behave himself with relation to posterity, let him consider in old books what he finds that he is glad to know, and what omissions he most laments.

Whatever the poets pretend, it is plain they give immortality to none but themselves; it is Homer and Virgil we reverence and admire, not Achilles or Æneas. With historians it is quite the contrary; our thoughts are taken up with the actions, persons, and events we read, and we little regard the authors. When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign; that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.

Men who possess all the advantages of life, are in a state where there are many accidents to disorder and discompose, but few to please them. It is unwise to punish cowards with ignominy, for if they had regarded that they would not have been cowards; death is their proper punishment, because they fear it most.

The greatest inventions were produced in the times of ignorance, as the use of the compass, gunpowder, and printing, and by the dullest nation, as the Germans. One argument to prove that the common relations of ghosts and spectres are generally false, may be drawn from the opinion held that spirits are never seen by more than one person at a time; that is to say, it seldom happens to above one person in a company to be possessed with any high degree of spleen or melancholy.

I am apt to think that, in the day of Judgment, there will be small allowance given to the wise for their want of morals, nor to the ignorant for their want of faith, because both are without excuse. This renders the advantages equal of ignorance and knowledge. But, some scruples in the wise, and some vices in the ignorant, will perhaps be forgiven upon the strength of temptation to each. The value of several circumstances in story lessens very much by distance of time, though some minute circumstances are very valuable; and it requires great judgment in a writer to distinguish.

It is grown a word of course for writers to say, “This critical age,” as divines say, “This sinful age.” It is pleasant to observe how free the present age is in laying taxes on the next. Future Ages Shall Talk of This; This Shall Be Famous To All Posterity. Whereas their time and thoughts will be taken up about present things, as ours are now.

The chameleon, who is said to feed upon nothing but air, hath, of all animals, the nimblest tongue. When a man is made a spiritual peer he loses his surname; when a temporal, his Christian name. It is in disputes as in armies, where the weaker side sets up false lights, and makes a great noise, to make the enemy believe them more numerous and strong than they really are.

Some men, under the notions of weeding out prejudices, eradicate virtue, honesty, and religion. In all well-instituted commonwealths, care has been taken to limit men’s possessions; which is done for many reasons, and among the rest, for one which perhaps is not often considered: that when bounds are set to men’s desires, after they have acquired as much as the laws will permit them, their private interest is at an end, and they have nothing to do but to take care of the public.

There are but three ways for a man to revenge himself of the censure of the world: to despise it, to return the like, or to endeavour to live so as to avoid it. The first of these is usually pretended, the last is almost impossible; the universal practice is for the second.

I never heard a finer piece of satire against lawyers than that of astrologers, when they pretend by rules of art to tell when a suit will end, and whether to the advantage of the plaintiff or defendant; thus making the matter depend entirely upon the influence of the stars, without the least regard to the merits of the cause.

The expression in Apocrypha about Tobit and his dog following him I have often heard ridiculed, yet Homer has the same words of Telemachus more than once; and Virgil says something like it of Evander. And I take the book of Tobit to be partly poetical.

I have known some men possessed of good qualities, which were very serviceable to others, but useless to themselves; like a sun-dial on the front of a house, to inform the neighbours and passengers, but not the owner within.
If a man would register all his opinions upon love, politics, religion, learning, etc., beginning from his youth and so go on to old age, what a bundle of inconsistencies and contradictions would appear at last! What they do in heaven we are ignorant of; what they do not we are told expressly: that they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.

It is a miserable thing to live in suspense; it is the life of a spider. The Stoical scheme of supplying our wants by lopping off our desires, is like cutting off our feet when we want shoes.

Physicians ought not to give their judgment of religion, for the same reason that butchers are not admitted to be jurors upon life and death. The reason why so few marriages are happy, is, because young ladies spend their time in making nets, not in making cages.

If a man will observe as he walks the streets, I believe he will find the merriest countenances in mourning coaches. Nothing more unqualifies a man to act with prudence than a misfortune that is attended with shame and guilt.

The power of fortune is confessed only by the miserable; for the happy impute all their success to prudence or merit. Ambition often puts men upon doing the meanest offices; so climbing is performed in the same posture with creeping. Censure is the tax a man pays to the public for being eminent.

Although men are accused for not knowing their own weakness, yet perhaps as few know their own strength. It is, in men as in soils, where sometimes there is a vein of gold which the owner knows not of.

Satire is reckoned the easiest of all wit, but I take it to be otherwise in very bad times: for it is as hard to satirise well a man of distinguished vices, as to praise well a man of distinguished virtues. It is easy enough to do either to people of moderate characters.

Invention is the talent of youth, and judgment of age; so that our judgment grows harder to please, when we have fewer things to offer it: this goes through the whole commerce of life. When we are old, our friends find it difficult to please us, and are less concerned whether we be pleased or no. No wise man ever wished to be younger.

An idle reason lessens the weight of the good ones you gave before. The motives of the best actions will not bear too strict an inquiry. It is allowed that the cause of most actions, good or bad, may he resolved into the love of ourselves; but the self-love of some men inclines them to please others, and the self-love of others is wholly employed in pleasing themselves. This makes the great distinction between virtue and vice. Religion is the best motive of all actions, yet religion is allowed to be the highest instance of self-love.

Old men view best at a distance with the eyes of their understanding as well as with those of nature. Some people take more care to hide their wisdom than their folly.

Anthony Henley’s farmer, dying of an asthma, said, “Well, if I can get this breath once OUT, I’ll take care it never got in again.” The humour of exploding many things under the name of trifles, fopperies, and only imaginary goods, is a very false proof either of wisdom or magnanimity, and a great check to virtuous actions. For instance, with regard to fame, there is in most people a reluctance and unwillingness to be forgotten. We observe, even among the vulgar, how fond they are to have an inscription over their grave. It requires but little philosophy to discover and observe that there is no intrinsic value in all this; however, if it be founded in our nature as an incitement to virtue, it ought not to be ridiculed.

Complaint is the largest tribute heaven receives, and the sincerest part of our devotion. The common fluency of speech in many men, and most women, is owing to a scarcity of matter, and a scarcity of words; for whoever is a master of language, and hath a mind full of ideas, will be apt, in speaking, to hesitate upon the choice of both; whereas common speakers have only one set of ideas, and one set of words to clothe them in, and these are always ready at the mouth. So people come faster out of a church when it is almost empty, than when a crowd is at the door.
Few are qualified to shine in company; but it is in most men’s power to be agreeable. The reason, therefore, why conversation runs so low at present, is not the defect of understanding, but pride, vanity, ill-nature, affectation, singularity, positiveness, or some other vice, the effect of a wrong education.

To be vain is rather a mark of humility than pride. Vain men delight in telling what honours have been done them, what great company they have kept, and the like, by which they plainly confess that these honours were more than their due, and such as their friends would not believe if they had not been told: whereas a man truly proud thinks the greatest honours below his merit, and consequently scorns to boast. I therefore deliver it as a maxim, that whoever desires the character of a proud man, ought to conceal his vanity.

Law, in a free country, is, or ought to be, the determination of the majority of those who have property in land. One argument used to the disadvantage of Providence I take to be a very strong one in its defence. It is objected that storms and tempests, unfruitful seasons, serpents, spiders, flies, and other noxious or troublesome animals, with many more instances of the like kind, discover an imperfection in nature, because human life would be much easier without them; but the design of Providence may clearly be perceived in this proceeding. The motions of the sun and moon — in short, the whole system of the universe, as far as philosophers have been able to discover and observe, are in the utmost degree of regularity and perfection; but wherever God hath left to man the power of interposing a remedy by thought or labour, there he hath placed things in a state of imperfection, on purpose to stir up human industry, without which life would stagnate, or, indeed, rather, could not subsist at all: *Curis Accuunt Mortalia Corda* [“Inciting the human heart by anxiety”-Virgil].

Praise is the daughter of present power. How inconsistent is man with himself! I have known several persons of great fame for wisdom in public affairs and counsels governed by foolish servants. I have known great Ministers, distinguished for wit and learning, who preferred none but dunces. I have known men of great valour cowards to their wives. I have known men of the greatest cunning perpetually cheated.

I knew three great Ministers, who could exactly compute and settle the accounts of a kingdom, but were wholly ignorant of their own economy. The preaching of divines helps to preserve well-inclined men in the course of virtue, but seldom or never reclaims the vicious.

Princes usually make wiser choices than the servants whom they trust for the disposal of places: I have known a prince, more than once, choose an able Minister, but I never observed that Minister to use his credit in the disposal of an employment to a person whom he thought the fittest for it. One of the greatest in this age owned and excused the matter from the violence of parties and the unreasonableness of friends.

Small causes are sufficient to make a man uneasy when great ones are not in the way. For want of a block he will stumble at a straw. Dignity, high station, or great riches, are in some sort necessary to old men, in order to keep the younger at a distance, who are otherwise too apt to insult them upon the score of their age. Every man desires to live long: but no man would be old.

Love of flattery in most men proceeds from the mean opinion they have of themselves; in women from the contrary. If books and laws continue to increase as they have done for fifty years past, I am in some concern for future ages how any man will be learned, or any man a lawyer. Kings are commonly said to have LONG HANDS; I wish they had as LONG EARS.

Princes in their infancy, childhood, and youth are said to discover prodigious parts and wit, to speak things that surprise and astonish. Strange, so many hopeful princes, and so many shameful kings! If they happen to die young, they would have been prodigies of wisdom and virtue. If they live, they are often prodigies indeed, but of another sort.
Politics, as the word is commonly understood, are nothing but corruptions, and consequently of
no use to a good king or a good ministry; for which reason Courts are so overrun with politics. A
nice man is a man of nasty ideas.

Apollo was held the god of physic and sender of diseases. Both wore originally the same trade,
and still continue. Old men and comets have been reverenced for the same reason: their long
beards, and pretences to foretell events.

A person was asked at court, what he thought of an ambassador and his train, who were all
embroidery and lace, full of bows, cringes, and gestures; he said, it was Solomon’s importation,
gold and apes. Most sorts of diversion in men, children, and other animals, is an imitation of
fighting.

Augustus meeting an ass with a lucky name foretold himself good fortune. I meet many asses, but
none of them have lucky names. If a man makes me keep my distance, the comfort is he keeps his
at the same time.

Who can deny that all men are violent lovers of truth when we see them so positive in their errors,
which they will maintain out of their zeal to truth, although they contradict themselves every day
of their lives? That was excellently observed, say I, when I read a passage in an author, where his
opinion agrees with mine. When we differ, there I pronounce him to be mistaken.

Very few men, properly speaking, live at present, but are providing to live another time. Laws
penned with the utmost care and exactness, and in the vulgar language, are often perverted to
wrong meanings; then why should we wonder that the Bible is so? Although men are accused for
not knowing their weakness, yet perhaps as few know their own strength.

A man seeing a wasp creeping into a vial filled with honey, that was hung on a fruit tree, said
thus: “Why, thou scottish animal, art thou mad to go into that vial, where you see many hundred
of your kind there dying in it before you?” “The reproach is just,” answered the wasp, “but not
from you men, who are so far from taking example by other people’s follies, that you will not take
warning by your own. If after falling several times into this vial, and escaping by chance, I should
fall in again, I should then but resemble you.”

An old miser kept a tame jackdaw, that used to steal pieces of money, and hide them in a hole,
which the cat observing, asked why he would hoard up those round shining things that he could
make no use of? “Why,” said the jackdaw, “my master has a whole chest full, and makes no more
use of them than I.”

Men are content to be laughed at for their wit, but not for their folly. If the men of wit and genius
would resolve never to complain in their works of critics and detractors, the next age would not
know that they ever had any.

After all the maxims and systems of trade and commerce, a stander- by would think the affairs of
the world were most ridiculously contrived. There are few countries which, if well cultivated,
would not support double the number of their inhabitants, and yet fewer where one-third of the
people are not extremely stinted even in the necessaries of life. I send out twenty barrels of corn,
which would maintain a family in bread for a year, and I bring back in return a vessel of wine,
which half a dozen good follows would drink in less than a month, at the expense of their health
and reason. A man would have but few spectators, if he offered to show for three pence how he
could thrust a red-hot iron into a barrel of gunpowder, and it should not take fire.

Self-Assessment

1. Fill in the blanks:
   (i) Miscellanies in Prose and Verse published in ............... .
   (ii) Swift had offered to send this incremental installment to Pope in December ............... .
(iii) In ..............., a cobbler named John Partridge published a popular almanac of astrological predictions.


27.3 Summary

• Jonathan Swift was an Anglo-Irish satirist, essayist, political pamphleteer (first for the Whigs, then for the Tories), poet and cleric who became Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin. He is remembered for works such as Gulliver’s Travels, A Modest Proposal, A Journal to Stella, Drapier’s Letters, The Battle of the Books, An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, and A Tale of a Tub. Swift is probably the foremost prose satirist in the English language, and is less well known for his poetry.

• Swift's family had several interesting literary connections: His grandmother, Elizabeth (Dryden) Swift, was the niece of Sir Erasmus Dryden, grandfather of the poet John Dryden. The same grandmother's aunt, Katherine (Throckmorton) Dryden, was a first cousin of the wife of Sir Walter Raleigh. His great-great grandmother, Margaret (Godwin) Swift, was the sister of Francis Godwin, author of The Man in the Moone which influenced parts of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. His uncle, Thomas Swift, married a daughter of the poet and playwright Sir William Davenant, a godson of William Shakespeare.

• Swift left Temple in 1690 for Ireland because of his health, but returned to Moor Park the following year. The illness, fits of vertigo or giddiness—now known to be Ménière’s disease—would continue to plague Swift throughout his life. During this second stay with Temple, Swift received his M.A. from Hart Hall, Oxford in 1692. Then, apparently despairing of gaining a better position through Temple's patronage, Swift left Moor Park to become an ordained priest in the Established Church of Ireland and in 1694 he was appointed to the prebend of Kilroot in the Diocese of Connor, with his parish located at Kilroot, near Carrickfergus in County Antrim.

• Swift appears to have been miserable in his new position, being isolated in a small, remote community far from the centres of power and influence. While at Kilroot, however, Swift may well have become romantically involved with Jane Waring.

• Swift became increasingly active politically in these years. From 1707 to 1709 and again in 1710, Swift was in London, unsuccessfully urging upon the Whig administration of Lord Godolphin the claims of the Irish clergy to the First-Fruits and Twentieths (“Queen Anne’s Bounty”), which brought in about £2,500 a year, already granted to their brethren in England.

• Swift’s first major prose work, A Tale of a Tub, demonstrates many of the themes and stylistic techniques he would employ in his later work. It is at once wildly playful and funny while being pointed and harshly critical of its targets. In its main thread, the Tale recounts the exploits of three sons, representing the main threads of Christianity, who receive a bequest from their father of a coat each, with the added instructions to make no alterations whatsoever.

27.4. Key-Words

1. Affectation : writing that is artificial and designed to impress.

2. Singularity : a measure or probability distribution whose support has zero Lebesgue (or other) measure

3. Positiveness : Characterized by or displaying certainty, acceptance, or affirmation: a positive answer; positive criticism.
27.5 Review Questions

1. Explain Swift as a satirist.
2. Give an introduction to Swift’s Thoughts on Various Subjects.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) 1711 (ii) 1726 (iii) 1708 (iv) 1690

27.6 Further Readings

8. Cruden A. (1796) *Complete Concordance to the Old and New Testaments*
Unit 28: Swift: Thoughts on Various Subjects: Critical Appreciation cum Analysis

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to
• Analyse Swift’s Major Works
• Make a critical appreciation on Thoughts on various Subjects

Introduction
Jonathan Swift engages scholars and students alike with the outstanding range of his writing. Whether one reads his political pamphlets, journalistic pieces, allusive satires on religious and political topics, intimate and direct letters, or entertaining and pungently ironic poetry, his intelligence, wit, and creativity shine clearly through. The memorable prose pieces of Gulliver’s Travels, “A Tale of a Tub,” “Battle of the Books,” and “A Modest Proposal” remain at the forefront of any discussion concerning satire, irony, the mock-epic, the errors of human nature, the value of classical traditions, and literary portraits of starvation and poverty. While his works provide important insights on the events, persons, and society of his own day, they also offer artful commentaries on enduring issues. During the 19th century, many readers believed Swift crossed over into uncontrolled anger for the sake of being outrageous, embraced a rebelliousness that was dangerous to the common good, and exhibited “an incipient disorder of the mind” (as Sir Walter Scott described it) in writing his so-called scatological poems. But in our time, readers and critics alike have come to realize and accept that Swift’s powerful imagination places him in the ranks of Rabelais, Sterne, Joyce, and even Borges. His allusiveness and inventiveness remain the hallmarks of his work and must be interpreted in the fullest range possible.

Critical Companion to Jonathan Swift is a guide to Swift’s works and to the images, events, and people surrounding them, as well as to the critics and biographers who have commented on his writing.

28.1 Critical Appreciation

Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting is the title of a satirical essay by Jonathan Swift. It also has appeared under the title Thoughts on Various Subjects. It consists of a series of short epigrams or apothegms with no particular connections between them.
It contains the quotation “When a true genius appears in the world, you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.” which is the source for the title of *A Confederacy of Dunces* by John Kennedy Toole.

Other typical quotes include:

- “The latter part of a wise man’s life is taken up in curing the follies, prejudices, and false opinions he had contracted in the former.”
- “Whatever the poets pretend, it is plain they give immortality to none but themselves; it is Homer and Virgil we reverence and admire, not Achilles or Aeneas. With historians it is quite the contrary; our thoughts are taken up with the actions, persons, and events we read, and we little regard the authors.”
- “When a man is made a spiritual peer he loses his surname; when a temporal, his Christian name.”
- “If a man would register all his opinions upon love, politics, religion, learning, etc., beginning from his youth and so go on to old age, what a bundle of inconsistencies and contradictions would appear at last!”
- “What they do in heaven we are ignorant of; what they do not we are told expressly: that they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.”

Jonathan Swift wrote “Thoughts on Various Subject, Moral and Diverting” in this work was the profound epigraph: “When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.” Ostensibly, John Kennedy Toole derived the title of his book, *A Confederacy of Dunces*, from Swift’s quotation. Furthermore, the major purpose of the book is to further this philosophical musing of Swift’s mind. However, *A Confederacy of Dunces* is a fictional book; therefore, to accomplish his purpose Toole realized that he must utilize his astute sense of use of rhetorical elements. Consequently, *A Confederacy of Dunces* is saturated with the six elements of rhetoric: persona, appeal to the audience, proper treatment and recognition of subject matter, context, intention, and genre. The prolific and powerful rhetorical elements utilized by John Kennedy Toole in *A Confederacy of Dunces* prodigiously contribute to the impact of the novel; the rhetorical elements execute Toole’s purpose.

**Thoughts on Various Subjects from Miscellanies (1711-1726)**

- We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another.
- Every man desires to live long, but no man would be old.
- A nice man is a man of nasty ideas.
- **Vision is the art of seeing things invisible.**
- What they do in heaven we are ignorant of; what they do not we are told expressly: that they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.
- The Stoical scheme of supplying our wants by lopping off our desires, is like cutting off our feet when we want shoes.
- The power of fortune is confessed only by the miserable; for the happy impute all their success to prudence or merit.
- The latter part of a wise man’s life is taken up in curing the follies, prejudices, and false opinions he had contracted in the former.
- Positiveness is a good quality for preachers and orators, because he that would obtrude his thoughts and reasons upon a multitude, will convince others the more, as he appears convinced himself. Politics, as the word is commonly understood, are nothing but corruptions, and consequently of no use to a good king or a good ministry; for which reason Courts are so overrun with politics.
• Men are contented to be laughed at for their wit, but not for their folly.
• Although men are accused of not knowing their own weakness, yet perhaps as few know their own strength. It is in men as in soils, where sometimes there is a vein of gold, which the owner knows not of.
• Ambition often puts men upon doing the meanest offices; so climbing is performed in the same posture with creeping.
• Censure is the tax a man pays to the public for being eminent.
• Invention is the talent of youth, and judgment of age…
• I never wonder to see men wicked, but I often wonder to see them not ashamed.
• No wise man ever wished to be younger.
• The Bulk of mankind is as well equipped for flying as thinking.
• Complaint is the largest tribute heaven receives, and the sincerest part of our devotion.
• When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign; that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.
• The two maxims of any great man at court are always to keep his countenance and never to keep his word.

**On the Style of Jonathan Swift**

In [Swift's] works, he has given very different specimens both of sentiment and expression. His “Tale of a Tub” has little resemblance to his other pieces. It exhibits a vehemence and rapidity of mind, a copiousness of images, and vivacity of diction, such as he afterwards never possessed, or never exerted. It is of a mode so distinct and peculiar, that it must be considered by itself; what is true of that, is not true of any thing else which he has written.

In his other works is found an equable tenor of easy language, which rather trickles than flows. His delight was in simplicity. That he has in his works no metaphor, as has been said, is not true; but his few metaphors seem to be received rather by necessity than choice. He studied purity; and though perhaps all his strictures are not exact, yet it is not often that solecisms can be found; and whoever depends on his authority may generally conclude himself safe. His sentences are never too much dilated or contracted; and it will not be easy to find any embarrassment in the complication of his clauses, any inconsequence in his connections, or abruptness in his transitions.

His style was well suited to his thoughts, which are never subtilised by nice disquisitions, decorated by sparkling conceits, elevated by ambitious sentences, or variegated by far-sought learning. He pays no court to the passions; he excites neither surprise nor admiration; he always understands himself, and his readers always understand him: the peruser of Swift wants little previous knowledge; it will be sufficient that he is acquainted with common words and common things; he is neither required to mount elevations nor to explore profundities; his passage is always on a level, along solid ground, without asperities, without obstruction.

This easy and safe conveyance of meaning it was Swift’s desire to attain, and for having attained he deserves praise, though perhaps not the highest praise. For purposes merely didactic, when something is to be told that was not known before, it is the best mode, but against that inattention by which known truths are suffered to lie neglected it makes no provision; it instructs, but does not persuade.

**Self-Assessment**

1. Fill in the blanks:
   (i) Swift was born in ............... .
   (ii) Stella was the nickname of Swift’s ............... .
   (iii) Swift left Temple in ............... .
28.2 Summary

- Jonathan Swift engages scholars and students alike with the outstanding range of his writing. Whether one reads his political pamphlets, journalistic pieces, allusive satires on religious and political topics, intimate and direct letters, or entertaining and pungently ironic poetry, his intelligence, wit, and creativity shine clearly through. The memorable prose pieces of Gulliver’s Travels,

- “A Tale of a Tub,” “Battle of the Books,” and “A Modest Proposal” remain at the forefront of any discussion concerning satire, irony, the mock-epic, the errors of human nature, the value of classical traditions, and literary portraits of starvation and poverty.

- **Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting** is the title of a satirical essay by Jonathan Swift. It also has appeared under the title *Thoughts on Various Subjects*. It consists of a series of short epigrams or apothegms with no particular connections between them.

- Jonathan Swift wrote “Thoughts on Various Subject, Moral and Diverting” in this work was the profound epigraph: “When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.” Ostensibly, John Kennedy Toole derived the title of his book, *A Confederacy of Dunces*, from Swift’s quotation. Furthermore, the major purpose of the book is to further this philosophical musing of Swift’s mind.

- In [Swift’s] works, he has given very different specimens both of sentiment and expression. His “Tale of a Tub” has little resemblance to his other pieces. It exhibits a vehemence and rapidity of mind, a copiousness of images, and vivacity of diction, such as he afterwards never possessed, or never exerted. It is of a mode so distinct and peculiar, that it must be considered by itself; what is true of that, is not true of any thing else which he has written.

- Rhetoricians of all genres utilize the same elements to further their own purpose in writing and oration. Everything in life is an argument; therefore, everyone is obligated to analyze arguments presented and discover maxims to live life by. Miguel de Cervantes once said, “Truth indeed rather alleviates than hurts, and will always bear up against falsehood, as oil does above water.

28.3. Key-Words

1. Eccentricity: In popular usage, eccentricity (also called quirkiness or kookiness) refers to unusual or odd behavior on the part of an individual. This behavior would typically be perceived as unusual or unnecessary, without being demonstrably maladaptive.

2. Irrationality: Irrationality is cognition, thinking, talking or acting without inclusion of rationality. It is more specifically described as an action or opinion given through inadequate use of reason, emotional distress, or cognitive deficiency. The term is used, usually pejoratively, to describe thinking and actions that are, or appear to be, less useful, or more illogical than other more rational alternatives.

28.4 Review Questions

1. Discuss style and genre presented in Swift’s works.

2. Critically examine Swift’s views on Thoughts on various subjects.
Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) Dublin  (ii) student  (iii) 1690

28.5 Further Readings


Unit 29: T.S. Eliot: Tradition and Individual Talent: Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives

After reading this Unit students will be able to:

• Discuss “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” the most influential essay Eliot wrote, and “The Function of Criticism” where he talks about the tools of the critic.

• Evaluate his achievement as a critic, and try to gauge his influence on later critics.

Introduction

Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965) is probably the best known and most influential English poet of the twentieth century. His work as a critic is equally significant. He was born in St Louis, Missouri; his parents belonged to New England, from a section of society which has been called WASP: White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, that is, part of the mainstream of society which colonized the eastern coast of America. He joined Harvard University in 1906, obtained his M.A. in 1911, and started work on a doctoral thesis on the philosophy of F.H. Bradley. In 1912 he was appointed an assistant at Harvard, but he was already under the influence of the symbolists, and had started writing poems in the manner of Jules Laforgue. He spent one year (1910-11) in Paris, and in 1914 he joined Merton College, Oxford. He settled in London, and became a member of the Anglican church and a British citizen in 1927, preferring to renounce his American heritage. He left academic pursuits to earn a living, working first in a bank, later as an editor with the publishing firm of Faber and Faber. In 1922 he founded The Criterion, a cultural quarterly, and The Waste Land was published in the inaugural issue. In 1924 he published Homage to John Dryden, which contained studies of Dryden and the metaphysical poets. This was followed by For Lancelot Andrews: Essays on Style and Order (1928) in which he announced himself to be “classicist in literature, royalist in politics and Anglo-Catholic in religion.” His major books of criticism include The Sacred Wood (1920), The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1933), and Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1949) and On Poetry and Poets (1957). I am sure you are already familiar with his achievements as a poet and dramatist. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1948.

T.S. Eliot’s critical output was quite diverse; he wrote theoretical pieces as well as studies of particular authors. In “To Criticize the Critic”, a lecture delivered at Leeds University in 1961, Eliot divided his prose writings into three periods. During the first, he was writing for journals
like *The Egoist*; the main influences on him were Ezra Pound, and Eliot’s teacher Irving Babbitt, who had introduced him to the philosophy of Humanism at Harvard. The second period, roughly from 1918 to 1930, was primarily one of regular contributions to the *Athenaeum* and the *Times Literary Supplement*; the third period was one of lectures and addresses, after Eliot had established himself as the leading poet of the age. As he grew older, he produced a lot of social and religious criticism; books like *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1939) shed light on his literary criticism and poetry. The later writings reveal a certain tiredness, a refusal to take his role as poet-critic seriously. He often suggested in his later lectures that he ought not to be taken too seriously. His second lecture on Milton, delivered in 1947, contradicts his first one, delivered in 1936, which declared that “Milton’s poetry could only be an influence for the worse, upon any poet whatsoever” and accused Milton of “having done damage to the English language from which it has not wholly recovered”. His convoluted style of qualification and reservations grows more complex over the years. In the words of George Watson, (he is commenting on Eliot’s two lectures on Milton), “Argument advances crabwise.” His first book, *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism* (1920), containing seminal essays like “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and “Hamlet”, is central to his achievement as a critic. It is this early work which influenced the New Critics.

### 29.1 “Tradition and the Individual Talent”

“Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) clearly expresses Eliot’s concepts about poetry and the importance of tradition. Eliot emphasizes the need for critical thinking—“criticism is as inevitable as breathing”. He feels that it is unfortunate that the word “tradition” is mentioned only with pejorative implications, as when we call some poet “too traditional.” He questions the habit of praising a poet primarily for those elements in his work which are more individual and differentiate him from others. According to T.S. Eliot, even the most “individual” parts of a poet’s work may be those which are most alive with the influence of his poetic ancestors. Eliot stresses the objective and intellectual element. The whole of past literature will be “in the bones” of the poet with the true historical sense; a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.” No poet has his complete meaning alone. For proper evaluation, you must set a poet, for contrast and comparison, among the dead poets. Eliot envisages a dynamic relationship between past and present writers. “The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them.” An artist can be judged only by the standards of the past; this does not mean the standards of dead critics. It means a judgement when two things, the old and the new, are measured by each other. To some extent, this resembles Matthew Arnold’s “touchstone”; the “ideal order” formed by the “existing monuments” provide the standard, a kind of touchstone, for evaluation. As with Arnold’s touchstones, Eliot’s ideal order is subjective and in need of modification from time to time.

Eliot lays stress on the artist knowing “the mind of Europe — the mind of his own country—a mind which he learns in time to be much more important than his own private mind”. But he does not mean pedantic knowledge, he means a consciousness of the past, and some persons have a greater sensitivity to this historical awareness. As Eliot states, with epigrammatic brevity, “Some can absorb knowledge, the more tardy must sweat for it. Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum.” Throughout Eliot’s poetry and criticism, we find this emphasis on the artist surrendering himself to some larger authority. His later political and religious writings too valorized authority. It is interesting that Eliot always worked within his own cultural space: religion meant Christianity, while literature, culture and history meant exclusively European literature, culture or history. Tradition, for Eliot, means an awareness of the history of Europe, not as dead facts but as an ever-changing yet changeless presence, constantly interacting subconsciously with the individual poet.
He wants the poet to merge his personality with the tradition. “The progress of the artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.” He suggests the analogy of the catalyst in a scientific laboratory for this process of depersonalization. The mind of the poet is a medium in which experiences can enter into new combinations. When oxygen and sulphur dioxide are mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum, they form sulphuric acid. This combination takes place only in the presence of platinum, which is the catalyst. But the sulphuric acid shows no trace of platinum, which remains unaffected. The catalyst facilitates the chemical change, but does not participate in it, and remains unchanged. Eliot compares the mind of the poet to the shred of platinum, which will “digest and transmute the passions which are its material”. Eliot shifts the critical focus from the poet to the poetry, and declares, “Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry.” Eliot sees the poet’s mind as “a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together.” He says that concepts like “sublimity”, “greatness” or “intensity” of emotion are irrelevant. It is not the greatness of the emotion that matters, but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure under which the artistic fusion takes place, that is important. In this way he rejects the Romantic emphasis on ‘genius’ and the exceptional mind.

Eliot refutes the idea that poetry is the expression of the personality of the poet. Experiences important for the man may have no place in his poems, and vice-versa. The emotions occasioned by events in the personal life of the poet are not important. What matters is the emotion transmuted into poetry, the feelings expressed in the poetry. “Emotions which he has never experienced will serve his turn as well as those familiar to him”. Eliot says that Wordsworth’s formula is wrong. (I am sure you would remember Wordsworth’s comments on poetry in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads: “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling: it takes its origins from emotion recollected in tranquility.”) For Eliot, poetry is not recollection of feeling, “it is a new thing resulting from the concentration of a very great number of experiences ... it is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of deliberation.” Eliot believes that “Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.” For him, the emotion of art is impersonal, and the artist can achieve this impersonality only by cultivating the historical sense, by being conscious of the tradition.

It is now generally believed that Eliot’s idea of tradition is rather narrow in two respects. First, he’s talking of simply the poetic tradition and neglects the fact that even the poetic tradition is a complex amalgam of written and oral poetry and the elements that go into them. It was only in later writings that he realised the fact that in the making of verse many elements are involved. In his writings on poetic drama he gives evidence of having broadened his scope.

Second, Eliot is neglecting other traditions that go into social formations. When he later wrote ‘Religion and Literature’, he gives more scope to non-poetic elements of tradition. On these considerations one can say that he develops his ideas on tradition throughout his literary career — right up to the time he wrote ‘Notes Towards a Definition of Culture’ in which tradition is more expansive than in his earlier writings.

### 29.2 “The Function of Criticism”

Early in his career, Eliot had declared, “The poet critic is criticizing poetry in order to create poetry” (“The Perfect Critic”, 1920). Eliot’s criticism was subsidiary to his creative writing. We can consider him Dryden’s successor because his critical work serves the purpose of introducing and justifying his own practice as a poet and playwright. He also shared Dryden’s classical leanings. In “The Function of Criticism” (1923), Eliot unambiguously states his views on criticism, and on the methodology it should adopt.
He begins the essay by repeating his views on tradition expressed in “Tradition and the Individual Talent”. That essay postulated a certain order of literary masterpieces which constituted tradition. It is only in relation to this tradition that individual artists have their significance. He says that criticism too requires the same sacrifice of the ego.

He defines criticism as “the commenation and exposition of works of art by means of written words.” Criticism, unlike literature, is not an autotelic activity, it is dependent on literature. The purpose of criticism is “the elucidation of works of art and the correction of taste.” Commenting on the prevailing state of criticism, Eliot bemoans the fact that criticism, “far from being a simple and orderly field of beneficent activity” is a field where critics excel in opposing each other. For Eliot, criticism should be marked by “cooperative labour.” “The critic ... should endeavour to discipline his personal prejudices and cranks ... and compose his differences with as many of his fellows as possible, in the common pursuit of true judgement.” In the New Critics in America, we find a demonstration of this co-operative venture. And much of Leavis’s criticism is expressed in terms of friendly debate, as if he were discussing the work with a colleague, and trying to reach a consensus. A collection of his essays has the very apt title, The Common Pursuit; the title pays a graceful compliment to Eliot’s theory of criticism, and also demonstrates the use of this collaborative method.

Eliot refutes a fellow critic Middleton Murray’s suggestion that progress is possible by following the “Inner Voice”. He believes that following the “Inner Voice” is only an excuse for “doing as one likes.” He feels that Matthew Arnold is among those who value “tradition and the accumulated wisdom of time.” According to Eliot, Arnold distinguishes too sharply between the “creative” and “critical”, he overlooks the importance of criticism in the work of creativity. Eliot believes that “the larger part of the labour of an author in composing his work is critical labour: the labour of sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, testing: this frightful toil is as much critical as creative.” He says “some creative writers are superior to others solely because their critical faculty is superior.” He believes that the criticism employed by a good writer on his own work “is the most vital, the highest kind of criticism.” The vast amount of critical labour may not be apparent, it may have “flashed in the very heat of creation.” Just because it is not obvious, and we have no way of knowing what goes on in the mind of the creative artist, we should not assume that this critical activity is absent. Here Eliot is presenting his concept of artistic activity; in “Tradition and the Individual Talent”, he had talked about “impersonality” and criticized Wordsworth’s concept of poetry as a “spontaneous overflow”. Here Eliot attacks the idea that “the great artist is an unconscious artist”. Art does not arise just from inspiration; a lot of effort has to go into perfecting it, “expunging, correcting, testing”.

According to Eliot, “The critical activity finds its highest, its true fulfilment in a kind of union with creation in the labour of the artist.” It follows that creative artists would be the best critics. He admits that at one time he believed that “the only critics worth reading are the critics who practised and practised well, the art of which they wrote.” He says that what gives the practitioner’s criticism its special force is his “highly developed sense of fact.” The best critics can make nebulous feelings into something “precise, tractable, under control.”

Eliot then considers the importance of interpretation. A critic may feel that he has the true understanding of a work, but there is no way of confirming this interpretation. Eliot feels that such interpretations are of no use; far more useful would be to put the reader in possession of facts about the work to enable him to respond to it fully. “Interpretation is only legitimate when it is not interpretation at all, but merely putting the reader in possession of facts which he would otherwise have missed.”

Eliot has already said that criticism is a common pursuit. Now he tells us how to go about it. “Comparison and analysis, I have said before, and Remy de Gourmont has said before me, are the chief tools of the critic.” But one must know what to compare and what to analyze, we should not
reduce it to a mechanical exercise, counting the “number of times giraffes are mentioned in the English novel.” He is against interpreters who can find things in the poem which are not there. He uses the metaphor of medical dissection to emphasize his point: “Comparison and analysis need only the cadavers on the table; but interpretation is always producing parts of the body from its pockets, and fixing them in place.” The text is compared to the dead body on the operation table; when an interpreter puts ideas of his own making into the reading of the poem, he is compared to a doctor bringing in parts from outside when conducting a post mortem. Eliot feels that anything which produces “a fact even of the lowest order about a work of art” is better. With a trace of wit, he states, “We assume, of course, that we are masters and not servants of facts, and that we know that the discovery of Shakespeare’s laundry bills would not be of much use to us.” But he adds that we should reserve judgement on the futility of research, it is possible that some genius may appear in the future who would make good use of even trivial facts. He feels that “facts cannot corrupt taste”, but impressionistic criticism, expressing opinion or fancy (he suggests Coleridge’s comments on Hamlet as an example) can be harmful. He ends the essay by warning us against an ever present danger of criticism: “the multiplication of critical books and essays may create .. a vicious taste for reading about works of art instead of reading the works themselves, it may supply opinion instead of educating taste.”

Eliot anchors criticism squarely in the text and is wary of opinionated views. In this respect Eliot echoes some contemporary theorists who believe that a text is animated by the reader and the critic only facilitates the exercise.

29.3 The Achievement of T.S. Eliot as a Critic

Eliot’s influence as a poet and critic has done a lot to establish a climate favorable to objective criticism, eschewing the nebulous impressionism of the preceding age. His best critical writing analyzes and clarifies the theoretical and technical problems which had a bearing on his writing of poetry. He made an important contribution to ideas concerning the integrity of poetry, the process of poetic composition, the importance of tradition to the maturing of the individual talent, the relation of the past and the present, and the fusion of feeling and thought. Eliot as a critic can be considered a successor of Matthew Arnold, because he assumed the role of a guardian of culture; like Arnold, he laid stress on impartiality, and proper evaluation of a poet. And like Arnold, he became a legislator of literary culture, as his later writings testify.

The earlier Eliot staunchly defended the autonomy of art, arguing against linking up art and religion or art and morality. But later he started believing in the importance of the poet’s beliefs. R. n, Wellek points out that Eliot “advocated a double standard of criticism: artistic on the one hand and moral-philosophical-theological on the other.” Eliot declared (in Essays Ancient and Modern, 1936) “In an age like our own ... it is the more necessary ... to scrutinize works of imagination, with explicit ethical and theological standards. The ‘greatness’ of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards; though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined only by literary standards.”

Many fellow critics have expressed their dissatisfaction with Eliot’s criticism, in spite of its great influence. Yvor Winters categorically states, “Eliot is a theorist who has repeatedly contradicted himself on every important issue that he has touched... many of them [the contradictions] occur within the same book or even within the same essay.” F.R. Leavis grants Eliot’s eminence as a poet, but feels that his criticism falls short of the “consciousness that one thinks of as necessary to the great creative writer.” According to Leavis, “some of the ideas, attitudes, and valuations put into currency by Eliot were arbitrary.” He says that “Tradition and the Individual Talent” is
“notable for its ambiguities, its logical inconsequence, its pseudo-precisions, its fallaciousness, and the aplomb of its equivocations and its specious cogency”. He attacks the “falseness” of Eliot’s doctrine of impersonality, and says that it is designed to eliminate the conception of the artist as an individual distinguished by his openness to life.

Lack of clarity is another common charge. W.K. Wimsatt says of “Tradition and the Individual Talent”:

This celebrated early essay, despite its forceful suggestiveness, the smoothness and fullness of its definition of the poet’s impersonality was a highly ambiguous statement. Therein, no doubt, consisted something of its pregnancy. In this essay as poet and critic Eliot is saying two things about three ideas (man, poet and poem) and saying them simultaneously. He is saying that a poet ought to depersonalize his raw experience, transcend the immediacy of the suffering man. At the same time, he is saying that the reader ought to read the poem impersonally, as an achieved expression, not personally, with attendant inquiries into the sufferings, the motives of the man behind the poem. The idea ‘poet’ as Eliot employs it in this essay is sometimes the antithesis of ‘man’ and sometimes the antithesis of ‘poem’.

The attempt to minimize the role of the poet’s personality leads to confusion, as two views of the mind emerge from this essay. The mind is presented as an agent of change, it is an active force which transmutes experience, Eliot refers to “the mind which creates”. But it is also referred to as a catalyst, which facilitates change without itself changing. His further statement only confuses the issue further, when he says, “the more perfect the artist the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates.”

In many places there is a gap between his theoretical formulations and his practical criticism. He insisted that critics should not indulge in interpretation or judgement: “The critic must not coerce, and he must not make judgements of worse or better” (The Sacred Wood). But his best essays, whether on the metaphysical poets, Marvell or Milton, make clear value judgements. Even the concept of a tradition implies an hierarchy, for it is the best works which make up the tradition that Eliot considers so important.

Self-Assessment

1. Fill in the blanks:
   (i) The Perfect Critic appeared in ................ .
   (ii) The Function of Criticism was published in ............... .

29.4 Summary

- T.S. Eliot’s critical pronouncements stimulated a revaluation of various literary reputations. He brought about the re-appraisal of metaphysical poetry and sixteenth and seventeenth century drama. His successful practice as a poet gave special weight to his pronouncement as a critic. His later prose writing gives more attention to society and culture, and the literary essays and lectures of the later part of his life tend to be more conventional than his early work. “Tradition and the Individual Talent” presents a view of the great artist as part of tradition. Eliot refutes the concept of poetry as an expression of emotion, and lays stress on its impersonality. He used the phrase “the objective correlative” to describe how emotion can be represented in literature. “The Metaphysical Poets” presented the concept of a “dissociation of sensibility”, and declared that “poets in our civilization ... must be difficult”; these comments shed as much light on Eliot’s own poetry as on the process of literary creation. His essay, “The Function of Criticism”, discusses the tools, like “comparison and analysis” which have been used by most New Critics in their analysis of literary texts.
29.5 Key-Words

Autotelic : having or being a purpose in itself, not dependent on other things for its intention or usefulness.

Bacon : Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Elizabethan man of letters. His Essays and The Advancement of Learning are good examples of early English prose.

Catalyst : in chemistry, a substance that without itself undergoing any change, starts a reaction or increases the rate of a reaction; metaphorically, a person or thing that causes change.

Epigrammatic : having the quality of an epigram, a short witty poem, proverb or expression.

Hobbes : Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), author of Leviathan, one of the earliest books of political economy.

Iconoclast : literally, a person who breaks religious images used in worship. Now the word is more commonly used for its metaphorical meaning, a person who attacks cherished beliefs or established reputations.

29.6 Review Questions

1. How far do you agree with Eliot’s view that poetry is not an expression of personality but an escape from personality?

2. Discuss Eliot’s view of the relationship between the individual poet and the tradition.


4. Write short notes on
   (a) dissociation of sensibility
   (b) objective correlative.


Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) 1920 (ii) 1923

29.7 Further Readings


Objectives

After reading this Unit, Students will to be able to:

• Generate awareness amongst the learners about T. S. Eliot’s position as a Critic.
• Enable the learners to understand in detail the essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” as one of his most famous critical outputs.

Introduction

T. S. Eliot as a Critic’ Besides being a poet, playwright and publisher, T. S. Eliot (1888-1965) was one of the most seminal critics of his time. Carlo Linati, his Italian critic, found his poetry to be ‘irrational, incomprehensible… a magnificent puzzle’, and in his poetic endeavors ‘a deliberate critical purpose’. Also in his literary criticism Eliot’s personality has found its full expression. Thus Eliot’s literary criticism can be seen as expression of his poetic credo. As one of the seminal critics of the twentieth century; Eliot shows a disinterested endeavour of critical faculty and intelligence in analyzing a work of art. For the sake a systematic discussion, his critical works may be grouped under the following headings:

1. theoretical criticism dealing with the principles of literature,
2. descriptive and practical criticism dealing with the works of individual writers and evaluation of their achievements, and
3. theological essays.

‘Tradition and Individual Talent’ has been one of his extraordinarily influential critical works. It was first published in 1922 in Sacred Woods, and was subsequently included in the ‘Selected Essays’ (1917-1932). In this essay, Eliot has primarily dealt with his concepts of

1. Historical Sense, and Tradition
2. Interdependence of the past and the present
3. Impersonality in art in general and poetry in particular

30.1 The Concept of Tradition and Individual Talent

According to the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Tradition means a belief, principle or way of acting which people in a particular society or group have continued to follow for a long
time, or all of these beliefs, etc. in a particular society or group. Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes ‘Tradition’ an ‘inherited, established, or customary pattern of thought, action or behavior (as a religious practice or a social custom)’. Eliot commences the essay with the general attitude towards ‘Tradition’. He points out that every nation and race has its creative and critical turn of mind, and emphasises the need for critical thinking. ‘We might remind ourselves that criticism is as inevitable as breathing.’ In ‘Tradition and Individual Talent’, Eliot introduces the idea of Tradition. Interestingly enough, Eliot’s contemporaries and commentators either derided the idea as irrelevant, conservative and backward-looking stance or appreciated the idea and read it in connection with Matthew Arnold’s historical criticism of texts popularly known as ‘touchstone’ method. In this section we will first make an attempt to summarize Eliot’s concept of tradition and then will seek to critique it for a comprehensive understanding of the texts.

At the very outset, Eliot makes it clear that he is using the term tradition as an adjective to explain the relationship of a poem or a work to the works of dead poets and artists. He regrets that in our appreciation of authors we hardly include their connections with those living and dead. Also our critical apparatus is significantly limited to the language in which the work is produced. A work produced in a different language can be considered for a better appreciation of the work. In this connection, he notices “our tendency to insist…those aspects” of a writer’s work in which “he least resembles anyone else”. Thus, our appreciation of the writer is derived from exhumation of the uniqueness of the work. In the process, the interpretation of the work focuses on identifying the writer’s difference from his predecessors. Eliot critiques this tendency in literary appreciation and favours inclusion of work or parts of work of dead poets and predecessors.

Although Eliot attaches greater importance to the idea of tradition, he rejects the idea of tradition in the name of ‘Blind or Timid Adherence’ to successful compositions of the past. By subscribing to the idea of tradition, Eliot does not mean sacrificing novelty nor does he mean slavish repetitions of stylistic and structural features. By the term ‘Tradition’, he comes up with something ‘of much wider significance’. By ‘Tradition’, he does not refer to a legacy of writers which can be handed down from a generation to another generation. It has nothing to do with the idea of inheritance; rather it regrets a great deal of endeavour. He further argues, “It involves... The historical sense... and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past but its presence; ... This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional.” By this statement, Eliot wants to emphasize that the writer or the poet must develop a sense of the pastness of the past and always seeks to examine the poem or the work in its relation to the works of the dead writers or the poets. To substantiate his point of view, Eliot says, “No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and the artists.” As he says this, he is perfectly aware of Matthew Arnold’s notion of historical criticism and therefore distances himself from such the Arnoldian critical stance. He identifies his approach to literary appreciation “as a principle of aesthetics and thereby distinguishes it from Arnold’s “Historical Criticism”. Thus, Eliot offers an organic theory and practice of literary criticism. In this, he treats tradition not as a legacy but as an invention of anyone who is ready to create his or her literary pantheon, depending on his literary tastes and positions. This means that the development of the writer will depend on his or her ability to build such private spaces for continual negotiation and even struggle with illustrious antecedents, and strong influences. Harold Bloom terms the state of struggle as “The anxiety of influence”, and he derides Eliot for suggesting a complex, an elusive relationship between the tradition and the individual, and goes on to develop his own theory of influence.

The Concept of ‘Impersonality’

In the second part of the essay Eliot argues that “Honest Criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry”. This hints at the actual beginning of ‘New
Criticism’ where the focus will shift from author to the text. Eliot here defines the poet’s responsibility. The poet is not supposed to compose poetry which is full of his personal emotions. He must subscribe himself to something more valuable, i.e., what others have composed in the past. Thus, Eliot emphasizes objectivity in poetry. Eliot believes that some sort of ‘physical distancing’, to use Bullough’s term, is necessary for successful composition. He also mentions that the poet has to merge his personality with the tradition. “The progress of the artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.” The mind of the poet is a medium in which experiences can enter new combinations. He exemplifies this process as when oxygen and sulphur dioxide are mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum, they form sulphuric acid. This combination takes place only in the presence of platinum, which acts as the catalyst. But the sulphuric acid shows no trace of platinum, and remains unaffected. The catalyst facilitates the chemical change, but does not participate in the chemical reaction, and remains unchanged. Eliot compares the mind of the poet to the shred of platinum, which will “digest and transmute the passions which are its material”. He suggests the analogy of a catalyst’s role in a chemical process in a scientific laboratory for this process of depersonalization. Eliot sees the poet’s mind as “a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together.” He says that concepts like “sublimity”, “greatness” or “intensity” of emotion are irrelevant. It is not the greatness of the emotion that matters, but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure under which the artistic process takes place, that is important. In this way he dissociates the notion on the artistic process from an added emphasis on ‘genius’ and the exceptional mind.

Eliot refutes the idea that poetry is the expression of poet’s personality. Experiences in the life of the man may have no place in his poems, and vice-versa. The emotions occasioned by events in the personal life of the poet are not important. What matters is the emotion transmuted into poetry, the feelings expressed in the poetry. “Emotions which he has never experienced will serve his turn as well as those familiar to him”. Eliot critiques Wordsworth’s definition of poetry in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads: “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling: it takes its origins from emotion recollected in tranquility.” For Eliot, poetry is not recollection of feeling, “it is a new thing resulting from the concentration of a very great number of experiences . . . it is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of deliberation.” Eliot defines that “Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.” For him, the emotion of art is impersonal, and the artist can achieve this impersonality only by and being conscious of the tradition, He is talking about the poetic tradition and neglects the fact that even the poetic tradition is a complex mixture of written and oral poetry and the elements that go into them. It was only in his later writings that he realized that in poetic composition many elements are involved. In his poetic dramas, he sought to brodent his scope. Eliot has also ignored other traditions that go into social formations. In ‘Religion and Literature’, he has dealt with the non-poetic elements of tradition at length. He kept on developing his notion of tradition right up to the time he wrote ‘Notes towards a definition on culture’.

Creative writer has artistic sensibility. He observes the world like any common men. But his vision observes the world quite differently. He can perceive from life-experience what common man cannot see at all. This experience and observation get imaginative colours with the help of artistic sensibility. He creates a world of imaginative reality. His world is more beautiful and artistic than the real world. He is naturally gifted to create the work which has power to move or transport the reader. He gets his raw material from the life. He is critic of life.

30.2 Text—Tradition and Individual Talent

In English writing we seldom speak of tradition, though we occasionally apply its name in deploring its absence. We cannot refer to “the tradition” or to “a tradition”; at most, we employ the adjective
in saying that the poetry of So-and-so is “traditional” or even “too traditional.” Seldom, perhaps, does the word appear except in a phrase of censure. If otherwise, it is vaguely approbative, with the implication, as to the work approved, of some pleasing archæological reconstruction. You can hardly make the word agreeable to English ears without this comfortable reference to the reassuring science of archæology.

Certainly the word is not likely to appear in our appreciations of living or dead writers. Every nation, every race, has not only its own creative, but its own critical turn of mind; and is even more oblivious of the shortcomings and limitations of its critical habits than of those of its creative genius. We know, or think we know, from the enormous mass of critical writing that has appeared in the French language the critical method or habit of the French; we only conclude (we are such unconscious people) that the French are “more critical” than we, and sometimes even plume ourselves a little with the fact, as if the French were the less spontaneous. Perhaps they are; but we might remind ourselves that criticism is as inevitable as breathing, and that we should be none the worse for articulating what passes in our minds when we read a book and feel an emotion about it, for criticizing our own minds in their work of criticism. One of the facts that might come to light in this process is our tendency to insist, when we praise a poet, upon those aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else. In these aspects or parts of his work we pretend to find what is individual, what is the peculiar essence of the man. We dwell with satisfaction upon the poet’s difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors; we endeavour to find something that can be isolated in order to be enjoyed. Whereas if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously. And I do not mean the impressionable period of adolescence, but the period of full maturity.

Yet if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, “tradition” should positively be discouraged. We have seen many such simple currents soon lost in the sand; and novelty is better than repetition. Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity.

No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism. The necessity that he shall conform, that he shall cohere, is not one-sided; what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new. Whoever has approved this idea of order, of the form of European, of English literature, will not find it preposterous that the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past. And the poet who is aware of this will be aware of great difficulties and responsibilities.
In a peculiar sense he will be aware also that he must inevitably be judged by the standards of the past. I say judged, not amputated, by them; not judged to be as good as, or worse or better than, the dead; and certainly not judged by the canons of dead critics. It is a judgment, a comparison, in which two things are measured by each other. To conform merely would be for the new work not really to conform at all; it would not be new, and would therefore not be a work of art. And we do not quite say that the new is more valuable because it fits in; but its fitting in is a test of its value—a test, it is true, which can only be slowly and cautiously applied, for we are none of us infallible judges of conformity. We say: it appears to conform, and is perhaps individual, or it appears individual, and may conform; but we are hardly likely to find that it is one and not the other.

To proceed to a more intelligible exposition of the relation of the poet to the past: he can neither take the past as a lump, an indiscriminate bolus, nor can he form himself wholly on one or two private admirations, nor can he form himself wholly upon one preferred period. The first course is inadmissible, the second is an important experience of youth, and the third is a pleasant and highly desirable supplement. The poet must be very conscious of the main current, which does not at all flow invariably through the most distinguished reputations. He must be quite aware of the obvious fact that art never improves, but that the material of art is never quite the same. He must be aware that the mind of Europe—the mind of his own country—a mind which he learns in time to be much more important than his own private mind—is a mind which changes, and that this change is a development which abandons nothing en route, which does not superannuate either Shakespeare, or Homer, or the rock drawing of the Magdalenian draughtsmen. That this development, refinement perhaps, complication certainly, is not, from the point of view of the artist, any improvement. Perhaps not even an improvement from the point of view of the psychologist or not to the extent which we imagine; perhaps only in the end based upon a complication in economics and machinery. But the difference between the present and the past is that the conscious present is an awareness of the past in a way and to an extent which the past's awareness of itself cannot show.

Some one said: “The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.” Precisely, and they are that which we know. I am alive to a usual objection to what is clearly part of my programme for the métier of poetry. The objection is that the doctrine requires a ridiculous amount of erudition (pedantry), a claim which can be rejected by appeal to the lives of poets in any pantheon. It will even be affirmed that much learning deadens or perverts poetic sensibility. While, however, we persist in believing that a poet ought to know as much as will not encroach upon his necessary receptivity and necessary laziness, it is not desirable to confine knowledge to whatever can be put into a useful shape for examinations, drawing-rooms, or the still more pretentious modes of publicity. Some can absorb knowledge, the more tardy must sweat for it. Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum. What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career.

What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality. There remains to define this process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition. It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science. I shall, therefore, invite you to consider, as a suggestive analogy, the action which takes place when a bit of finely filiated platinum is introduced into a chamber containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide.

Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry. If we attend to the confused cries of the newspaper critics and the susurrus of popular repetition that follows, we shall hear the names of poets in great numbers; if we seek not Blue-book knowledge
but the enjoyment of poetry, and ask for a poem, we shall seldom find it. In the last article I tried to point out the importance of the relation of the poem to other poems by other authors, and suggested the conception of poetry as a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been written. The other aspect of this Impersonal theory of poetry is the relation of the poem to its author. And I hinted, by an analogy, that the mind of the mature poet differs from that of the immature one not precisely in any valuation of “personality,” not being necessarily more interesting, or having “more to say,” but rather by being a more finely perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty to enter into new combinations. The analogy was that of the catalyst. When the two gases previously mentioned are mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum, they form sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the platinum is present; nevertheless the newly formed acid contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected; has remained inert, neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material.

The experience, you will notice, the elements which enter the presence of the transforming catalyst, are of two kinds: emotions and feelings. The effect of a work of art upon the person who enjoys it is an experience different in kind from any experience not of art. It may be formed out of one emotion, or may be a combination of several; and various feelings, inhering for the writer in particular words or phrases or images, may be added to compose the final result. Or great poetry may be made without the direct use of any emotion whatever: composed out of feelings solely. Canto XV of the *Inferno* (Brunetto Latini) is a working up of the emotion evident in the situation; but the effect, though single as that of any work of art, is obtained by considerable complexity of detail. The last quatrains gives an image, a feeling attaching to an image, which “came,” which did not develop simply out of what precedes, but which was probably in suspension in the poet’s mind until the proper combination arrived for it to add itself to. The poet’s mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together.

If you compare several representative passages of the greatest poetry you see how great is the variety of types of combination, and also how completely any semi-ethical criterion of “sublimity” misses the mark. For it is not the “greatness,” the intensity, of the emotions, the components, but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place, that counts. The episode of Paolo and Francesca employs a definite emotion, but the intensity of the poetry is something quite different from whatever intensity in the supposed experience it may give the impression of. It is no more intense, furthermore, than Canto XXVI, the voyage of Ulysses, which has not the direct dependence upon an emotion. Great variety is possible in the process of transmutation of emotion: the murder of Agamemnon, or the agony of Othello, gives an artistic effect apparently closer to a possible original than the scenes from Dante. In the *Agamemnon*, the artistic emotion approximates to the emotion of an actual spectator; in *Othello* to the emotion of the protagonist himself. But the difference between art and the event is always absolute; the combination which is the murder of Agamemnon is probably as complex as that which is the voyage of Ulysses. In either case there has been a fusion of elements. The ode of Keats contains a number of feelings which have nothing particular to do with the nightingale, but which the nightingale, partly, perhaps, because of its attractive name, and partly because of its reputation, served to bring together.

The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a “personality” to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which
impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. Impressions and experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those which become important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the personality.

I will quote a passage which is unfamiliar enough to be regarded with fresh attention in the light—or darkness—of these observations: And now methinks I could e’en chide myself For doating on her beauty, though her death Shall be revenged after no common action. Does the silkworm expend her yellow labours For thee? For thee does she undo herself? Are lordships sold to maintain ladyships For the poor benefit of a bewildering minute? Why does yon fellow falsify highways, And put his life between the judge’s lips, To refine such a thing—keeps horse and men To beat their valours for her?... In this passage (as is evident if it is taken in its context) there is a combination of positive and negative emotions: an intensely strong attraction toward beauty and an equally intense fascination by the ugliness which is contrasted with it and which destroys it. This balance of contrasted emotion is in the dramatic situation to which the speech is pertinent, but that situation alone is inadequate to it. This is, so to speak, the structural emotion, provided by the drama. But the whole effect, the dominant tone, is due to the fact that a number of floating feelings, having an affinity to this emotion by no means superficially evident, have combined with it to give us a new art emotion.

It is not in his personal emotions, the emotions provoked by particular events in his life, that the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting. His particular emotions may be simple, or crude, or flat. The emotion in his poetry will be a very complex thing, but not with the complexity of the emotions of people who have very complex or unusual emotions in life. One error, in fact, of eccentricity in poetry is to seek for new human emotions to express; and in this search for novelty in the wrong place it discovers the perverse. The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones and, in working them up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual emotions at all. And emotions which he has never experienced will serve his turn as well as those familiar to him. Consequently, we must believe that “emotion recollected in tranquillity” is an inexact formula. For it is neither emotion, nor recollection, nor, without distortion of meaning, tranquillity. It is a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the concentration, of a very great number of experiences which to the practical and active person would not seem to be experiences at all; it is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of deliberation. These experiences are not “recollected,” and they finally unite in an atmosphere which is “tranquil” only in that it is a passive attending upon the event. Of course this is not quite the whole story. There is a great deal, in the writing of poetry, which must be conscious and deliberate. In fact, the bad poet is usually unconscious where he ought to be conscious, and conscious where he ought to be unconscious. Both errors tend to make him “personal.” Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things.

This essay proposes to halt at the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism, and confine itself to such practical conclusions as can be applied by the responsible person interested in poetry. To divert interest from the poet to the poetry is a laudable aim: for it would conduce to a juster estimation of actual poetry, good and bad. There are many people who appreciate the expression of sincere emotion in verse, and there is a smaller number of people who can appreciate technical excellence. But very few know when there is expression of significant emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem and not in the history of the poet. The emotion of art is impersonal. And the poet cannot reach this impersonality without surrendering himself wholly to the work to be done. And he is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already living.
30.3 Analysis

Tradition and Individual Talent” is the essay of lasting significance in the history of modern criticism. The essay brought into being two principal aspects of Eliot's critical domain – tradition and impersonality in art and poetry, that rated over the realm of criticism. The essay also brings forth Eliot's views on the inter-relation between traditional and individual talent. The essay brought into being the new approach with poets of everlasting significance and it also provided the parameters for the assessment of the genius and the shortcomings of the masters but contributed to the history of English Literature. The idea of tradition with all its magnificence, has a meaning beyond the conventional sense of term. It begins with a historical sense and goes on acquiring new dimensions along political and cultural dimension, and this creates a system of axes for the assessment of the worth and genius of a poet. The idea of Eliot's theory of tradition is based on the inevitable phenomenon of the continuity of the values during the process called civilization. Eliot brings with a description that makes tradition a term of abuse and develops to a metaphor of unquestionable authenticity. 'Seldom perhaps', he says, 'does the word appear except in a phrase of censure'. He further says: You can hardly make the word agreeable to English ears without this comfortable reference to the reassuring science of archaeology. The above quoted lines from one of the most celebrated critical endeavours make it clear that Eliot aims at developing a new concept and structuring a new approach to the very phenomenon called poetry. Eliot, after beginning with the seemingly derogatory implications of the term imparts a new meaning and magnificence to the term when he identifies tradition with historical sense. The identification discussed above makes it clear that the tradition according to Eliot is something more than mere conglomeration of dead works. The identification of tradition with historical sense serves to ratify the stature of tradition in assessing the works and function of poets and poetry. He elaborates the idea of historical sense and says: and the historical sense invokes a perception not only of the partners of the past but also of its presence: The historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones but with a feeling that whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. Eliot in the above quoted line puts forth a dynamic manifestation of tradition which shapes the minds of different poets of different generation. Eliot also inks that the poet's conformity into tradition is an act of rigorous intellectual efforts that constitute a poet in him. Eliot further defines the idea of historical sense and says: The historical sense which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal, and of timeless and temporal together, is what makes a writer tradition. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acute by conscious of his place in time of his contemporaneity. The excerpt from the essay makes it clear that Eliot puts the whole term in a much wider context than it is otherwise used before. Eliot takes tradition to be an embodiment of values and beliefs shared by a race which leads to the idea that there is a process of natural selection and rejection. The values and the belief that die with the passage of time are subject to rejection. The values and beliefs that constitute the tradition are living one with capacity of mutual interaction. The old and the new interpenetrate and this interpenetration results into a new order defined in terms of the simultaneous existence of the values of the past and the present. The survival of past ratifies the presentness of it. The simultaneous existence of the past and the present, of the old and the new. It is, thus, evident that the poet is guided chiefly by the dynamics of the tradition. Eliot further elaborates: No poet, no artist has a complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation in the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone, you must set him from contrast and comparison among the dead.

Eliot reaffirms that the poet, in order to survive as a poet must invite close contrast and comparison with the dead poets. Unless, a poet is capable of doing that he ceases to matter in the history of poetry. Richard Shusterman rightly observes that the ‘enduring demands preserved in a tradition make it capable of functioning as a synchronize structural system’. Raman Selden observes that 'the standard theories of literature often combine these apparently disparate modes of thinking'.
It is remarkable that these apparently disparate modes of thinking are disciplined by values. The relation between the new work of art and the tradition is another very complex idea enshrined in the essay. It is, however, true that the complete meaning of the poet is realized through his relationship with the tradition but the importance of individual talent cannot be set aside in a discussion on the Eliot’s poetics. It is again noteworthy that the tradition and individual talent are not at a sharp contrast with each other but they are mutually complimentary. Eliot conceives tradition and individual talent as unifiable and show that the two have an equally important role to play in poetic creation. The views of Jean Michael Rabate capture our attention. He commenting on the function of historical sense in the caste of an individual talent says: *This requires that the “bones” belong to the individual who recomposes simultaneity at every moment without losing a combination of the timeless and the merely temporal.* Individual talent is needed to acquire the sense of tradition. Eliot lays good emphasis on the idea of interactivity between the tradition and individual talent. If the individual talent needs to acquire tradition, then the individual talent in turn modifies tradition. Eliot ratifies the dynamic nature of tradition. *The existing monument form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art towards the whole are readjusted; and this in conformity between the old and the new.* The above quoted lines make clear the cyclic interdependence between tradition and individual talent. Shusterman’s view again oblige inclusion, ‘Old and new elements’, he points out, ‘derive their meaning from their reciprocal relations of contrast and coherence, in a larger whole of tradition which they themselves constitute as parts’. It is evident from the views of Shusterman that tradition is not anything fixed or static but it is something dynamic and everchanging. Every new participation in the tradition results into restructuring of the same tradition with different emphasis. It is constantly growing and changing and becoming different from what it has been earlier. The past directs the present and is modified by the present. This is an apt revelation of the traditional capabilities of a poet. The past helps us understand the present and the present throws light on the past. The new work of art is judged by the standards set by the past. It is in the light of the past alone that an individual talent can be. This is the way Eliot subtly reconciles the tradition and the individual talent. Eliot’s views on tradition paves way for the theorization of the impersonality in art and poetry. Divergent views about Eliot’s theory of objectivity have been discussed but it is observed that critics tend to generalize the theory to a common experience. It is noticeable that the impersonality that Eliot discusses in his criticism does not imply a mechanical objectivity of a hoarding painter, but, it owes its genesis to the personality that emerges out of the creative personality of the poet. It is understandable that Eliot denies an outright and blind adherence to some peculiar faiths and belief but an emancipation from what is very personal on peculiar. He says: ...... the poet has not a personality to express but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experience combine in a peculiar and unexpected ways. Impressions and experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the personality. It is clear from the above quotation that Eliot lays heavy stress on the two different aspect of a creator what he is as an individual and at the same time what he is as a creator; It is an easy inference from the above equation that Eliot’s to his critical theories discards the emotion of strictly personal significance and centers his ideals on the transformation of what is personal but something of universal significance. The above quoted excerpts from “Tradition and Individual Talent” put forth a belligerently anti romantic view of poetry which lays emphasis on poetry and discards the very idea of the personality of the poet. It is obligatory to remember Aristotle as this point of time who, against all odds takes ‘plot’ to be the ‘soul of the tragedy’ and claims that ‘there can be tragedy than a character but not without a plot’.11 Eliot in these lines discovers a new possibility of a universal meaning, which free from the whims and eccentricities of the poet and
has a wider significance. The comparison made out by Eliot between the mind of the poet and the
catalyst in a chemical reaction further confirms the point of view. He says: When the two gases,
previously mentioned are mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum they form sulphurous
acid. This combination takes place, only if the platinum is present, nevertheless the newly formed
acid contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected. The analogy
that Eliot puts forth makes it clear that the poetry is something entirely different from what is the
personal identity of the poet. This is principally the reason that Eliot, all along the length and
breadth of his critical writings, makes frequent use of terms like ‘transmute’, ‘transform’, ‘digest’,
etc. He further suggests: ... but the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him
will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest
and transmute the passions which are its material.

**Tradition and Individual Talent**

**Critical commentary manifesto of eliot's critical creed.** The essay “tradition and individual
talent” was first published in 1919 in the times literary supplement, as a critical article. The essay
may be regarded as an unofficial manifesto of eliot’s critical creed, for it contains all those critical
principles from which his criticism has been derived ever since. The seed which have been sown
here come to fryttion in his subsequent essays. It is a declaration of eliot’s critical creed and these
principles are the basis of all his subsequent criticism. Its Three Parts.

**The Essay is Divided Into Three Parts**

The first part gives us eliot’s concept of tradition, and in the second part is developed his theory
of the impersonality of poetry. The short third part is in the nature of a conclusion, or summing up
of the whole discussion.

**Tradition : Ways on which it can be acquired** For eliot, tradition is a matter of much wider
significance. Tradition in the true sense of the term cannot be inherited, it can only be obtained by
hard labour. This this labour is the labours of the knowing the past writers. It is the critical labour
of shifting the good and useful. Tradition can be obtained only by those who have the historical
sense.

The historical sense involves a perception “not only of the pastness of the part, but also of its
present sense. One who has the historical sense feels that the whole of the literature of europe from roman
down to his own day, including the literature of his own century, forms one continuous literary
tradition.

He realises the past exists in present, and the past and present form one simultaneous order. This
historica sense is the sense of timeless and the temporal, as well as of the timeless and the temporal
together. It is this historic sense which makes a writer traditional. A writer with the sense of
tradition is fully conscius of his own genration, of his place in the present, but he is also acutely
conseious of his relationship with the writer of the past.

**Dynamic Conception Of Tradition : Emphasising future the value of tradition, eliot points out that
no writers has his value and significance in isolation to judge the work of a poet or an artist, we
must compare and contrast his work with the work of poet and artist in the past. Such comparison
and contrast is essential for forming an idea a new the real worth and significance of a new writer
and his work. Eliot's conception of tradition is a dynamic one.**

According to his view, tradition is not anything fixed and sttic, it is constantly changing, growing
and becoming different from what it is a writer in the present must seek guidance from the past,
he must conform to the literary tradition, but just as the past directs and guides the present, so the
present alters and modifies the past when a new work of art is created, if it is a really new and
original the whole literary tradition is modified though ever so sligtly.
Its Function: The work of a poet in the present is to be compared and contrasted with works of the past, and judged by the standards of the past. But this judgement does not mean determining good or bad; it does not mean deciding whether the present work is better or worse than works of the past. It is only to be judged by the principles and standards of the past the comparison is to be made for knowing the facts, all the facts, about the new work of art. The comparison is made for the purposes of analysis, and for forming a better understanding of the new.

The past helps us to understand the present, and he throws light on the past. It is this way along that we can form an idea of what is really individual and new. It is by comparison along that we can sift the traditional from individual elements in a given work of art.

Sense of Tradition: Eliot now explains what he means by a sense of tradition. The sense of tradition does not mean that the poet should know the past as whole, take it to be lump or mass without any discrimination. Such a course is impossible as well as undesirable.

A sense of tradition in the real sense means consciousness, “of the main current, which does not at all flow invariably through the most distinguished reputation.” In other words, to know the tradition, the poet must judge critically what are the main trends and what are not. He must confine himself to the main trends to the exclusion of all that is incidental or topical.

The poet must also realise that art never improves, though its material is never the same. The great works of art never lose their significance, for there is no qualitative improvement in art. There may be refinement, there may be development. But from the point of view of the artist there is no improvement.

Impersonality of Poetry: The artist must continually surrender himself to something which is more valuable than himself, i.e., the literary tradition. He must allow his poetic sensibility to be shaped and modified by the past. He must continue to acquire the sense of tradition throughout his career in the beginning, his self, his individuality, may assert itself, but as power mature there must be greater and greater extinction of personality. He must acquire greater and greater objectivity. His emotions and passion must be depersonalised: he must be as impersonal and objective as a scientist. The personality of the artist is not important: the important thing is his sense of ‘tradition’ — a good poem is a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been written.

Thus the poet’s personality is merely a medium, having the same significance as catalytic agent, or a receptacle in which chemical reactions take place. That is why the poet holds that, “honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is direct not upon the poet but upon the poetry.”

The Poetics Process: In the second part of the essay Eliot develops further his theory of the impersonality of poetry. He compares the mind of the poet to a catalyst and the process of a chemical reaction, just as chemical reactions take place in the presence of a catalyst along, so also the poet’s mind is the catalytic agent for combining different emotions into something new. Suppose there is a jar containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide. These two gases combine to form sulphurous acid when a fine filament of platinum is introduced into the jar. The combination takes place only in the presence of the place of platinum, but the metal itself does not undergo any change, it remains inert, neutral and un affected. The mind of the poet is like the catalytic agent. It is necessary for combinations of emotions and experiences to take place, but itself does not undergo any change during the process of poetic combination.

In the case of a young and immature poet, his mind, his personal emotions and experiences, may find some expression in his composition, but says Eliot, “the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man and the mind which creates”. T.S. Eliot here distinguishes between emotions and feelings, but he does not state what this difference is.

Nowhere else in his writings says A.G. George, “is this distinction maintained: neither does he adequately distinguish between the meaning of the two words.” The distinction should, therefore, be ignored more as it has bearing on his impersonal theory of poetry.
Notes

Poetry as Organisation:- Eliot next compares the poet’s mind to a jar or receptable in which are stored numberless feeling, emotions etc. Which remain there is an organised and chaotic form till “all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together”. Thus poetry is organisation rather then inspiration impression and experience which are important in for the man way find no place in his poetry, and those which become important in the poetry amy have no significance for the man.

Eliot’s rejects words woth’s theory of poetry. Having its origin “emotions recollected in tranquility”. And points out that in the process of poetic composition there is neither emotion, nor recollection for tranquility. In the poetic process there is only concentration of a number of experincess, and anew thing results from concentration. And this process of concentration is neither conscious nor deliberate : it is a passice one.

The difference between a good and a bad poet is that a bad is conscious and unconscious where he should be conscious. It is this consciousness of the wrong kind which makes a poem personal, whereas mature art must be impersonal, but eliot dose not tell us when a poet should be conscious, and when not. The point has been left vague and interminate.

Poetry As Escape from Personality :- Eliot conclude: “poetry is not a turing loose of emotion, but as escape from emotion: it is not the expression of personality,but an escape from personality”. Thus, eloit dose not deny personality or emotion to the poet only , the must depersonalise his emotions. There should be exitinotion of his personality this impersonamility can be achived only when the poet surrenders himself completely to the work that is to be done and the poet can know what is to be done , only if he acquires a sense of traditon, the historic sense, which makes him conscious, not only of the present, but also of the present movement of the past, not only of what is dead, but of what is already living.

Self-Assessment

1. Choose the correct option:
   1. “Honest Criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry”. Can be elucidate as ........
      (a) Only the poets can make honest criticism and sensitive appreciation of his own poetry.
      (b) Sincere criticism has to focus on the poet’s personality which would in turn lead him to neglect his poetic contribution.
      (c) The focus of literary criticism has to shift from author to the text. The poet is not supposed to compose poetry which is full of his personal emotions.
      (d) None of the above
   2. Eliot’s attention shifts in the second section from ........ to ...........
      (a) Tradition, individual talent
      (b) The author, the text
      (c) Individual talent, tradition
      (d) The text, author
   3. According to Eliot the emotion of art is ...........
      (a) Impersonal
      (b) Personal
      (c) Inaccurate
      (d) Spontaneous
   4. Eliot has not completed his notion of tradition in this essay; he develops it further in ........
      (a) ‘Notes towards a definition on culture’.
5. T. S. Eliot defines poetry as ……

(a) “The spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling: it takes its origins from emotion recollected in tranquility.

(b) “Not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.”

(c) “A metrical composition which is a blissful blend of emotions and intellect.

(d) None of the above

30.4 Summary

- Thus, Eliot denounces the romantic criticism of the nineteenth century (particularly Wordsworth’s theory of poetry); second, it underlines the importance of ‘tradition’ and examines the correlation between ‘tradition’ and ‘individual talent’ and finally, it announces the death of the author (i.e., the empirical author, the author in the biographical sense of term) and shifts the focus from the author to the text.

- Tradition and Individual Talent” is one of the more well known works that T. S. Eliot has produced in his critic capacity. It formulates Elliot’s conception of the relationship between the poet and the literary tradition which precedes him.

- In “Tradition and Individual Talent” Eliot presents his conception of tradition and the definition of the poet and poetry in relation to it. He wishes to correct for the fact that, as he perceives it, “in English writing we seldom speak of tradition, though we occasionally apply its name in deploring its absence.”

- Eliot posits that, though the English tradition generally upholds the belief that art progresses through change - a separation from tradition, literary advancements are instead recognized only when they conform to the tradition. Eliot, a classicist, felt that the true incorporation of tradition into literature was unrecognized, that tradition, a word that “seldom…..appear in phase of censure”, was actually a thus-far unrealized element of literary criticism.

- For Eliot, the term “tradition” is imbued with a special and complex character. It represents a “simultaneous order,” by which Eliot means a historical timelessness – a fusion of past and present – and, at the same time, a sense of present temporality. A poet must embody “the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer,” while, simultaneously, expressing his contemporary environment. Eliot challenges our common perception that a poet’s greatness and individuality lies in his departure from his predecessors. Rather, Eliot argues that “the most individual parts of his (the poet) work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously.” Eliot claims that this “historical sense,” that is, not only a resemblance to traditional works, but an awareness and understanding of their relation to his poetry.

- But, this fidelity to tradition does not require the great poet to forfeit novelty in an act of surrender to repetition. Rather, Eliot has a much more dynamic and progressive conception of the poetic process. Novelty is possible, and only possible, through tapping into tradition. When a poet engages in the creation of new work, he realizes an aesthetic “ideal order,” as it has been established by the literary tradition that has come before him. As such, the act of artistic creation does not take place in a vacuum. The introduction of a new work alters the cohesion of this existing order, and causes a readjustment of the old in order to accommodate the new. Thus, the inclusion of the new work alters the way in which the past is seen,
elements of the past that are noted and realized. In Eliot’s own words: “What happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art that preceded it.” Eliot refers to this organic tradition, this developing canon, as the “mind of Europe.” The private mind is subsumed by this more massive one.

- Despite the title of the essay, Eliot never directly mentions the word talent once. Instead, he seems to focus solely on the “tradition” aspect of his essay. This implies that the “Individual Talent” mentioned here is not what is conventionally considered to be talent, but instead, in Eliot’s definition, it is in fact the ability to connect with Tradition (Eliot’s definition), and create something which has the merit to become a part of it.

- The implications here separate Eliot’s idea of talent from the conventional definition (just as his idea of Tradition is separate from the conventional definition), one so far from it, perhaps, that he chooses never to directly label it as talent. Whereas the conventional definition of talent, especially in the arts, is a genius that one is born with. Not so for Eliot. Instead, talent is acquired through a careful study of poetry, claiming that Tradition, “cannot be inherited, and if you want it, you must obtain it by great labour.” Eliot asserts that it is absolutely necessary for the poet to be studied, to have an understanding of the poets before him, and to be well versed enough that he can understand and incorporate the “mind of Europe” into his poetry. But the poet’s study is unique – it is knowledge which “does not encroach,” and which does not “deaden or pervert poetic sensibility.” It is, to put it most simply, a poetic knowledge – knowledge observed through a poetic lens. This ideal implies that knowledge gleaned by a poet is not knowledge of facts, but knowledge which leads to a greater understanding of the mind of Europe. As Eliot explains, “Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum.”

- Such is the essence of Eliot’s widely influential argument. It is an argument that has given shape to large portions of subsequent literary critical awareness. Many more recent students of literature have taken their cues from this essay and other essays by Eliot. And Eliot’s presence can be felt even in works that travel in other directions. For example, the basic tension between the individual writer and traditions, between the poet and his forbears, is read quite differently in Harold Bloom’s “The anxiety of Influence: A Theory of poetry”.

- In short, Eliot’s essay has been, in a current critical term, a seminal essay. That is, much has grown from the terrain cultivated by Eliot’s spade in this work.

### 30.5 Key-Words

1. Plutarch: The Greek historian Plutarch (c. 46-114 A.D.) wrote about important Greeks and Romans in his Parallel Lives. He started with contemporary historical figures like Julius Caesar and Mark Anthony, and went back to mythical figures like Theseus, in ancient Athens, and Romulus, founder of Rome. Shakespeare’s Roman plays were inspired by his reading of Plutarch’s Lives, translated into English by North.

2. Valorized: to valorize is to raise the value of something, to invest it with special significance.

### 30.6 Review Questions

1. Discuss T. S. Eliot as a Critic.
2. Briefly describe the essay tradition and individual talent.
3. What is Eliot’s definition of criticism? What guidelines does he give for the practice of criticism?
4. Does Eliot’s critical practice conform to the guidelines he has given for the critic?
Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (c) (ii) (a) (iii) (d) (iv) (b) (v) (a)

30.7 Further Readings

Unit 31: G.K. Chesterton-On Lying In Bed:  
Introduction and Detailed Study

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Discuss the life and works of G.K. Chesterton
• Introduce the essay On Lying in Bed

Introduction
G. K. Chesterton was one of the dominating figures of the London literary scene in the early twentieth century. Not only did he get into lively discussions with anyone who would debate him, including his friend, frequent verbal sparring partner, and noted Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw, but he wrote about seemingly every topic, in every genre, from journalism to plays, poetry to crime novels. “He said something about everything and he said it better than anyone else,” declared Dale Ahlquist, president of the American Chester Society, on the society’s Web site. Most of Chesterton’s literary output was nonfiction, including thousands of columns for various periodicals, but today he is best remembered for his fictional work—a mystery series about Father Brown, a Catholic priest and amateur detective.

Chesterton began his literary career as a manuscript reader for a London publishing house, but he soon moved into writing art criticism. When his friends formed a journal, the Speaker, Chesterton contributed a series of articles, and soon began writing for the London Daily News and Bookman as well. Before long, people were taking notice of his work. Ian Boyd explained in the Dictionary of Literary Biography, “He belonged to that category of writer which used to be called the man of letters, and like the typical man of letters he wrote journalism which included a wide variety of literary forms and literature which possessed many of the characteristics of journalism.”

Did you know? Chesterton’s first published books were of poetry, seemingly a far cry from his column-writing. But Boyd noticed a “close connection between his poetry and his everyday journalism.”

Boyd concluded: “In this sense, T. S. Eliot’s description of Chesterton’s poetry as ‘first-rate journalistic balladry’ turns out to have been particularly perceptive, since it is a reminder about
the essential character of all Chesterton’s work. In his verse, as in all his writings, his first aim was to comment on the political and social questions of the day.”

Chesterton’s first novel, the manuscript of which was discovered in a steamer trunk in 1989, was published for the first time in 2001. Basil Howe was written in 1893, shortly after Chesterton graduated from school. Although, as critics noted, the book is clearly the work of an inexperienced, unformed writer, it shows hints of Chesterton’s future style—including the witticisms for which he would later become famous—and provides insights into his frame of mind during this stage in his life. It has long been known that Chesterton underwent a period of philosophical soul-searching during his young adulthood that was so intense that some of his friends thought he was losing his mind, and Basil Howe is assumed to have been written during that time. “Those familiar with Chesterton’s teenage years will see much of the author in” the book, Mark Knight commented in English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920, although he cautioned against reading the book as autobiography rather than as a novel.

Although best known nowadays for his detective fiction, Chesterton first gained public attention as a journalist and social philosopher; he actually wrote the popular, lucrative Father Brown mysteries in part to bankroll his less financially rewarding work. Questions of religion and morality were prominent in his writings. His book What’s Wrong with the World advocated Distributism, a social philosophy that divided property holders into small communities, trying to foster neighborliness. Chesterton viewed Distributism as a counter to Socialism and Capitalism, ideologies that, he felt, reduced people to inhumane units. Stephen Metcalf, writing in the Times Literary Supplement, pointed out that this philosophy, also expounded in the 1904 novel The Napoleon of Notting Hill, more accurately reflects modern society’s problems than does George Orwell’s classic 1984: “It is not only . . . that Chesterton cared passionately for what ordinary humanity feels and thinks,” Metcalf stated. “It is also that he had particular convictions about how one should understand humanity.”

Much of Chesterton’s work reflected his social concern. Using literary devices such as parable and allegory, he sought to bring about social changes that embodied his religious and political beliefs. His novels, reported Brian Murray in the Dictionary of Literary Biography, “are as frequently called romances, extravaganzas, fantasies, parables, or allegories. For while they are thick with the details of everyday life, Chesterton’s hastily written book-length fictions are outlandishly plotted and, in the main, unabashedly didactic.”

This didacticism has alienated modern readers from some of Chesterton’s fiction. His detective stories, however, remain popular. Chesterton himself was very fond of the detective story and recognized that much of his writing was pedantic and would probably not survive him. “Chesterton assumed that he would never be considered a novelist of enormous importance,” asserted Murray; “that, as a writer of fiction, he would always remain best known for the long series of Father Brown stories he began with The Innocence of Father Brown in 1911—stories he sometimes tossed off in a day or two.” Loosely based upon Chesterton’s friend, the Roman Catholic priest John O’Connor, Father Brown “drops typical Chestertonian quips as he solves ghastly transgressions not with Holmes-sharp logic but by ‘getting inside’ the criminal mind,” according to Murray. Rather than using deductive methods to discover the perpetrator of a crime, Father Brown—whom Chesterton depicted in his Autobiography as “shabby and shapeless [in appearance], his face round and expressionless, his manners clumsy”—bases his conclusions on his knowledge of
human nature. This knowledge is drawn in part from his experience in the confessional box, but also from his recognition of his own capacity for evil. “The little priest could see,” stated Ronald Knox in his introduction to Father Brown: Selected Stories, “not as a psychologist, but as a moralist, into the dark places of the human heart; could guess, therefore, at what point envy, or fear, or resentment would pass the bounds of the normal, and the cords of convention would snap, so that a man was hurried into crime.” “To Father Brown,” wrote Eric Routley in The Puritan Pleasures of the Detective Story: A Personal Monograph, “any criminal is a good man gone wrong. He is not an evil man who has cut himself off from the comprehension or sympathy of those who labour to be good.” To this end, Brown is not primarily interested in solving the case, but in getting the criminal to confess his sin and repent, thereby saving his soul.

Father Brown remains, in the minds of most readers, Chesterton’s greatest creation, although his contribution to the art of mystery writing is also recognized. “If Chesterton had not created Father Brown,” Leitch declared, “his detective fiction would rarely be read today, but his place in the historical development of the genre would still be secure.” Even in his own day, Chesterton was considered to be the father of the detective tale. As Leitch noted, when the Detection Club was founded in 1928, “Chesterton, not Conan Doyle [creator of Sherlock Holmes] . . . became its first president and served in this capacity until his death.” Not only did Chesterton write detective stories, he also wrote several critical essays about the proper form and style of such works.

Under the influence of Chesterton’s Father Brown, the mystery story became less a portrait of the detective’s personality, and more a puzzle that the detective and the reader could both solve. “Chesterton’s determination to provide his audience with all the clues available to his detectives,” stated Leitch, “has been so widely imitated as to become the defining characteristic of the formal or golden age period (roughly 1920-1940) in detective fiction. . . . Modern readers, for whom the term whodunit has become synonymous with detective story, forget that the concealment of the criminal’s identity as the central mystery of the story is a relatively modern convention.” In the end, H. R. F. Keating (himself a prominent mystery writer) concluded in the St. James Guide to Crime and Mystery Writers, “Chesterton’s fame rests on the priest with ‘the harmless, human name of Brown’ and it will endure.” Fellow British essayist Hilaire Belloc said of G.K. Chesterton that “the intellectual side of him has been masked for many and for some hidden by his delight in the exercise of words and especially in the comedy of words. . . . [His] was a voice from which I learnt continually, from the first day I heard it until the last; acquiring from it discoveries, explanations, definitions which continue to increase my possessions” (The Observer, June 21, 1936). Chesterton’s frequently anthologized essay “On Lying in Bed” originally appeared in the collection Tremendous Trifles (1909).

31.1 Text—On Lying in Bed

Lying in bed would be an altogether perfect and supreme experience if only one had a coloured pencil long enough to draw on the ceiling. This, however, is not generally a part of the domestic apparatus on the premises. I think myself that the thing might be managed with several pails of Aspinall and a broom. Only if one worked in a really sweeping and masterly way, and laid on the colour in great washes, it might drip down again on one’s face in floods of rich and mingled colour like some strange fairy rain; and that would have its disadvantages. I am afraid it would be necessary to stick to black and white in this form of artistic composition. To that purpose, indeed, the white ceiling would be of the greatest possible use; in fact it is the only use I think of a white ceiling being put to.

But for the beautiful experiment of lying in bed I might never have discovered it. For years I have been looking for some blank spaces in a modern house to draw on. Paper is much too small for any really allegorical design; as Cyrano de Bergerac says: “Il me faut des géants.” But when I tried to find these fine clear spaces in the modern rooms such as we all live in I was continually disappointed. I found an endless pattern and complication of small objects hung like a curtain of fine links between me and my desire. I examined the walls; I found them to my surprise to be
already covered with wall-paper, and I found the wall-paper to be already covered with very uninteresting images, all bearing a ridiculous resemblance to each other. I could not understand why one arbitrary symbol (a symbol apparently entirely devoid of any religious or philosophical significance) should thus be sprinkled all over my nice walls like a sort of small-pox. The Bible must be referring to wall-papers, I think, when it says “Use not vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do.” I found the Turkey carpet a mass of unmeaning colours, rather like the Turkish Empire, or like the sweetmeat called Turkish delight. I do not exactly know what Turkish delight really is; but I suppose it is Macedonian Massacres. Everywhere that I went forlornly, with my pencil or my paint brush, I found that others had unaccountably been before me, spoiling the walls, the curtains, and the furniture with their childish and barbaric designs.

Nowhere did I find a really clear place for sketching until this occasion when I prolonged beyond the proper limit the process of lying on my back in bed. Then the light of that white heaven broke upon my vision, that breadth of mere white which is indeed almost the definition of Paradise, since it means purity and also means freedom. But alas! like all heavens, now that it is seen it is found to be unattainable; it looks more austere and more distant than the blue sky outside the window. For my proposal to paint on it with the bristly end of a broom has been discouraged—never mind by whom; by a person debarred from all political rights—and even my minor proposal to put the other end of the broom into the kitchen fire and turn it into charcoal has not been conceded. Yet I am certain that it was from persons in my position that all the original inspiration came for covering the ceilings of palaces and cathedrals with a riot of fallen angels or victorious gods. I am sure that it was only because Michael Angelo was engaged in the ancient and honourable occupation of lying in bed that he ever realised how the roof of the Sistine Chapel might be made into an awful imitation of a divine drama that could only be acted in the heavens.

The tone now commonly taken towards the practice of lying in bed is hypocritical and unhealthy. Of all the marks of modernity that seem to mean a kind of decadence, there is none more menacing and dangerous than the exultation of very small and secondary matters of conduct at the expense of very great and primary ones, at the expense of eternal public and tragic human morality. If there is one thing worse than the modern weakening of major morals it is the modern strengthening of minor morals. Thus it is considered more withering to accuse a man of bad taste than of bad ethics. A playwright can attack the institution of marriage so long as he does not misrepresent the manners of society, and I have met Ibsenite pessimists who thought it wrong to take beer but right to take prussic acid. Especially this is so in matters of hygiene; notably such matters as lying in bed. Instead of being regarded, as it ought to be, as a matter of personal convenience and adjustment, it has come to be regarded by many as if it were a part of essential morals to get up early in the morning. It is upon the whole part of practical wisdom; but there is nothing good about it or bad about its opposite.

Did you know? Cleanliness is not next to godliness nowadays, for cleanliness is made an essential and godliness is regarded as an offence.

Misers get up early in the morning; and burglars, I am informed, get up the night before. It is the great peril of our society that all its mechanism may grow more fixed while its spirit grows more fickle. A man’s minor actions and arrangements ought to be free, flexible, creative; the things that should be unchangeable are his principles, his ideals. But with us the reverse is true; our views change constantly; but our lunch does not change. Now, I should like men to have strong and rooted conceptions, but as for their lunch, let them have it sometimes in the garden, sometimes in bed, sometimes on the roof, sometimes in the top of a tree. Let them argue from the same first principles, but let them do it in a bed, or a boat, or a balloon. This alarming growth of good habits...
really means a too great emphasis on those virtues which mere custom can misuse, it means too little emphasis on those virtues which custom can never quite ensure, sudden and splendid virtues of inspired pity or of inspired candour. If ever that abrupt appeal is made to us we may fail. A man can get used to getting up at five o’clock in the morning. A man cannot very well get used to being burnt for his opinions; the first experiment is commonly fatal. Let us pay a little more attention to these possibilities of the heroic and the unexpected. I daresay that when I get out of this bed I shall do some deed of an almost terrible virtue.

For those who study the great art of lying in bed there is one emphatic caution to be added. Even for those who can do their work in bed (like journalists), still more for those whose work cannot be done in bed (as, for example, the professional harpooner of whales), it is obvious that the indulgence must be very occasional. But that is not the caution I mean. The caution is this: if you do lie in bed, be sure you do it without any reason or justification at all. I do not speak, of course, of the seriously sick. But if a healthy man lies in bed, let him do it without a rag of excuse; then he will get up a healthy man. If he does it for some secondary hygienic reason, if he has some scientific explanation, he may get up a hypochondriac.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Chesterton’s first published books were of

   (a) Prose  (b) Essays
   (c) Poetry  (d) None of these

   (ii) George Bernard Shaw was

   (a) Irish Playwright  (b) Germany Playwright
   (c) British Playwright  (d) None of these

   (iii) Chesterton’s first novel was published in:

   (a) 2000  (b) 2001  (c) 2010  (d) 1995

   (iv) The Essay “On Lying in Bed” originally appeared in

   (a) 1909  (b) 1910  (c) 1912  (d) 1908

31.2 Summary

- In this short essay, G. K. Chesterton is able to display his absolute understanding of human nature. He explains this nature through humor and wit in this particular essay, On Lying in Bed. According to this essay, Chesterton has developed three parts to human nature. The first part is that items that are desired by humans can often be found in unusually normal places. The second part is that humans have begun to aggrandize trivial morals and to debase major morals. The final part to his outlook on human nature is that the lives of humans have become exceedingly mechanical. These are the topics explained by G. K. Chesterton in this essay.

- Chesterton begins his essay by discussing his idea that items longed for by humans can be found in normal places. He does this in the essay by describing his pursuit of a perfect space to paint. He states that he looks on walls, paper, and several other places. His search, however, comes to end in the most normal of places, the ceiling above his bed. In the essay he realizes that he has found his object of desire in a rather ordinary place. In a similar way, people in today’s society can find their desires in places that are rather customary. We, however, are not looking for a place to paint. In the many items we covet, many can be found in regular locations. Frequently, we look in unusual places for these items, when they are actually located directly “under our nose.” This shows the first part of the human nature presented by G. K. Chesterton.
• The second part of Chesterton’s essay displays his next theory on human nature. This second theory, that humans promote unimportant values and cheapen important values, is shown by examples in the next part of the essay. He interweaves this theory into the essay again by using the example of lying in bed. He demonstrates that people have begun to believe that lying in bed is worthless, while in fact, it is vital to life to lie in bed at some point.

• Likewise, people in modern society have priorities jumbled. Some people now believe that it is more important to make money than to work hard. They believe that supporting one’s self is more important than helping others. If these people would read this essay, they would realize that their values are mixed, and that in the end, they will regret it because they will feel unfulfilled.

• The third and final part of Chesterton’s essay deals with his idea that life has become a monotonous task for some people. He shows this by demonstrating that it is more beneficial to lie in bed spontaneously than to lie in bed after examining the pros and cons of it. He states that it can be detrimental to maintain the same routine without surprises.

• Similarly, people today live a mechanical life. This part of human nature can be found even in myself. Often, I find myself repeating the same schedule for weeks. Soon, I realize that my life has become very boring. This essay shows that when something spontaneous is done in my life, it will become more exciting.

• In short, G. K. Chesterton’s essay, On Lying in Bed, demonstrates his complete understanding of humans and their nature. He does this by showing the three parts of his theory on human nature. First of all, humans are unable to find items that are in obvious locations. Secondly, people have begun to mix order of priorities. Finally, people live terribly mechanical lives. By showing his theory, people in the modern world are able to read his essay and improve their lives.

31.3 Key-Words

1. Didacticism : Morally Instructive.
2. Hypocritical : A person who pretends to have virtue.

31.4 Review Questions

1. Briefly explain the life and works of G.K. Chesterton.
2. Discuss Chesterton’s views On Lying in Bed.

Answers: Self-Assessment

1. (i) (c) (ii) (a) (iii) (b) (iv) (a)

31.5 Further Readings

1. Banshi Dhar, G.K. Chesterton and the twentieth century english essays, S. Chand and Company Ltd.
Unit 32: G.K. Chesterton-On Lying In Bed: Critical Appreciation cum Analysis

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Objectives
After reading this Unit students will be able to:
• Know about Chesterton as a Critic.
• Examine Chesterton’s essay ‘On Lying in Bed.’

Introduction
Gilbert Keith Chesterton was a prolific English critic and author of verse, essays, novels, and short stories. He is probably best known for his series about the priest-detective Father Brown who appeared in 50 stories. Between 1900 and 1936 Chesterton published some one hundred books.

G.K. Chesterton was born in London into a middle-class family on May 29, 1874. He studied at University College and the Slade School of Art (1893-96). Around 1893 he had gone through a crisis of skepticism and depression and during this period he experimented with the Ouija board and grew fascinated with diabolism. In 1895 Chesterton left University College without a degree and worked for the London publisher Redway, and T. Fisher Unwin (1896-1902). Chesterton later renewed his Christian faith; the courtship of his future wife, Frances Blogg, whom he married in 1901 also helped him to pull himself out of his spiritual crisis.

In 1900 appeared Greybeards At Play, Chesterton’s first collection of poems. Robert Browning (1903) and Charles Dickens (1906) were literary biographies. The Napoleon Of Notting Hill (1904) was Chesterton’s first novel, a political fantasy, in which London is seen as a city of hidden fairytale glitter. In The Man Who Was Thursday (1908) Chesterton depicted fin-de-siècle decadence.

Did you know? In 1909 Chesterton moved with his wife to Beaconsfield, a village twenty-five miles west of London, and continued to write, lecture, and travel energetically.

Between 1913 and 1914 Chesterton was a regular contributor for the Daily Herald. In 1914 he suffered a physical and nervous breakdown. After World War I Chesterton became leader of the Distributist movement and later the President of the Distributist League, promoting the idea that
private property should be divided into smallest possible freeholds and then distributed throughout society.

In 1922 Chesterton was converted from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism, and thereafter he wrote several theologically oriented works, including lives of Francis of Assisi and Thomas Aquinas. He received honorary degrees from Edinburgh, Dublin, and Notre Dame universities. Chesterton died on June 14, 1936, at his home in Beaconsfield. The above biography is copyrighted. Do not republish it without permission.

32.1 Critical Appreciation—On Lying in Bed

There is on record the case of a man who, after some fourteen years of robust health, spent a week in bed. His illness was apparently due to a violent cold, but he confessed, on medical cross-examination, that the real and underlying cause was the steady reading of Mr. Chesterton’s books for several days on end.

No one will accuse Mr. Chesterton of being an unhealthy writer. On the contrary, he is among the most wholesome writers now alive. He is irresistibly exhilarating, and he inspires his readers with a constant inclination to rise up and shout. Perhaps his danger lies in that very fact, and in the exhaustion of the nerves which such sustained exhilaration is apt to produce. But besides this, he, like so many of our contemporaries, has written such a bewildering quantity of literature on such an amazing variety of subjects, that it is no wonder if sometimes the reader follows panting, through the giddy mazes of the dance. He is the sworn enemy of specialisation, as he explains in his remarkable essay on “The Twelve Men.” The subject of the essay is the British jury, and its thesis is that when our civilisation “wants a library to be catalogued, or a solar system discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it uses up its specialists. But when it wishes anything done which is really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary men standing round. The same thing was done, if I remember right, by the Founder of Christianity.” For the judging of a criminal or the propagation of the gospel, it is necessary to procure inexpert people—people who come to their task with a virgin eye, and see not what the expert (who has lost his freshness) sees, but the human facts of the case. So Mr. Chesterton insists upon not being a specialist, takes the world for his parish, and wanders over it at will.

This being so, it is obvious that he cannot possibly remember all that he has said, and must necessarily abound in inconsistencies and even contradictions. Yet that is by no means always unconscious, but is due in many instances to the very complex quality and subtle habit of his mind. Were he by any chance to read this statement he would deny it fiercely, but we would repeat it with perfect calmness, knowing that he would probably have denied any other statement we might have made upon the subject. His subtlety is partly due to the extraordinary rapidity with which his mind leaps from one subject to another, partly to the fact that he is so full of ideas that many of his essays (like Mr. Bernard Shaw’s plays) find it next to impossible to get themselves begun. He is so full of matter that he never seems to be able to say what he wants to say, until he has said a dozen other things first.

The present lecture is mainly concerned with his central position, as that is expounded in Heretics and Orthodoxy. Our task is not to criticise, nor even to any considerable extent to characterise his views, but to state them as accurately as we can. It is a remarkable phenomenon of our time that all our literary men are bent on giving us such elaborate and solemnising confessions of their faith. It is an age notorious for its aversion to dogma, and yet here we have Mr. Huxley, Mr. Le Gallienne, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wells (to mention only a few of many), who in this creedless age proclaim in the market-place, each his own private and brand-new creed.

Yet Mr. Chesterton has perhaps a special right to such a proclamation. He believes in creeds vehemently. And, besides, the spiritual biography of a man whose mental development has been so independent and so interesting as his, must be well worth knowing. Amid the many weird theologies of our time we have met with nothing so startling, so arresting, and so suggestive since Mr. Mallock published his New Republic and his Contemporary Superstitions. There is something common to the two points of view. To some, they come as emancipating and most welcome
reinforcements, relieving the beleaguered citadel of faith. But others, who differ widely from them both, may yet find in them so much to stimulate thought and to rehabilitate strongholds held precariously, as to awaken both appreciation and gratitude.

Mr. Chesterton’s political opinions do not concern us here. It is a curious fact, of which innumerable illustrations may be found in past and present writers, that political radicalism so often goes along with conservative theology, and vice versa. Mr. Chesterton is no exception to the rule. His orthodoxy in matters of faith we shall find to be altogether above suspicion. His radicalism in politics is never long silent. He openly proclaims himself at war with Carlyle’s favourite dogma, “The tools to him who can use them.” “The worst form of slavery,” he tells us, “is that which is called Caesarism, or the choice of some bold or brilliant man as despot because he is suitable. For that means that men choose a representative, not because he represents them but because he does not.” And if it be answered that the worst form of cruelty to a nation or to an individual is that abuse of the principle of equality which is for ever putting incompetent people into false positions, he has his reply ready: “The one specially and peculiarly un-Christian idea is the idea of Carlyle—the idea that the man should rule who feels that he can rule. Whatever else is Christian, this is heathen.”

But this, and much else of its kind, although he works it into his general scheme of thinking, is not in any sense an essential part of that scheme. Our subject is his place in the conflict between the paganism and the idealism of the times, and it is a sufficiently large one. But before we come to that, we must consider another matter, which we shall find to be intimately connected with it.

That other matter is his habit of paradox, which is familiar to all his readers. It is a habit of style, but before it became that it was necessarily first a habit of mind, deeply ingrained. He disclaims it so often that we cannot but feel that he protesteth too much. He acknowledges it, and explains that “paradox simply means a certain defiant joy which belongs to belief.” Whether the explanation is or is not perfectly intelligible, it must occur to every one that a writer who finds it necessary to give so remarkable an explanation can hardly be justified in his astonishment when people of merely average intelligence confess themselves puzzled. His aversion to Walter Pater—almost the only writer whom he appears consistently to treat with disrespect—is largely due to Pater’s laborious simplicity of style. But it was a greater than either Walter Pater or Mr. Chesterton who first pointed out that the language which appealed to the understanding of the common man was also that which expressed the highest culture. Mr. Chesterton’s habit of paradox will always obscure his meanings for the common man. He has a vast amount to tell him, but much of it he will never understand.

32.2 Analysis

Paradox, when it has become a habit, is always dangerous. Introduced on rare and fitting occasions, it may be powerful and even convincing, but when it is repeated constantly and upon all sorts of subjects, we cannot but dispute its right and question its validity. Its effect is not conviction but vertigo. It is like trying to live in a house constructed so as to be continually turning upside down. After a certain time, during which terror and dizziness alternate, the most indulgent reader is apt to turn round upon the builder of such a house with some asperity. And, after all, the general judgment may be right and Mr. Chesterton wrong.

Upon analysis, his paradox reveals as its chief and most essential element a certain habit of mind which always tends to see and appreciate the reverse of accepted opinions. So much is this the case that it is possible in many instances to anticipate what he will say upon a subject. It is on record that one reader, coming to his chapter on Omar Khayyám, said to himself, “Now he will be saying that Omar is not drunk enough”; and he went on to read, “It is not poetical drinking, which is joyous and instinctive; it is rational drinking, which is as prosaic as an investment, as unsavoury as a dose of camomile.” Similarly we are told that Browning is only felt to be obscure because he is too pellucid. Such apparent contradictoriness is everywhere in his work, but along with it goes a curious ingenuity and nimbleness of mind. He cannot think about anything without remembering
something else, apparently out of all possible connection with it, and instantly discovering some
clever idea, the introduction of which will bring the two together. Christianity “is not a mixture
like russet or purple; it is rather like a shot silk, for a shot silk is always at right angles, and is in
the pattern of the cross.”

In all this there are certain familiar mechanisms which constitute almost a routine of manipulation
for the manufacture of paradoxes. One such mechanical process is the play with the derivatives of
words. Thus he reminds us that the journalist is, in the literal and derivative sense, a journalist,
while the missionary is an eternalist. Similarly “lunatic,” “evolution,” “progress,” “reform,” are
etymologically tortured into the utterance of the most forcible and surprising truths. This curious
word-play was a favourite method with Ruskin; and it has the disadvantage in Mr. Chesterton
which it had in the earlier critic. It appears too clever to be really sound, although it must be
confessed that it frequently has the power of startling us into thoughts that are valuable and
suggestive.

Another equally simple process is that of simply reversing sentences and ideas. “A good bush
needs no wine.” “Shakespeare (in a weak moment, I think) said that all the world is a stage. But
Shakespeare acted on the much finer principle that a stage is all the world.” Perhaps the most
brilliant example that could be quoted is the plea for the combination of gentleness and ferocity in
Christian character. When the lion lies down with the lamb, it is constantly assumed that the lion
becomes lamblike. “But that is brutal annexation and imperialism on the part of the lamb. That is
simply the lamb absorbing the lion, instead of the lion eating the lamb.”

By this process it is possible to attain results which are extraordinarily brilliant in themselves and
fruitful in suggestion. It is a process not difficult to learn, but the trouble is that you have to live
up to it afterwards, and defend many curious propositions which may have been arrived at by its
so simple means. Take, for instance, the sentence about the stage being all the world. That is
undeniably clever, and it contains an idea. But it is a haphazard idea, arrived at by a short-cut, and
not by the high road of reasonable thinking. Sometimes a truth may be reached by such a short-
cut, but such paradoxes are occasionally no better than chartered errors.

Yet even when they are that, it may be said in their favour that they startle us into thought. And
truly Mr. Chesterton is invaluable as a quickener and stimulator of the minds of his readers.
Moreover, by adopting the method of paradox, he has undoubtedly done one remarkable thing.
He has proved what an astonishing number of paradoxical surprises there actually are, lying
hidden beneath the apparent commonplace of the world. Every really clever paradox astonishes
us not merely with the sense of the cleverness of him who utters it, but with the sense of how
many strange coincidences exist around us, and how many sentences, when turned outside in,
will yield new and startling truths. However much we may suspect that the performance we are
watching is too clever to be trustworthy, yet after all the world does appear to lend itself to such
treatment.

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Notes

There is, for example, the paradox of the love of the world—“Somehow one must love
the world without being worldly.”

Again, “Courage is almost a contradiction in terms. It means a strong desire to live taking the form
of a readiness to die.” The martyr differs from the suicide in that he cherishes a disdain of death,
while the motive of the suicide is a disdain of life. Charity, too, is a paradox, for it means “one of
two things—pardoning unpardonable acts, or loving unlovable people.” Similarly Christian
humility has a background of unheard-of arrogance, and Christian liberty is possible only to the
most abject bondsmen in the world.

This long consideration of Mr. Chesterton’s use of paradox is more relevant to our present subject than it may seem. For, curiously enough, the habit of paradox has been his way of entrance into faith. At the age of sixteen he was a complete agnostic, and it was the reading of Huxley and Herbert Spencer and Bradlaugh which brought him back to orthodox theology. For, as he read, he found that Christianity was attacked on all sides, and for all manner of contradictory reasons; and this discovery led him to the conviction that Christianity must be a very extraordinary thing, abounding in paradox. But he had already discovered the abundant element of paradox in life; and when he analysed the two sets of paradoxes he found them to be precisely the same. So he became a Christian.

It may seem a curious way to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Those who are accustomed to regard the strait gate as of Gothic architecture may be shocked to find a man professing to have entered through this Alhambra-like portal. But it is a lesson we all have to learn sooner or later, that there are at least eleven gates besides our own, and that every man has to enter by that which he finds available. Paradox is the only gate by which Mr. Chesterton could get into any place, and the Kingdom of Heaven is no exception to the rule.

His account of this entrance is characteristic. It is given in the first chapter of his Orthodoxy. There was an English yachtsman who set out upon a voyage, miscalculated his course, and discovered what he thought to be a new island in the South Seas. It transpired afterwards that he had run up his flag on the pavilion of Brighton, and that he had discovered England. That yachtsman is Mr. Chesterton himself. Sailing the great sea of moral and spiritual speculation, he discovered a land of facts and convictions to which his own experience had guided him. On that strange land he ran up his flag, only to make the further and more astonishing discovery that it was the Christian faith at which he had arrived. Nietzsche had preached to him, as to Mr. Bernard Shaw, his great precept, “Follow your own will.” But when Mr. Chesterton obeyed he arrived, not at Superman, but at the ordinary old-fashioned morality. That, he found, is what we like best in our deepest hearts, and desire most. So he too “discovered England.”

He begins, like Margaret Fuller, with the fundamental principle of accepting the universe. The thing we know best and most directly is human nature in all its breadth. It is indeed the one thing immediately known and knowable. Like R.L. Stevenson, he perceives how tragically and comically astonishing a phenomenon is man. “What a monstrous spectre is this man,” says Stevenson, “the disease of the agglutinated dust, lifting alternate feet or lying drugged with slumber; killing, feeding, growing, bringing forth small copies of himself; grown upon with hair like grass, fitted with eyes that move and glitter in his face; a thing to set children screaming;—and yet looked at nearer, known as his fellows know him, how surprising are his attributes!” In like manner Mr. Chesterton discovers man—that appalling mass of paradox and contradiction—and it is the supreme discovery in any spiritual search.

Having discovered the fundamental fact of human nature, he at once gives in his allegiance to it. “Our attitude towards life can be better expressed in terms of a kind of military loyalty than in terms of criticism and approval. My acceptance of the universe is not optimism, it is more like patriotism. It is a matter of primary loyalty. The world is not a lodging-house at Brighton, which we are to leave because it is miserable. It is the fortress of our family, with the flag flying on the turret, and the more miserable it is, the less we should leave it.”

There is a splendid courage and heartiness in his complete acceptance of life and the universe. In a time when clever people are so busy criticising life that they are in danger of forgetting that they have to live it, so busy selecting such parts of it as suit their taste that they ignore the fact that the other parts are there, he ignores nothing and wisely accepts instead of criticising. Mr. Bernard Shaw, as we have seen, will consent to tolerate the universe minus the three loyalties to the family, the nation, and God. Mr. Chesterton has no respect whatever for any such mutilated scheme of human life. His view of the institution of the family is full of wholesome common sense. He
perceives the immense difficulties that beset all family life, and he accepts them with immediate and unflinching loyalty, as essential parts of our human task. His views on patriotism belong to the region of politics and do not concern us here. In regard to religion, he finds the modern school amalgamating everything in characterless masses of generalities. They deny the reality of sin, and in matters of faith generally they have put every question out of focus until the whole picture is blurred and vague. He attacks this way of dealing with religion in one of his most amusing essays, “The Orthodox Barber.” The barber has been sarcastic about the new shaving—presumably in reference to M. Gillett’s excellent invention. “It seems you can shave yourself with anything— with a stick or a stone or a pole or a poker” (here I began for the first time to detect a sarcastic intonation) ‘or a shovel or a — — ‘ Here he hesitated for a word, and I, although I knew nothing about the matter, helped him out with suggestions in the same rhetorical vein. ‘Or a button-hook,’ I said, ‘or a blunderbuss or a battering-ram or a piston-rod — — ‘ He resumed, refreshed with this assistance, ‘Or a curtain-rod or a candlestick or a — — ’ ‘Cow-catcher,’ I suggested eagerly, and we continued in this ecstatic duet for some time. Then I asked him what it was all about, and he told me. He explained the thing eloquently and at length. ‘The funny part of it is,’ he said, ‘that the thing isn’t new at all. It’s been talked about ever since I was a boy, and long before.’” Mr. Chesterton rejoins in a long and eloquent and most amusing sermon, the following extracts from which are not without far-reaching significance.

“‘What you say reminds me in some dark and dreamy fashion of something else. I recall it especially when you tell me, with such evident experience and sincerity, that the new shaving is not really new. My friend, the human race is always trying this dodge of making everything entirely easy; but the difficulty which it shifts off one thing it shifts on to another.... It would be nice if we could be shaved without troubling anybody. It would be nicer still if we could go unshaved without annoying anybody—

“‘But, O wise friend, chief Barber of the Strand, Brother, nor you nor I have made the world. Whoever made it, who is wiser, and we hope better than we, made it under strange limitations, and with painful conditions of pleasure.... But every now and then men jump up with the new something or other and say that everything can be had without sacrifice, that bad is good if you are only enlightened, and that there is no real difference between being shaved and not being shaved. The difference, they say, is only a difference of degree; everything is evolutionary and relative. Shavedness is immanent in man.... I have been profoundly interested in what you have told me about the New Shaving. Have you ever heard of a thing called the New Theology?’ He smiled and said that he had not.”

In contrast with all this, it is Mr. Chesterton’s conviction that the facts must be unflinchingly and in their entirety accepted. With characteristic courage he goes straight to the root of the matter and begins with the fact of sin. “If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do. The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution to deny the cat.” It is as if he said, Here you have direct and unmistakable experience. A man knows his sin as he knows himself. He may explain it in either one way or another way. He may interpret the universe accordingly in terms either of heaven or of hell. But the one unreasonable and impossible thing to do is to deny the experience itself.

It is thus that he treats the question of faith all along the line. If you are going to be a Christian, or even fairly to judge Christianity, you must accept the whole of Christ’s teaching, with all its contradictions, paradoxes, and the rest. Some men select his charity, others his social teaching, others his moral relentlessness, and so on, and reject all else. Each one of these aspects of the Christian faith is doubtless very interesting, but none of them by itself is an adequate representation of Christ. “They have torn the soul of Christ into silly strips, labelled egoism and altruism, and they are equally puzzled by His insane magnificence and His insane meekness. They have parted His garments among them, and for His vesture they have cast lots; though the coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout.”
The characteristic word for Mr. Chesterton and his attitude to life is vitality. He has been seeking for human nature, and he has found it at last in Christian idealism. But having found it, he will allow no compromise in its acceptance. It is life he wants, in such wholeness as to embrace every element of human nature. And he finds that Christianity has quickened and intensified life all along the line. It is the great source of vitality, come that men might have life and that they might have it more abundantly. He finds an essential joy and riot in creation, a “tense and secret festivity.” And Christianity corresponds to that riot. “The more I considered Christianity, the more I found that while it had established a rule and order, the chief aim of that order was to give room for good things to run wild.” It has let loose the wandering, masterless, dangerous virtues, and has insisted that not one or another of them shall run wild, but all of them together. The ideal of wholeness which Matthew Arnold so eloquently advocated, is not a dead mass of theories, but a world of living things. Christ will put a check on none of the really genuine elements in human nature. In Him there is no compromise. His love and His wrath are both burning. All the separate elements of human nature are in full flame, and it is the only ultimate way of peace and safety. The various colours of life must not be mixed but kept distinct. The red and white of passion and purity must not be blended into the insipid pink of a compromising and consistent respectability. They must be kept strong and separate, as in the blazing Cross of St. George on its shield of white. Chaucer’s “Daisy” is one of the greatest conceptions in all poetry. It has stood for centuries as the emblem of pure and priceless womanhood, with its petals of snowy white and its heart of gold. Mr. Chesterton once made a discovery that sent him wild with joy—“Then waxed I like the wind because of this, And ran like gospel and apocalypse.

From door to door, with wild, anarchic lips, Crying the very blasphemy of bliss.

“The discovery was that “the Daisy has a ring of red.” Purity is not the enemy of passion; nor must passion and purity be so toned down and blent with one another, as to give a neutral result. Both must remain, and both in full brilliance, the virgin white and the passionate blood-red ring.

In the present age of reason, the cry is all for tolerance, and for redefinition which will remove sharp contrasts and prove that everything means the same as everything else. In such an age a doctrine like this seems to have a certain barbaric splendour about it, as of a crusader risen from the dead. But Mr. Chesterton is not afraid of the consequences of his opinions. If rationalism opposes his presentation of Christianity, he will ride full tilt against reason. In recent years, from the time of Newman until now, there has been a recurring habit of discounting reason in favour of some other way of approach to truth and life. Certainly Mr. Chesterton’s attack on reason is as interesting as any that have gone before it, and it is even more direct. Even on such a question as the problem of poverty he frankly prefers imagination to study. In art he demands instinctiveness, and has a profound suspicion of anybody who is conscious of possessing the artistic temperament. As a guide to truth he always would follow poetry in preference to logic. He is never tired of attacking rationality, and for him anything which is rationalised is destroyed in the process. In one of his most provokingly unanswerable sallies, he insists that the true home of reason is the madhouse. “The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.” When we say that a man is mad, we do not mean that he is unable to conduct a logical argument. On the contrary, any one who knows madmen knows that they are usually most acute and ingeniously consistent in argument. They isolate some one fixed idea, and round that they build up a world that is fiercely and tremendously complete. Every detail fits in, and the world in which they live is not, as is commonly supposed, a world of disconnected and fantastic imaginations, but one of iron-bound and remorseless logic. No task is more humiliating, nor more likely to shake one’s sense of security in fundamental convictions, than that of arguing out a thesis with a lunatic.

Further, beneath this rationality there is in the madman a profound belief in himself. Most of us regard with respect those who trust their own judgment more than we find ourselves able to trust.
ours. But not the most confident of them all can equal the unswerving confidence of a madman. Sane people never wholly believe in themselves. They are liable to be influenced by the opinion of others, and are willing to yield to the consensus of opinion of past or present thinkers. The lunatic cares nothing for the views of others. He believes in himself against the world, with a terrific grip of conviction and a faith that nothing can shake.

Mr. Chesterton applies his attack upon rationality to many subjects, with singular ingenuity. In the question of marriage and divorce, for instance, the modern school which would break loose from the ancient bonds can present their case with an apparently unassailable show of rationality. But his reply to them and to all other rationalists is that life is not rational and consistent but paradoxical and contradictory. To make life rational you have to leave out so many elements as to make it shrink from a big world to a little one, which may be complete, but can never be much of a world. Its conception of God may be a complete conception, but its God is not much of a God. But the world of human nature is a vast world, and the God of Christianity is an Infinite God. The huge mysteries of life and death, of love and sacrifice, of the wine of Cana and the Cross of Calvary—theese outwit all logic and pass all understanding. So for sane men there comes in a higher authority. You may call it common sense, or mysticism, or faith, as you please. It is the extra element by virtue of which all sane thinking and all religious life are rendered possible. It is the secret spring of vitality alike in human nature and in Christian faith.

At this point it may be permissible to question Mr. Chesterton’s use of words in one important point. He appears to fall into the old error of confounding reason with reasoning. Reason is one thing and argument another. It may be impossible to express either human nature or religious faith in a series of syllogistic arguments, and yet both may be reasonable in a higher sense. Reason includes those extra elements to which Mr. Chesterton trusts. It is the synthesis of our whole powers of finding truth. Many things which cannot be proved by reasoning may yet be given in reason—involvolved in any reasonable view of things as a whole. Thus faith includes reason—it is reason on a larger scale—and it is the only reasonable course for a man to take in a world of mysterious experience. If the matter were stated in that way, Mr. Chesterton would probably assent to it. Put crudely, the fashion of pitting faith against reason and discarding reason in favour of faith, is simply sawing off the branch on which you are sitting. The result is that you must fall to the ground at the feet of the sceptic, who asks, “How can you believe that which you have confessed there is no reason to believe?” We have abundant reason for our belief, and that reason includes those higher intuitions, that practical common sense, and that view of things as a whole, which the argument of the mere logician necessarily ignores.

With this reservation, Mr. Chesterton’s position in regard to faith is absolutely unassailable. He is the most vital of our modern idealists, and his peculiar way of thinking himself into his idealism has given to the term a richer and more spacious meaning, which combines excellently the Greek and the Hebrew elements. His great ideal is that of manhood. Be a man, he cries aloud, not an artist, not a reasoner, not any other kind or detail of humanity, but be a man. But then that means, Be a creature whose life swings far out beyond this world and its affairs—swings dangerously between heaven and hell. Eternity is in the heart of every man. The fashionable modern gospel of Pragmatism is telling us to-day that we should not vex ourselves about the ultimate truth of theories, but inquire only as to their value for life here and now, and the practical needs which they serve. But the most practical of all man’s needs is his need of some contact with a higher world than that of sense. “To say that a man is an idealist is merely to say that he is a man.” In the scale of differences between important and unimportant earthly things, it is the spiritual and not the material that counts. “An ignorance of the other world is boasted by many men of science; but in this matter their defect arises, not from ignorance of the other world, but from ignorance of this world.” “The moment any matter has passed through the human mind it is finally and for ever spoilt for all purposes of science. It has become a thing incurably mysterious and infinite; this
Here we begin to see the immense value of paradox in the matter of faith. Mr. Chesterton is an optimist, not because he fits into this world, but because he does not fit into it. Pagan optimism is content with the world, and subsists entirely in virtue of its power to fit into it and find it sufficient. This is that optimism of which Browning speaks with scorn—"Tame in earth's paddock as her prize," and which he repudiates in the famous lines, "Then, welcome each rebuff That turns earth's smoothness rough, Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go! Be our joys three parts pain! Strive, and hold cheap the strain; Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe!"

Mr. Chesterton insists that beyond the things which surround us here on the earth there are other things which claim us from beyond. The higher instincts which discover these are not tools to be used for making the most of earthly treasures, but sacred relics to be guarded. He is an idealist who has been out beyond the world. There he has found a whole universe of mysterious but commanding facts, and has discovered that these and these alone can satisfy human nature.

The question must, however, arise, as to the validity of those spiritual claims. How can we be sure that the ideals which claim us from beyond are realities, and not mere dream shapes? There is no answer but this, that if we question the validity of our own convictions and the reality of our most pressing needs, we have simply committed spiritual suicide, and arrived prematurely at the end of all things. With the habit of questioning ultimate convictions Mr. Chesterton has little patience. Modesty, he tells us, has settled in the wrong place. We believe in ourselves and we doubt the truth that is in us. But we ourselves, the crude reality which we actually are, are altogether unreliable; while the vision is always trustworthy. We are for ever changing the vision to suit the world as we find it, whereas we ought to be changing the world to bring it into conformity with the unchanging vision. The very essence of orthodoxy is a profound and reverent conviction of ideals that cannot be changed—ideals which were the first, and shall be the last.

If Mr. Chesterton often strains his readers' powers of attention by rapid and surprising movements among very difficult themes, he certainly has charming ways of relieving the strain. The favourite among all such methods is his reversion to the subject of fairy tales. In "The Dragon's Grandmother" he introduces us to the arch-sceptic who did not believe in them—that fresh-coloured and shortsighted young man who had a curious green tie and a very long neck. It happened that this young man had called on him just when he had flung aside in disgust a heap of the usual modern problem-novels, and fallen back with vehement contentment on Grimm's Fairy Tales. "When he incidentally mentioned that he did not believe in fairy tales, I broke out beyond control. 'Man,' I said, 'who are you that you should not believe in fairy tales? It is much easier to believe in Blue Beard than to believe in you. A blue beard is a misfortune; but there are green ties which are sins. It is far easier to believe in a million fairy tales than to believe in one man who does not like fairy tales. I would rather kiss Grimm instead of a Bible and swear to all his stories as if they were thirty-nine articles than say seriously and out of my heart that there can be such a man as you; that you are not some temptation of the devil or some delusion from the void.'" The reason for this unexpected outbreak is a very deep one. "Folk-lore means that the soul is sane, but that the universe is wild and full of marvels. Realism means that the world is dull and full of routine, but that the soul is sick and screaming. The problem of the fairy tale is—what will a healthy man do with a fantastic world? The problem of the modern novel is—what will a madman do with a dull world? In the fairy tale the cosmos goes mad; but the hero does not go mad. In the modern novels the hero is mad before the book begins, and suffers from the harsh steadiness and cruel sanity of the cosmos." In other words, the ideals, the ultimate convictions, are the trustworthy things; the actual experience of life is often matter not for distrust only but for scorn and contempt. And this philosophy Mr. Chesterton learned in the nursery, from that "solemn and star-appointed priestess," his nurse. The fairy tale, and not the problem-novel, is the true presentment of human nature and of life. For, in the first place it preserves in man the faculty most essential to human nature—the
faculty of wonder, without which no man can live. To regain that faculty is to be born again, out of a false world into a true. The constant repetition of the laws of Nature blunts our spirits to the amazing character of every detail which she reproduces. To catch again the wonder of common things “the hour Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower” is to pass from darkness into light, from falsehood to truth. “All the towering materialism which dominates the modern mind rests ultimately upon one assumption: a false assumption. It is supposed that if a thing goes on repeating itself it is probably dead: a piece of clockwork.” But that is mere blindness to the mystery and surprise of everything that goes to make up actual human experience. “The repetition in Nature seemed sometimes to be an excited repetition, like that of an angry schoolmaster saying the same thing over and over again. The grass seemed signalling to me with all its fingers at once; the crowded stars seemed bent on being understood. The sun would make me see him if he rose a thousand times.”

That is one fact, which fairy tales emphasise—the constant demand for wonder in the world, and the appropriateness and rightness of the wondering attitude of mind, as man passes through his lifelong gallery of celestial visions. The second fact is that all such vision is conditional, and “hangs upon a veto. All the dizzy and colossal things conceded depend upon one small thing withheld. All the wild and whirling things that are let loose depend upon one thing which is forbidden.” This is the very note of fairyland. “You may live in a palace of gold and sapphire, if you do not say the word ‘cow’; or you may live happily with the King’s daughter, if you do not show her an onion.” The conditions may seem arbitrary, but that is not the point. The point is that there always are conditions. The parallel with human life is obvious. Many people in the modern world are eagerly bent on having the reward without fulfilling the condition, but life is not made that way. The whole problem of marriage is a case in point. Its conditions are rigorous, and people on all sides are trying to relax them or to do away with them. Similarly, all along the line, modern society is seeking to live in a freedom which is in the nature of things incompatible with the enjoyment or the prosperity of the human spirit. There is an if in everything. Life is like that, and we cannot alter it. Quarrel with the seemingly arbitrary or unreasonable condition, and the whole fairy palace vanishes. “Life itself is as bright as the diamond, but as brittle as the window-pane.”

From all this it is but a step to the consideration of dogma and the orthodox Christian creed. Mr. Chesterton is at war to the knife with vague modernism in all its forms. The eternal verities which produce great convictions are incomparably the most important things for human nature. No “inner light” will serve man’s turn, but some outer light, and that only and always. “Christianity came into the world, firstly in order to assert with violence that a man had not only to look inwards, but to look outwards, to behold with astonishment and enthusiasm a divine company and a divine captain.” This again is human nature. No man can live his life out fully without being mastered by convictions that he cannot challenge, and for whose origin he is not responsible. The most essentially human thing is the sense that these, the supreme conditions of life, are not of man’s own arranging, but have been and are imposed upon him.

At almost every point this system may be disputed. Mr. Chesterton, who never shrinks from pressing his theories to their utmost length, scoffs at the modern habit of “saying that such-and-such a creed can be held in one age, but cannot be held in another. Some dogma, we are told, was credible in the twelfth century, but is not credible in the twentieth. You might as well say that a certain philosophy can be believed on Mondays, but cannot be believed on Tuesdays. You might as well say of a view of the cosmos that it was suitable to half-past three, but not suitable to half-past four.” That is precisely what many of us do say. Our powers of dogmatising vary to some extent with our moods, and to a still greater extent with the reception of new light. There are many days on which the dogmas of early morning are impossible and even absurd when considered in the light of evening.

But it is not our task to criticise Mr. Chesterton’s faith nor his way of dealing with it. Were we to
do so, most of us would probably strike a balance. We would find many of his views and statements unconvincing; and yet we would acknowledge that they had the power of forcing the mind to see fresh truth upon which the will must act decisively. The main point in his orthodoxy is unquestionably a most valuable contribution to the general faith of his time and country. That point is the adventure which he narrates under the similitude of the voyage that ended in the discovery of England. He set out to find the empirical truth of human nature and the meaning of human life, as these are to be explored in experience. When he found them, it was infinitely surprising to him to become aware that the system in which his faith had come at last to rest was just Christianity — the only system which could offer any adequate and indeed exact account of human nature. The articles of its creed he recognised as the points of conviction which are absolutely necessary to the understanding of human nature and to the living of human life.

Thus it comes to pass that in the midst of a time resounding with pagan voices old and new, he stands for an unflinching idealism. It is the mark of pagans that they are children of Nature, boasting that Nature is their mother: they are solemnised by that still and unresponsive maternity, or driven into rebellion by discovering that the so-called mother is but a harsh stepmother after all. Mr. Chesterton loves Nature, because Christianity has revealed to him that she is but his sister, child of the same Father. “We can be proud of her beauty, since we have the same father; but she has no authority over us; we have to admire, but not to imitate.”

It follows that two worlds are his, as is the case with all true idealists. The modern reversion to paganism is founded on the fundamental error that Christianity is alien to Nature, setting up against her freedom the repellent ideal of asceticism, and frowning upon her beauty with the scowl of the harsh moralist. For Mr. Chesterton the bleakness is all on the side of the pagans, and the beauty with the idealists. They do not look askance at the green earth at all. They gaze upon it with steady eyes, until they are actually looking through it, and discovering the radiance of heaven there, and the sublime brightness of the Eternal Life. The pagan virtues, such as justice and temperance, are painfully reasonable and often sad. The Christian virtues are faith, hope, and charity — each more unreasonable than the last, from the point of view of mere mundane common sense; but they are gay as childhood, and hold the secret of perennial youth and unfading beauty, in a world which upon any other terms than these is hastening to decay.

Self Assessment

1. Choose the correct options:

   (i) Between 1900 and 1936 Chesterton published

      (a) 200 books  (b) 50 books  (c) 10 books  (d) 100 books

   (ii) G.K. Chesterton was born in London on

         (a) May 29 1874  (b) May 28 1874
         (c) June 29 1874  (d) None of these

   (iii) Chesterton was converted from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism in

         (a) 1921  (b) 1922  (c) 1931  (d) 1911

   (iv) Daily is written by

         (a) Chesterton  (b) Dryden
         (c) Chaucer  (d) Bacon

32.3 Summary

• G.K. Chesterton begins his essay in an engaging way — a personal anecdote of his coming to the revelation that the white ceiling above his bed is a perfect, but unattainable canvas for him to paint. Chesterton makes it clear through his musing on the uninspired artwork
surrounding him in his home in comparison to the beautiful possibilities he sees in his white ceiling that his story of lying in bed is a metaphor for his feelings about society as a whole. He makes the claim that the morals of proper behavior and hygiene adopted by society inhibit creativity. By disregarding those arbitrary values, says Chesterton, people will lead more fulfilling lives.

* Chesterton calls upon the credibility of famous artists such as Michael Angelo when he suggests that great works of genius such as Michael Angelo’s painting of the Sistine Chapel were only created because people disregarded expectations, and spent more time metaphorically “lying in bed”. Chesterton also employs Logos to make his case when he says that less respectable people such as burglars and misers comply with societal norms and get up early. To make his argument stronger, Chesterton brings up a converse argument; too much time spent in bed could make a person lazy. He ends his essay by refuting this detractor of his claim and saying that one should only occasionally lay in bed, and when one is doing so, they must make no excuse for being there. If this is done, a person will go to bed and wake up “a healthy man”.

### 32.4 Key-Words

1. Exhilaration : The feeling of lively and cheerful joy.
2. Contradictions : Discrepancy inconsistency.

### 32.5 Review Questions

2. What did Chesterton try to provide the readers from on Lying in Bed.

**Answers: Self-Assessment**

1. (i) (d) (ii) (a) (iii) (i) (iv) (c)

### 32.6 Further Readings

1. Banshi Dhar, G.K. Chesterton and the twentieth century english essays, S. Chand and Company Ltd.